Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

R.M.A., a transgender student who transitioned from female to male, attended public school in the Blue Springs R-IV School District. R.M.A. requested to use male-designated restrooms and locker rooms during the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years, but the School District denied the request. R.M.A. filed a charge of discrimination with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights, alleging public accommodation discrimination based on sex. After receiving a notice of right to sue, R.M.A. filed a petition against the School District, claiming sex discrimination under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA).The Circuit Court of Jackson County dismissed R.M.A.'s petition, stating that the public accommodation protection in section 213.065 does not cover claims based on gender identity. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed this decision in R.M.A. I, finding that R.M.A. had pleaded sufficient facts to establish a claim of sex discrimination and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, R.M.A. proceeded to trial, and the jury found the School District liable for sex discrimination, awarding R.M.A. compensatory and punitive damages.The School District filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, alternatively, a motion for a new trial, arguing that R.M.A. failed to make a submissible case for sex discrimination. The circuit court sustained the JNOV motion, finding that the evidence showed R.M.A. was excluded from male facilities due to female genitalia, not male sex. R.M.A. appealed.The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court's judgment, holding that R.M.A. did not present sufficient evidence that the School District's denial was based on R.M.A.'s male sex. The court concluded that the term "sex" in section 213.065 refers to biological sex, and the evidence indicated the School District's decision was based on R.M.A.'s female genitalia. Consequently, the court upheld the JNOV and denied R.M.A.'s motion for attorney fees. View "R.M.A. vs. Blue Springs R-IV School District" on Justia Law

In 2008, a class action was filed against officials from the City of Tenaha and Shelby County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs claimed that the officials had an illegal practice of targeting and seizing property from racial or ethnic minorities. A settlement agreement, including a consent decree, was reached, requiring the defendants to follow specific procedures to prevent future illegal stops. The decree also included a court-appointed monitor to ensure compliance. The consent decree was initially entered in 2013, amended in 2019, and expired in July 2020. Plaintiffs' motion to extend the decree was denied, and the County Defendants settled, leaving only the City Defendants in the case.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas handled the case, where class counsel filed four motions for attorney fees. The first three motions were granted, totaling $324,773.90. The fourth motion requested $88,553.33 for fees from April to December 2020. Initially denied as untimely, the decision was vacated and remanded by the appellate court. On reconsideration, the district court awarded $16,020, reducing the hourly rates and the hours deemed reasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court failed to provide class-wide notice of the attorney-fee motion as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h). This failure deprived class members of the opportunity to object to the fee motion. The appellate court held that the district court abused its discretion by not enforcing the notice requirement and vacated the fee award, remanding the case for further proceedings to ensure compliance with Rule 23(h). View "Morrow v. Jones" on Justia Law

Mark Petersen sued Deputy Stefanie Pedersen under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging false arrest for drunk driving and an unlawful blood draw. On December 27, 2018, Deputy Pedersen responded to a car crash in rural Wisconsin. She found Petersen, who was intoxicated, attempting to change a tire on a car registered to him. Witnesses confirmed he was the only person near the car. Petersen had a history of uncooperative behavior with law enforcement and prior OWI charges. Based on the scene, his behavior, and his intoxication, Pedersen arrested him for OWI and obtained a search warrant for a blood draw, which confirmed his high BAC.In the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, Petersen was charged with OWI – 4th Offense. He moved to suppress the BAC evidence, arguing lack of probable cause for his arrest. The state court granted his motion, leading to the dismissal of the charges. Petersen then filed a § 1983 lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which was reduced to claims against Deputy Pedersen for false arrest and unreasonable search. The district court granted summary judgment for Pedersen, finding probable cause for the arrest and a valid search warrant for the blood draw, and also granted her qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that probable cause supported Petersen’s arrest based on the totality of the circumstances, including his intoxication, the scene of the crash, and witness statements. The court also found the blood draw was lawful as it was conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant. Additionally, the court held that Deputy Pedersen was entitled to qualified immunity for both the arrest and the blood draw. View "Petersen v Pedersen" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of felony murder, armed robbery, and other crimes related to the shooting death of Sean Turner and the robbery of Turner and Stephen Thomas. The crimes occurred on December 4, 2015, and the appellant was indicted on multiple counts, including malice murder, felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, hijacking a motor vehicle, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The jury found the appellant guilty on all counts except malice murder and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the appellant to life in prison for felony murder, along with additional concurrent and consecutive sentences for other charges.The appellant filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred in several respects, and that his trial counsel was ineffective.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the evidence was sufficient to support the appellant's convictions for felony murder and armed robbery. The court also found that the trial court did not commit plain error by failing to charge the jury on accomplice corroboration, as the accomplice's testimony was corroborated by other evidence. Additionally, the court held that the appellant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was not violated, as the co-indictee who refused to testify was never brought before the jury. The court also found that any error in admitting testimony about the appellant's alleged gang involvement was harmless.Regarding the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court found that the appellant's counsel was not deficient in failing to file a general demurrer, request an accomplice corroboration charge, renew an objection to the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, or move to exclude evidence of a handgun. The court concluded that the appellant did not suffer cumulative prejudice from the alleged errors and affirmed the convictions. View "FLOYD v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Gregory Wilson was convicted by a jury of multiple charges, including human trafficking of a minor by force or fear, human trafficking to commit another crime, kidnapping, and criminal threats. He was sentenced to an aggregate determinate term of 31 years and eight months, followed by an indeterminate term of 30 years to life. Wilson appealed, arguing that his defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the prosecutor's use of the term "gorilla pimp" during closing arguments, which he claimed violated the Racial Justice Act (RJA).The trial court had found Wilson guilty based on substantial evidence, including testimonies from victims B.W., K.W., and B.C., who described being forced into prostitution through violence and threats. The jury found Wilson not guilty of rape and forcible oral copulation but convicted him on other charges. The trial court sentenced him accordingly.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that defense counsel was not ineffective as a matter of law for failing to object to the prosecutor's use of the term "gorilla pimp." The court reasoned that the term is a recognized term of art in the sex trafficking subculture, describing a pimp who uses force and violence. The court also noted that the issue of ineffective counsel should be resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding, where defense counsel can explain their conduct.The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding substantial evidence supporting Wilson's convictions for human trafficking and kidnapping. The court also rejected Wilson's claims regarding sentencing, including the argument that the trial court abused its discretion and violated section 654's prohibition against multiple punishments. View "People v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit filed by Albert Pickett, Jr., Keyonna Johnson, Jarome Montgomery, Odessa Parks, and Tiniya Shepherd against the City of Cleveland. The plaintiffs, all African American residents of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, allege that Cleveland Water's policy of placing water liens on properties for unpaid water bills disproportionately affects Black homeowners. The water liens, which accumulate penalties and interest, can lead to foreclosure and eviction. The plaintiffs claim that this policy violates the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Ohio Civil Rights Act (OCRA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, creating the "Water Lien Class" under Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class includes all Black homeowners or residents in Cuyahoga County who have had a water lien placed on their property by Cleveland Water within the last two years. The district court found that the plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a) and that common questions of law and fact predominated over individual issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's certification order. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue their FHA claim on a disparate-impact theory. The court found that the common question of whether Cleveland's water lien policy disproportionately affects Black homeowners predominated over individual issues, satisfying Rule 23(b)(3). The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class under Rule 23(b)(2) for injunctive and declaratory relief. The appellate court declined to address the merits of the plaintiffs' FHA claim, focusing solely on the class certification issues. View "Pickett v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Carvin Thomas and Terrell Lawrence, filed a class-action lawsuit against members of the Tennessee Board of Parole, alleging that the use of a computer test, STRONG-R, to determine parole eligibility violated their constitutional right to due process. They claimed that the test produced inaccurate results due to inadequate training of correctional employees and that the results were kept secret, preventing inmates from challenging them effectively. Both plaintiffs experienced changes in their STRONG-R scores without any new negative behavior, leading to parole denials based on these scores.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed the complaint, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim for relief. The court found that Tennessee’s parole statutes do not confer a protected liberty interest in parole, as they do not create a legitimate expectation of parole.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Tennessee’s parole statutes do not sufficiently constrain the Board’s discretion to deny parole, thus not creating a constitutionally recognized entitlement to parole. The court noted that while the plaintiffs identified serious issues with the STRONG-R test, the lack of a protected liberty interest in parole precluded their due process claims. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint. View "Thomas v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

Planned Parenthood of Montana and Dr. Samuel Dickman challenged three laws passed by the 2021 Montana Legislature regulating abortion care. The laws included a 20-week ban on abortions (HB 136), restrictions on medication abortions and requirements for informed consent (HB 171), and a mandate for providers to offer patients the opportunity to view an ultrasound and listen to a fetal heart tone before an abortion (HB 140).The Thirteenth Judicial District Court granted a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of these laws, which was affirmed by the Montana Supreme Court. Following discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, concluding that the laws violated the Montana Constitution's guarantees of individual privacy, equal protection, and free speech. The court permanently enjoined the enforcement of all three laws.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court held that the 20-week ban on abortions (HB 136) violated the right to privacy because it prohibited pre-viability abortions and was not justified by a compelling state interest. The Court also found that the restrictions on medication abortions and the informed consent requirements (HB 171) infringed on the right to privacy and free speech, as they imposed unnecessary burdens on patients and providers without addressing a bona fide health risk. Lastly, the Court held that the mandate to offer patients the opportunity to view an ultrasound and listen to a fetal heart tone (HB 140) violated the right to privacy by interfering with the patient-provider relationship without a compelling state interest.The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's judgment, permanently enjoining the enforcement of the challenged laws. View "Planned Parenthood v. State" on Justia Law

Nathan Rinne sued Camden County and two of its commissioners, Greg Hasty and Donald Williams, Jr., alleging violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights after Hasty and Williams voted to ban him from all County property for one year. The defendants sought summary judgment on the defenses of qualified and legislative immunity and on the merits of the issue of punitive damages. The district court denied these motions in full.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The defendants then appealed the denial of legislative immunity, qualified immunity, and the issue of punitive damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the denial of legislative immunity, holding that the commissioners' decision to ban Rinne from county property was administrative, not legislative, in nature. The court found that the act of banning Rinne did not concern the enactment or promulgation of public policy but was an effort to monitor and discipline his presence and conduct at future commission meetings. Consequently, the commissioners were not entitled to legislative immunity. The court dismissed the remainder of the appeal, including the issues of qualified immunity and punitive damages, for lack of jurisdiction, as these involved genuine disputes of fact that could not be resolved at the appellate level. View "Rinne v. Hasty" on Justia Law

DeShawn Gervin was on probation in Georgia with the sole condition that he not return to the South Georgia Judicial Circuit. He moved to North Carolina but was later imprisoned there for various crimes. A Georgia probation officer, Pamela Florence, learned of his North Carolina offenses and sought a warrant for his arrest in Georgia, falsely claiming he had violated probation by failing to report. Gervin was arrested in North Carolina and extradited to Georgia, where he spent 104 days in jail before a court found he had not violated his probation and ordered his release.Gervin sued Florence and another probation officer, Tandria Milton, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia granted summary judgment for the defendants on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims but denied it on the Fourth Amendment claim, characterizing it as a malicious-prosecution claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. The court held that Gervin presented enough evidence to support his Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim. The court found that Florence and Milton recklessly made false statements and omissions that led to Gervin's arrest and prolonged detention, violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court also concluded that the probation officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because the constitutional violations were clearly established at the time of their actions. View "Gervin v. Florence" on Justia Law