Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to two felonies. The Department of Corrections prepared a presentence investigation report (PSI) to assist in Defendant's sentencing, but when the circuit court and the parties received the PSI, Defendant disputed some of the information in the report. The circuit court judge ordered that a second PSI be prepared omitting the disputed information and that the first PSI be destroyed. The judge's successor modified the destruction order after Defendant was sentenced, ordering that the first PSI be sealed rather than destroyed because he questioned the court's authority to order the destruction of PSIs. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) courts do not have either express or implied statutory authority to order the destruction of PSIs; and (2) courts lack the inherent authority to order the destruction of PSIs on the facts before the Court because that power is not necessary to a court's administration of justice. View "State v. Melton" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted first-degree intentional homicide. Defendant had previously entered pleas of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect but later withdrew the not guilty pleas as part of a plea agreement. After he was sentenced, Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and trial court error because he was not informed about the possibility of a bifurcated plea with the right to a jury trial focused on the issue of his mental responsibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's claim alleging ineffective assistance was insufficient, as Defendant never alleged (i) his trial counsel failed to inform him that he had the option of pleading guilty to the crimes but also not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, or (ii) if trial counsel had informed him of the option of a trial focused solely upon mental responsibility, he would have chosen that option; and (2) Defendant's second claim was also insufficient because Defendant failed to state that, due to a defect in the plea colloquy, he did not enter his pleas knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. View "State v. Burton" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a minor diagnosed with aplastic anemia. Petitioner opposed any life-saving blood transfusions on religious grounds. Petitioner's parents supported her position. The circuit court ultimately appointed a temporary guardian for the purpose of deciding whether to consent to medical treatment. While Petitioner's appeal was pending, the order appointing the temporary guardian expired. The court of appeals dismissed Petitioner's appeal, finding that the issues presented were moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the issues presented in this case were moot; and (2) it was unwise to address the moot issues because the legislature was far better able to decide substantial social policy issues such as those presented in this case. View "In re Sheila W." on Justia Law

Mother and Father chose to treat their eleven-year-old daughter's undiagnosed illness with prayer rather than medicine. Their daughter subsequently died from diabetic ketoacidosis resulting from untreated juvenile onset diabetes mellitus. In separate trials with different juries, Mother and Father were each convicted of second-degree reckless homicide. The parents appealed, arguing (1) their convictions for choosing treatment through prayer violated due process fair notice requirements; and (2) their convictions should be reversed because the real controversy was not fully tried due to erroneous jury instructions and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding, inter alia, (1) the second-degree reckless homicide statute and the criminal child abuse statute provided sufficient notice that the parents' conduct could have criminal consequences if their daughter died; (2) the jury instructions on parents' duty to provide medical care were not erroneous, as the statutory provision protecting treatment through prayer does not negate the legal duty to provide medical care in a second degree reckless homicide prosecution; (3) trial counsels did not provide ineffective assistance; and (4) the controversy was fully tried where the circuit court properly refused to instruct the jury on the parents' sincerely held religious belief in prayer. View "State v. Neumann" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged and convicted of two counts of conspiracy to commit theft by fraud of property in excess of $10,000. The charges stemmed from Defendant's conspiracy, while in prison, that defrauded AT&T out of approximately $28,000 of phone services by furnishing the company with fraudulent information. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant made "false representations" to AT&T under the theft-by-fraud statute by submitting fictitious names and stolen personal identifying information; and (2) "property" under the theft-by-fraud statute is all forms of tangible property, including electricity, and therefore, because Defendant stole electricity from AT&T , the conspiracy perpetrated against AT&T deprived the company of its property. View "State v. Steffes" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession of child pornography. Defendant moved to suppress the seized evidence, claiming that law enforcement violated his Fourth Amendment rights by entering his residence and viewing suspicious files on his computer after the woman he was dating invited the officer to enter the residence. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the woman had the authority to extend the invitation to the officer to cross the threshold and validly consented to the officer's entry and search. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the woman had actual authority to consent to the officer's entry into the home and the living room and to consent to the officer's search of the laptop. View "State v. Sobczak" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of child pornography after making incriminating statements to his probation agent. The statements led directly to Defendant's conviction. Defendant appealed the circuit court's denial of his motion to suppress the admissions to his probation agent, claiming they were compelled, testimonial, and incriminating in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination. The court of appeals upheld the circuit court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the facts in the record were insufficient to show compulsion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was insufficient evidence in the record to show that Defendant's statements were compelled. View "State v. Sahs" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of fleeing or attempting to elude a traffic officer. Defendant appealed, contending that the jury instructions given in this case required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant violated Wis. Stat. 346.04(3) "by increasing the speed of the vehicle to flee" and that there was no evidence that Defendant increased the speed of his vehicle after law enforcement officers began to pursue him. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the disputed jury instruction was erroneous because it added a requirement to the statutory definition of the crime; but (2) it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found Defendant guilty of the crime of fleeing or attempting to elude an officer, and therefore, there was sufficient evidence to convict Defendant. View "State v. Beamon" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to first-degree sexual assault with a child. Defendant was convicted to a violation of Wis. Stat. 948.02(1)(d). The court of appeals ordered the judgment of conviction to be amended in accordance with the plea agreement and ordered the circuit court to list the correct crime, a violation of Wis. Stat. 948.02(1)(e). The court then remanded for resentencing because a structural error occurred when the circuit court imposed the sentence relying on the penalty provision for a violation of section 948.02(d) instead of the penalty provision for a violation of section 948.02(e). The State appealed. At issue on appeal was whether a circuit court's imposition of a sentence using inaccurate information that Defendant was subject to a mandatory minimum five-year period of confinement is structural error or subject to the application of harmless error analysis. The Supreme Court affirmed, but on different grounds, holding (1) the error in this case was subject to a harmless error analysis and was not a structural error; and (2) the error was not harmless. View "State v. Travis" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to charges of uttering a forgery as a repeater. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to a six-year term of imprisonment for the conviction. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief moving to withdraw his contest plea, arguing that it was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The circuit court denied Defendant's motion without requiring the State to prove that Defendant entered his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The court stated that since Defendant was informed that he faced a six-year term of imprisonment and he received a six-year term of imprisonment, any error was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, as Defendant knew the maximum penalty that could be imposed and was verbally informed at the plea hearing of the penalty that he received; and (2) withdrawal of Defendant's plea was not necessary to correct a manifest injustice. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law