Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Tayvin Galanakis sued Officers Nathan Winters and Christopher Wing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Iowa law, alleging they arrested him without probable cause. He also brought federal and state claims against the City of Newton, Iowa. The district court denied summary judgment in part, determining that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity or state statutory immunity, and the City was subject to vicarious liability on a surviving state-law claim.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied summary judgment with respect to the § 1983 and false arrest claims against Winters and Wing, as well as the respondeat superior claim against the City predicated on Galanakis’s false arrest claim. The defendants appealed, arguing that qualified immunity and state statutory immunity protected the officers—and, as to the false arrest claim, the City—from suit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on Galanakis’s Fourth Amendment claim, concluding that no objectively reasonable officer could have concluded that there was a substantial chance Galanakis had driven while under the influence of marijuana. The court found that Galanakis evinced almost no indicia of intoxication and that his behavior during the stop did not suggest impairment. The court also dismissed the interlocutory appeal as to the state-law claims, noting that without clarification that resolution of the qualified immunity claim necessarily resolves the pendent claims, it declined to exercise jurisdiction. View "Galanakis v. City of Newton, Iowa" on Justia Law

On Thanksgiving night in 2018, Officer David Alexander, a policeman with the City of Hoover, was on foot patrol at the Galleria Mall in Birmingham, Alabama. During a suspected active shooting situation, Officer Alexander saw Emantic "E.J." Fitzgerald Bradford moving towards two men with a gun in his hand. Without issuing a verbal warning, Officer Alexander shot and killed Mr. Bradford, who was legally authorized to carry his gun and was attempting to provide assistance.April Pipkins, Mr. Bradford's mother and representative of his estate, filed a lawsuit against Officer Alexander, the City of Hoover, and other defendants, asserting Fourth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims for negligence and wantonness. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama dismissed the state law claims and granted summary judgment on the § 1983 claims, ruling that Officer Alexander's use of deadly force was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that a verbal warning was not feasible under the circumstances.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that Officer Alexander acted reasonably under the Fourth Amendment given the circumstances, which included a crowded mall, the sound of gunshots, and Mr. Bradford running with a gun towards two men. The court also found that a verbal warning was not feasible due to the immediate threat perceived by Officer Alexander. Additionally, the court upheld the dismissal of the state law claims, concluding that the Mall defendants did not owe a duty to protect Mr. Bradford from the criminal acts of a third party and that the complaint did not plausibly allege foreseeability or incompetency in hiring, training, and supervising Officer Alexander. View "Pipkins v. City of Hoover, Alabama" on Justia Law

Alejandro Estevis was involved in a high-speed chase with the Laredo Police Department (LPD) that lasted two hours and reached speeds over 100 mph. The chase ended when officers forced Estevis's truck off the road. Estevis then rammed a police cruiser and attempted to flee again, prompting two officers to fire nine shots at him, injuring him severely. Estevis sued the officers, claiming they used excessive force.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted the officers qualified immunity for the first three shots but denied it for shots four through nine. The court found that while Estevis posed a threat initially, the threat had diminished by the time the later shots were fired. The court reasoned that Estevis had stopped revving his engine and was no longer an immediate threat, making the additional shots potentially excessive.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the officers did not violate clearly established law by firing the additional shots under the circumstances. The court noted that the situation was dangerous and unpredictable, and the officers had reason to believe they were still under threat. The court found that existing precedent did not clearly establish that the officers' actions were unlawful, and thus, they were entitled to qualified immunity for all shots fired. The court rendered judgment granting the officers qualified immunity for shots four through nine. View "Estevis v. Cantu" on Justia Law

Justin Longworth, a federal inmate, alleged that he faced repeated sexual harassment and abuse by Sherry M. Beck, a correctional officer at the Federal Correctional Institution in Butner, North Carolina. Longworth claimed Beck engaged in daily aggressive sexual harassment and abuse, including forced oral sex, fondling, and groping. He did not immediately report Beck's conduct due to fear of retaliation. Other officials at the institution initially did nothing to stop or report Beck's abuse. Eventually, Beck was reported, fired, and Longworth was transferred to another facility, but Beck continued to harass him through letters.Longworth filed two separate lawsuits in the Eastern District of North Carolina. The first lawsuit was a Bivens action against the officials directly involved, alleging violations of his civil rights under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. The district court dismissed the Bivens claims, finding that they presented new contexts and that special factors counseled hesitation in extending Bivens to this context. Longworth appealed the dismissal of his Bivens claims. The second lawsuit was an FTCA claim against the United States, alleging negligence by the officials. The district court dismissed the FTCA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that Beck was not acting within the scope of her employment during the alleged misconduct. Longworth did not appeal the FTCA judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court's FTCA judgment precluded Longworth's Bivens appeal. The FTCA judgment bar provides that an FTCA judgment is a complete bar to any action by the claimant against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim. Since a judgment on the FTCA claim had been entered, Longworth could no longer pursue his Bivens action based on the same conduct. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal. View "Longworth v. Mansukhani" on Justia Law

The defendant, John Volungus, a convicted pedophile, was conditionally released from civil commitment under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006. The Act allows for the involuntary civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons in federal custody. Volungus, who had been in federal prison for child-sex crimes, was civilly committed in 2012. In 2022, the facility's warden certified that Volungus would not be sexually dangerous if released under a prescribed regimen of care. The district court ordered his conditional release with specific conditions and a prescribed regimen of treatment.The district court's conditional-release order included numerous conditions, some of which Volungus objected to, arguing that the court exceeded its authority by imposing conditions beyond the prescribed treatment regimen and requiring him to pay for certain costs. The district court denied his objections and his motion to dismiss the government's motion to revoke his conditional release for alleged violations of the conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Adam Walsh Act allows judges to impose conditions beyond the prescribed regimen of treatment, provided they are related to the individual's mental illness and the safety of the public. The court also rejected Volungus's argument that the district court lacked authority to require him to pay for certain costs associated with his release conditions. The court affirmed the district court's conditional-release order, finding that the additional conditions and cost requirements were within the court's authority and aligned with the Act's purpose of protecting the public from sexually dangerous individuals. View "US v. Volungus" on Justia Law

A class of incarcerated juvenile offenders in Florida, all sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole under a now-defunct sentencing scheme, sued the Commissioners of the Florida Commission on Offender Review. They claimed that the parole system violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment's due process rights. The plaintiffs argued that the parole system did not provide a meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment to the Commissioners, dismissing the plaintiffs' claims. The court found that Florida's parole system did not violate the Eighth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Florida's parole system does not violate the Eighth Amendment for either homicide or non-homicide juvenile offenders. For homicide offenders, the system is not a sham and provides a genuine possibility of parole, satisfying the requirements set forth in Miller v. Alabama. For non-homicide offenders, the system offers a meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation, as required by Graham v. Florida.Regarding the due process claim, the court concluded that the plaintiffs did not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole under either state law or the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, their procedural due process claim failed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Commissioners. View "Howard v. Coonrod" on Justia Law

Neysha Cruz, on behalf of her son O.F., filed a lawsuit against the New York City Department of Education (DOE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Cruz rejected the DOE's education plan for O.F., who has multiple disabilities, and sought reimbursement for his private school tuition. Cruz argued that the DOE's placement of O.F. in a twelve-student classroom violated a New York regulation requiring students with highly intensive management needs to be placed in classes of six or fewer students. The DOE acknowledged the regulation but argued that another regulation allowing a maximum of twelve students for those with severe multiple disabilities also applied, giving them discretion in class size placement.An Impartial Hearing Officer (IHO) initially found that the DOE offered O.F. a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) but that the recommended school could not implement the IEP due to scheduling issues. The IHO ordered partial reimbursement for private tuition. The State Review Officer (SRO) reversed the IHO's finding on the school's ability to implement the IEP and concluded that the DOE provided a FAPE, thus denying reimbursement.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York upheld the SRO's decision, agreeing that the DOE could choose between the two class size regulations. Cruz appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.The Second Circuit found that the case hinged on interpreting New York's education regulations and certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals. The court sought clarification on whether the DOE must satisfy both class size regulations or if it can choose between them when both apply to a student. The Second Circuit retained jurisdiction pending the state court's response. View "Cruz v. Banks" on Justia Law

Matthew Morrison was convicted of a sexually violent offense and sentenced to prison. Before his release, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a petition to commit him as a sexually violent predator under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). The trial court found the petition true, declared Morrison a sexually violent predator, and committed him to the State Department of State Hospitals for an indeterminate term.Morrison appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by not personally advising him of his right to a jury trial and securing a personal waiver of that right. He claimed that the SVPA’s failure to require a personal jury trial advisement and waiver, unlike other civil commitment statutes, violated the constitutional equal protection guarantee.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court determined that Morrison’s equal protection challenge was subject to rational basis review. Since Morrison did not raise the issue in the trial court, the appellate court conditionally affirmed the commitment order and remanded the matter to allow Morrison to raise his equal protection claim before the trial court. The appellate court provided guidance on the principles the trial court should apply when resolving Morrison’s constitutional claim. View "P. v. Morrison" on Justia Law

David Knellinger and Robert Storey discovered that the state of Colorado had taken possession of their property under the Revised Uniform Unclaimed Property Act (RUUPA). They filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Colorado's unclaimed property scheme violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs alleged that Colorado took their property for public use without just compensation and did not provide them with notice or compensation.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for lack of standing. The court found that Knellinger and Storey failed to sufficiently allege ownership of the property at issue, partly because they did not file an administrative claim to establish ownership as required by RUUPA. The district court also dismissed the plaintiffs' equitable claims, concluding that § 1983 provided an adequate basis for obtaining just compensation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' claims for monetary relief. The appellate court held that Knellinger and Storey had plausibly alleged that Colorado took their property for public use without just compensation, which is sufficient to confer standing. The court emphasized that property owners need not file administrative claims with Colorado before suing for just compensation under the Takings Clause. However, the appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' equitable claims, as § 1983 provides an adequate remedy for obtaining just compensation.The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' damages claims and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Knellinger v. Young" on Justia Law

Several college volleyball players accused their coach of physical, verbal, psychological, and sexual abuse. The players alleged that the coach engaged in a pattern of sexual harassment and abuse, including inappropriate touching and forcing players to engage in uncomfortable physical interactions. They also claimed that the coach's misconduct was reported to various university administrators and assistant coaches, who either witnessed or were informed of the abuse.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama dismissed the players' Title IX and § 1983 claims with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The court found that the players had abandoned their breach-of-contract claims and dismissed those with prejudice. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, dismissing them without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the players failed to state a Title IX claim because only certain university administrators were "appropriate persons" to receive notice of the misconduct, and the players did not provide sufficient actual notice of sexual harassment to those individuals. The court also found that the university did not act with deliberate indifference upon receiving the notice.Regarding the § 1983 claims, the court held that the players did not show that the university employees' conduct violated clearly established substantive-due-process principles. The court concluded that the employees were entitled to qualified immunity because the players did not provide case law with indistinguishable facts, a broad statement of principle, or conduct so egregious that it clearly violated constitutional rights.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order dismissing the players' Title IX and § 1983 claims. View "DeMarcus v. University of South Alabama" on Justia Law