Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of first-degree sexual assault of a child under the age of thirteen without great bodily harm. Following Defendant's conviction, all the principals in this case learned that Defendant was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years in prison. Defendant moved for a new trial on the basis that he was denied his due process rights when he was not adequately informed of the penalty of the crime prior to going to a jury trial. The circuit court granted the motion. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Defendant's lack of knowledge regarding a mandatory minimum sentence could not have interfered with Defendant's right to plea bargain because he did not have such a right. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the case must be remanded to the circuit court for a hearing to determine whether Defendant was prejudiced by the violations of Wis. Stat. 970.02(1)(a), which requires the judge who presides at an initial appearance to inform the defendant of the possible penalties for the offenses in the complaint.

Defendant pled guilty to second-degree recklessly endangering safety with a deadly weapon. Defendant moved for postconviction relief wherein he sought to withdraw his guilty plea and to vacate the judgment, asserting that the proceeding at which he pled guilty via videoconferencing violated due process as well as his statutory right to be present under Wis. Stat. 971.04(1)(g). Defendant argued that he could not have effectively waived his right to challenge the use of videoconferencing because he was not aware that such a right existed. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 971.04(1)(g) provides a criminal defendant the statutory right to be in the same courtroom as the presiding judge when a plea hearing is held, if the court accepts the plea and pronounces judgment; but (2) this statutory right may be waived, and Defendant waived it prior to pleading and the court's pronouncement of judgment.

Defendant was charged with being a party to the crime of possession with intent to deliver more than 10,000 grams of THC. Smith stipulated to the fact that the packages seized by the police contained more than 10,000 grams of THC. Prior to the jury's deliberations, the circuit court answered a verdict question for the jury concerning the weight of the drugs. The jury then found Defendant guilty as charged. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the cause, holding that Defendant did not waive his right to a jury determination of the drug quantity. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the guilty verdict and judgment of conviction, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction; and (2) although the circuit court erred in determining the drug quantity without submitting the question to the jury, the error was harmless because it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed, rational jury would have found Defendant guilty of the charged offense absent the error.

In 1992, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree sexual assault of a person under the age of sixteen years. Nearly eighteen years after his conviction, Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, basing his motion on Wis. Stat. 971.08, which allows a defendant to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea where a plea-accepting court fails to personally advise the defendant of the potential immigration consequences of the plea. The circuit court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The court of appeals affirmed. The court assumed that Defendant had not been personally advised as required under the statute, but, as Defendant was aware of the potential immigration consequences of his plea, the court concluded that any failure to personally advise him was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was properly denied, as Defendant's affidavit did not allege sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle him to withdraw his guilty plea.

A jury found Defendant guilty of several crimes stemming from allegations involving four teenage girls. Defendant appealed, challenging his conviction on four grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to convict Defendant of interference with child custody; (2) the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss five of the seven counts of second-degree sexual assault of a child as multiplicitous in violation of Defendant's constitutional protection against double jeopardy, as the five offenses, while identical in law, were different in fact; (3) the admission at trial of Defendant's mug shot did not deprive Defendant of his right to a fair trial; and (4) the circuit court appropriately exercised its discretion in ordering Defendant to wear a stun belt at trial.

At issue in these two consolidated appeals was whether Wis. Stat. 980 requires the dismissal of a pending commitment petition when the individual subject to the petition is re-incarcerated because of the revocation of parole or extended supervision. This appeal involved two defendants committed under chapter 980 after their parole and extended supervision was revoked. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court and held that dismissal of a Wis. Stat. 980 proceeding was not required when the subject of the petition is transferred to the custody of the Department of Corrections before a chapter 980 commitment order is entered. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State may proceed with a chapter 980 commitment after the revocation of a subject individual's parole or extended supervision; and (2) therefore, both of the chapter 980 commitments at issue in this case were valid.

Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State in which Defendant pled no contest to manufacturing THC. Based on a plea colloquy, the circuit court determined that the plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The circuit court accepted Defendant's plea and placed Defendant on probation for a period of two years. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for post-conviction relief, arguing that he was entitled to withdraw his plea to correct a manifest injustice because did not admit to having more than four marijuana plants at the time of the plea colloquy, but rather admitted to having only four plants. The circuit court denied Defendant's post-conviction motion, determining that Defendant's plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record, when viewed in its totality, did not support withdrawal of Defendant's plea, as Defendant did not meet his burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that allowing the withdrawal of his no contest plea was necessary to correct a manifest injustice.

In this case, an officer conducted a traffic stop of Dimitrius Anagnos's vehicle. Once the vehicle was stopped, the officer determined that Anagnos was intoxicated and arrested him for operating while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI). The circuit court determined that the traffic stop was unconstitutional and that Anagnos's operating privileges should not have been revoked on account of his refusal to take a chemical test to determine the presence or quantity of alcohol in his blood or breath. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the arresting officer pointed to specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, gave rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary for an investigative stop; and (2) because the stop of Anagnos's vehicle was supported by reasonable suspicion, the circuit court erred in concluding that the stop was unconstitutional and that Anagnos was not lawfully placed under arrest. Remanded.

As a result of an investigatory stop and search, police discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia in a vehicle driven by Defendant Joseph Miller. The circuit court denied Miller's motion to suppress the evidence and statement obtained from this stop, and Miller pleaded no contest to possession of between five and fifteen grams of cocaine with intent to distribute as a party to a crime. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the totality of the circumstances, police acted reasonably when they conducted an investigatory stop of the vehicle that Miller was driving based on reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, and therefore, the circuit court did err in denying Miller's motion to suppress.

Defendant was convicted of, inter alia, battery to a police officer, carrying a concealed weapon, and DUI. For the battery conviction, Rowan was sentenced to initial confinement followed by extended supervision. Among the conditions of extended supervision imposed by the sentencing court was the condition that Rowan's person, residence, or vehicle was subject to search for a firearm at any time by any law enforcement officer without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding (1) while the condition the circuit court imposed on Rowan's extended supervision may have impinged on constitutional rights, it did not violate them; and (2) the evidence in regard to Rowan's conviction for battery to a police officer was sufficient to support the conviction.