Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 after he was pepper-sprayed and tackled by a Des Moines Police Officer while photographing a protest. Plaintiff, who was covering the protest as a journalist, claimed that the officer and other city officials violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted the city officials’ motion for summary judgment after concluding that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity.   The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting summary judgment on the unlawful seizure and excessive force claims but affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment dismissing the retaliation claim. The court explained that viewing the totality of the circumstances in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there are genuine issues of material fact on whether there was an excessive use of force. To begin, they arrested Plaintiff for failure to disperse—a misdemeanor. Second, while the officer focuses on the fact there had been “hours of criminal activity occurring” and that he was “under constant threat of harm from active rioters,” he cannot point to any facts suggesting an immediate threat to his safety or the safety of others. Further, the court wrote that numerous cases show that the identified general constitutional rule applies with obvious clarity to the conduct in question. View "Mark Nieters v. Brandon Holtan" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed a superior court order granting a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Sheriff of Tift County, Gene Scarbrough, in this action brought by Sherrie McBrayer for the wrongful death of her husband, James McBrayer (“the decedent”). The Court of Appeals held that Scarbrough was immune from suit because McBrayer’s complaint did not show that the decedent’s death, which occurred while he was restrained in the back seat of a patrol car, arose from the sheriff’s deputies’ “use” of the patrol car “as a vehicle,” which, under Court of Appeals case law construing OCGA §§ 33-24-51 (b) and 36-92-2, was a prerequisite for a waiver of sovereign immunity for injuries arising from the “negligent use of a covered motor vehicle.” In so holding, the Court of Appeals noted that McBrayer’s complaint did not allege “that the car was running; that any deputy was seated in the car; that any deputy was poised to start the car or transport the decedent to any location;” or that the deputies were otherwise “actively” using the patrol car “as a vehicle. McBrayer thereafter timely petitioned the Georgia Supreme Court for certiorari review. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in limiting the meaning of the word “use” in the phrase “use of a covered motor vehicle” by reading into OCGA §§ 33-24-51 (b) and 36-92-2 the words “actively” and “as a vehicle.” Therefore, it reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "McBrayer, et al. v. Scarbrough" on Justia Law

Whitaker, an Illinois prisoner, had $573 when he filed a notice of appeal in his Section 1983 lawsuit; he subsequently spent most of his money at the prison commissary and on postage. The district court denied his request to proceed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(1).The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court did not adequately consider the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) balance between the need to collect fees and a prisoner’s discretionary use of his funds. The PLRA mandates that a court apply a statutory formula and collect an initial partial filing fee, then collect the remainder of the fees in installments. Whitaker had enough money to pay the fees in full when they were due and when this court sent him a notice informing him as much but the statute does not mandate that prisoners prioritize their filing fees above all other expenses. Drawing the line for in forma pauperis eligibility at the mere ability to pay the full fee can lead to odd, unintended results. There is nothing suggesting that Whitaker deliberately depleted his account to avoid payment. Whitaker should be permitted to prepay the prescribed portion of the fee with the rest to be collected from his future income, as Congress envisioned. View "Whitaker v. Dempsey" on Justia Law

Alyssa was visiting her friend when Lundy, intoxicated forced his way into the house. A neighbor called 911 after hearing “a woman crying” and someone “being thrown around.” Lundy left before officers arrived. The women stated that Lundy left in a red Pontiac. Officers, looking for Lundy, received another call. Lundy had returned with a gun. Officer Martin returned to the house in about two minutes, activated his bodycam, and recorded the women saying that Lundy pointed the gun at them, loaded it, and threatened to kill them in front of Alyssa and Lundy’s young children. Officer Brown found Lundy near the house and looked through the window of the red Pontiac. A loaded pistol sat on the passenger’s seat. During booking, Lundy stated that he’d take the gun charge because “it’s mine.”Lundy was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The prosecution introduced Martin’s bodycam footage and Martin’s testimony about that conversation. Lundy argued that because Alyssa did not testify, her out-of-court statement was barred. The Sixth Circuit upheld the admission of that evidence. The excited-utterance exception applied because there was an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement, the statement was made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent, and the statement was made while Alyssa was under the stress of the excitement caused by the event. The statement was nontestimonial, and the Confrontation Clause does not apply. View "United States v. Lundy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for interference with a peace officer, holding that the district court did not violate Defendant's due process rights by conducting a hearing under Asch v. State, 62 P.3d 945 (Wyo. 2003), in Defendant's absence after he refused to attend the hearing.Defendant, who was serving three consecutive life sentences at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, was charged with interference with a peace officer. Before the scheduled trial date, the State moved to require Defendant to be restrained during trial. The district court conducted an Asch hearing without Defendant and decided to impose restraints at trial. Defendant was convicted of one count of felony interference with a peace officer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant waived any right he had to be present at the Asch hearing by knowingly and voluntarily failing to appear at the hearing due to circumstances within his control. View "Castellanos v. State" on Justia Law

In this case concerning how an Ohio prisoner is to enforce his constitutional right to a speedy trial on an untried indictment the Supreme Court held that a prisoner satisfies the "causes to be delivered" requirement of Ohio Rev. Code 2941.401 when he delivers the written notice and the request to the warden where he is imprisoned, even if the warden fails to deliver the notice and the request to the prosecuting attorney or the appropriate court.Appellant, who was indicted on counts of aggravated robbery and robbery, moved to dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Appellant had strictly complied with section 2941.401 when he provided written notice of his place of imprisonment and a request for a final disposition and that the 180-day speedy trial time was not tolled by the warden's failure to comply with his duty to send out Appellant's written notices and requests to the prosecuting attorney or the appropriate court. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Appellant had not strictly complied with the requirements of the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant caused to be delivered his written notice and request for final disposition under the statute when he provided them to the warden. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Michigan’s Uniform Unclaimed Property Act (UUPA) allows the state to take custody—not ownership—of unclaimed property “in trust for the benefit of the rightful owner” After publishing required notices, the state sells or liquidates the unclaimed property within three years of receiving it, unless the owner brings a valid claim, then deposits the proceeds into its general fund, subtracting reasonable administration costs; the owner can no longer reclaim his property, but can still recover the “net proceeds” from its sale. UUPA apermits owners to recover the interest earned on their property and post-liquidation interest if the property accrued interest before the state took custody of it.Two companies delivered O’Connor’s properties—checks collectively worth no more than $350— to the state after he failed to claim them. The state liquidated them. O’Connor filed a claim for compensation. Michigan reimbursed O’Connor for the value of his property, but not any post-liquidation interest. O’Connor alleges that neither the state nor the third-party holders provided him with the statutorily required notices. O’Connor sued Michigan under the Fifth Amendment; Michigan’s Treasurer, and the Administrative Manager of the Unclaimed Property Program, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit held that the officials are entitled to qualified immunity on O’Connor’s taking claims but not his due process claims. The district court correctly dismissed O’Connor’s claims against the state but should not have dismissed them with prejudice. View "O'Connor v. Eubanks" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant to seventy years in Montana State Prison for deliberate homicide, a felony, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant's claim that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance when he advised Defendant and the court that mitigated deliberate homicide was not a lesser-included offense of deliberate homicide was more appropriate for postconviction relief; and (2) the district court did not err when it concluded that the State's offer of proof provided sufficient evidence to accept Defendant's Alford plea. View "State v. Bristow" on Justia Law

Since 1979, Tennessee has made it a crime for anyone other than election officials to distribute the state’s official form for applying to vote absentee. During much of this time, Tennessee kept close guard of this form to deter fraud. Election officials now make the form widely available online so that eligible voters may easily apply. According to the Plaintiffs, this change has rendered the ban on distributing the application form “outdated.” They want to distribute the form while encouraging absentee voting at their get-out-the-vote drives. They allege that the First Amendment gives them the right to do so and that, because they seek to distribute the form while expressing a political message, the ban is subject to strict scrutiny.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Tennessee’s ban prohibits an act--distributing a government form--that qualifies as conduct, not speech. While the First Amendment provides some protection to “expressive conduct,” strict scrutiny does not apply to Tennessee’s ban because it neutrally applies no matter the message that a person seeks to convey and because it burdens nobody’s ability to engage in actual speech. At most, the Supreme Court’s lenient First Amendment test for neutral laws that regulate conduct applies and the ban survives that nondemanding test, View "Lichtenstein v. Hargett" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a hospital nurse for St. Vincent’s Health System. After St. Vincent’s fired her, Plaintiff sued, alleging race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted summary judgment for St. Vincent’s, and Plaintiff appealed.On appeal, Plaintiff claimed she presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment as to all her claims. She also claimed that the district court erred in applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to a “mixed-motive” retaliation claim.The Eleventh Circuit held that Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim failed because there was no evidence of severe or pervasive harassment; Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) did nothing to undermine the application of McDonnell Douglas to retaliation claims because but for causation still applies; Plainitff's retaliation claim cannot survive; and disparate-treatment claim fails because there is no evidence that race played a role in her termination. View "Cynthia Diane Yelling v. St. Vincent's Health System" on Justia Law