Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal, challenging the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Officer David McNamee, Officer Cory Budaj, and Sergeant Patricio Serrant. Between May 28 and June 2, 2020, several large protests occurred on Denver streets in reaction to the murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis. On May 30, then-Denver Mayor Michael Hancock declared a state of emergency and imposed a curfew; he also requested assistance from mutual aid police departments, including the Aurora Police Department. At about 9 p.m. on May 31, Plaintiff Zachary Packard was protesting near downtown Denver when a police officer threw a tear gas canister near Packard. Packard kicked the cannister“away from himself and other protesters, in the direction of a line of officers.” Packard kicked the canister about five to ten feet away from himself and other protesters. Critically, this action “did not pose an immediate threat,” the district court concluded, “because officers were equipped with gas masks that protected them from any gas from that container.” Immediately after kicking the canister, Packard was hit in the head with a beanbag round fired from a shotgun; the round knocked him unconscious and caused major injuries. One of the officers on Sergeant Serrant’s line was Defendant Officer McNamee. He fired several beanbag rounds at the time Packard was shot, but the parties disputed whether Officer McNamee was the officer who shot Packard. The district court concluded Plaintiffs raised genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Sergeant Serrant and Officer McNamee were “personally involved in the alleged violation of Mr. Packard’s rights.” The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found no reversible error in the district court's judgment and affirmed. View "Duran, et al. v. Budaj, et al." on Justia Law

The Wisconsin Constitution, Article I, section 26, protects the right to hunt. Since 1990, Wisconsin has had a special statute making it a crime to harass hunters in various ways; a 2016 amendment makes it a crime to interfere intentionally with a hunter by “maintaining a visual or physical proximity” to the hunter, by “approaching or confronting” the hunter, or by photographing, videotaping, audiotaping, or otherwise recording the hunter's activity. The plaintiffs oppose hunting. They have observed hunters on public land, have sometimes approached and confronted them, have photographed and filmed hunters’ activities, and intend to continue all those activities.The plaintiffs assert that the prohibitions violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. In a pre-enforcement challenge, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring an as-applied challenge to the law and that their facial constitutional challenges failed on the merits.The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, first holding that the plaintiffs have standing to bring both their as-applied and facial challenges before formal enforcement efforts because the statute has been used to harass and intimidate them and has caused them to refrain from engaging in activity protected by the First Amendment. Certain clauses of the law are unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The statute discriminates against speech and expressive activity based on viewpoint and the defendants have not offered justifications for the provision that satisfy strict scrutiny. View "Brown v. Kemp" on Justia Law

Appellant as next of kin and on behalf of a minor, J.T.A., and all similarly situated minors (“Appellants”), filed a class action lawsuit against the School Board of Volusia County, Florida for allegedly violating the minors’ rights to free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The Appellants appealed the district court’s order dismissing their amended complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order of dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the holding in Perez. The court explained that here, Appellants seek compensatory and punitive damages. The IDEA provides neither. Thus, applying Perez to this case, Appellants can proceed without attempting to exhaust administrative remedies that do not exist under the IDEA. Appellants unambiguously sought compensatory monetary damages under the ADA and not compensatory education under the IDEA. Consequently, in light of Perez, the Appellants should have been allowed to proceed with their claims regardless of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirements. View "Kimberly Powell, et al. v. School Board of Volusia County, Florida" on Justia Law

In 2020, Bennett, a nursing student completing a clinical rotation at Hurley, requested that her service dog, Pistol, be permitted to accompany her. Pistol recognizes the symptoms Bennett exhibits just before a panic attack and alerts her so that she can take Ativan. Hurley agreed. Its Service Animal Policy largely tracks regulations implementing the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12131. When Bennett brought Pistol to the hospital, one staff member and one patient reported allergic reactions. Hurley revoked Bennett’s ability to have Pistol with her at all times, stating the hospital remained “open to continued dialogue” and would provide space for a crate for Pistol on another floor and “make every effort to accommodate” unscheduled breaks. Hurley concluded that relocating staff and patients could compromise patient care. Moving nurses would be difficult; Hurley nurses are union members and the hospital was short-staffed during the pandemic. There were concerns about having a dog on a floor with immunocompromised or unconscious patients. Bennett finished her Hurley rotation without Pistol and without experiencing a panic attack. Bennett completed rotations at other hospitals with PistolThe Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of Bennett’s claims under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, and Michigan law. Hurley’s concerns were with Pistol, not with Bennett’s medical condition. Hurley reasonably decided that Pistol posed a direct threat to the health and safety of patients and that the accommodations necessary to mitigate the risk were not reasonable. View "Bennett v. Hurley Medical Center" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review challenging the denial of her application for asylum and withholding of removal, holding that Petitioner failed to establish a connection between her past persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground.Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) Petitioner failed to raise before the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) her argument that the BIA's failure to address a procedural error in Petitioner's hearing before the IJ violated her right to due process under the Fifth Amendment, and therefore, this Court was precluded from addressing it now; and (2) the BIA erred by failing to evaluate the severity of Petitioner's mistreatment as a teenager through the eyes of a child, but the error did not warrant remand because Petitioner failed to link her mistreatment to a statutorily-protected ground. View "Varela-Chavarria v. Garland" on Justia Law

Bailey, an RN employed by MMBH, West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) psychiatric facility, alleges that he intervened when M.C., a patient with a known history of self-harm, attempted to harm himself. A struggle ensued. M.C. suffered minor injuries. Subsequently, an employee of Legal Aid of West Virginia (LAWV), observed M.C.'s bruising, read the nursing notes, and viewed a security video of the struggle, then filed a referral with Adult Protective Services. MMBH’s Director of Nursing filed a patient grievance form on behalf of M.C. Bailey was suspended. Several witnesses were never interviewed and the report failed to relate M.C.’s history of self-harm. Bailey’s employment was terminated. The Board of Nursing initiated proceedings against his nursing license.The West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board reinstated Bailey. The Board of Nursing dismissed the complaint against his license. During the investigation, MFCU allegedly made Bailey submit to a “custodial interrogation,” conducted by MFCU employees and a West Virginia Attorney General’s Office lawyer. Bailey was not advised of his Miranda rights. Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MFCU) investigator Lyle then referred the matter to the Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, which filed criminal charges. MMBH again suspended Bailey. The charges were later dismissed.Bailey sued DHHR, MMBH, MFCU, LAWV, and several individuals under 42 U.S.C. 1983 based on unreasonable and unlawful seizure of the person, malicious prosecution, and violation of the Whistle-Blower Law.The West Virginia Supreme Court issued a writ of prohibition. Bailey cannot maintain section 1983 claims against MFCU and Lyle. Bailey’s whistle-blower claim against Lyle is unsustainable because Lyle had no authority over Bailey’s employment. Bailey’s malicious prosecution claim fails to allege sufficient facts to meet the required heightened pleading standard to overcome MFCU’s and Lyle’s qualified immunity. View "State of West Virginia v. Ballard" on Justia Law

Ward, charged with felony possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, moved to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment. He alleged that Raleigh County Sheriff’s Officers arrived at his mother’s residence, questioned him regarding a dispute, and asked him for identification. Ward stated he could retrieve it from “downstairs in [his] mother’s house in the [t]-shirt shop.” Both officers and Ward walked around to the door. Ward opened the door. The officers grabbed the door and followed him in. Ward then walked through another door that led into a separate room used for his t-shirt printing shop. While Ward retrieved his identification, an officer observed a firearm. Ward testified that a person standing at the entryway to the basement door would not have been able to see the firearm because it would have been obscured by two doors and a curtain. The basement was not his residence and there was a lock on the front door. Detective Queen stated that he watched Ward retrieve his identification “[f]or officer safety” although he did not have a specific reason to fear for his safety.The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. Officers conducted the search and seized the firearm without a warrant; the plain view and officer safety exceptions do not apply. View "State of West Virginia v. Ward" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jane Doe AW, a former criminal clerk in the Burleson County Attorney’s Office, alleged that Burleson County Judge Mike Sutherland used his power and authority as a county judge to sexually assault her on several occasions. Doe claimed that Sutherland sexually assaulted her once in his restaurant, Funky Junky, LLC (“Funky Junky”), and twice in his office. According to Doe, when she complained to Sutherland about the abuse, she was terminated from her job. The district court entered final judgment, ordering that Doe take nothing against Burleson County. Doe timely appealed the judgment. Doe raised three issues on appeal: (1) whether Sutherland, as the Burleson County Judge, was a policymaker with final decision-making authority for Burleson County with respect to Doe’s claim; (2) whether the Magistrate Judge abused her discretion when she reversed and vacated a prior order on a dispositive motion; and (3) whether the Magistrate Judge erred in indicating that she would deny a party’s challenge for cause unless the parties agreed on the challenge.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that despite his position as County Judge, Sutherland lacked the requisite policymaking authority to hold Burleson County liable for his alleged sexual misconduct. Monell requires that “the municipal official . . . possess final policymaking authority for the action in question.” The court wrote that even if the Texas constitutional provision gave Sutherland, as County Judge, broad ability to oversee operations in the county, this authority is immaterial because Doe fails to establish that Sutherland possessed the requisite authority as it relates specifically to the alleged sexual abuse. View "Doe AW v. Burleson County, TX" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case, which included the estate and surviving family members of Allan Thomas George, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the City of Rifle, Colorado (the City), Tommy Klein, the chief of the Rifle Police Department (RPD), and Dewey Ryan, a corporal with RPD, alleging that the defendants violated George’s Fourth Amendment rights by employing excessive and deadly force against him in the course of attempting to arrest him on a felony warrant. Plaintiffs also raised a Colorado state law claim of battery causing wrongful death against Ryan. Defendants moved for summary judgment with respect to all of the claims asserted against them. Defendants Ryan and Klein asserted, in particular, that they were entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 excessive force claim. The district court denied defendants’ motion in its entirety. Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court’s ruling. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that where, as here, a police officer’s employment of deadly force against a fleeing felony suspect was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the officer’s use of force cannot, as a matter of law, be deemed to be in “conscious disregard of the danger.” The Court therefore concluded the district court erred in denying summary judgment to the defendant officers, and reversed with respect to all defendants. View "Estate of Allan George, et al. v. Ryan, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the Utah State Tax Commission that the Property Tax Division correctly followed the requirements of the Aircraft Valuation Law, Utah Code 59-2-201 subsection 4, in determining the 2017 value of Delta Air Lines' aircraft, holding that Salt Lake County failed to demonstrate that the Law, as applied to Delta's 2017 assessment, violated the fair market value provision of the Utah Constitution.For tax year 2017, the Division valued Delta's aircraft according to section 59-2-201's preferred methodology. The County appealed, arguing that the valuation did not reflect the fair market value of Delta's aircraft, in violation of the Utah Constitution. The Commission upheld the assessment, concluding that the County did not establish that the Legislature's preferred method of valuation did not reasonably reflect fair market value. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Aircraft Valuation Law was not unconstitutional as applied by the Commission to assess the value of Delta's aircraft for tax year 2017. View "Salt Lake County v. Utah State Tax Commission" on Justia Law