Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of aggravated arson, holding that the court of appeals did not err in concluding that Defendant's counsel did not render ineffective assistance.On appeal, Defendant argued that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move for a directed verdict and by failing to object to the testimony of an expert who opined that the structure Defendant had set fire to was habitable. A divided court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) reasonable counsel could have decided to forgot a motion for directed verdict; and (2) the court of appeals correctly concluded that Defendant was not deprived of the Sixth Amendment guarantees. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is the former Chief Financial Officer of the Cypress Bayou Casino. The Casino is owned by the Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana. The Chitimacha Tribe is one of four federally recognized Indian tribes in Louisiana. According to the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, the Chitimacha tribal council authorized Spivey (as CFO of the Casino) to make a $3,900 bonus payment to the then-newly elected chairman of the tribal council. Plaintiff claimed that several members of the tribal council turned around and reported the bonus payment to federal and state law enforcement. Plaintiff initially sued the Tribe, the Casino, and four tribal council members in federal court under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1985 and Louisiana tort law. The district court, over Plaintiff’s objections, again adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations, denied Plaintiff’s remand motion, and dismissed all Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded to state court. The court first wrote that when a district court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case, it must remand. The court held, in accordance with the statute’s plain text and the great weight of authority from across the country, that Section 1447(c) means what it says, admits of no exceptions, and requires remand even when the district court thinks it futile. Moreover, the court held that such a dismissal should be made without prejudice. View "Spivey v. Chitimacha Tribe" on Justia Law

The district court dismissed with prejudice a suit brought by Plaintiff against the Louisiana Twenty-First Judicial District and its former Chief Judge Robert Morrison, concluding that: (1) the Twenty-First Judicial District lacked the capacity to be sued; (2) McLin failed to plausibly allege that she was treated differently from anyone else; and, (3) Chief Judge Morrison was entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in dismissing her Section 1981 and Title VII claims.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff sought to meet the racial causation element with the comments made by Brumfield that her “hands are tied” as well as the Chief Judge’s tone and comment stating, “in today’s world that we live in, I have no other choice but to terminate you. You need to watch what you say and do.” The court wrote that these speculative allegations do not carry the day. Plaintiff issued the public statement “#IWillrunYouOver” in reference to driving her truck over peaceful protestors. Taking all the factual allegations as true, a more reasonable and obvious interpretation than the one put forth by Plaintiff is that her termination had to do with her public threat to run over people. While the district court erred in requiring Plaintiff to make allegations that satisfy the McDonnell Douglas standard, Plaintiff still failed to plead one ultimate element a plaintiff is required to plead: that the termination was taken against her because of her protected status. The court concluded that Plaintiff has not asserted plausible facts meeting the elements of this claim. View "McLin v. Twenty-First Judicial Dist" on Justia Law

On a  Mesa Airlines flight from Birmingham to Dallas Fort Worth International Airport, a flight attendant grew concerned about two passengers, Plaintiffs.  She alerted the pilot, who, despite the reassurance of security officers, delayed takeoff until the flight was canceled. The passengers were told the delay was for maintenance issues, and all passengers, including the two in question (Plaintiffs), were rebooked onto a new flight that reached DFW. After learning the real reason behind the cancellation, Plaintiffs sued Mesa under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The airline countered that it had immunity under 49 U.S.C. Section 44902(b) and 49 U.S.C. Section 44941(a).     Given the unusual facts that all passengers had their flight canceled, the primary issue on appeal whether such conduct constitutes disparate treatment under Section 1981, whether a Section 1981 claim can exist without a “breach” of contract, and whether Section 44902(b) grants immunity to airlines for allegedly discriminatory decisions, thereby negating Section 1981’s application against airlines in this context.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Section 1981 prohibits discrimination in contracting. Section 44902(b) provides immunity to airlines in their decision to remove passengers they feel are “inimical to safety.” There is a straightforward way to reconcile these two statutes: If a passenger’s protected status is the but-for cause of the airline’s decision to remove them (such that the passenger has made out a Section 1981 claim), then Section 44902(b) does not grant immunity to the airline because the decision is not based on a fear that the passenger was inimical to safety. View "Abdallah v. Mesa Air Group" on Justia Law

The United States Food and Drug Administration approved mifepristone for use in 2000 under the brand name Mifeprex. FDA approved a generic version in 2019, and in 2021, FDA announced that it would not enforce an agency regulation requiring mifepristone to be prescribed and dispensed in person. The agency moved that requirement from mifepristone’s conditions for use. The subject of this appeal is those four actions: the 2000 Approval, the 2016 Amendments, the 2019 Generic Approval, and the 2021 Non-Enforcement Decision. Plaintiffs, Medical Organizations and Doctors contend that FDA overlooked important safety risks in approving mifepristone and amending its restrictions. The Medical Organizations and Doctors moved for preliminary injunctive relief. The district court granted the motion but stayed the effective date of each of the challenged actions under 5 U.S.C. Section 705. FDA appealed, as did Intervenor Danco Laboratories, LLC.     The Fifth Circuit vacated in part and affirmed in part. The court vacated in part and concluded that the Medical Organizations and Doctors’ claim as to the 2000 Approval is likely barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, until final judgment, Mifeprex will remain available to the public under the conditions for use that existed in 2016. The court also vacated the portion of the order relating to the 2019 Generic Approval because Plaintiffs have not shown that they are injured by that particular action. The generic version of mifepristone will also be available under the same conditions as Mifeprex. The court affirmed the components of the stay order that concern the 2016 Amendments and the 2021 Non-Enforcement Decision. View "Alliance Hippocratic Medicine v. FDA" on Justia Law

While serving a short sentence for domestic violence, Johnson caused a disturbance in a jail’s intake area. Officers were taking Johnson to his cell when he disobeyed orders to slow down. Another officer, Deputy Sootsman, stopped him. After a brief exchange, Johnson stepped in Sootsman’s general direction. Sootsman testified that he viewed this conduct as a threat. In response, he immediately grabbed Johnson’s neck, pushed him against the wall, and took him to the ground to be handcuffed. This force lasted about seven seconds. Investigators found that Sootsman’s actions violated jail policies. Sootsman pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor battery.Johnson sued Sootsman, citing the Eighth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the claim. Johnson failed to meet the demanding standard of proving that Sootsman used force “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of” inflicting pain. Johnson’s claim fails if Sootsman used force out of a belief—even an unreasonable belief—that the force was necessary to control Johnson. The states may impose stricter limits on officers than the Constitution demands, so Johnson may try to seek relief under state tort law. View "Johnson v. Sootsman" on Justia Law

Based on a 1983 murder, a three-judge panel convicted Von Clark Davis of aggravated murder and sentenced him to death. On direct appeal, Davis’s sentence was vacated, but on remand, the same three-judge panel again sentenced him to death. The Sixth Circuit subsequently vacated Davis’s death sentence on appeal of his first federal habeas petition. A different three-judge panel again sentenced Davis to death. Davis again petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the petition.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part and granted conditional relief on claims that the state violated Davis’s constitutional rights by enforcing his 1984 jury waiver against him at his third sentencing hearing in 2009 and that Davis’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at Davis’s 2009 sentencing hearing by failing to move to recuse a judge for bias and in failing to reasonably prepare and present mitigation evidence. The court rejected claims that Davis’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing adequately to advise him of the collateral consequences of a jury waiver and that Davis’s trial attorneys were constitutionally ineffective in failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence about the circumstances of Davis’s prior conviction, which provided the aggravating circumstance that made him eligible for the death penalty View "Davis v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

While working an IT position at Enterprise Services LLC, Plaintiff said he was discriminated against because he has disability—an arthritic big toe. The company says the issues arose because Plaintiff didn’t work well with others, and actually, didn’t work much at all. Plaintiff says the issues arose because of his alleged disability. After he was fired, he brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act asserting that Enterprise Services discriminated against him because of his toe and retaliated against him for seeking toe-related accommodations. For the retaliation claim, the district court held that Enterprise Services’ only potentially retaliatory act was firing Plaintiff and allowed him to take that claim to trial. But Enterprise Services moved to strike Plaintiff’s jury-trial demand. The district court granted the motion. Following the bench trial, the district court entered judgment for Enterprise Services on the remaining claim because Plaintiff failed to prove he was fired because he asked for disability accommodations.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. First, while the district court did cite an outdated EEOC regulation when determining he is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA, he is not disabled under any reasonable reading of the ADA. So that disposes of every claim except retaliation. Second, Burlington Northern makes clear that only “significant” harm to an employee constitutes retaliatory adverse action. And only his termination met that threshold. Third, a straightforward reading of Section 1981a(a)(2) shows that an ADA-retaliation plaintiff is not entitled to legal damages and, therefore not guaranteed a jury trial by the Seventh Amendment. View "Jeffrey Israelitt v. Enterprise Services LLC" on Justia Law

This case arises from the September 2017 fatal police shooting of Ruben Galindo Chavez (who used the surname “Galindo”) during an encounter with officers of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department. The action was initiated by plaintiff Azucena Zamorano Aleman — Galindo’s girlfriend and the mother of his child — both as the administrator of Galindo’s estate and in her individual capacity. Plaintiff asserted five causes of actions, including a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court awarded summary judgment to the defendants on each of the plaintiff’s claims. The court therein determined that — because it was objectively reasonable for Officer Guerra to shoot Galindo, in that Galindo posed an immediate threat to Guerra and others — Guerra is entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim. For the same reason, the court awarded summary judgment to Guerra and the City on the assault and battery, wrongful death, and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. Citing a lack of sufficient evidence, the court also awarded summary judgment to the City on the negligent training claim.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment award to the City on the negligent training claim. The court vacated the award of qualified immunity to Officer Guerra on the Fourth Amendment claim, as well as the related summary judgment awards to Guerra and the City on the balance of the state law claims. Rather than directing the entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff on any of those claims, the court remanded for further proceedings as to all of them View "Azucena Zamorano Aleman v. City of Charlotte" on Justia Law

Petitioner applied to the trial court in March 2022 to change his name. On the ground that Petitioner has “outstanding warrant(s),” the trial court denied Harris’s petition.   The Second Appellate District affirmed because there was no abuse of discretion. The court explained that by statute, it was proper for the trial court to check law enforcement records when considering Petitioner’s petition to change his name. The California Legislature has directed courts to use the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) and Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) to determine whether a name change applicant must register as a sex offender. View "In re Harris" on Justia Law