Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty and was convicted of child abuse-recklessly causing great bodily harm and neglecting a child resulting in the child's death. Defendant's appealed the denial of his motion to suppress statements he made after he stated that he wanted an attorney on the grounds that an Edwards v. Arizona violation had occurred. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly denied the motion to suppress because Defendant was not in custody when he asked for an attorney, and therefore, Miranda's rule requiring that the interrogation cease upon a request for an attorney did not apply, and there was no constitutional violation and no bar to using Defendant's subsequent statements. View "State v. Lonkoski" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of stalking, bail jumping, and violating a harassment injunction. Defendant appealed, contending (1) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to use certain fingerprint evidence and related testimony in rebuttal, which the court had previously excluded from the State's case-in-chief due to a discovery violation; and (2) he was deprived of his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury because, he claimed, one of the jurors was sleeping during a portion of defense counsel's closing argument. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) properly exercised its discretion in permitting the rebuttal use of the fingerprint evidence and related testimony; and (2) did not clearly err in finding that the juror was not sleeping and in therefore concluding that Defendant failed to establish a finding necessary to his contention. View "State v. Novy" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers installed a GPS device on Defendant's vehicle and monitored the vehicle pursuant to a warrant. The warrant was based on witness reports that a car matching the description of Defendant's vehicle had been seen at the locations of recent burglaries in the area. The device was installed after officers lawfully stopped Defendant and his co-defendant in the suspect vehicle. The officers then moved the vehicle to another location where the GPS device could be installed. Only days later, Defendant was arrested and charged with fourteen criminal counts. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence obtained through the use of the GPS device on the ground that the evidence was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Defendant then pled guilty to some counts. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Defendant's suppression motion, holding (1) the three-hour seizure of Defendant's vehicle was supported by probable cause and was thus constitutionally permissible; and (2) the technology used in conducing the GPS search did not exceed the scope of the warrant allowing GPS tracking of Defendant's vehicle. View "State v. Brereton" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol content, fourth offense. Defendant appealed, challenging the circuit court's denial of his suppression motion and collaterally attacking a prior conviction as the result of an invalid waiver to the right to counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress, as the law enforcement officers' warrantless search of Defendant's bedroom was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) despite a technically deficient plea colloquy, Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel before he pleaded not contest to his second operating a motor vehicle under the influence offense in 1998, and thus the circuit court properly denied the collateral attack of his earlier conviction and thus properly considered the 1998 conviction in determining that Defendant had three prior relevant convictions. View "City of Menasha v. Gracia" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of two counts of robbery, party to a crime. Twelve years later, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence and in the interest of justice. Defendant's arguments stemmed from new expert analysis of a video of one of the robberies. By applying new technology - digital photogrammetry - one expert concluded that Defendant was too tall to be the robber in the video. The circuit court denied relief. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Defendant was entitled to a new trial based on the photogrammetry evidence and in the interest of justice because the jury was precluded from hearing photogrammetry evidence, and therefore, the real controversy was not fully tried. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) there was not a reasonable probability that a jury, looking at both the evidence presented at trial and the new digital photogrammetry evidence, would have a reasonable doubt as to Defendant's guilt; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice because the controversy was fully tried even though the jury did not hear the photogrammetry evidence. View "State v. Avery" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first degree sexual assault of a child. Prior to trial, Defendant moved to suppress statements he made during an undisputedly non-custodial interrogation, claiming they were involuntary. The circuit court found Defendant's statements were voluntary under the totality of the circumstances and allowed admission of the statements at trial. Defendant then testified at trial and was convicted. Defendant appealed on the grounds that the statements were involuntary and were thus improperly admitted. The court of appeals assumed the statements were involuntary but held that, in light of the other evidence produced at trial, the admission of the statements was harmless error. The Supreme Court affirmed but under a different analysis, holding that the admission of Defendant's statements at trial was not error because, under the totality of the circumstances, the statements were voluntary. View "State v. Lemoine" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to three felonies on the morning of a scheduled trial in which he was facing six felony charges. As part of the plea bargain, the State agreed to dismiss three felony charges, but there was no agreement that the dismissed charges would be "read-in" under Wis. Stat. 973.20(1g)(b). At sentencing, the circuit court explicitly considered the dismissed charges in explaining and imposing Defendant's sentence. Defendant subsequently challenged the validity of the sentence. The circuit court denied Defendant's motion for resentencing, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a circuit court may consider dismissed charges in imposing sentence; (2) the circuit court here did not use the dismissed charges for an improper purpose; and (3) Defendant had adequate opportunity to refute the purported inaccuracies of the facts underlying the dismissed charges.

The circuit court suppressed an incriminating statement that Defendant made to police during custodial interrogation. The court of appeals reversed, holding that even though Defendant invoked his right to counsel during questioning, he later initiated conversation with his police interrogator and thereafter knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights before making the incriminating statement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendants' Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his equivalent right under the Wisconsin Constitution were not violated, as Defendant withdrew his request for an attorney by voluntarily initiating a request to resume the questioning; and (2) the court of appeals was not required to disregard State v. Middleton, but Middleton was factually distinguishable from this case and was now overruled in its entirety.

Defendant appealed his convictions of four counts of child enticement after the circuit court declined to suppress an incriminating statement Defendant made to police officers who were conducting a follow up investigation of incriminating admissions that Defendant made to his probation agent during a compelled polygraph examination. Defendant claimed that his admissions to the agent were subject to use and derivative use immunity, and that the derivative use immunity covered the subsequent statement he made to the police, even though this statement was preceded by a valid Miranda warning. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) Defendant's statement to officers was subject to derivative use immunity and could not be used in any subsequent criminal trial; and (2) Defendant's compelled statement to his probation agent, his subsequent statement to the police, and any evidence derived from either statement must be suppressed in any criminal trial.

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of one count of possession of a firearm by a felon and one count of carrying a concealed weapon. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant made incriminating statements while in police custody and while being subjected to interrogation by police officers, he had a Fifth Amendment right to receive Miranda warnings; (2) accordingly, it was error to admit the incriminating statements at trial; and (3) because the State did not meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found Defendant guilty absent the error, the error was not harmless.