Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Nationwide Recovery, a towing company, held a permit with the City of Detroit to recover stolen vehicles, which provided significant economic benefits. In July 2017, the Detroit Police Department suspected that a Nationwide tow operator was colluding with car-theft gangs by bribing them for tips on stolen vehicle locations. These suspicions led to the immediate suspension of Nationwide’s towing permit without a hearing. Subsequent investigations uncovered evidence suggesting that a Nationwide driver communicated with, and likely paid, known car thieves for information, allowing for rapid recovery of stolen vehicles. Further audits revealed that Nationwide had routinely charged excessive fees beyond the amounts permitted by city rules.In response to the suspension, Nationwide and associated plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging a procedural due process violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court initially found that the towing permit constituted a property interest and that the lack of a hearing deprived Nationwide of due process. However, after extensive discovery, the district court concluded that, based on after-acquired evidence, Nationwide’s conduct—including collusion with car thieves and fee overcharging—would have justified termination even if a hearing had occurred. Therefore, the court limited Nationwide’s damages to nominal damages and entered judgment for one dollar.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions de novo and for abuse of discretion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that although the City failed to provide procedural due process, the after-acquired evidence justified permit termination, and thus Nationwide was not entitled to compensatory damages. The court clarified that in procedural due process cases, post-termination evidence may be considered, and where termination would have occurred regardless of the process, only nominal damages are available. The judgment for nominal damages was affirmed. View "Nationwide Recovery, Inc. v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

The case concerns an incident in which Yoni Perdomo, after being terminated from a residential remodeling job, returned to the worksite to retrieve his tools and seek unpaid wages. When the general contractor refused payment and asked Perdomo to leave, Perdomo called the police. Officers from the League City Police Department arrived and, after a brief interaction during which Perdomo became frustrated, Perdomo physically slammed his back into one of the officers. Officer Rector then tackled Perdomo to the ground, resulting in Perdomo suffering serious injuries when his head struck the concrete. The officers called for medical assistance within seconds.Perdomo filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas against the officers, the police department, and the city, alleging violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims, including excessive force, false arrest, and deliberate indifference to medical needs. The district court dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6), finding that body camera footage contradicted Perdomo’s account and showed that the officers acted reasonably, entitling them to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The appellate court agreed that the video evidence contradicted Perdomo’s version of events, showing him as aggressive and not compliant. The court held that the officers’ use of force was reasonable under the circumstances, that probable cause existed for Perdomo’s arrest, and that the officers were not deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The city and police department could not be liable absent an underlying constitutional violation. State law claims were also barred by immunity. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all claims. View "Perdomo v. City of League City, TX" on Justia Law

A group of patients civilly committed under Minnesota law challenged the state's sex offender treatment program, alleging inadequate treatment and unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The lawsuit was brought as a class action, initially filed pro se and later supported by counsel through the Minnesota Federal Bar Association’s Pro Se Project. During the litigation, the patients, citing indigence and the need for expert testimony, requested court-appointed experts under Federal Rule of Evidence 706. Both parties jointly nominated experts, and in 2013, they recommended a 50/50 split of expert costs. However, the court initially allocated all costs to the defendants, reserving the option to adjust later.After more than a decade of litigation, the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota ruled in favor of the state officials on all claims. The officials then sought to recover litigation costs, including expert fees, as prevailing parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1). The district court declined to award any costs to the officials, citing the plaintiffs' indigence, good faith, public importance of the issues, vigorous litigation, difficulty and closeness of the issues, and potential chilling effect on future litigants.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the district court failed to consider the plaintiffs’ 2013 recommendation to share expert costs and did not adequately weigh their acknowledged ability to pay half at that time. The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s cost judgment and remanded with instructions to award half of the expert costs to the prevailing defendants, to be assessed jointly and severally against the named plaintiffs. View "Karsjens v. Gandhi" on Justia Law

An African American police officer employed by the Baltimore Police Department attended a nightclub event in August 2018, where an altercation occurred between a member of her party and an on-duty police sergeant, resulting in the sergeant striking her friend. The officer testified against the sergeant before a grand jury and at his criminal trial, after which she was warned by colleagues that she was being targeted. Though criminal charges against her were declined, the department initiated internal disciplinary proceedings, ultimately filing charges against her in June 2020 for assault and making false statements. She was suspended with pay and later, after filing an EEOC complaint in February 2021 alleging race discrimination and retaliation, was forced to resign in lieu of termination in June 2022.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland reviewed her claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including allegations of race discrimination, retaliation, and municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York. The district court dismissed her original and amended complaints, concluding that she failed to plead plausible claims for relief, specifically finding her comparator evidence insufficient for the discrimination claim and that her retaliation and Monell claims lacked factual support.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied de novo review to the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the officer had sufficiently alleged a Title VII racial discrimination claim by identifying multiple white or non-black comparators who engaged in similar conduct but received less severe discipline. However, it affirmed the dismissal of her retaliation claim, finding she failed to plausibly allege a causal connection between her protected activity and the adverse employment action. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claim, holding the complaint did not include specific factual allegations of a widespread pattern or practice. The judgment was therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Johnson v. Baltimore City, Maryland" on Justia Law

Adrian Roberts, a military veteran suffering from severe mental health issues, was the subject of an involuntary commitment order after his wife raised concerns about his safety and possession of weapons. Law enforcement officers, including a specially trained response team, attempted to execute the order, initially trying to persuade Adrian to leave his home peacefully. When he refused, the team forcibly entered his residence. Shortly after entry, Deputy Evans shot and killed Adrian. The circumstances surrounding the shooting were disputed: Evans claimed Adrian charged at officers with a machete, while Adrian’s wife alleged he was shot in the back while facing away.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina reviewed the case after Adrian’s wife brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force and unlawful entry. The district court granted Evans qualified immunity and summary judgment on the unlawful entry claim but denied both on the excessive force claim. The court found that genuine disputes of material fact existed, particularly regarding whether Adrian posed an immediate threat or was resisting arrest, and relied on the autopsy report suggesting Adrian may have been shot from behind. Because these factual disputes remained, the court concluded that a reasonable jury could find Evans violated Adrian’s clearly established rights.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and summary judgment on the excessive force claim. The Fourth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction because the district court’s decision was based on unresolved factual disputes rather than purely legal questions. The court emphasized it could not weigh evidence or resolve factual disputes at this stage, and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Roberts v. Evans" on Justia Law

During a shopping trip at Walmart, William Montgomery was stopped by a store employee and subsequently by Officer Armando Cruz, who suspected shoplifting after Montgomery declined to show a receipt. Officer Cruz directed Montgomery to raise his hands, handcuffed him, and proceeded to search his pockets. Without conducting a pat-down, Officer Cruz reached into Montgomery’s pockets, removing a prescription bottle and a wallet, and looked for Montgomery’s driver’s license. Montgomery was detained briefly, but Walmart employees determined he had paid for the items and he was released.Montgomery filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging that Officer Cruz violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching his pockets and wallet without proper justification. Officer Cruz moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, arguing that his actions did not violate clearly established law. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment, finding that factual disputes existed regarding whether Officer Cruz had patted Montgomery down before reaching into his pockets and whether Montgomery had consented to the search of his wallet.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of summary judgment de novo. The court held that, accepting the district court’s factual conclusions, Officer Cruz’s search of Montgomery’s pockets without a pat-down or arrest constituted a clearly established violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court further concluded that the subsequent search of Montgomery’s wallet was not justified by consent, as any statement made by Montgomery after the illegal search could not retroactively legitimize the search. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Officer Cruz. View "Montgomery v. Cruz" on Justia Law

Two individuals were charged with multiple criminal offenses following an encounter with law enforcement. The initial police contact arose when an officer observed their vehicle driving at night without a functioning license plate light. After the officer followed the vehicle, one passenger exited and ran away, prompting further investigation. The officer questioned the driver, who admitted to having a suspended license and denied ownership of the car. Other officers arrived, and both individuals were eventually detained and handcuffed. A search of the vehicle revealed marijuana, methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and identification for the passenger. Subsequent criminal charges against both individuals were dismissed after a state court granted their motions to suppress the evidence.After the dismissal of the state charges, the two individuals filed a civil suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. They brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their Fourth Amendment rights, and asserted additional claims under state law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants—local officers and government entities—concluding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over some state law claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the federal claims against two officers. The Eighth Circuit held that the officers had, at minimum, arguable reasonable suspicion to justify the initial detention, that the warrantless search of the vehicle was permissible under the plain view doctrine, and that the arrests were supported by probable cause or, at least, arguable probable cause. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Valdivia v. Porsch" on Justia Law

In 2023, Wyoming enacted two laws restricting abortion: the Life is a Human Right Act, which broadly banned abortion procedures with limited exceptions, and a separate statute prohibiting the prescription or use of drugs to induce abortions, also with exceptions. These laws imposed criminal and civil penalties on violators, excluding the pregnant person. After the laws took effect, several plaintiffs—including medical professionals, non-profit organizations, and an individual woman—challenged the statutes in District Court of Teton County, arguing they violated Article 1, Section 38 of the Wyoming Constitution, which guarantees each competent adult the right to make their own health care decisions.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the challenged laws unreasonably and unnecessarily infringed on the constitutional right to make health care decisions, and issued a permanent injunction preventing enforcement of the abortion restrictions. The State of Wyoming appealed directly to the Wyoming Supreme Court.The Wyoming Supreme Court, exercising de novo review, held that the decision to terminate or continue a pregnancy is a health care decision protected by Article 1, Section 38. The Court determined that this provision confers a fundamental right, and that statutes restricting it must satisfy strict scrutiny: the State must show such laws are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest and use the least restrictive means. The majority found that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that the abortion restrictions and their exceptions were the least restrictive means of protecting prenatal life. Accordingly, the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding the 2023 abortion laws unconstitutional under the Wyoming Constitution. View "State of Wyoming v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Enrique Aguilar was involved in a shootout with San Diego Police Department officers after leading one officer on a foot chase during which he brandished a gun. Although Aguilar was wounded, none of the officers were hit, and a bullet fired from Aguilar’s direction struck a nearby store door. Aguilar was charged with multiple offenses, including attempted voluntary manslaughter, assaulting peace officers with a semiautomatic firearm, shooting at an occupied building, possessing methamphetamine while armed, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. At trial in September 2023, a jury convicted him of all charges and the court sentenced him to a lengthy prison term.During jury selection in the Superior Court of San Diego County, the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to strike a Latina juror (Juror 1), claiming she struggled to understand the concept of intent, as revealed by her responses to a hypothetical question. Aguilar objected, arguing that the prosecutor was improperly excluding Hispanic and Latina jurors. The trial court accepted the prosecutor’s explanation, found Juror 1’s answers equivocal and overruled Aguilar’s objection, determining that ethnicity was not a factor in the challenge.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the denial of Aguilar’s objection de novo, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7. The appellate court found no substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that Juror 1 was confused about intent; her answers were clear and consistent. The court held that “juror confusion” is a presumptively invalid reason for a peremptory challenge under section 231.7, and that the prosecution failed to rebut this presumption. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. View "P. v. Aguilar" on Justia Law

Several individuals and organizations sought to circulate a petition to place a campaign finance ordinance on Houston’s ballot, but the city’s charter at that time required petition circulators to be both residents and registered voters of Houston. The plaintiffs did not meet these requirements. They notified the city of their intent to circulate petitions and challenge the constitutionality of the residency and voter registration requirements. The city initially did not clarify its position but later stated it would not enforce the challenged provisions. Despite this, the plaintiffs filed suit in federal court, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, arguing that the requirements were unconstitutional under Supreme Court precedent.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas first granted the plaintiffs a temporary restraining order barring enforcement of the requirements. After the petition circulation period ended, the court dismissed the claims as moot following a stipulation by the parties. The plaintiffs moved to alter or amend the judgment, which was denied. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiffs had standing and that the case was not moot, and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court granted the plaintiffs declaratory relief and, after the city repealed the challenged provisions, awarded the plaintiffs attorneys’ fees as prevailing parties. However, in a subsequent appeal, a different Fifth Circuit panel concluded there was no case or controversy because all parties agreed the provisions were unconstitutional, vacated the judgment, and remanded for dismissal.On remand, the district court vacated the attorneys’ fees award and ordered reimbursement to the city. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed this ruling, holding that after the prior appellate decision vacated the underlying merits judgment for lack of a case or controversy, there was no basis for a fee award under Rule 60(b)(5). The court also clarified that the city was not required to appeal the fee award directly, and the plaintiffs’ claims of prejudice were unavailing. View "Pool v. City of Houston" on Justia Law