Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants enforced two local ordinances in violation of the Eighth Amendment. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's order granting summary judgment to defendants. The court reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for retrospective relief because those claims were not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; the court reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief because those claims have not been mooted by defendants' voluntary conduct; the court did not reach the merits of plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment challenges; and the court held that jurisdiction existed as to plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims and remanded for a consideration of the merits in the first instance. View "Bell, et al v. City of Boise, et al" on Justia Law

This appeal involved a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance creating an offstreet parking district adjoining a Cabela's store. Plaintiff, a resident of the City, filed a complaint against the City and its mayor and city council members, seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the ordinance. The district court found the action was barred by the general four-year statute of limitations because it was commenced more than four years after the ordinance was adopted. At issue on appeal was when the statute of limitations began to run. The Supreme Court reversed without reaching the constitutionality of the ordinance because the Court could not tell from the face of Plaintiff's complaint when Plaintiff's cause of action accrued for purposes of the running of the statute of limitations. Remanded. View "Lindner v. Kindig" on Justia Law

In 2009, the City Council revoked a blanket special exception permitting two business establishments (the Establishments) operating in the City to operate as "entertainment establishments" serving alcoholic beverages for on-site consumption and denied their individual applications for special exceptions to continue such operations. The City later filed a complaint requesting that the Establishments be permanently enjoined from selling or serving alcohol or providing entertainment in their businesses. The Establishments filed a separate complaint and petition for appeal, asserting that the City Council's actions impaired their vested rights and that the manner in which the Council executed these actions violated their statutory notice and due process rights. The circuit court denied the relief requested by the Establishments and granted the City's request for injunctive relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Establishments did not acquire any vested rights under Va. Code 15.2-2307 or Va. Code 15.2-2311(C); and (2) because the Establishments had actual notice of and actively participated in the City Council meeting, any statutory notice issues were waived and their constitutional rights were not violated. View "Norfolk 102, LLC v. City of Norfolk" on Justia Law

The owner (an Asian Indian) of 60-room hotel in a manufacturing district near a major highway in Oak Forest, a Chicago suburb, sued the city, charging racial discrimination in zoning (42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982) and that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, based on the city’s refusal to allow it to sell the hotel for conversion to a retirement home to be owned by a church in which most of the membership is African-American. The city claimed that a retirement home would not be “highway oriented” and, after the plan was proposed, amended its ordinance so that the hotel became nonconforming, and denied a special use permit. The owner later lost the hotel in foreclosure; it is now operating as a hotel under new ownership. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting numerous irregularities in the zoning process, but stating that the owner presented no evidence that any comparable facility, serving a white clientele, has ever been permitted by Oak Forest in a comparable district. View "Parvati Corp. v. City of Oak Forest" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, seeking to offer services as a psychic and spiritual counsel in the County of Chesterfield, challenged the application of regulations enacted by the County affecting fortune tellers. The County regulated fortune tellers in four ways, one of which was applicable to all those operating a business in the County, with the others more specific to fortune tellers. The district court considered and rejected plaintiff's claims and plaintiff subsequently appealed. The court held that the First Amendment Free Speech Clause afforded some degree of protection to plaintiff's activities where the County could not establish either premise of its argument that fortune telling was inherently deceptive speech outside the scope of the First Amendment. However, the County's regulations did not abridge plaintiff's First Amendment freedom of speech where the County's regulation of plaintiff's activities fell squarely within the scope of the professional speech doctrine. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that granting summary judgment to the County on plaintiff's constitutional and statutory religion claims was proper where plaintiff's beliefs comprised a way of life, and not a religious exercise. Finally, plaintiff's Equal Protection argument failed where the court, applying rational basis review, held that the County's regulatory scheme was rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield, VA" on Justia Law

This case involved the City's adoption of an ordinance that proscribed "soliciting" in certain areas of the City. At issue was whether the ordinance restricted the free speech of individuals who regularly beg in the areas at issue. The court held that plaintiffs had standing to bring this First Amendment suit and that the complaint was improperly dismissed at the pleadings stage. The court found that plaintiffs have asserted a claim that the City enacted a content-based regulation, which was not the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville" on Justia Law

The Nimers own land, zoned for residential use, where they operate a business that produces meat snacks. They began constructing buildings to expand the business to include butchering. They did not get zoning certificates. A state court enjoined the Nimers from putting the buildings to any use other than keeping and feeding animals, without the necessary zoning certificates. Several days after appealing the state court decision, the Nimers sued Litchfield Township in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court decided to abstain and dismissed without prejudice. The Sixth Circuit remanded with instructions to stay the case. While Younger abstention applies to section 1983 damages claims, a district court lacks the power to decide whether to dismiss such a damages claim. Where plaintiffs seek only legal relief (in the form of damages), relief that does not involve the district court’s equitable or discretionary powers, then the district court may not exercise its discretion to decide whether to dismiss the case; instead, the district court must stay the damages claim pending the outcome of the state court proceedings. View "Nimer v. Litchfield Twp. Bd. of Trs" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the closure of the Franklin Shelter, an overnight facility for homeless men in downtown Washington D.C. On appeal, plaintiffs alleged that the closure violated federal and D.C. antidiscrimination statutes. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal on res judicata grounds because plaintiffs could have raised these claims in two prior Superior Court cases. View "Sheptock v. Fenty" on Justia Law

Good News appealed from the district court's determination on remand from the Ninth Circuit that the Town's ordinance restricting the size, duration, and location of temporary directional signs did not discriminate between different forms of noncommercial speech in an unconstitutional manner. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the court held that the ordinance was not a content-based regulation and was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction. Accepting the court's opinion in Reed as law of the case, the court concluded that the Sign Code was constitutional because the different treatment of types of noncommercial temporary signs were not content-based as that term was defined in Reed, and the restrictions were tailored to serve significant government interests. Good News' other challenges did not merit relief. Further, the court determined that the amendments to the Sign Code made by the Town during the pendency of the appeal did not moot this case and that Good News could file a new action in the district court should it wish to challenge the new provisions of the Sign Code. View "Reed, et al v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, et al" on Justia Law

The City brought an eminent domain action to acquire a forty-foot-wide strip of real property from Respondent. Respondent's predecessor-in-interest originally acquired title to this property through a federal land patent that reserved a thirty-three-foot-wide easement across the strip of property for "roadway and public utilities purposes." The City asserted that it sought to utilize its existing rights to the thirty-three-foot right-of-way under the federal land patent's easement and to attain, by condemnation, the remaining seven-foot portion of land. The district court granted Respondent partial summary judgment and awarded Respondent $394,490 in compensation, concluding that the City lacked any right to use the easement because the federal patent did not specifically name the City. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in (1) determining that the federal land patent did not create a thirty-three-foot-wide easement, as the plain meaning of the patent's language created a valid public easement; (2) determining that the City's proposed use of the easement constituted a taking, as the use of this easement was within its scope and did not strip Respondent of a property interest; and (3) awarding Respondent just compensation and attorney fees. View "City of Las Vegas v. Cliff Shadows Prof'l Plaza, LLC" on Justia Law