Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In Milwaukee County Circuit Court Defendant pled guilty to criminal charges. At the time of her arrest, Defendant was on probation after pleading guilty to three criminal charges in Waukesha County. Consequently, the Waukesha County Circuit Court sentenced Defendant to a term of confinement and a term of probation. The Milwaukee County Circuit Court subsequently sentenced Defendant to a term of confinement and extended supervision. The next day, the Milwaukee County Circuit Court sua sponte recalled the case and modified Defendant’s sentences due to the court’s mistaken belief in the length of Defendant’s Waukesha County sentence. The result was a nine-month increase in Defendant’s overall time of incarceration. Defendant filed a post-conviction motion to reinstate her original sentence, arguing that the circuit court violated her constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of finality, and therefore double jeopardy principles were not implicated, and the circuit court acted appropriately in resentencing Defendant. View "State v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In 2005, Ardonis Greer pled guilty to criminal charges and was sentenced to terms of imprisonment. In 2007, Greer began serving his period of probation. Subsequently, Greer was erroneously issued a discharge certificate stating that he was discharged from supervision. In 2010, Greer pled no contest to intimidating a witness. Thereafter, the Department of Corrections (DOC) discovered that Greer was still purportedly serving the probation term from his 2004 conviction and initiated revocation proceedings against Greer. The Division of Hearings and Appeals ordered Greer’s probation revoked. Greer filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the DOC lost jurisdiction to revoke his probation when it issued the discharge certificate. The circuit court reversed the Division’s decision. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the erroneous issuance of a discharge certificate did not deprive the DOC of jurisdiction to revoke Greer’s probation because his court-ordered term of probation had not expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the DOC retained jurisdiction over Greer despite the erroneous issuance of the discharge certificate; (2) Greer’s due process rights were not violated; and (3) the circuit court, sitting in certiorari, was not empowered to equitably estop the DOC from revoking Greer’s probation. View "Greer v. Wiedenhoeft" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with sexually assaulting his niece. During trial, the jury asked the circuit court if it needed to agree on the location of the assault, and the court responded, “no.” The court of appeals remanded for a new trial, concluding that this exchange permitted the jury to speculate beyond the evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court’s response of “no” did not deprive Defendant of a unanimous verdict because, where the location of the crime was not one of the essential elements of the crime, the jurors did not need to unanimously agree on the location; and (2) Defendant failed to show that the court’s response of “no” was ambiguous or reasonably likely to cause the jury to apply the jury instructions in a manner that violated due process, as the response was unlikely to mislead the jury into believing that the victim’s credibility was irrelevant and that it could speculate beyond the evidence. View "State v. Badzinski" on Justia Law

A six-person jury found Milwaukee County met its burden to involuntarily commit Appellant for mental illness treatment under Wis. Stat. 51.20, and the circuit court entered an order that committed Appellant for a period no longer than six months. Appellant appealed, arguing that the six-person non-unanimous jury available to her under section 51.20 violated equal protection guarantees. Specifically, Appellant argued that her equal protection rights were violated because only a six-person jury with a five/six determination is available to those subject to involuntary commitment under Chapter 51 when compared to the twelve-person jury with a requirement of unanimity for individuals subject to involuntary civil commitment proceedings under Chapter 980. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the differences in the jury provisions for initial commitment hearings under Chapter 51 and Chapter 980 do not violate Appellant's constitutional right to equal protection. View "Milwaukee County v. Mary F.-R." on Justia Law

Bostco LLC and Parisian, Inc. (hereinafter, Bostco) filed a complaint against Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District (MMSD), claiming that MMSD's negligent operation and maintenance of a sewerage tunnel beneath Bostco's property resulted in excessive groundwater seepage into the tunnel, causing significant damage to Bostco's buildings. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the circuit court. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals on all but one of the issues, holding (1) MMSD was not entitled to immunity for its construction and maintenance of the tunnel; (2) the court of appeals erred in denying the equitable relief of abatement, as MMSD's duty to abate the private nuisance that MMSD caused by its negligent maintenance of the deep tunnel was not statutorily abrogated; (3) the damage cap capping the damages recoverable in an action against governmental entities at $50,000 does not violate equal protection; and (4) MMSD had sufficient notice of Bostco's claim. Remanded. View "Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist." on Justia Law

Defendant condemned a pair of easements on the residential property of Plaintiffs to facilitate the placement of high-voltage transmission lines. Plaintiffs filed a right-to-take action, arguing that because the proposed easements would cover more than half of their property and render their residential improvements obsolete, they would be left with an "uneconomic remnant" under Wis. Stat. 32.06(3m). The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, concluding that Plaintiffs' property, after the taking of the easements, was an uneconomic remnant, and ordered Defendant to acquire the entire property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that after Defendant took two easements for transmission lines, Plaintiffs' property was an uneconomic remnant because its condition was such that it was of substantially impaired economic viability as either a residential or an industrial parcel. View "Waller v. Am. Transmission Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of second-degree sexual assault by use of force. Defendant appealed, contending that his right to confrontation was violated when the circuit court allowed a state crime lab analyst to testify that an out-of-state lab produced DNA profiles of semen found on the victims' swabs, which the analyst discovered resulted in a match to Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Defendant's confrontation rights were not violated because the DNA profiles produced by the out-of-state lab were not testimonial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the expert's testimony did not violate Defendant's right to confrontation; and (2) even assuming that the admission of the expert's testimony violated Defendant's right to confrontation, the error was harmless in light of Defendant's previous admissions of sexual intercourse with the victims. View "State v. Deadwiller" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of reckless homicide and possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a motion pursuant to Wis. Stat. 974.06, alleging that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. The circuit court dismissed the motion for exceeding the page length limit. Two days later, Defendant filed a Cherry motion to vacate his assessed DNA surcharge, which the circuit court denied as untimely. Defendant subsequently refiled his original section 974.06 motion within the page limit requirement. The circuit court denied the motion on the merits. The court of appeals affirmed but on different grounds, holding that Defendant's second section 974.06 was procedurally barred because Defendant did not raise his ineffective assistance of counsel arguments in his Cherry motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a defendant is not required to raise postconviction ineffective assistance of counsel arguments in a Cherry motion; but (2) Defendant's appellate attorney was not ineffective. View "State v. Starks" on Justia Law

Defendant was a suspect in two arsons committed in a nearby town. On March 30, a detective met with Defendant and asked him about the two arsons. Defendant requested counsel, and the detective ceased questioning him. On April 20, the detective arrested Defendant for the arson fires. Defendant asked if his attorney could be "present for this" before being brought into an interrogation room. After waiving his Miranda rights, Defendant made incriminating statements to the detective. Defendant was charged with the arsons and moved to suppress the statements he made after he waived his right to counsel on April 20. The circuit court granted the motion, finding that the detective violated Defendant's right to counsel on April 20 when he interrogated Defendant after Defendant unequivocally, unambiguously requested counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because nineteen days had passed between when Defendant was released from custody and when he was reinterrogated, the March 30 invocation did not bar the interrogation on April 20; but (2) after Defendant's request for an attorney on April, police should have ceased questioning him, and because they did not, Defendant's statements made after that request must be suppressed. View "State v. Edler" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide. Defendant subsequently sought postconviction relief, arguing that his constitutional and statutory rights were violated when the trial judge held separate in-chambers discussions with two jurors regarding a potential bias issue outside Defendant's presence. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the circuit court's decision to exclude Defendant from the in-chambers meetings with the jurors did not deprive Defendant of a fair and just hearing because his attorneys were present at the in-chambers meetings and Defendant would not have been able to contribute anything to the circuit court's inquiry of the jurors; and (2) Defendant's statutory right to be present during voir dire was not violated because, in this case, the trial had already commenced and the jurors had been selected when the in-chambers meeting took place. View "State v. Alexander" on Justia Law