Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of one count of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor and eight counts of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor. In this appeal, Appellant raised eight issues where he claimed there was an error in his trial. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant's convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the district court's decision finding the victim was competent to testify was clearly erroneous, as there was no evidence to support the conclusion that the victim understood the obligation to tell the truth while testifying, and the error was not harmless; (2) the admission of evidence that Appellant visited several pornographic websites on the Internet and admission of photos of the victim and his brother engaging in innocent activities in the nude, pursuant to Wyo. R. Evid. 404(b), was prejudicial error; (3) the district court's statement to the jury that they would hear about child pornography websites constituted plain error; and (4) plain error occurred when the interviewer expressed his opinion that Appellant was lying during the interview. View "Mersereau v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to six counts of second-degree sexual assault in 2000 and was sentenced to six consecutive life terms. In this appeal, Appellant, acting pro se, challenged the district court's denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence under Wyo. R. Crim. P. 35(a). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that Appellant's claims of illegal sentence were barred by the doctrine of res judicata; and (2) Appellant's claims that his sentence was illegal due to alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report and that the sentencing court erred in denying correction of factual inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report were barred by res judicata. View "Deloge v. State" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Vincent Scott of first degree sexual assault, aggravated assault, and child abuse. Scott appealed, claiming the district court denied his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself at trial and imposed an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court in this case had the discretion to deny Scott's untimely request to proceed without counsel, and although it erred in denying the request on the grounds that Scott's decision was not knowing and intelligent, the request was properly denied as untimely; and (2) the sentence imposed was not impossible or illegal because the district court awarded credit for time served, which made the sentencing scheme possible.

A Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper stopped Bryan Phelps and Justin Fitch for a traffic violation, detained them, conducted a drug dog sniff of their vehicle and, after the dog alerted to the presence of controlled substances, searched the vehicle and found marijuana. Phelps and Fitch were each charged with three felonies. They moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, and the district court denied the motion. Phelps and Fitch subsequently entered pleas of guilty to one of the counts while reserving their right to appeal the denial of their suppression motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the suppression motion, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that probable cause existed for the search.

After a jury trial, Appellant Charles Jones was convicted of aggravated robbery and first-degree murder. Jones appealed, arguing that the trial judge erroneously instructed the jury, that there was insufficient evidence to convict him, and that the prosecutor committed cumulative error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge's failure to give an intent instruction was harmless, as there was no prejudice to Jones; (2) the jury had sufficient evidence to convict Jones of robbery; and (3) Jones was not denied his right to a fair trial due to the cumulative effect of any alleged prosecutorial misconduct that may have occurred.

After entering a conditional plea to one count of felony child abuse, Roman Vance reserved his right to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss, which was premised on grounds of constitutional speedy trial. On appeal, Vance claimed that a six and one-half year delay between charging and arrest raised a presumption of prejudice that the State did not persuasively rebut. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that the district court erred in denying Vance's motion to dismiss based upon a violation of his constitutional speedy trial right, as the court overlooked the question of presumptive prejudice and because no evidence was offered by the prosecution to rebut the presumption of prejudice afforded to Vance.

After a jury trial, Appellant Francis Guerrero was convicted of felony larceny. The district court sentenced Appellant to three to five years of imprisonment. Appellant appealed, claiming the district court erroneously instructed the jury on the elements of larceny and that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. The Supreme Court agreed with Appellant's second claim and reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to show that Appellant's activities constituted a taking, one of the elements of larceny, as opposed to a conversion. Consequently, the Court found that Appellant was entitled to an acquittal on the charge of felony larceny.

Following a jury trial, Timothy Kramer was convicted of attempted first-degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not plainly err in instructing the jury on the elements of first-degree murder; (2) Kramer's trial attorneys were not ineffective by not objecting to the jury instructions, and counsel's investigation into the timeline of events was sufficient; and (3) the trial court did not err or violate Kramer's confrontation right when it allowed one of the main witnesses in the trial to testify via video conference, as, under the circumstances, presentation of this testimony in that manner was necessary to further an important public policy, and the reliability of the testimony was otherwise assured.

Defendant Christopher Counts was convicted of aggravated burglary and kidnapping. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error by the district court in admitting redacted documents and recordings into evidence was harmless; (2) the district court erred by limiting Defendant's cross-examination of the victim, but the error was harmless; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for a bill of particulars; (4) the district court properly instructed the jury; (5) the verdict was consistent; and (6) there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict on the charges of kidnapping and aggravated burglary.

Alfred Baldes, a certified nursing assistant, was convicted of two counts of third-degree sexual assault after giving a young man who suffered from muscular dystrophy a sponge bath. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain Baldes' conviction, and specifically, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that Baldes was in a position of authority and that sexual contact occurred, respectively; and (2) the trial court did not err when, following a Gleason analysis, it allowed the introduction of Wyo. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence, specifically the testimony of another client of Baldes'.