Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the claim brought by the Back Beach Neighbors Committee alleging that the Town of Rockport, Massachusetts committed a class-of-one equal protection violation by failing adequately to enforce local rules against scuba divers at Back Beach, holding that the district court did not err.The Committee brought this complaint claiming that the Town's failure consistently to enforce various rules as to Back Beach led to the singling out of the beach as a place "to welcome divers." The district court granted the Town's motion to dismiss as to six of the complaint's eight counts and then granted summary judgment for the Town on the remaining counts. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that because the Committee did not plausibly allege the existence of similarly-situated comparators, its class-of-one equal protection claim failed. View "Back Beach Neighbors Committee v. Town of Rockport" on Justia Law

A 2008 Michigan initiative decriminalized marijuana for medical purposes; a 2016 law afforded legal status to medical marijuana dispensaries. In Detroit, the Buildings, Safety Engineering, and Environmental Department (BSEED) screened applications for such facilities. The code prohibits locating such a facility in a drug-free zone–an area “within 1,000 radial feet of the zoning lot” containing any one of several "sensitive places," including a school.Genie applied to run a medical marijuana distribution facility on Mack Avenue in Detroit. BSEED denied the application at the screening stage because the proposed site was in a drug-free zone based on a lot (in the neighboring community of Grosse Point Park) on which St. Clare School sits. Genie unsuccessfully challenged the determination through state administrative and judicial channels. Detroit deemed the St. Clare’s “zoning lot” to include land where the parish church sits (the church and school have separate lots of record), all of which is listed under a single tax parcel number.Genie sued in federal court, arguing that Detroit erred in measuring the distance between the proposed Genie site and St. Clare’s while approving other sites in violation of the equal protection and due process guarantees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Detroit. Genie had no property interest in its proposed facility. Detroit applied the same method of measurement to each comparable applicant. Although Genie cited two applications that were approved, many applications were rejected on that basis. View "Green Genie, Inc. v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

To improve a stretch of U.S. Route 22 near Altoona, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) sought two right-of-way easements from for new drainage pipes, covering less than one-tenth of an acre of Merritt's property. PennDOT initiated condemnation and over Merritts’s objections, acquired title to and possession of the easements. With no success in that state-court proceeding, Merritts filed a federal suit, claiming that PennDOT’s acquisition of the easements and the compensation offered for them violated the U.S. Constitution and Pennsylvania law.The district court dismissed all claims with prejudice, some based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, the remainder under “Burford abstention,” which protects “complex state administrative processes from undue federal interference.” The Third Circuit affirmed in part. The “Ex parte Young” exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity does not allow Merritts’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against the PennDOT officials in their official capacities because he does not seek prospective relief from an ongoing violation. Merritts’s section 1983 claims for damages against the PennDOT officials in their individual capacities for allegedly unlawfully acquiring the easements for PennDOT cannot be dismissed under Burford abstention; his claims for damages premised on the allegedly unlawful acquisition of the easements meet the conditions for dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but his claims concerning the denial of just compensation do not. The dismissals on Eleventh Amendment and Rooker-Feldman grounds should have been without prejudice. View "Merritts v. Richards" on Justia Law

GEFT, a billboard company, sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 because Monroe County did not allow the installation of a digital billboard along I-69. Receiving a sign permit required compliance with size limits, height restrictions, setback requirements, a ban on changeable-copy (or digital) signs, and a prohibition on off-premises commercial signs, The ordinance provided exceptions to the permit requirement for government signs and certain noncommercial signs. If a proposed sign was ineligible for a permit, the applicant could apply for a use variance, which required specific findings.The district court granted GEFT summary judgment and enjoined the permitting scheme and the variance procedures. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part, first declining to extend the injunction to encompass the entire ordinance. Monroe County’s substantive sign standards do not need a permitting scheme to function. Indiana law provides that local government entities can enforce their own ordinances through civil penalties or injunctions. The court reinstated the variance procedure. That procedure is a “prior restraint” but is not unconstitutional; it does not involve consideration of content, permits ample alternatives for speech, including displays of messages on signs, and it does not give the Board of Zoning Appeals so much discretion that it violates the First Amendment. View "GEFT Outdoor, LLC v. Monroe County Indiana" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court entering summary judgment for the Town of Pittsfield, New Hampshire and dismissing Plaintiff's allegation that the Town's zoning ordinance, as applied by the Town's Board of Selectmen, was unconstitutionally vague and violated his First Amendment and equal protection rights, holding that the district court did not err.Plaintiff applied for and received a permit to keep a trailer on his property for storage purposes. In 2016 and 2017, the Board granted Plaintiff permit extensions. In 2018, the Board denied Plaintiff's request for a third extension and required him to remove the trailer from his property. Plaintiff subsequently brought this action, invoking 42 U.S.C. 1983 and challenging the ordinance. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court provided the requisite notice that it would reach Plaintiff's claim of content or viewpoint discrimination at summary judgment and properly entered summary judgment on this claim; (2) the Town's application of the ordinance against Defendant did not violate Defendant's equal protection rights; and (3) the ordinance, as applied by the Town, was not unconstitutionally vague. View "McCoy v. Town of Pittsfield, NH" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Alive Church of the Nazarene, Inc. (the “Church”) purchased 17 acres of land — zoned primarily for agricultural use — on which the Church sought to conduct religious assemblies. After Defendant Prince William County, Virginia (the “County”), denied the Church’s request to worship on its property before the Church complied with the zoning requirements, the Church initiated a lawsuit in district court. By its Complaint, the Church has alleged six claims against the County — three claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), and three federal constitutional claims. For reasons explained in its Memorandum Opinion of November 2021, the district court dismissed those claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that allowing religious institutions to conduct worship services does not further the purpose of the Agricultural Zoning Ordinance — that is, to promote farming. Specific to the Church, allowing services would not increase its ability to continue farming its land. Accordingly, the court wrote it cannot agree with the Church that it is similarly situated to farm wineries and limited-license breweries with regard to the Ordinance. The Church has failed to meet its initial burden of proof by providing a similarly situated comparator with which it has been treated unequally, and has thereby failed to state an RLUIPA equal terms claim. View "Alive Church of the Nazarene, Inc. v. Prince William County, Virginia" on Justia Law

In 1993 the Village of Channahon approved the plat of a residential subdivision lying within the DuPage River Special Flood Hazard Area. The Village subsequently issued permits for the construction of houses in this subdivision, all of which experience flooded basements when the river is at high water. The current owners of these houses contend that the Village violated the Constitution either by granting the permits to build or by failing to construct dykes to keep water away.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of their suit, noting the plaintiffs do not contend that the Village required them to build where they did or dig basements, or took any steps after the houses’ construction that made flooding worse. The Constitution establishes rights to be free of governmental interference but does not compel governmental intervention to assist persons. Even if the Village violated a local ordinance and a federal regulation, 44 C.F.R. §60.3(c)(7), by granting the applications without insisting that the houses be built higher, the Constitution does not entitle private parties to accurate enforcement of local, state, or federal law. The Village did not take anyone’s property, either by physical invasion or by regulation that prevented the land’s use. The river, which did invade their basements, is not a governmental body. Government-induced flooding of limited duration may be compensable but the -plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that the water in their basements is “government-induced.” View "Billie v. Village of Channahon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals dismissing the complaint in this case involving the removal of a Confederate monument with prejudice, holding that dismissal should have been without prejudice.After the City of Winston Salem decided to remove a Confederate monument from the grounds of the former Forsyth County Courthouse Plaintiff, the United Daughters of the Confederacy, North Carolina Division, Inc., filed a complaint against the City and County seeking the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants from taking affirmative action to remove or relocate the monument prior to full adjudication of the respective rights of the parties. The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice, concluding that Plaintiff failed establish standing and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by dismissing the amended complaint for lack of standing; but (2) erred by dismissing the complaint with, rather than without, prejudice. View "United Daughters of the Confederacy, N.C. Division v. City of Winston-Salem" on Justia Law

Detroit prohibits street vendors from selling their goods within 300 feet of sports arenas or stadiums. After the completion of Little Caesar’s Arena in 2017, the new home of the Red Wings and Pistons, Detroit refused to renew three vendor licenses for locations that fell within the 300-foot exclusion zone. The licenses had been in place since 2008. The displaced vendors sued, claiming due process violations.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Detroit. The ordinance does not create a property interest in a vendor’s license; it never says that applicants will receive licenses for the places they choose but requires that they apply “for an approved location,” and warns that the city may “terminate[] or eliminate[]” a vendor location. Detroit retains the discretion to deny or suspend licenses to prevent a violation of the rules or to protect public safety. Even a protected property interest would not suffice to defeat Detroit’s decision. Detroit had rational reasons for denying these vendor applications: its interest in preventing congestion on its sidewalks, ensuring sidewalk safety, eliminating blight and litter, and protecting arena operators from competition. A 300-foot buffer zone around arenas is a rational way to advance Detroit’s interest in preventing congestion. View "Williams v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Oakland County took title to the plaintiffs’ homes under the Michigan General Property Tax Act, which (after a redemption period) required the state court to enter a foreclosure judgment that vested “absolute title” to the property in the governmental entity upon payment of the amount of the tax delinquency or “its fair market value.” The entity could then sell it at a public auction. No matter what the sale price, the property’s former owner had no right to any of the proceeds.In February 2018, under the Act, Oakland County foreclosed on Hall’s home to collect a tax delinquency of $22,642; the County then conveyed the property to the City of Southfield for that price. Southfield conveyed the property for $1 to a for-profit entity, the Southfield Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative, which later sold it for $308,000. Other plaintiffs had similar experiences.The plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. The “Michigan statute is not only self-dealing: it is also an aberration from some 300 years of decisions.” The government may not decline to recognize long-established interests in property as a device to take them. The County took the property without just compensation. View "Hall v. Meisner" on Justia Law