Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellants, two individuals, were arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DWUI). Each appellant's blood-alcohol content was determined in accordance with the procedures set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 31-6-102(d), which sets forth the procedure for remotely communicated search warrants in DWUI cases, in that the circuit court judge issued a remotely communicated search warrant after communicating via telephone with the arresting officer, who was under oath, and directed the officer to affix the judge's signature to the warrant. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the requirements of section 31-6-102(2) are the equivalent of an affidavit under the State Constitution and whether the requirements of Wyo. R. Crim. P. 41(c), which provides the procedural requirements for the issuance of a search warrant, must be met. The Supreme Court answered certified questions of law by holding (1) the procedures set forth in section 31-6-102(d) do not violate the State Constitution; and (2) search warrants issued pursuant to section 31-6-102(d) must meet the requirements of Rule 41(c). View "Smith v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant entered an unconditional guilty plea to one count of incest for having sexual intercourse with his adult daughter. The district court sentenced Appellant to thirteen and a half to fifteen years imprisonment. Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and sentence, holding (1) Appellant's guilty plea waived non-jurisdictional claims; (2) Appellant did not provide adequate grounds to support his claim of selective prosecution; (3) Appellant failed to establish that the district court relied on any allegedly inaccurate and improper information at sentencing; and (4) the remainder of Appellant's claims were without merit. View "Sisneros v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of a single count of felony larceny. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) any deficiency in Defendant's trial attorney's failure to challenge a certain juror for cause was not prejudicial, and therefore, counsel did not provide constitutionally ineffective assistance; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant Defendant's motion for a new trial based on the claim that another juror was mentally incompetent; and (3) Defendant could not prevail on his claim that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors warranted reversal of his conviction, as the doctrine did not apply in this case. View "Moore v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of eleven counts of burglary. At his arraignment, Appellant peremptorily disqualified Judge Kalokathis and the case was assigned to a different judge. After Defendant was convicted, the case was again assigned to Judge Kalokathis for sentencing. Judge Kalokathis sentenced Appellant to a total of forty-four to eighty-eight years but later vacated Appellant's sentence because he had previously been disqualified. Judge Grant was assigned the case for resentencing and sentenced Appellant to a total of fifty-two to seventy-five years. Appellant's convictions were affirmed on appeal. Appellant later filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, asserting that Judge Grant improperly increased the original sentence in violation of his due process rights. The district court denied Appellant's due process claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata because Appellant failed to raise them in the direct appeal from his convictions; and (2) Appellant's sentence on resentencing did not violate his constitutional due process and double jeopardy protections. View "Ferguson v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated assault and battery. Defendant appealed both convictions and requested remand for a hearing on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective because they failed to call expert witnesses to substantiate his claim of self-defense. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's request. On remand, the district court concluded that Defendant's trial counsel performed deficiently but that Defendant was not prejudiced by the deficient performance. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions, holding that the prosecution engaged in misconduct, and, given the numerous errors on the part of the prosecution, both of Defendant's convictions were tainted. Remanded for retrial. View "Drennen v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with three crimes for his sexually-charged attack on his sister-in-law. The morning trial was to begin, the district court allowed the State to amend to Information to clarify that one of the charges was for aggravated burglary, not simply burglary. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of aggravated burglary, battery, and third-degree sexual assault. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court erred by permitting amendment of the aggravated burglary charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion or deprive Appellant of his due process rights by granting the State's motion to amend the Information before trial began. View "Albarran v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit burglary. Defendant appealed, contending that the district court erred by refusing to order one of his co-conspirators to submit handwriting exemplars so that Defendant's expert witness could analyze whether the co-conspirator was the author of certain notes sent in jail. The district court concluded that there was no legal authority to require a non-party to appear before trial to provide handwriting exemplars. The Supreme Court disagreed with the district court but affirmed, holding (1) the subpoena procedure may be used to order a witness to provide handwriting exemplars; but (2) any error regarding Defendant's right to obtain handwriting exemplars from his co-conspirator was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "West v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with first degree sexual assault. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of third degree sexual assault. Appellant appealed, arguing that the jury should not have been instructed on third degree sexual assault because that offense was not charged and was not a lesser included offense of first degree sexual assault. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant's conviction for third degree sexual assault, holding that third degree sexual assault is not a lesser included offense of first degree sexual assault, and the jury in this case should not have been so instructed. View "Jackson v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant pled no contest to one felony count of aggravated assault and battery and one count of misdemeanor battery. Appellant appealed, claiming that he should be permitted to withdraw his plea because he was not properly advised. Specifically, Appellant claimed that the district court erred in failing to advise him at arraignment of the potential loss of firearm rights and any impact that loss might have on employment in occupations that require the use of a firearm, as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 7-11-507. The State argued that firearms advisements not be required for Defendants with prior convictions that disqualify them from possessing firearms under federal law. The Supreme Court set Appellant's conviction aside, holding that the district court erred in failing to advise Appellant of the potential loss of his firearms rights under federal law, as section 7-11-507 applies to all defendants facing a charge that may, under federal law, result in loss of firearms rights and employment requiring possession of a firearm. View "Balderson v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of one count of obtaining property by false pretenses and one count of wrongful disposing of that property. Appellant was sentenced to terms of imprisonment on each count, to be served consecutively. On appeal, Appellant contended, among other things, that the two criminal counts should have merged for purposes of sentencing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the "same elements" test shall henceforth serve as the sole test for evaluating sentencing merger questions, and the "same facts or evidence test" is overruled; (2) sufficient evidence supported Appellant's conviction for obtaining property by false pretenses; and (3) the district court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to merge sentences. View "Sweets v. State" on Justia Law