Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

This appeal stems from a dispute between outdoor advertising companies and the City over certain billboards with digital displays. Plaintiff Summit Media filed a motion seeking, among other things, an order that “[a]ll digital displays and sign structures” identified in the trial court's April 2013 order “shall be demolished and removed . . . .” Real parties CBS Outdoor wished to resume the use of their sign structures to display static advertising, as they had before the illegal digital conversion. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion to demolish the signs and denied plaintiff's request for attorney fees. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to require either the demolition of the structural improvements or the removal of the digital equipment, and that plaintiff offers no persuasive authority for its claim. Further, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiff had a personal financial stake in this litigation that was sufficient to warrant its decision to incur significant attorney fees and costs in the vigorous prosecution of this lawsuit. View "Summit Media v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In 1993, the Patereks, owners of PME, an injection molding company, relocated the business from Macomb County to the Village Armada, after purchasing a former high school auto shop. The Planning Commission issued the required Special Approval Land Use permit (SALU) with restrictions. Over the following years, the Patereks were occasionally in violation of the SALU, obtained modifications, and expanded the business. Paterek became involved in local government and was sometimes at odds with other local politicians, including a planning commissioner. Patereks ultimately filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, after the village declined perform inspections and to issue a certificate of occupancy for a 2013 expansion. The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, reasoning that a jury could reasonably find that defendants retaliated against Patereks for having complained about officials, in violation of the First Amendment; that defendants arbitrarily and capriciously ticketed Patereks, in violation of substantive due process; that defendants, due to their animus against Patereks, subjected PME to disparate treatment, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause; and that the district court erroneously denied Patereks’ civil contempt motion. View "Paterek v. Village of Armada" on Justia Law

Anderson’s daughter, C.A., suffers from disabilities that affect her ability to walk and balance independently. A miniature horse enables her to play and get exercise in her backyard without adult assistance. Anderson first acquired a horse in 2010. In 2013, the city passed an ordinance banning horses from residential property and prosecuted Anderson for violating it. Anderson claimed that the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, and the Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601, entitle her to keep the horse as C.A.'s service animal. The Hamilton County Municipal Court found Anderson guilty. Anderson sued. The district court granted the city summary judgment, finding Anderson’s claims barred by claim and issue preclusion stemming from her Municipal Court conviction. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Because fact-finding procedures available in a municipal court criminal proceeding differ substantially from those available in a civil proceeding, Anderson’s conviction has no preclusive effect on this lawsuit. While there is no evidence that the city’s actions were motivated by discriminatory intent against C.A. or had a disparate impact on disabled individuals, there are significant factual disputes regarding whether the ADA or FHAA require the city to permit Anderson to keep her miniature horse at her house. View "Anderson v. City of Blue Ash" on Justia Law

In 2005, the City of Winona enacted the thirty-percent rule, which limits the number of lots on a block in certain areas of the City that are eligible for certification as rental properties. Appellants brought this action challenging the rental ordinance, claiming that the thirty-percent rule is a zoning law that exceeds the City’s power authorized by Minn. Stat. 462.357 and violates their equal protection and substantive due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, concluding that the ordinance is not unconstitutional and that the City had authority to enact it. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellants filed a petition for review. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Appellants' claims had become moot because, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the alleged harm to Appellants’ interests had ceased. View "Dean v. City of Winona" on Justia Law

The Yangs listed their building for sale. In February 2011 the restaurant leasing the property closed. The Yangs never sold the building or found another tenant. They continued to pay property taxes. The building was vandalized and started to fail. In October 2011, city officials posted an abandonment notice and mailed a copy to the owner listed in its files. The notice went to the abandoned building and named the previous owner. Nine months later, the city posted a “repair/demolish” notice and sent notices by certified mailing to the property’s address; the notices were returned. After a title search, which identified the Yangs, the city sent certified mail notices to their home in September 2012. Having no response, the city scheduled a November 1 hearing about demotion and sent the Yangs notice by regular mail, with a copy to their realtor. The post office returned as “unclaimed” the certified mailing. The non-certified mailing was not returned. The Yangs did not appear. Demolition was approved. The city mailed another notice to the home address, but got no response. In January 2013, the city razed the building and mailed a $22,500 bill. The Yings claim to remember getting mail that said something about fixing up the building but ignoring it and that they did not receive notice concerning demolition. The Yangs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the city summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the city provided all of the notice that was reasonably due. View "Yang v. City of Wyoming" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were more than 400 residents and homeowners in the upper White Oak Bayou watershed in Harris County. From 1998 to 2002, most of Plaintiffs’ homes were inundated in three successive floods. Plaintiffs filed an inverse condemnation suit against several government entities, arguing that Defendants knew that harm was substantially certain to result to Plaintiffs’ homes when Defendants approved private development in the White Oak Bayou watershed without mitigating its consequences. Defendants responded with a combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, contending that no genuine issue of material fact had been raised on the elements of the takings claim. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of the plea to the jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a fact question existed as to each element of Plaintiffs’ takings claim, and therefore, the government entities’ plea to the jurisdiction was properly denied. View "Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr" on Justia Law

In 2004, Miller sought to build a four-unit condominium project on her Monona lot. The process stalled while Miller bought another lot, amended the plan, and abated an unexpected asbestos problem. She had unsuccessful negotiations with her neighbor, a former mayor, who trespassed on her property at the direction of city officials and took photographs for use at a planning commission meeting to oppose her project. Citations were issued for creating a public nuisance and working without a proper permit; the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources issued a “stop work” order because of asbestos; Miller was required to erect a fence; and she was told that weeds were too high and was ordered to remove various structures. A court rejected three out of four citations issued against her, stating that, although “some of the efforts to enforce compliance were unreasonable,” Miller had not pointed to any similarly situated person who had been treated differently. Monona refused to adjust the taxes on Miller’s property to reflect the demolitions. Officials continued to trespass by parking cars on her property. In 2010, Miller filed suit, asserting equal protection violations. The district court dismissed, finding that Miller had not identified a suitable comparator and that there was no evidence that Miller had been treated unfairly because of her sex. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting conceivable rational reasons for various actions and requirements. View "Miller v. City of Monona" on Justia Law

In Puerto Rico, the Controlled Access Law (CAL) allows private citizens to protect themselves against violent crimes by maintaining gated residential communities that incorporate public streets. In 2004, two corporations operated by the governing body of the Jehovah’s Witnesses brought suit against municipal defendants alleging that the CAL unconstitutionally infringed on the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ right to engage in door-to-door ministry. The district court established a remedial scheme that attempted to balance the competing interests of the parties. Both the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the municipalities appealed. The First Circuit upheld the district court’s solution but modified it in some aspects, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in crafting the remedy at issue.View "Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Colombani" on Justia Law

Springfield has an ordinance that prohibits panhandling in its “downtown historic district”—less than 2% of the city’s area but containing its principal shopping, entertainment, and governmental areas, including the Statehouse and many state-government buildings. The ordinance defines panhandling as an oral request for an immediate donation of money. Signs requesting money are allowed; as are oral pleas to send money later. Plaintiffs have received citations for violating this ordinance and allege that they will continue panhandling but fear liability. They unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction. The parties agreed that panhandling is a form of speech, to which the First Amendment applies, and that if it drew lines on the basis of speech’s content it would be unconstitutional. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the ordinance, which it called “indifferent to the solicitor’s stated reason for seeking money, or whether the requester states any reason at all…. Springfield has not meddled with the marketplace of ideas.” The prohibition is based on where a person says something rather than what position a person takes.View "Norton v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law

Landowners filed a complaint against the City of North Las Vegas for inverse condemnation and precondemnation damages. The district court awarded Landowners precondemnation damages and attorney fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s orders with the exception of the prejudgment interest award, which the Court reversed, concluding that the district court erred in failing to calculate prejudgment interest from the date on which the resulting injury arose. The City sought rehearing of that order on the prejudgment issue and on issues concerning the statute of limitations and standing. Although rehearing was not warranted, the Court took the opportunity to clarify the relevant law, holding (1) the Court’s dispositional order properly concluded that prejudgment interest should be calculated from the date of taking, which was the first date of compensable injury; (2) the City could not raise its statute of limitations argument for the first time on rehearing, and even if it could, that defense was inapplicable to the facts of this case; and (3) rehearing was not warranted to clarify whether the City can assert a standing defense on remand. View "City of N. Las Vegas v. 5th & Centennial, LLC" on Justia Law