Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

George Peterson was investigated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) for illegal firearm transactions at his business, PDW Solutions, LLC, which he operated from his home. The ATF conducted undercover operations where Peterson sold firearms without reporting the transactions as required. Based on this, a magistrate judge issued a warrant to search Peterson's home and business. During the search, agents found an unregistered firearm suppressor in Peterson's bedroom-closet safe. Peterson was indicted for possession of an unregistered suppressor.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana denied Peterson's pretrial motions to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds and to suppress the evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. Peterson argued that the National Firearms Act's (NFA) registration requirement for suppressors violated his Second Amendment rights and that the search warrant lacked probable cause. The district court rejected these arguments, and Peterson entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that suppressors are not "Arms" protected by the Second Amendment, as they are accessories and not weapons themselves. Therefore, the NFA's registration requirement does not violate the Second Amendment. Additionally, the court found that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied, as the officers reasonably relied on the warrant issued by the magistrate judge. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Peterson's motions to dismiss and suppress. View "USA v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Nia Lucas, an African American woman with military service-related disabilities, including PTSD, depression, anxiety, panic attacks, and a traumatic brain injury, sought care at VHC for her pregnancy. Despite her complaints of pre-term contractions and pain, the Labor and Delivery Unit staff did not treat her as prescribed by her doctor. Lucas alleged that she was told her pain was not real and was only in her head. After complaining to VHC staff about racial and disability discrimination, she received a letter terminating her care, and she was subsequently dismissed from a scheduled appointment. Lucas gave birth prematurely and experienced ongoing physical and mental suffering.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Lucas' claims of racial discrimination, disability discrimination, and retaliation under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The court found that Lucas did not plausibly plead that she was denied treatment because of her disabilities and that her racial discrimination claim was based on a single, isolated statement. The court also concluded that the ACA did not support an independent cause of action for retaliation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of Lucas' disability discrimination claim, finding that she did not allege facts connecting her disabilities to the denial of treatment or her termination. However, the court reversed the dismissal of her racial discrimination claim, holding that Lucas plausibly alleged that VHC acted with deliberate indifference to her complaints of racial discrimination. The court also held that the ACA permits retaliation claims, and Lucas plausibly pled a retaliation claim based on the temporal proximity between her complaints and her termination. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Lucas v. VHC Health" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of charter-boat operators and trade associations in Maryland, sued the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission to enjoin the Commission’s striped-bass plan. The Commission, formed in 1942, recommends fishery management plans to its member states. Plaintiffs argued that the plan, which included a one-fish limit for charter boats, would significantly harm their businesses. They sought an injunction to prevent the implementation of the plan.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that Plaintiffs likely lacked standing because they were regulated by Maryland, not the Commission. The court noted that even if the Commission’s plan were enjoined, it was unlikely that Maryland would rescind its own regulations, which were stricter than the Commission’s recommendations. The court also found that Plaintiffs did not plausibly state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as the Commission is not a “person” under the statute and does not act under “color of state law.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. The court held that Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that Maryland would likely rescind its regulations if the Commission’s plan were enjoined. The court emphasized that Maryland voluntarily adopted the regulations and had the authority to impose stricter measures than those recommended by the Commission. As a result, the court vacated the district court’s order denying the preliminary injunction and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Delmarva Fisheries Association, Inc. v. Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission" on Justia Law

In June 2015, Dylann Roof shot and killed nine people at Mother Emanuel AME Church in Charleston, South Carolina, including M.P.'s father, Reverend Clementa Pinckney. M.P., a minor, filed a lawsuit against Meta Platforms, Inc. (formerly Facebook, Inc.) and its subsidiaries, alleging that Facebook's algorithm recommended harmful content that radicalized Roof, leading to the murders. M.P. asserted claims of strict products liability, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress under South Carolina law, as well as a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) for conspiracy to deprive her of her civil rights.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina dismissed M.P.'s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act barred her state law tort claims. The court also found that M.P. failed to plausibly allege a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that M.P.'s state law tort claims were barred by Section 230 because they sought to hold Facebook liable as a publisher of third-party content. The court also determined that M.P. failed to plausibly allege proximate causation under South Carolina law, as her complaint did not provide sufficient factual foundation linking Roof's Facebook use to his crimes. Additionally, the court found that M.P. forfeited her challenge to the dismissal of her Section 1985 claim by not adequately addressing it in her appellate brief. The court also concluded that any potential claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment granting Facebook's motion to dismiss. View "M.P. v. Meta Platforms Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Jose Rosado, a Hispanic male of Colombian origin, who worked as an Information Technology (IT) Specialist for the United States Navy. Rosado alleged that he was denied promotions on five occasions between 2014 and 2018 due to race, national origin, and age discrimination, as well as retaliation for his prior Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) activity. The promotions in question were for various IT Specialist positions within the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southeast (NAVFAC SE).In the lower court, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the Navy. The court concluded that Rosado failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation for any of the promotion decisions. Specifically, the court found that Rosado did not provide sufficient evidence to show that he was equally or more qualified than the individuals who were selected for the positions or that the Navy's decisions were influenced by discriminatory or retaliatory motives.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Rosado did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he failed to show that the selected candidates were similarly situated in all material respects or that unlawful discrimination played any part in the Navy's decision-making process. Additionally, the court found that Rosado did not present sufficient evidence to support his retaliation claims, as there was no indication that retaliatory animus influenced the Navy's actions.In summary, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Navy, concluding that Rosado did not provide enough evidence to support his claims of discrimination and retaliation. View "Rosado v. Secretary, U.S. Department of the Navy" on Justia Law

Betty Grooms, a Missouri clerk of court, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Alice Bell and Judge Steven Privette, alleging violations of her First Amendment rights through discrimination and retaliation, and violations of her substantive due process rights. Grooms, a Republican, had defeated Bell, a Democrat, in an election for Circuit Clerk. Bell, who retained her job under Grooms, later married Privette, a Republican judge. Tensions arose when Bell and Privette were uncooperative with Grooms, leading to Bell's resignation and announcement to run for Circuit Clerk. Privette ordered Grooms to prepare detailed spreadsheets, which he repeatedly rejected, and initiated a contempt prosecution against her, which was eventually dismissed by the Missouri Supreme Court.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri dismissed Grooms's claims, ruling that the defendants did not violate her clearly established First Amendment rights and did not violate her substantive due process rights. The court found that the defendants' actions did not constitute adverse employment actions under clearly established law and that Grooms did not suffer a serious deprivation of a protected interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Bell and Privette were entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim, as Grooms failed to show that their actions constituted adverse employment actions under clearly established law. Additionally, the court found that Grooms's substantive due process claim was inadequate, as she did not demonstrate a serious deprivation of a protected interest. The court concluded that the defendants' conduct did not shock the conscience and did not violate Grooms's substantive due process rights. View "Grooms v. Privette" on Justia Law

Julio Cesar Hernandez-Rodriguez was convicted of two drug offenses after a trial court denied his motion to suppress statements made to Maine Drug Enforcement Agency (MDEA) agents. Hernandez-Rodriguez argued that his statements to one agent should be suppressed because he was subject to unwarned custodial interrogation and that his statements to another agent should be suppressed due to his limited English proficiency, which he claimed prevented him from making a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights.The trial court found that Hernandez-Rodriguez was in custody during his interactions with the agents and that he had not waived his Miranda rights while speaking with the first agent. However, the court concluded that his statements to the first agent were admissible because they were not the product of interrogation. The court also found that Hernandez-Rodriguez had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights when speaking with the second agent, despite his limited English proficiency. Hernandez-Rodriguez entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the suppression rulings.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and determined that the trial court erred in not suppressing Hernandez-Rodriguez’s statement identifying a substance as cocaine in response to the first agent’s question, as it was the product of custodial interrogation. However, the court upheld the trial court’s finding that Hernandez-Rodriguez had validly waived his Miranda rights when speaking with the second agent. Given the error in admitting the statement about the cocaine, the court vacated the judgment and remanded the case, allowing Hernandez-Rodriguez the opportunity to withdraw his plea. View "State of Maine v. Hernandez-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Lakewood police agents followed Tien Dinh Pham after observing his vehicle leave a house in a high-crime area. They initiated a traffic stop for a lane change violation. Pham pulled into a parking lot, and the agents ordered him out of the vehicle. After a brief pat down, Pham was directed away from the car, leaving the door open. Agent Kyle Winters then deployed a drug-detection dog, which entered the vehicle and alerted to the presence of drugs. The agents searched the vehicle and found drugs, paraphernalia, and weapons. Pham was charged with multiple offenses, including possession with intent to distribute controlled substances and possession of a weapon by a previous offender.The Jefferson County District Court held a suppression hearing and ruled that the search was unconstitutional. The court found that the officers had no reason to remove Pham from his vehicle and acted improperly by leaving the door open, facilitating the dog's entry into the car. The court suppressed the evidence obtained from the search.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case. It concluded that the trial court erred in finding that removing Pham from his vehicle was improper, as officers may order a driver out of a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop for safety reasons. However, the court agreed that the dog's entry into the vehicle constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. Since the search was conducted without probable cause, it was deemed unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the trial court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "People v. Pham" on Justia Law

Rhonda Fleming, an inmate at Federal Correctional Institution Tallahassee (FCIT), filed a pro se lawsuit against Warden Erica Strong and the United States, alleging Eighth Amendment violations due to her exposure to mold, asbestos, and COVID-19, which she claimed caused severe health issues. Fleming sought injunctive relief and damages under Bivens and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). She alleged that despite her complaints, the prison officials, including Warden Strong, failed to address the hazardous conditions, leading to her contracting COVID-19 twice and requiring hospitalization.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida partially granted and partially denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The magistrate judge recommended dismissing most of Fleming's claims, including all claims against Strong, citing that Bivens did not provide a remedy for her Eighth Amendment claim. However, the district court disagreed, finding that Fleming's Eighth Amendment claim was similar to a previously recognized Bivens claim and allowed it to proceed. The district court did not address the issue of qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court had to determine whether it had jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal from the district court's order recognizing a Bivens cause of action. The Eleventh Circuit joined four other circuits in holding that the collateral-order doctrine does not extend to Bivens-extension orders that do not address qualified immunity. The court emphasized that qualified immunity adequately protects government officials from the burdens of litigation and that separation-of-powers concerns with Bivens extensions do not justify immediate appeal. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Fleming v. FCI Tallahassee Warden" on Justia Law

Three former students of East Gaston High School, who were members of the wrestling team, filed a lawsuit against their coach, Gary Scott Goins, and the Gaston County Board of Education. They alleged that Goins subjected them to sexual abuse, physical violence, and psychological harm during the mid-1990s and early 2000s. Goins was criminally convicted in 2014 and sentenced to over thirty-four years in prison. The plaintiffs sought civil damages from the Board of Education, claiming it knew or should have known about the abuse. The claims were initially time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations, which began running on the victims' eighteenth birthdays.The Superior Court of Wake County, in a divided decision, declared the revival provision of the SAFE Child Act, which allowed previously time-barred claims to be filed during a two-year window, unconstitutional. The court held that the expiration of the statute of limitations created a vested right for the defendants, which the legislature could not retroactively alter.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision, holding that the revival of the statute of limitations did not interfere with vested rights. The court reasoned that statutes of limitations are procedural and do not create property rights. Therefore, the legislature could retroactively alter them without violating the constitution.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the running of a statute of limitations in a tort claim does not create a constitutionally protected vested right. The court emphasized that statutes of limitations are procedural and affect only the remedy, not the underlying right. The court concluded that the General Assembly has the authority to retroactively alter statutes of limitations for tort claims. View "McKinney v. Goins" on Justia Law