Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Brodey Burnett was convicted of attempted second degree murder and aggravated assault and battery. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury was properly instructed on the elements of attempted second degree murder; (2) the jury instructions regarding aggravated assault and battery causing serious bodily injury were not in error and caused no prejudice to Burnett; and (3) the fact that the statutory provisions defining the crimes of attempted second degree murder and aggravated assault and battery were overlapping did not deprive Burnett of his due process rights because the elements of the two crimes were not identical.

A jury convicted Varo Ken of attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on Ken's claim that counsel was ineffective. On remand, the district court concluded that Ken was prejudiced by counsel's failure to timely file a motion for a new trial because, had counsel timely filed the motion, the court would have granted it on the ground that the attempted first degree murder conviction was contrary to the weight of the evidence and may have resulted in a miscarriage of justice. After the case returned to the Supreme Court for consideration of the issues Ken presented in his appeal, the Court (1) held that Ken satisfied his burden to show ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) reversed the attempted murder conviction and remanded the case for a new trial on that charge.

Appellant's co-defendant was charged with one count of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance and two counts of delivery of a controlled substance. Appellant was charged with a similar conspiracy count and with being an accessory before the fact to one of the controlled substance deliveries. Appellant was acquitted of the conspiracy charge but convicted of the accessory charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in joining Appellant's case with that of her co-defendent; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting cross-examination of a witness, in admonishing the co-defendant's counsel in that regard, and in giving the jury a curative instruction; and (3) the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence.

Appellant Jeramie Large was charged with six crimes arising from an incident when he stole and crashed a vehicle. Large appealed, claiming (1) his right to a speedy trial was violated and (2) he was denied his right to counsel without being adequately instructed and warned of the dangers of proceeding without counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was afforded a speedy trial as it occurred without the 180-day time period required by Wyo. R. Crim. P. 48, and any delays did not violate Appellant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial; and (2) Appellant's right to counsel was not violated as the district court adequately instructed Appellant on the dangers of proceeding without counsel.

A state trooper stopped William Tiernan on suspicion of driving while impaired after he observed Tiernan's vehicle cross the center line and fog line a couple of times. The trooper conducted field sobriety tests and arrested Tiernan for driving under the influence of alcohol. Tiernan refused to submit to chemical testing. The Department of Transportation (DOT) subsequently suspended Tiernan's driver's license. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the suspension. The district court affirmed. Tiernan appealed, contending that the trooper failed to present sufficient facts to support the stop for a lane violation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the agency's decision.

Appellant Randal Craft entered a conditional guilty plea to felony possession of a controlled substance and reserved the right to appeal whether he entered a valid waiver of counsel in a prior conviction that was used to enhance the present charge to a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding Appellant's waiver of counsel in the proceeding at issue was knowing and intelligent where the advisements given in the proceeding complied with the requirements of Wyo. R. Crim. P. 11, and there was no indication in the record that Appellent did not understand those advisements, including the advisement that he had a right to an attorney.

In 1999, James Graham was convicted on four counts of obtaining property by false pretenses. Graham's appeal challenged the amount of restitution ordered as part of his sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. In 2010, Graham filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. The district court ruled that Graham's sentence was not illegal and denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Graham's appeal was barred under the doctrine of res judicata because he could have raised the majority of his issues in his initial appeal and did not suggest any good cause for failing to do so; (2) because res judicata barred his claims that the underlying sentence was illegal, there was no foundation for his challenge to the subsequent revocation of his probation; and (3) the Court was not compelled to consider Graham's claims in the interests of justice, largely because his claims were without merit.

Appellant Christopher Harrell was convicted of rape, kidnapping, and assault. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion when it did not allow him to introduce evidence that he had been acquitted of a previous battery charge and that his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process was violated because he was deprived of testimony that was vital, material, and relevant to his defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's arguments were not persuasive and that Appellant did not demonstrate that he suffered prejudice from the district court's refusal to allow him to introduce testimony about his previous acquittal for battery.

Petitioner Bobby Jenkins was charged with misdemeanor animal cruelty after a horse he owned was discovered in dire physical condition. A jury convicted him of the charges. The district court affirmed. Petitioner petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of review, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner failed to show that he was materially prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to (1) object to testimony and argument regarding the arrest and incarceration of both Petitioner and his brother, (2) object to the prosecutor's improper questioning of a witness about the credibility of another witness, or (3) object to the prosecutor's question relating to allegedly irrelevant testimony about the condition of other horses and Petitioner's speeding ticket.

Appellant Thomas Stastny was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor and attempted sexual abuse of a minor. On appeal, Appellant challenged the district court's admission of evidence of a prior conviction, accused the prosecutor of committing misconduct during closing argument, and alleged that these cumulative errors required reversal of his convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the doctrine of invited error barred Appellant from raising in his appeal issues concerning the admission of evidence of his prior conviction, (2) plain error did not occur as a result of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, and (3) as there was no error, the doctrine of cumulative error did not require reversal of Appellant's convictions.