Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

George Clark and Kevin Harrington were convicted of murder based on the testimony of a single eyewitness, Bearia Stewart, who later claimed she was coerced by detectives to lie. After nearly two decades in prison, the Wayne County Prosecution Integrity Unit found that Clark and Harrington did not receive a fair trial, leading to the dismissal of charges and their release. Clark and Harrington then sued the detectives, alleging constitutional violations.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted in part and denied in part the detectives' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court denied qualified immunity on claims that the detectives fabricated the eyewitness statement, facilitated prosecution without probable cause, and violated the Brady rule by withholding evidence of coercion and benefits offered to key witnesses. The detectives appealed the denial of qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity, holding that there was sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the fabrication of evidence and the lack of probable cause. The court also held that the detectives' actions, if proven, violated clearly established constitutional rights. The case was remanded for trial on the merits. View "Clark v. Abdallah" on Justia Law

Edward Burrell, an inmate at Clarke County Jail, suffered a heart attack while serving a sentence. Chief Deputy Sheriff and Jail Administrator Tyler Norris drove Burrell to the hospital instead of calling an ambulance and released him from jail to avoid medical costs. Burrell died shortly after arriving at the hospital. Barbara Donald, administratrix of Burrell's estate, claimed that Norris's actions delayed medical care and caused Burrell's death, bringing a federal constitutional claim and an Alabama wrongful-death claim.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama denied Norris's motion for summary judgment on both claims. The court held that Norris was not entitled to qualified immunity because he acted outside his discretionary authority by releasing Burrell early. The court also found that a reasonable jury could determine Norris's actions violated Burrell's constitutional rights. The court did not address whether Norris's actions violated clearly established law. For the wrongful-death claim, the court denied summary judgment under Alabama’s jailer immunity statute, concluding Norris was not acting within the scope of his duties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Norris acted within his discretionary authority when he decided to drive Burrell to the hospital. The court emphasized that the discretionary-authority inquiry focuses on the general nature of the action, not whether the officer made the correct decision. The court found that Norris's actions did not violate any clearly established constitutional right and concluded that Norris was entitled to qualified immunity for the federal claim, reversing the district court's denial of summary judgment.Regarding the state wrongful-death claim, the court noted that the district court conflated state immunity with statutory jailer immunity. The court vacated the district court's denial of summary judgment on the state claim and remanded for the district court to determine whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and, if so, to decide the issue of state immunity. View "Donald v. Norris" on Justia Law

Keith Paul Bird, a prisoner at High Desert State Prison in Nevada, requested a cell transfer due to concerns about his cellmate, fearing a potential fight. Officer Bruce Huinker, the officer in charge, called for assistance, and Officers Paryga and Atherton responded. Bird explained his concerns, and Officer Paryga allegedly threatened him. The officers then instructed Bird to gather his belongings for a move but later changed their minds, leading to a confrontation. Bird's property was confiscated, and he claimed this was in retaliation for his request. Bird filed grievances, which were denied at all levels.Bird then filed a pro se complaint in federal court against the officers and other prison administrators, alleging retaliation and other claims. The district court found that only the retaliation claim survived screening and was properly exhausted. The district court denied the prison officials' motion for summary judgment on the retaliation claim, holding that they were not entitled to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Bird's request for a cell transfer based on concerns with his cellmate did not constitute "protected conduct" under clearly established law. The court noted that neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit had ever held that retaliation for complaints against other prisoners violated the First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances. Consequently, the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity and remanded with instructions to grant summary judgment on Bird's retaliation claim. View "BIRD V. DZURENDA" on Justia Law

Pollyann Sorcan, a member of the Rock Ridge School District board, was excluded from committee assignments and meetings by the board. The board alleged that Sorcan undermined the District’s mission and violated policies and data privacy laws. Sorcan filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the District and Bill Addy, the board chair, claiming retaliation for her protected speech under the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Sorcan’s case. The court concluded that Addy was entitled to legislative immunity and that Sorcan failed to state a claim against the District under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The court found that Sorcan did not identify a persistent pattern of unconstitutional behavior by the District.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Addy, sued in his official capacity, was not entitled to legislative immunity because such immunity does not extend to local officials in their official capacities. The court also found that the district court erred in requiring Sorcan to identify a persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct. Instead, a single decision by authorized decisionmakers can represent an official policy under Monell. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sorcan v. Rock Ridge School District" on Justia Law

In 2001, Morris Mullins, then seventeen, killed a seventy-eight-year-old widow, Amy Davis, in her home. He was charged as an adult with rape and aggravated murder. Mullins pled guilty to aggravated murder in exchange for the State dropping the rape charge and not seeking the death penalty. He was sentenced to life without parole (LWOP). At sentencing, the court considered evidence of Mullins's dysfunctional upbringing and psychological evaluations but ultimately imposed a juvenile life without parole (JLWOP) sentence.Mullins later challenged his sentence as unconstitutional, citing the Eighth Amendment and the Utah Constitution. In 2013, he filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, which held that mandatory JLWOP for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment. The district court denied his motion in 2016, and Mullins's appeal was delayed until 2020 due to ineffective assistance of counsel.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether Mullins's JLWOP sentence was constitutional. The court held that the sentencing judge's comments suggested ambiguity about Mullins's capacity for change, which undermined confidence in the appropriateness of the JLWOP sentence. The court vacated Mullins's sentence and remanded for resentencing, emphasizing the need to consider Mullins's youth and potential for rehabilitation in light of Miller and its progeny. The court did not find the sentencing statute unconstitutionally vague or the JLWOP categorically unconstitutional but required a more thorough consideration of Mullins's youth and potential for change. View "State v. Mullins" on Justia Law

A tenured professor at the University of Illinois Chicago School of Law, Jason Kilborn, included an expurgated racial slur in a law school exam question. This led to an investigation by university officials, who found that Kilborn had created a racially hostile environment and violated the university's nondiscrimination policy. Consequently, Kilborn was suspended from teaching until he completed a diversity training program and was denied a two percent raise. Kilborn sued several university officials, alleging violations of his constitutional rights to free speech and due process.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Kilborn's federal claims with prejudice, finding that his speech was not constitutionally protected. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims, dismissing them without prejudice. Kilborn appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the dismissal of Kilborn's First Amendment retaliation claim, concluding that his speech was constitutionally protected under the Supreme Court's decisions in Connick v. Myers and Pickering v. Board of Education. The court found that Kilborn's speech addressed matters of public concern and that the university's actions could be seen as pretextual. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Kilborn's remaining federal claims, including his compelled speech and procedural due process claims. The court also vacated the dismissal of Kilborn's state law claims for further consideration by the district court. View "Kilborn v. Amiridis" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, January and Jeffrey Littlejohn, allege that the Leon County School Board and its officials violated their parental due-process rights. The dispute arose when school officials met with the Littlejohns' thirteen-year-old child to discuss the child's gender identity and developed a "Student Support Plan" without involving the parents, contrary to their wishes. The school officials acted in compliance with the Board's guidelines, which did not require parental notification if the child did not request it.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida dismissed the Littlejohns' claims. The court found that the release of a new guide in 2022 mooted the claims for injunctive relief based on the superseded 2018 guide. It also determined that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the damages claims. The court concluded that the school officials' actions did not "shock the conscience" and thus did not violate the Littlejohns' substantive due-process rights. Consequently, the court dismissed the federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state constitutional claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the actions of the school officials were executive, not legislative, in nature. Therefore, the appropriate standard was whether the officials' conduct "shocked the conscience." The court concluded that the school officials' actions did not meet this standard as a matter of law. The court emphasized that the officials did not act with intent to injure and sought to help the child, even if their actions were contrary to the parents' wishes. Thus, the dismissal of the Littlejohns' claims was affirmed. View "Littlejohn v. School Board of Leon County" on Justia Law

Steven D’Braunstein was involved in a serious single-vehicle accident, resulting in his car being totaled. California Highway Patrol Officer Samantha Diaz-Durazo arrived at the scene and found D’Braunstein disoriented and in physical distress. Despite his evident symptoms, she did not call for medical assistance. Instead, she arrested him for driving under the influence of drugs and took him to jail. A nurse at the jail refused to admit D’Braunstein due to his medical condition, prompting Durazo to finally take him to the hospital, where he was diagnosed with a stroke. The delay in receiving medical treatment allegedly led to permanent injuries for D’Braunstein.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Officer Durazo, holding that although she violated D’Braunstein’s Fourth Amendment rights by failing to provide reasonable medical care, she was entitled to qualified immunity. The court reasoned that the constitutional violation was not clearly established, as D’Braunstein’s injury was sustained prior to his arrest and not during the arrest process.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find that Durazo violated D’Braunstein’s constitutional rights by failing to summon prompt medical care, given the serious nature of the collision and his symptoms. The court further held that Durazo’s failure to provide medical care was a violation of clearly established law, which requires officers to seek medical assistance for an injured detainee or arrestee facing a substantial and obvious risk of serious harm. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "D’Braunstein v. California Highway Patrol" on Justia Law

Two professors of Indian descent and adherents to the Hindu religion challenged California State University's (CSU) anti-discrimination and harassment policy, which included "caste" as a protected class. They argued that this inclusion stigmatized their religion and caused them to self-censor certain religious practices. They filed a lawsuit alleging violations of the Due Process Clause, Free Exercise Clause, and Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as well as equivalent claims under the California Constitution.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the professors' Equal Protection claim and the equivalent state law claim for lack of standing. The court also dismissed the Free Exercise claim for failing to state a claim without deciding on standing. The Due Process and Establishment Clause claims proceeded to a bench trial, where the court ultimately dismissed these claims as well, finding that the professors lacked sufficient injury for a pre-enforcement challenge and that the policy did not express government disapproval of Hinduism.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that the professors lacked Article III standing for their Due Process claim because they failed to show that they intended to engage in any religious practice that could reasonably constitute caste discrimination or harassment. The court also found that the professors lacked standing for their Free Exercise claim, as they did not demonstrate any injury to their ability to exercise their religion. Finally, the court held that the professors lacked standing for their Establishment Clause claim, as the district court's factual finding that the policy had no hostility toward religion was not clearly erroneous. The court affirmed the judgment for the defendants and remanded for entry of judgment of dismissal without prejudice. View "Kumar v. Koester" on Justia Law

Anna Gristina, the plaintiff-appellant, sought to unseal transcripts related to her 2012 New York State criminal conviction for promoting prostitution. Nearly ten years after her guilty plea, she filed motions before Justice Juan Merchan, requesting the unsealing of several transcripts. After her motion was partially denied and while the decision was under review by higher state courts, Gristina filed a federal suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Justice Merchan and New York District Attorney Alvin Bragg, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to unseal three specific transcripts.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Gristina's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing the Younger abstention doctrine. The district court concluded that it was required to abstain from exercising jurisdiction because the state court order denying the unsealing of transcripts was a pending matter in New York State court involving a judicial function. Alternatively, the district court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibited it from reviewing the state court order as it was a final state court judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court properly abstained from exercising jurisdiction under the Younger abstention doctrine. The court found that the state court's order denying the unsealing of transcripts, which was still under review by higher state courts at the time Gristina filed her federal suit, was a pending civil proceeding uniquely in furtherance of the state court's ability to perform its judicial functions. Therefore, Younger abstention was required, and the district court's dismissal of the complaint was affirmed. View "Gristina v. Merchan" on Justia Law