Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Craig Winstead pled guilty to three counts of third degree sexual assault, and the district court sentenced him to ten to fifteen years on each count with the sentence on the first count to be served first and the sentences on the second and third counts to be served consecutively to the first sentence and concurrently with each other. Winstead filed a motion to correct on illegal sentence, claiming his sentences should have merged and asking the court to order that he serve his sentences concurrently. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Winstead's claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because Winstead could have raised the issue during the sentencing hearing, on direct appeal, or when he filed a motion for judgment and sentence nunc pro tunc and failed to do so.

Appellant Dana Dickey entered a conditional plea to one count of possession of a controlled substance. Dickey reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of her motion to suppress the methamphetamine found in her purse following a traffic stop, claiming the evidence should have been suppressed as the fruit of a constitutionally infirm detention under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by denying Dickey's motion to suppress where (1) the detention lasted no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, (2) the use of a drug dog during Dickey's lawful detention did not violate any constitutionally protected right, and (3) law enforcement officers had probable cause to search the vehicle.

Appellant Marshall Washington, while working as a confidential informant for the Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI), was charged with and found guilty of possession of a controlled substance. The district court's judgment and sentence incorrectly stated that Appellant pled guilty to the offenses, and the parties entered a stipulated motion to modify the judgment and sentence to correct the inaccuracy. Washington appealed, arguing that (1) the district court improperly denied discovery of the confidential informant agreement (CI agreement) between him and the DCI as well as the DCI's policy manual; and (2) the matter should be reversed inasmuch as the modified judgment and sentence did not fully comply with Wyo. R. Crim. P. 32. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that no reversible error was committed by the trial court because (1) Appellant had access to the CI agreement prior to trial and referred to the document at trial, and denial of Appellant's motion to compel discovery of DCI's policy manual was not an abuse of discretion; and (2) the omissions in the modified judgment and sentence were simply clerical errors that would be corrected on remand to the district court. Remanded.

David Baker was convicted on six methamphetamine-related charges. The Supreme Court reversed his convictions on two of the charges and affimed the other four. In these consolidated appeals, Baker (1) challenged the district court's denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, and (2) claimed the district court erred when it did not grant him access to e-mail correspondence between the department of corrections and the public defender's office. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decisions, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Baker's motion to correct an illegal sentence, and (2) the district court was correct in observing that Baker's motion for subpoena duces tecum asking for the requested e-mail correspondence was not appropriate in the context of Baker's criminal matter.

Appellant Warren Rathbun was convicted of attempted kidnapping and was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) Rathbun's prosecution for attempted kidnapping was not barred by the doctrine of double jeopardy due to his earlier guilty plea to battery because the two crimes each contained elements not contained in the other, and therefore, there was no preclusive effect; (2) the doctrine of res judicata neither barred the refiling of a charge for attempted kidnapping nor a subsequent preliminary hearing on the charge where there was a dismissal of the charge based upon a failure of proof of probable cause at a preliminary hearing; (3) the district court applied the proper penalty range in imposing sentence; and (4) the district court's determination of the penalty range in imposing sentence did not violate Rathbun's right to trial by jury.

Christopher Jones pled guilty to a third battery against a household member and was sentenced to a prison term of four or five years. Jones appealed, contending that Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6-2-501(f)(ii), which prescribes the punishment for battery against a household member, was unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Jones's argument that the statute was ambiguous did not constitute sufficient grounds to invalidate the statute as the mere fact that a statute is ambiguous is not sufficient in itself to violate the constitutional guarantee of due process; (2) the statute was not ambiguous; and (3) because the statute was unambiguous, the rule of lenity did not apply to the case.

After a jury trial, Michael Downing was convicted of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. Evidence was presented at trial involving an incident wherein a confidential informant (CI), who was working with the state Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI), arranged to purchase morphine pills from Downing. In his appeal, Downing alleged that the district court abused its discretion by denying his pretrial motion seeking discovery of "other buys" in which the CI participated and by excluding at trial evidence of other such buys. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction, holding that the district court's rulings excluding evidence of the CI's other buys (1) implicated Downing's Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness and (2) were not harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded for a new trial.

Defendant Richard Vasco was arrested for interference with a police officer and for driving under the influence of alcohol. Vasco refused to submit to chemical testing, and the Wyoming DOT advised him that it was suspending his driver's license for six months. Vasco requested a hearing, at the conclusion of which the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the suspension. Vasco sought review in the district court, which affirmed the OAH order. Vasco appealed, claiming the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for interference, and therefore the subsequent search was improper and the evidence obtained in the search that supported the DUI arrest was inadmissible. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that substantial evidence supported the OAH decision where (1) the officer had probable cause to arrest Vasco for interference with a police officer, and (2) the officer had probable cause to believe Vasco had been driving under the influence of alcohol.

In an effort to address a perceived drug and alcohol problem among its students, Goshen County School District No. 1 ("school district") adopted a policy requiring all students who participated in extracurricular activities to consent to random testing for alcohol and drugs. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the school district where both parties agreed that there were no genuine issues of material fact but disagreed about whether the district court correctly applied the provisions of the Wyoming and United States Constitutions to the undisputed facts. The court held that appellants failed to demonstrate that the school district's policy subjected students to searches that were unreasonable under all of the circumstances and therefore, the policy did not violate Article 1, section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. The court also held that the fact that the policy did not subject students to unreasonable seizures was, therefore, determinative of appellants' equal protection claim as well. The court further held that appellant had not demonstrated infringement of due process rights where appellants' speculation that judicial review might be denied in the future was insufficient to support a due process claim now. Accordingly, because appellants failed to prove that the school district's policy was unconstitutional, there was no basis for their claim that they were entitled to a permanent injunction or for their claim that the district court erred in granting summary judgment.

Appellant was convicted of first-degree sexual assault and first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. Appellant, acting pro se, filed an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 contending that he was denied his constitutional right of access to the courts because he did not have adequate access to Wyoming legal research materials in a Nevada state correctional facility. Appellant challenged the district court's dismissal of his suit based on a failure to state a claim. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the facts set forth in the complaint did not allege an actual injury and without any facts to indicate that appellant could have filed a viable petition for post-conviction relief, it could not determine that he had been injured by the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The court also held that, because appellant was able to file at least five petitions seeking relief from his conviction while he was an inmate at the Nevada state prison, and he was represented by court-appointed counsel in at least one of those actions, appellant's ability to conduct this volume of legal activity further indicated that he retained meaning access to the courts.