Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The case involves Albert Collins, who was employed by the Kansas City Missouri Public School District. After the termination of his employment, Collins sued the school district, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation for participating in protected activities. The school district had fired Collins following an investigation into "attendance fraud," a scheme in which Collins admittedly took part. The three claims relevant in this case were racial discrimination during termination in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, retaliation for engaging in protected activities under Title VII and § 1983, and violation of a state law prohibiting public employers from retaliating against whistleblowers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the school district. The court held that Collins failed to provide sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that his termination was motivated by his race. He failed to demonstrate that a white employee engaged in the same fraudulent scheme was treated differently, failing to meet the "rigorous" requirement that the comparators must have dealt with the same supervisor, been subject to the same standards, and engaged in the same conduct.The court also found that Collins' retaliation claim failed for lack of evidence linking his termination to any protected conduct. His interviews about the attendance fraud scheme were not related to race, and he failed to demonstrate that another employee's claims, in which he acted as a witness, had anything to do with racial discrimination or retaliation.Regarding the whistleblower claim, the court held that a Missouri law excluding disclosures related to the employee's own violations applied to Collins. Since he failed to argue against the court's application of the statutory exclusion, his challenge to the court's grant of summary judgment on his whistleblower claim was deemed waived. View "Collins v. K.C. MO Public School District" on Justia Law

In this case, the issue at hand revolves around the California Racial Justice Act (CRJA). The petitioner, Michael Earl Mosby III, was charged with the drive-by shooting of Darryl King-Divens, along with a gun enhancement and three special circumstances, including having committed multiple murders. The District Attorney sought the death penalty for Mosby, who had been previously convicted in Los Angeles County of two additional murders and attempted murder. Mosby filed a motion claiming that the District Attorney's decision to seek the death penalty violated the CRJA, which prohibits seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction on the basis of race. The trial court denied Mosby's motion, ruling that he had failed to make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination under the CRJA.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District granted the writ petition and directed the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The court held that under the CRJA, a defendant must present not only statistical evidence of racial disparity in the charging of the death penalty but also evidence of nonminority defendants who were engaged in similar conduct and were similarly situated but charged with lesser offenses, to establish a prima facie case. The court found that Mosby had met his burden of establishing a prima facie case under the CRJA. Therefore, the trial court should have ordered an evidentiary hearing at which the District Attorney could produce evidence of the relevant factors that were used to determine the charges against the nonminority defendants who were involved in similar conduct, and who were similarly situated to Mosby; and to provide any race-neutral reasons that it considered in deciding to charge Mosby with the death penalty. View "Mosby v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Alaska ruled on the legal process applying to the Office of Children's Services (OCS) when it seeks to admit a child in its custody to a hospital for psychiatric care. The case centered on a minor named Mira J., a member of the Native Village of Kwinhagak (the Tribe), who was placed in OCS custody and hospitalized for 46 days for psychiatric treatment without a hearing to determine if the hospitalization was justified.The Tribe argued that her hospitalization should have been governed by the civil commitment statutes or, alternatively, that the constitution did not permit OCS to hospitalize a child for such a long time without a court hearing to determine whether the hospitalization was justified. The court rejected the Tribe's statutory argument but agreed that Mira's due process rights under the Alaska Constitution were violated.The court held that while OCS was not required to follow the civil commitment statutes when admitting Mira to either hospital, due process required OCS to promptly notify parties to the child in need of aid (CINA) case when admitting a child to the hospital for psychiatric care. Further, due process required the court to hold a hearing as soon as reasonably possible to determine whether the hospitalization was justified. The court held that the 46-day wait between Mira's first admission to the hospital and the hearing was too long to satisfy due process, and thus reversed the lower court's order authorizing Mira's continued hospitalization. View "Native Village of Kwinhagak v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered an appeal by several Missouri public officials who were denied qualified immunity by a lower court regarding five claims arising from a murder prosecution. The murder case, involving Donald Nash who was eventually convicted for the murder of Judy Spencer, was reopened in 2007, 25 years after the crime occurred. The officials based their case on a theory that DNA evidence found under Spencer's fingernails belonged to Nash, which they asserted could not have remained present if Spencer had washed her hair after their last encounter.Nash was convicted and spent 11 years in prison until the Missouri Supreme Court set aside his conviction in 2020. The charges were dismissed after DNA testing on the shoelace used to strangle Spencer supported Nash’s noninvolvement. Nash and his wife filed a lawsuit against the officials, claiming violations of rights including unlawful arrest and detention, fabrication of evidence, failure to investigate, violations of rights of access to courts, and violation of the right to familial and marital associations.The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and dismissed in part the appeals on the denial of qualified immunity. The court held that the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity on the claim of unlawful arrest and detention, finding that the omission of certain exculpatory facts from the probable cause affidavit negated probable cause for Nash's arrest. However, the court reversed the denial of qualified immunity for the claim alleging violation of the right to familial and marital associations, as this was not a clearly established constitutional right in 2008. The court dismissed the officials' appeal on the remaining claims due to lack of jurisdiction, as these involved genuine disputes of material fact to be resolved by a jury. View "Estate of Nash v. Folsom" on Justia Law

In a case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, plaintiffs Mark Bambach and his minor children sued defendants Gina Moegle and Susan Shaw, employees of Michigan's Children’s Protective Services, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that Moegle and Shaw violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by removing the children from Bambach's custody without a warrant and failing to return them after Bambach revoked his consent for the children to stay with their mother during an investigation into allegations of child abuse. The court found that no clearly established law put the state defendants on notice that they were violating the Bambach's Fourteenth and Fourth Amendment rights. The court determined that the key factual dispute underpinning the remaining claims was whether Bambach’s children were removed from his custody without his consent from December 29, 2015, to January 14, 2016. The court found that a reasonable jury could determine that Bambach had revoked his consent to his children’s placement with their mother by expressing to Moegle that he wanted to see his children and wanted to know when they would be back. But the court did not assess whether those constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the violations. The court found that Moegle and Shaw were entitled to qualified immunity as they could not have been on notice that their actions were unconstitutional. The court reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment and remanded for entry of an order dismissing the plaintiffs' claims against the defendants. View "Bambach v. Moegle" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of Arkansas, defendant Robert J. Williams, Jr. appealed his conviction for capital murder and aggravated assault. Williams argued that the trial court erred in granting the State's motion for continuance, violated his rights to a speedy trial, and improperly denied his Batson challenge during jury selection. The Supreme Court of Arkansas disagreed and affirmed the lower court's decision.On the issue of the continuance, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's motion for continuance. The court found that the State acted with due diligence and the affidavit submitted by the State substantially complied with the requirements set forth by law.On the issue of speedy trial, the court conducted a de novo review to determine whether specific periods of time were excludable under the speedy-trial rules. The court found that Williams was brought to trial within the twelve-month period required by the rules. Therefore, the court held that Williams's right to a speedy trial was not violated.Finally, on the issue of the Batson challenge, the court held that the trial court properly allowed the State to strike a juror based on a race-neutral reason, that is, the juror's lack of involvement in the judicial process. The court deferred to the trial court's ability to gauge the State's demeanor and credibility, finding no error in the denial of the Batson challenge.Therefore, the court affirmed the decisions of the lower court, finding no prejudicial error. View "Williams v. State" on Justia Law

In Pennsylvania, four family members, including two elderly parents, were injured during a pre-dawn, no-knock raid by the Special Emergency Response Team (SERT) of the Pennsylvania State Police. The police acted on information about alleged drug sales by a family member, but none of the four injured individuals were suspected of any wrongdoing. They sued the officers for excessive use of force, but the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, ruling that they were entitled to qualified immunity.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the District Court's decision. The court found that the officers' conduct was objectively unreasonable as they had used substantial force against individuals who were unarmed, cooperative, outnumbered by law enforcement, not suspected of wrongdoing, and in their own home. Furthermore, the court held that the right to be free from such excessive force was clearly established at the time of the officers' conduct, and that any reasonable officer would have known that their actions were unlawful. Hence, the court concluded that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity.The case has been remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. View "Anglemeyer v. Ammons" on Justia Law

In this case, Larry Donnell Gibbs, a pro se plaintiff, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against five officers of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. He alleged that two officers allowed him to bleed for 45 minutes after being stabbed by another inmate, and three other officers used excessive force against him in retaliation for filing a grievance about the incident. Gibbs attempted to proceed in forma pauperis, which would have allowed service to be made by a United States marshal, but the district court denied this on the basis that he had already paid the filing fee, had sufficient funds in his inmate trust account to serve the defendants, and had not provided the addresses of the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the district court had abused its discretion by denying Gibbs's in forma pauperis status. It held that a person who is not a pauper at the commencement of a suit may become one during or prior to its prosecution. The court also found that the district court had arbitrarily determined that the funds in Gibbs's inmate trust account were sufficient for him to serve the defendants and that there's no requirement for an individual to be absolutely destitute to enjoy the benefit of in forma pauperis status. The court also held that a district court's determination of whether a party may proceed in forma pauperis must be based solely upon economic criteria and not on the lack of addresses for the defendants. The court concluded that the denial of Gibbs's in forma pauperis status had prejudiced his chances of effecting service. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to permit Gibbs to proceed in forma pauperis. View "Gibbs v. Jackson" on Justia Law

In a case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, plaintiffs Jennifer Dupree and Detrich Battle challenged the dismissal of their Title V claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) on the basis of sovereign immunity. Dupree, who worked for the Georgia Department of Human Services, and Battle, an employee of the Georgia Department of Corrections, had requested accommodations at their respective workplaces due to their health conditions. After their requests were denied and their employment terminated, they filed claims under Title V, alleging retaliation.The court, however, found that sovereign immunity applies to Title V claims when brought in conjunction with Title I claims. This meant that the plaintiffs' claims could not proceed. Importantly, the court clarified that dismissals based on sovereign immunity, a jurisdictional issue, should be entered without prejudice. Not specifying this in the dismissal could lead to misunderstandings about the nature of the dismissal. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded the case for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to dismiss the case without prejudice. View "Dupree v. Owens" on Justia Law

In 2003, Terry Harper and Emmanuel Ruiz were convicted by a jury of murder and related charges connected to the shooting deaths of Joe Luhrman, David Carty, and Tracy Glover in 2001. Harper appealed his conviction, arguing that his right to due process was violated due to the almost 20-year delay between his conviction and his direct appeal, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial after the State referenced a response he gave to police questioning that he contends was previously excluded and prejudicial, and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial attorneys failed to obtain and introduce evidence that he was suffering a severe injury to his dominant hand at the time of the shootings.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision. The court applied the four-part balancing test from Barker v. Wingo to Harper's claim of a due process violation due to the delayed appeal. Although the court found that the delay was lengthy and Harper consistently asserted his right to appeal, it ultimately held that Harper failed to show actual prejudice from the delay. Regarding the mistrial motion, the court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as the jury was given prompt curative instructions, and the prosecutor acted in good faith. Lastly, the court denied Harper's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as he failed to show a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different if his medical records were introduced into evidence. View "HARPER v. STATE" on Justia Law