Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court denying Defendant's motion to suppress certain firearm evidence on the grounds that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant's vehicle, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the stop was lawful.At issue was whether the law enforcement officer in this case has a reasonable suspicion that Defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime. The court of appeals concluded that the stop was unlawful. The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed, holding that, considering the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable law enforcement officer knowing what the officer in this case knew and seeing what he saw would reasonably suspected that Defendant was engaged in a drug transaction, and therefore, the investigatory stop of Defendant's vehicle complied with the Fourth Amendment. View "State v. Genous" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment of conviction of Defendant for possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia and remanded with instructions to grant Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the seizure of Defendant was unlawful because the police officer did not have reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity.Defendant's conviction arose from a search of her vehicle. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the search violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) Defendant was seized when the officer returned to her vehicle after running a records check, withheld her driver's license, and continued to question her and her passenger in order to hold her until a drug-sniff dog arrived; and (2) the seizure was unlawful because Defendant did not have a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity at the time he seized her. View "State v. VanBeek" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the law on testimonial hearsay has not changed in the last fourteen years to such a degree that, at Defendant's new trial, the circuit court was no longer bound by the Supreme Court's decision on appeal in State v. Jensen (Jensen I), 727 N.W.2d 518 (Wis. 2007).Before Defendant's criminal trial for killing his wife, Julie, the Supreme Court held that certain hearsay statements made by Julie were testimonial and that the statements were inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause. Defendant was convicted. In subsequent federal habeas corpus litigation, the federal court held that it was not harmless error to admit Julie's testimonial statements and ordered Defendant's conviction vacated. The State then initiated new proceedings against Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to exclude Julie's statements, per Jensen I. The circuit court denied the motion, explaining that, under the law today, Julie's statements were not testimonial. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the circuit court was bound by Jensen I. View "State v. Jensen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this case to the circuit court with directions to deny Defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that Defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), when he was interviewed by a police officer.Defendant was an inmate in jail when he returned a call from an officer regarding an incident at Defendant's prior correctional institution. During the call, during which no Miranda warnings were given, Defendant admitted to the officer that he took and destroyed an inmate's missing property. The circuit court granted Defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that it was bound to apply the per se rule set forth in State v. Armstrong, 588 N.W.2d 606 (Wis. 1999), that incarcerated individuals are in custody for Miranda purposes. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the per se rule adopted in Armstrong was effectively overruled by the United States Supreme Court in Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (2012). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the decision in Howes functionally overruled Armstrong's per se rule; and (2) Defendant's circumstances did not satisfy the standard requirements for custody under Miranda's framework. View "State v. Halverson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's judgment of conviction and the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion for postconviction relief, holding that the felon-in-possession statute as applied to Defendant as applied to Defendant is constitutional.In 2003, Defendant was convicted of multiple felony counts of failure to support a child. Consequently, Defendant was permanently prohibited from possessing a firearm. Defendant was subsequently charged with one count of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of Wis. Stat. 941.29(2). Defendant moved for postconviction relief, arguing that section 941.29(2) was unconstitutional as applied because his 2003 conviction did not justify the lifetime firearm ban. The circuit court denied postconviction relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's challenge to the felon-in-possession statute requires the application of an intermediate level of scrutiny; and (2) the statute is constitutional as applied because it is substantially related to important governmental objectives. View "State v. Roundtree" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's judgment and order denying Defendant's postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea, holding that counsel was not ineffective and Defendant was not entitled to withdraw his plea post-sentencing.Defendant pleaded guilty to violation of sex offender registry and was sentenced. Almost one year later, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and that, as a result, his plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. After a hearing, the circuit court denied Defendant's postconviction motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in failing to inform Defendant about State v. Dinkins, 810 N.W.2d 787 (Wis. 2012), because Dinkins did not provide Defendant with a defense. View "State v. Savage" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for possession with intent to deliver cocaine, holding that the Wisconsin Constitution permits law enforcement to ask drivers stopped for a traffic violation to exit the vehicle, inquire about the presence of weapons, and request consent to search the driver.Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found during the search of the vehicle, contending that it was fruit of an unlawful search because the arresting officer's actions unlawfully extended the stop, and he lacked reasonable suspicion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the officer did not impermissibly extend Defendant's traffic stop beyond constitutional boundaries because his actions were negligently burdensome directly related to officer safety and therefore part of the stop's mission. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle, holding that the circuit court did not err in its evidentiary rulings.On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court (1) improperly excluded the expert testimony of Dr. Lawrence White, and (2) erred in denying his motion to suppress statements that he made to law enforcement because he was not read the Miranda warnings or, in the alternative, because his statements were not voluntarily made. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly excluded Dr. White's exposition testimony on the grounds that it did not fit with the facts of Defendant's case; (2) Defendant was subject to custodial interrogation and was not read the Miranda warnings, but the admission of those statements was harmless error; and (3) all of Defendant's statements were voluntary. View "State v. Dobbs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's denial of Defendant's suppression motion, holding that the deputies in this case were not acting as bona fide community caretakers when they seized Defendant's vehicle without a warrant, and therefore, the seizure and ensuing inventory search were both unconstitutional.Defendant was stopped for speeding and had been driving with a suspended operators license. The deputies told Defendant that department policy required them to take the vehicle to an impound lot. Prior to the tow, the deputies conducted an inventory search of the vehicle and discovered a firearm. Defendant was arrested for possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant moved to suppress the firearm, arguing that the "community caretaker" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement did not justify seizure of the vehicle. The circuit court denied the motion. Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief challenging the denial of his suppression motion. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the deputies were not acting as community caretakers when they decided to impound Defendant's vehicle; and (2) therefore, the seizure and ensuing inventory search were unconstitutional. View "State v. Brooks" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals denying Appellant's petition for habeas corpus after Appellant previously sought Wis. Stat. 974.06 postconviction relief without success, holding that the circuit court is the appropriate forum for Appellant's claim that postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to assert an ineffective trial counsel claim and that the language in State v. Starks, 833 N.W.2d 146 (Wis. 2013), is withdrawn to the extent it contradicts this conclusion.In both his habeas petition and postconviction motion, Appellant claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel for alleged errors that took place after his conviction. In ruling on Appellant's postconviction motion, the circuit court concluded that Appellant had sought relief in the wrong forum and should have instead filed a habeas petition. Appellant filed a habeas petition, which the court of appeals denied on the grounds that appellant should have instead filed an appeal of the circuit court's denial of his postconviction motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Knight/Rothering framework remains the correct mythology for determining the appropriate forum for a criminal defendant to file a claim relating to ineffective assistance of counsel after conviction; and (2) Appellant's original section 974.06 motion in the circuit court was properly filed. View "Warren v. Meisner" on Justia Law