Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant Douglas Williams pled no contest to manufacturing THC. Williams appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, asserting that the search warrant that was issued for his home by a circuit court commissioner was invalid as beyond the lawful authority of court commissioners, and that the evidence obtained upon the execution of the warrant should be suppressed. Williams' argued that any exercise of power by unelected persons, such as circuit court commissioners, violated the Wisconsin Constitution. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Wis. Stat. 757.96(1)(b), which grants specific statutory authority to circuit court commissioners to issue search warrants, was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Williams' motion to suppress, holding (1) section 757.69(1)(b) is constitutional, as it does not impermissibly intrude upon the judicial power granted to the courts by Wis. Const. art VII, 2; and (2) therefore, the circuit court commissioner's search warrant was validly issued.

After Employee suffered a work-related injury and was terminated by Employer due to Employer's inability to accommodate his physical restrictions, Employee filed a worker's compensation claim for permanent and total disability. The Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) determined that Employee was permanently and totally disabled as a result of his work injury. LIRC made this determination after denying Employer's last-minute request to cross-examine or make further inquires of Dr. Jerome Ebert, an independent physician appointed by the Department of Workforce Development to examine Schaefer and report on the cause of his disability. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Employer did not have a statutory right to cross-examine Dr. Ebert, (2) LIRC did not violate Employer's due process rights when it declined to remand for cross-examination, and (3) LIRC did not erroneously exercise its discretion by declining to remand for a third time to allow Dr. Ebert to be questioned further.

Defendant Devin Felix was convicted of second-degree intentional homicide. The court of appeals reversed, holding that statements and physical evidence obtained from Defendant outside of the home after Miranda warnings were given and waived following a warrantless in-home arrest made in violation of Payton v. New York were not sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful arrest as to be lawful. At issue before the Supreme Court was which analysis governed the admissibility of such evidence, Brown v. Illinois or New York v. Harris, both decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals after adopting the Harris exception to the exclusionary rule for certain evidence obtained after a Payton violation, holding that, where police had probable cause to arrest before the unlawful entry, a warrantless arrest from Defendant's home in violation of Payton required neither the suppression of statements outside of the home after Miranda rights were given and waived nor the suppression of physical evidence obtained from Defendant outside of the home.

The circuit court found William Dinkins guilty of knowingly failing to comply with the sex offender registration statute, which required Dinkins to provide the address at which he would be residing ten days prior to his release from prison. The court found that Dinkins attempted to comply with the statute but was unable to find housing for himself prior to his release. The court of appeals reversed. The State appealed, contending that homelessness was not a defense to failing to comply with the registration requirements and that Dinkins could have complied with the statute by listing a park bench or other on-the-street location as the place he would be residing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a registrant cannot be convicted of violating the statute for failing to report the address at which he will be residing when he is unable to provide this information.

Defendant was convicted at a bench trial of misdemeanor retail theft in the circuit court. On appeal, the court of appeals (1) affirmed the conviction; (2) denied Defendant's request to remand the cause to determine whether Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial; and (3) concluded that Defendant could raise the issue of postconviction counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel in a Wis. Stat. 974.06 motion. The court did not remand the matter. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in ruling that Defendant had an avenue of relief through section 974.06, and the court's error deprived Defendant of any opportunity for review of an on-its-face deficient jury trial waiver colloquy or the clear error by postconviction counsel in filing a defective postconviction motion. Remanded to reinstate Defendant's direct appeal rights and to remand the matter to the circuit court to allow counsel to file a new or amended motion for postconviction relief.

After a jury trial, Defendant Carl Dowdy was found guilty of second degree sexual assault. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to fifteen years imprisonment and then stayed the sentence in favor of a ten-year period of probation. Seven years later, Defendant petitioned the circuit court to reduce the length of his probation from ten years to seven years. The court granted the petition and thereby discharged Defendant from probation, finding (1) Wis. Stat. 973.09(3)(a) authorized the court to reduce the length of probation, and (2) there was cause for reducing the length of Defendant's probation. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court lacked authority to reduce the length of Defendant's probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Wis. Stat. 973.09(3)(a) does not grant a circuit court authority to reduce the length of probation; and (2) accordingly, the circuit court in this case erred as a matter of law when it relied upon section 973.09(3)(a) to reduce the length of Defendant's probation.

Defendant was convicted of battery to a law enforcement officer and disorderly conduct. Although the circuit court judge's daughter-in-law was not a member of the jury, she was in the pool of potential jurors, and Defendant used a peremptory challenge to remove the judge's daughter-in-law from the jury. The circuit court denied defendant's motion for a new trial, noting that neither party moved to strike the daughter-in-law for cause and neither the State nor Defendant suggested that the daughter-in-law was not a suitable juror. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction and the order denying post-conviction relief, holding that presiding judges must sua sponte remove their immediate family members from the panel of potential jurors. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant exercised a peremptory strike to remove the judge's daughter-in-law from the jury, and because Defendant did not claim the jury was unfair or partial, a new trial was not required under the circumstances.

After a jury trial, Daniel Hanson was found guilty of fleeing a traffic officer, a felony under Wis. Stat. 346.04(3). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly instructed the jury on the requirements of section 346.04(3); (2) there does not exist a subjective, good-faith exception to the fleeing law, and Hanson's opportunity to demonstrate any justification for his behavior was through his self-defense claim, which the jury considered and rejected; (3) the circuit court was correct to exclude testimony about the traffic officer's alleged confrontational character because the officer was not a "victim" for purposes of admitting character evidence under Wis. Stat. 904.04(1)(b); and (4) neither the Constitution nor the interests of justice warranted a new trial, as no constitutional infirmities were raised on appeal and the real controversy was tried.

Jason Goss was pulled over for a traffic stop, after which the officer discovered that Goss had a revoked license and, due to four prior drunk driving convictions, was subject to a .02 prohibited alcohol content (PAC) standard. While arresting Goss for the license offense, the officer noticed the odor of alcohol and asked Goss to provide a breath sample for a preliminary breath test (PBT). Goss was subsequently convicted for fifth offense drunk driving. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the officer's request for a PBT sample was made in violation of Wis. Stat. 343.303, which states that such requests may be made only where there is probable cause to believe the driver is operating a vehicle in violation of one of the statutes related to drunk driving. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under these circumstances, where Goss was known to be subject to a .02 PAC standard, the officer knew it would take very little alcohol for Goss to exceed that limit, and the officer smelled alcohol on Goss, there was probable cause to request a PBT breath sample.

In 1997, a jury found that Edwin West was a sexually violent person. West was committed under Wis. Stat. 980.08(1), which allows persons committed under chapter 980 to petition for supervised release into the community. In 2005, the legislature amended the statute, removing language that allocated the burden of proof to the State to prove that supervised release was not warranted. In 2008, West filed a motion with the circuit court to interpret whether the amended statute continued to allocate the burden on the State. The circuit court denied West's motion, finding that the amendments unambiguously placed the burden of proof with the committed individual. West appealed, arguing that the burden of proof did not rest with the committed person, and if it did, such allocation would violate due process and equal protection. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute unambiguously places the burden of proof with the committed individual, and the appropriate burden of persuasion is clear and convincing evidence; and (2) this allocation does not violate due process and equal protection.