Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A sheriff’s deputy responded to a 911 call reporting a domestic dispute at a residence, with allegations that the homeowner had threatened a woman with a gun and grabbed her by the neck. Upon arrival, the deputy encountered three women and a small child outside or in the garage; none appeared injured or in distress. The homeowner stood in the garage doorway, raised his hands when ordered, and denied wrongdoing. When the deputy attempted to handcuff him, the homeowner retreated into his house, resisted being handcuffed, and a physical altercation ensued, during which the deputy punched the homeowner. The deputy ceased his efforts after being told that no gun threat had occurred.The homeowner filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, alleging unlawful entry and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court denied summary judgment to the deputy on the unlawful entry and excessive force claims, finding that material factual disputes existed as to whether exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry and whether the force used was reasonable. The deputy appealed, asserting entitlement to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity de novo. The court held that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that the deputy lacked an objectively reasonable basis for believing exigent circumstances existed to justify a warrantless entry. The court further held that the right to be free from such entry and from force used to effectuate it was clearly established. Because the deputy failed to argue that his use of force was reasonable even if the entry was unlawful, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on both claims. View "Hoover v. Due" on Justia Law

Raymond Thompson purchased a custom Harley Davidson motorcycle and paid off all liens, but after the sale, the seller, Nathan Rench, fraudulently obtained a duplicate title, preventing Thompson from registering the motorcycle. Later, two individuals claiming to act for Rench arrived at Thompson’s home with Manchester, Missouri police officers, seeking to recover the motorcycle. The officers, after verifying the duplicate title and registration in Rench’s name, allowed the individuals to take the motorcycle from Thompson’s fenced backyard. Thompson was not home at the time. The next day, after Thompson reported the motorcycle stolen and provided evidence of his ownership, the officers instructed Rench to return the motorcycle, but Rench refused. The motorcycle was eventually recovered after Rench’s arrest.Thompson filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, alleging that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by entering his property and allowing the removal of his motorcycle, and his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. He also sought sanctions for the police department’s failure to preserve body and dash camera footage. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers on the basis of qualified immunity, denied Thompson’s motion for sanctions, and denied his motion for partial summary judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the officers did not violate a clearly established constitutional right by entering Thompson’s backyard or by allowing the motorcycle’s removal, as their actions were consistent with existing Eighth Circuit precedent regarding limited warrantless entries and peacekeeping roles. The court also found no evidence of joint action or coercion by the officers sufficient to establish state action for a due process claim. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying sanctions, as Thompson failed to show prejudice from the loss of the recordings. View "Thompson v. Cockrell" on Justia Law

During an oil pipeline protest in Hubbard County, Minnesota, Matthew Locke and another protestor locked themselves to construction equipment using a device known as a “sleeping dragon,” which made removal difficult. Law enforcement officers, including Sheriff Cory Aukes and Chief Deputy Scott Parks, responded to the scene. In their efforts to remove Locke, the officers used several pain compliance techniques, applying pressure to various nerves on Locke’s head and neck. Locke alleges that as a result, he suffered facial paralysis, tinnitus, and emotional distress. After being removed from the device by extraction teams, Locke was evaluated by EMTs, taken to the hospital, and then jailed.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Locke’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Minnesota law. The court held that Sheriff Aukes and Deputy Parks were entitled to qualified and official immunity, and that Locke’s complaint did not state a claim for municipal liability against Hubbard County. The district court also dismissed Locke’s state law claims for assault and battery.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Eighth Circuit held that, accepting the complaint’s allegations as true, Locke plausibly alleged a violation of his clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, as the officers’ use of pain compliance techniques on a nonviolent, passively resisting misdemeanant was not objectively reasonable. The court also found that the district court erred in dismissing the official capacity claim without considering whether the sheriff was a final policymaker for the county. Additionally, the Eighth Circuit reversed the grant of official immunity on the state law claims, finding that the complaint sufficiently alleged willful violation of a known right. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Locke v. County of Hubbard" on Justia Law

A man incarcerated in Texas state prison was classified as a member of a security threat group and placed in administrative segregation, a form of solitary confinement, for sixteen years. The only way for him to return to the general prison population was to complete a gang renunciation program, which required him to renounce his gang affiliation and participate in an interview. During the interview, he was questioned by prison and law enforcement officials about criminal activities that occurred during his incarceration. He refused to answer questions that could incriminate him, after which his application to the renunciation program was terminated for failure to cooperate. He filed grievances challenging the process, but they were denied or dismissed.He then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas against several prison officials, alleging violations of his Fifth, First, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court initially dismissed his claims, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded for further proceedings. After further litigation, including the appointment of counsel and discovery, the district court again granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding no constitutional violations and holding that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination and First Amendment compelled speech claims because there was no clearly established law making their conduct unlawful in this context. Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, the court assumed a liberty interest but found that the periodic classification reviews provided by the prison satisfied due process requirements. The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Ballentine v. Broxton" on Justia Law

Brandon Velez was stopped by Manchester, New Hampshire police officers for vehicle equipment violations. After parking near his residence, Velez did not immediately comply with officers’ orders to exit his car. When he verbally refused and reached for his phone, officers attempted to physically remove him, leading to a struggle. During the altercation, one officer struck Velez multiple times and tased him twice. Velez was arrested and charged with misdemeanors and a traffic violation, ultimately pleading guilty only to the traffic violation. He later sued the officers and the City of Manchester, alleging wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, excessive force, assault and battery, and failure to train.The case was removed from state court to the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted, finding that the officers had probable cause for the arrest and that the force used was not excessive. Velez appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment order de novo. The appellate court held that the officers had probable cause to arrest Velez for resisting detention under New Hampshire law, defeating his wrongful arrest and false imprisonment claims. The court also found that, although one officer’s use of force was excessive under the Fourth Amendment, qualified immunity shielded the officer from liability because the law was not clearly established in the specific context. The court further held that Velez’s state-law assault and battery claim failed under the same immunity standard, and that his claims against the City for failure to train were unsupported by evidence of a municipal policy or deliberate indifference. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the defendants on all counts. View "Velez v. Eutzy" on Justia Law

A woman experiencing a mental health crisis called 911 and requested that police come to her home to shoot her. Three officers responded and found her holding a bat and a pickaxe. The officers maintained a distance of about fifteen feet and attempted to de-escalate the situation, with one officer assuring her that she would not be harmed. After several minutes, and following an interaction with the woman’s mother, one officer tased her, and another officer shot her multiple times as she moved in the direction of the officers. The woman survived but suffered severe injuries.The plaintiff, acting on the woman’s behalf, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the two officers and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and also brought a negligence claim against the municipality. The officers moved to dismiss the complaint on qualified immunity grounds, and the municipality sought judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the officers’ motion to dismiss the excessive force claims and the municipality’s motion on the negligence claim, but initially denied the municipality’s motion as to the § 1983 claim. Later, the district court granted the municipality’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the § 1983 claim as well.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the complaint plausibly alleged that both officers violated the woman’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by tasing and shooting her under the circumstances described. The court also held that the district court erred in dismissing the municipal liability claim. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the claims against the officers, vacated the judgment for the municipality, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Chrestman v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County" on Justia Law

A man was arrested by city police officers in Rainsville, Alabama, after exhibiting erratic behavior and resisting arrest. The Chief of Police directed Officer White to transport the arrestee to the county jail in Fort Payne, which had better medical facilities. Upon arrival at the county jail, jailers became frustrated with the arrestee during booking and began to beat him. Officer White witnessed the beating from a few feet away but did not attempt to intervene or protest. The beating continued for several minutes after White left the room, resulting in significant injuries to the arrestee. The jailers involved were later criminally prosecuted and convicted for their conduct.The arrestee filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer White and others, alleging, among other claims, that White’s failure to intervene violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama granted summary judgment to the officers on the false arrest claim but denied summary judgment to White on the failure to intervene claim, rejecting his qualified immunity defense. White appealed the denial of qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that, under clearly established law as of March 2020, an arresting officer who delivers a helpless arrestee to jailers and witnesses those jailers immediately begin to beat the arrestee in his presence violates the Fourth Amendment if he remains silent and leaves the scene while the assault is ongoing. The court further held that the duty to intervene is not discharged by a phone call to a supervisor who is not in a position to stop the assault. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment to Officer White on the failure to intervene claim. View "Nute v. White" on Justia Law

A car leasing company leased a vehicle to an individual who defaulted on payments soon after the lease began. Despite having the right to repossess the car, the company did not do so. Two years later, the lessee was stopped by police in Butler, New Jersey, for driving with a suspended license, suspended registration, and no insurance. The police seized the car and had it towed by a contractor, Malanga’s Automotive. The lessee was informed of the tow but did not retrieve the vehicle. The towing company did not notify the leasing company that it possessed the car until nearly a year later, at which point it demanded payment of towing and storage fees before releasing the vehicle.The leasing company filed suit in the Superior Court of New Jersey against the towing company, later adding the Borough of Butler as a defendant and asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Fourth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, which granted summary judgment to Butler on all claims. The District Court found that the company had a property interest in the vehicle but concluded that Butler’s policies provided sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard, and that the seizure and retention of the vehicle were reasonable and did not constitute a taking.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Butler’s policies violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because they failed to require prompt notice to all holders of property rights in seized vehicles and did not provide an opportunity for a hearing to challenge the lawfulness of the tow or the fees. The court reversed and remanded the due process claim. However, it affirmed the District Court’s judgment on the Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims, finding no unreasonable seizure or unconstitutional taking. View "Honda Lease Trust v. Malanga's Automotive" on Justia Law

A tenured English professor at a public university in Ohio, who identifies as transgender, became involved in discussions about leading the university’s Center for the Study of Gender and Sexuality during a period of departmental restructuring. Although the professor expressed interest in directing the Center and was considered a strong candidate, the position was not open as the Center had gone dormant. The professor was offered a partial teaching load reallocation to help develop a new gender-studies major, but after a series of profanity-laden and disparaging social media posts targeting colleagues and administrators, the offer was rescinded. The professor also sought a tenure transfer to the main campus, which was denied by faculty committees after considering collegiality and departmental needs, with no discussion of gender identity.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted summary judgment for the university and individual defendants on all claims. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact and concluded that the university’s actions were based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, including the professor’s unprofessional conduct and the department’s academic requirements. The professor appealed, challenging the district court’s rulings on claims of sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and perceived-disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held that there was no direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination or retaliation, that the professor’s social media posts did not constitute protected speech on matters of public concern under the First Amendment, and that there was insufficient evidence to support a perceived-disability claim. The court clarified that adverse employment actions under Title VII need only cause some harm, but found the university’s reasons for its decisions were not pretextual. View "GPat Patterson v. Kent State University" on Justia Law

Two nonprofit organizations challenged the constitutionality of a North Carolina statute that made it a felony for individuals with felony convictions to vote before their rights were restored, regardless of whether those individuals mistakenly believed they were eligible. The statute, originally enacted in the late 19th century, was shown to have been motivated by racial animus and to have a disproportionate impact on Black North Carolinians. In 2023, the North Carolina General Assembly amended the statute to add a requirement that a person must “know” their rights had not been restored to be prosecuted, effective January 1, 2024.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina considered the plaintiffs’ claims under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. After the statute was amended, a magistrate judge recommended dismissal for lack of standing, but the district court found the case was not moot because prosecutions under the old statute for pre-2024 conduct could still occur, potentially chilling voter participation and requiring the plaintiffs to divert resources. The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding the statute unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the case was not moot because prosecutions under the prior version of the statute could still proceed, and the plaintiffs retained a concrete interest in the outcome. On the merits, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the challenged statute violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court found that the statute’s original enactment and reenactment were motivated by racial discrimination, and that subsequent legislative changes did not “cleanse” the statute of its discriminatory origins, as the statute itself had not been substantively reenacted or amended in a way that would warrant a presumption of legislative good faith. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "A. Philip Randolph Institute v. North Carolina State Board of Elections" on Justia Law