Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Jessica Bates, a devout Christian and widowed mother of five, applied to adopt children through the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS). Her application was denied because she could not comply with Oregon Administrative Rule § 413-200-0308(2)(k), which requires prospective adoptive parents to "respect, accept, and support" the sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression of children. Bates objected to using preferred pronouns and taking children to medical appointments for gender transitions, citing her religious beliefs. She sued, claiming the policy violated her First Amendment rights to free speech and free exercise of religion.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon denied Bates's motion for preliminary injunctive relief. The court found that the policy was neutral and generally applicable, thus subject to rational basis review, which it survived. The court also concluded that the policy, as applied to Bates, compelled and restricted speech based on content and viewpoint, triggering strict scrutiny. However, it held that the policy was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in protecting LGBTQ children.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Oregon's application of § 413-200-0308(2)(k) to Bates triggered strict scrutiny for both her free speech and free exercise claims. The court found that the policy restricted and compelled speech based on content and viewpoint and was not neutral or generally applicable. The court concluded that Oregon's policy was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, as less restrictive means were available to protect LGBTQ children. The court remanded the case with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction enjoining ODHS from applying the rule to Bates in deeming her ineligible for certification as an adoptive parent. View "Bates v. Pakseresht" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, thirty survivors of childhood sexual abuse, sought damages for negligence from the Holy See under a vicarious liability theory. They alleged that the Holy See promulgated a mandatory policy of secrecy that governed how its dioceses and bishops handled reports of sexual abuse by clerics. Plaintiffs claimed that bishops in New York failed to warn children and parents of the dangers posed by the accused clerics and failed to report suspected abuse to law enforcement, thus emboldening abusers and exposing children to harm.The District Court granted the Holy See’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The court concluded that the discretionary function exclusion from the FSIA’s tortious activity exception barred Plaintiffs’ claims. The court found that the bishops’ conduct was discretionary and susceptible to policy analysis, thus falling within the discretionary function exclusion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The appellate court agreed that the discretionary function exclusion applied, precluding federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over the claims against the Holy See. The court held that the bishops’ challenged conduct involved discretionary acts and that Plaintiffs failed to allege that the bishops’ conduct violated a mandatory policy. Additionally, the court found that the bishops’ conduct was susceptible to policy analysis, satisfying the second prong of the Berkovitz/Gaubert test. Therefore, the discretionary function exclusion barred the exercise of jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims against the Holy See. View "Blecher v. Holy See" on Justia Law

The Northwestern Illinois Area Agency on Aging (NIAAA) filed lawsuits against Paula Basta, the former Director of the Illinois Department on Aging (IDA), alleging that Basta unlawfully refused to hold hearings on three administrative petitions filed by NIAAA. These petitions concerned grievances about withheld funding and rejected service provider designations. NIAAA claimed that these actions violated their rights under the Older Americans Act (OAA) and Illinois state law.The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of Basta, determining that NIAAA did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in the funding or service provider designations. Subsequently, the federal district court dismissed NIAAA’s suit, finding it time-barred and failing to state a claim. NIAAA then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that NIAAA’s claims related to the denials of the Initial Petition and APS Petition were barred by the statute of limitations, as they accrued by September 2019 and were not tolled by NIAAA’s state court litigation. The court also agreed with the district court that NIAAA failed to plausibly allege a due process violation, as the Illinois Supreme Court had determined that NIAAA did not have a property interest in the funding or service provider designations.Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit found that the OAA provisions at issue did not create individual rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court concluded that the OAA’s language and context did not unambiguously confer individual rights upon NIAAA, and thus, NIAAA could not enforce these provisions through § 1983. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Basta. View "Northwestern Illinois Area Agency on Aging v. Basta" on Justia Law

Terrence Hammock, a detainee at the Baltimore County Detention Center (BCDC), filed a lawsuit alleging severe violations of his constitutional rights. He claimed that BCDC served him rotten and unsafe food, causing him to get sick multiple times and lose weight. Additionally, Hammock, a practicing Muslim, alleged that he was denied the ability to attend Jum’ah services, a central practice of Islam, throughout his detention from September 2019 to at least March 2022.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed Hammock’s claims. The court found that his allegations regarding the food did not meet the standard of a “serious deprivation of a basic human need” under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. It also held that the denial of Jum’ah services was justified by legitimate penological interests, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. The court denied Hammock’s motion for appointed counsel, stating that the case had not yet proceeded to discovery or trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in dismissing Hammock’s claims. The appellate court held that Hammock sufficiently pleaded a claim of deliberate indifference based on the conditions of confinement, specifically the provision of rotten and mice-bitten food. The court also found that Hammock adequately pleaded a First Amendment claim, as the defendants did not present a penological interest to justify the denial of Jum’ah services for the entire period in question. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Hammock’s claims and remanded the case for further proceedings, including the appointment of counsel for Hammock. View "Hammock v. Watts" on Justia Law

Zachary Hebb challenged a municipal ordinance in Asheville, North Carolina, that prohibited the use of amplified sound within 150 feet of a medical clinic during its operating hours. Hebb, who regularly protested outside a Planned Parenthood clinic, argued that the ordinance infringed on his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He preferred using a sound amplifier to communicate his message without yelling. After being cited for violating the ordinance, Hebb filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory relief, a permanent injunction, nominal damages, and attorneys' fees.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina initially granted Hebb a preliminary injunction, finding that the ordinance likely violated his First Amendment rights and was unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court denied Asheville's motions to dismiss and later granted Hebb's motion for summary judgment, permanently enjoining the ordinance and awarding nominal damages for the due process claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Asheville's motions to dismiss Hebb's First Amendment claim but reversed the summary judgment in Hebb's favor, finding that there were disputed factual and legal questions that warranted further consideration. The court held that the ordinance was content-neutral and served a significant government interest in protecting patients from harmful noise. However, it concluded that the entry of summary judgment was premature.Regarding Hebb's due process claim, the Fourth Circuit held that the 2021 version of the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to prevent Hebb from using a plastic cone. The court found that the ordinance provided adequate notice of what conduct was prohibited and included sufficient standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's decision on the due process claim and remanded with instructions to dismiss it. View "Hebb v. City of Asheville" on Justia Law

Eugene Hollow Horn Bear was convicted by a jury of two counts of abusive sexual contact and pled guilty to one count of failure to register as a sex offender. He was sentenced to 108 months’ imprisonment followed by a 5-year term of supervised release. Hollow Horn Bear appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for his convictions, a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota initially handled the case. Hollow Horn Bear was indicted on multiple counts, including sexual abuse and failure to register as a sex offender. The district court severed the SORNA counts, and Hollow Horn Bear was tried on the sexual abuse counts. He was acquitted of sexual abuse of a person incapable of consent but convicted of two counts of abusive sexual contact. He later pled guilty to failure to register as a sex offender, and the court dismissed the remaining count. At sentencing, the court considered his criminal history and mitigating factors but imposed a total term of 108 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, as the jury was entitled to believe the testimony of the witnesses despite their intoxication. The court also found no Double Jeopardy violation, as each act of sexual contact constituted a separate offense under the relevant statutes. Finally, the court determined that the sentence was substantively reasonable, given the serious nature of the offense and the district court’s consideration of the mitigating factors. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment and sentence of the district court. View "United States v. Hollow Horn Bear" on Justia Law

Hamdi A. Mohamud, a plaintiff, sued Heather Weyker, a St. Paul police officer, for wrongful arrest. Weyker, while working as a cross-deputized federal agent on a federal task force, allegedly lied to protect a federal witness, Muna Abdulkadir, leading to Mohamud's arrest. Weyker falsely claimed that Mohamud and others were trying to intimidate Abdulkadir, resulting in their arrest for witness tampering. Mohamud spent about 25 months in custody before the charges were dismissed.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota previously reviewed the case. Mohamud's claims were based on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court denied Mohamud's requests for limited discovery and to amend her complaint, concluding that further discovery would be futile and that the proposed amendment would not change the outcome. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Weyker, following the reasoning from a similar case, Yassin v. Weyker, which held that Weyker did not act under color of state law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that Weyker acted under federal authority, not state law, when she protected a federal witness in a federal investigation. The court found that the new facts alleged by Mohamud did not change the analysis from the Yassin case. The court also concluded that further discovery would not have made a difference and upheld the district court's denial of Mohamud's discovery request. View "Mohamud v. Weyker" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Joseph, an inmate working in a metal plant at a Missouri prison, injured his thumb while operating a "press-brake" machine. Joseph sued his supervisor, Kurt Schmiedeskamp, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Schmiedeskamp subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by instructing him not to use the machine's hand restraints, which were designed to prevent such injuries. Joseph claimed that Schmiedeskamp told him not to use the restraints because they slowed production.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied Schmiedeskamp's motion for summary judgment, which argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity. Schmiedeskamp then filed an interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo. The appellate court reversed and remanded the case, holding that Schmiedeskamp was entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that Joseph failed to show that Schmiedeskamp's actions violated clearly established constitutional rights. The court distinguished this case from Ambrose v. Young, noting that Schmiedeskamp's response to Joseph's question about the hand restraints did not demonstrate that he knew the machine presented a substantial risk of harm. The court also cited other cases involving inmate injuries in industrial settings, which indicated that the law was not clearly established in this area. Consequently, the court concluded that Schmiedeskamp's conduct did not meet the standard of deliberate indifference required to overcome qualified immunity. View "Joseph v. Schmiedeskamp" on Justia Law

In this case, the Attorney General of New Jersey decided to supersede control of the Paterson Police Department following a fatal police shooting. The Attorney General appointed Isa M. Abbassi, a veteran NYPD officer, as the Officer in Charge (OIC) and reassigned the Paterson Police Chief, Engelbert Ribeiro, to the Police Training Commission in Trenton. Plaintiffs, including Paterson officials, challenged the Attorney General's authority to supersede the police department without local consent.The case was first brought to the Law Division, which transferred it to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division consolidated the actions and ultimately reversed the Attorney General's decision, ruling that the Attorney General exceeded his statutory powers. The appellate court directed the defendants to reassign Ribeiro to Paterson, relinquish control of the department to city officials, and provide a report summarizing their actions and expenditures during the supersession.The New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed the case and found evidence that the Legislature intended to authorize the supersession in two statutes: Chapter 94, which facilitated the OIC's leadership, and the appropriations bill for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2024, which funded the Attorney General's operation of the department. The Court did not base its holding on other statutes or authorities cited by the defendants. The Court reversed the Appellate Division's judgment, finding that the Attorney General's supersession of the Paterson Police Department was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and had fair support in the record. The Court did not address whether the Attorney General has general authority to supersede municipal police departments in other circumstances. View "Bulur v. The New Jersey Office of the Attorney General" on Justia Law

Ayla Royan, a student in Chicago State University's (CSU) Doctor of Pharmacy program, was dismissed after failing two clinical rotations. Royan, who has clinical depression and an eating disorder, claimed her dismissal was due to her disabilities. CSU had accommodated her conditions by granting exam and assignment extensions and a yearlong medical leave. Despite these accommodations, Royan failed her first clinical rotation under Dr. Patel and her second under Dr. Kerner, leading to her dismissal.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of CSU, finding that Royan failed to present sufficient evidence that her dismissal was solely based on her disability. The court held that CSU had accommodated her disabilities and applied its academic standards without discrimination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Royan was not "otherwise qualified" for the program as she failed to meet the academic requirements, specifically passing the clinical rotations. The court also found no evidence of pretext in CSU's stated reasons for her dismissal. Additionally, the court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that CSU dismissed Royan solely because of her disabilities, as required under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The court emphasized that academic institutions have broad discretion in setting and enforcing academic standards, and CSU's actions were consistent with its policies and procedures. View "Royan v. Chicago State University" on Justia Law