Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Ludwikowski went to the police station to report extortionate threats. He was there for about seven hours and was questioned extensively about why he was vulnerable to extortion. He was given water and offered pizza. He went to the restroom, unaccompanied, at least three times. He was interviewed for about four hours, in three phases, punctuated by breaks. He had his phone and used it to make a call. It came to light that Ludwikowski, a pharmacist, had been filling fraudulent oxycodone prescriptions. He was later tried for distribution of a controlled substance. He moved to suppress the statements he made at the police station, arguing that they were inadmissible because no one read him his Miranda rights. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Ludwikowski was not in custody, so no Miranda warnings were needed. Much of the interview was devoted to trying to identify the extorter and the motivation; the interview would have been shorter if Ludwikowski had been more responsive. His statements at the police station were not involuntary. A reasonable person would have understood he could leave; Ludwikowski’s calm demeanor and calculated answers belie his argument that he subjectively felt his freedom was constrained. There was no plain error in the admission of expert testimony on the practice of pharmacy. . View "United States v. Ludwikowski" on Justia Law

Orie, a former state senator, used her government-funded legislative staff to do fundraising and campaigning for her reelection. When the Commonwealth investigated, she tried to hide and destroy documents. Orie's sisters, including a Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice, were also charged. At trial, Orie introduced exhibits with directives to her chief of staff, not to do political work on legislative time. The prosecution determined that these exhibits had forged signatures. The court found that the forged documents were “a fraud on the Court,” and declared a mistrial. The Secret Service subsequently found that many of the exhibits were forged. During Orie’s second trial, the prosecution's expert testified that Orie’s office lease barred her staff from using that office for anything besides legislative work. Orie unsuccessfully sought to call an expert to testify that the senate rules let staff do political work from legislative offices on comp time. Orie was convicted of theft of services, conspiracy, evidence tampering, forgery, and of using her political position for personal gain, in violation of the Pennsylvania Ethics Act. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of her federal habeas petition, first finding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider her Ethics Act challenge because she is not in custody for those convictions. The court rejected a double jeopardy argument. The state court reasonably found that a mistrial was manifestly necessary because the forged documents could have tainted the jury’s verdict. Orie did not show that her senate-rules expert’s testimony would have been material, so she had no constitutional right to call that witness. View "Orie v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

In 2003, Cordaro and his co-defendant were elected as two of three Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania county commissioners. About 30 percent of Ackers’ business was municipal engineering, mostly for Lackawanna County. McLaine, Acker’s principal, expressed concerns to Cordaro's friend, Hughes. Hughes arranged a meeting, telling McLaine to bring a list of Acker's existing work for the county. McLaine’s list included the Lackawanna Watershed 2000 Program, a multi-year project based on a $30 million congressional grant; work on the Main Street and Gilmartin Street Bridges; work for several municipal authorities; and surveying, paving, and mapping. Cordaro stated, “I think I can let you keep that, . . . if we’re having fundraisers you’re going to have to participate and support us.” McLaine agreed. After becoming aware that Acker might lose two large contracts, McLaine called Hughes, who called Cordaro. Hughes asked, “how much money ... to give for the work.” Cordaro said, “maybe $15,000.” Hughes told McLaine that if he gave him $10,000 a month for Cordaro, Hughes could guarantee that Acker would keep its contracts and that he would lose his work if he did not pay. Payments began. In 2011, Cordaro was convicted of bribery, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B); Hobbs Act extortion, section 1951(a); and racketeering, sections 1962(c) and (d). The court instructed the jury that those crimes required an “official act.” In 2016, the Supreme Court (McDonnell) clarified what constitutes an “official act.” The Third Circuit affirmed the rejection of Cordaro’s habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2241) because Cordaro cannot show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror properly charged under McDonnell would have convicted him. View "Cordaro v. United States" on Justia Law

Ayers, an experienced Kentucky criminal-defense attorney, was indicted in 2008 on five counts of failing to file state tax returns. Ayers represented himself throughout the 21 months between his indictment and trial, but never formally elected to do so. He never waived his right to counsel on the record, filed a notice of appearance, or moved to be allowed to proceed pro se. The court allegedly failed to inform him at his arraignment that he had a right to counsel and never subsequently sought to determine whether Ayers’s self-representation was a voluntary, intelligent, and knowing waiver of his right to counsel. When Ayers asked for a continuance a day before trial was scheduled to begin so that he could hire an attorney with whom he attested he was already in negotiations, the court denied his request and forced him to proceed pro se. Ayers was convicted. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. The Kentucky Supreme Court acted contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent when it held that trial courts need not “obtain a waiver of counsel” before allowing “experienced criminal trial attorneys” to represent themselves. Applying de novo review, the court concluded that Ayers did not validly waive his right to counsel. View "Ayers v. Hall" on Justia Law

On the facts of the case, the constitutional speedy trial clock began to run from the date of the original indictment rather than from the date of an additional charge first brought in a superseding indictment.A federal grand jury indicted Defendant on twelve counts of wire fraud. Approximately six years later, the government filed a superseding indictment containing the same twelve wire-fraud counts as the original indictment and adding a new count for bank fraud. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the original indictment and the added bank-fraud count on Sixth Amendment speedy trial grounds. The government appealed, arguing that, with respect to the bank-fraud charge, the district court should have measured the period of delay from the filing of the superseding indictment, not from the filing of the initial indictment. The First Circuit disagreed, holding that the bringing of an additional charge does not reset the Sixth Amendment speedy trial clock to the date of the superseding indictment where the additional charge and the charge for which the defendant was previously accused are based on the same act or transaction, or common scheme or plan, and where the government could have, with diligence, brought the additional charge at the time of the prior accusation. View "United States v. Handa" on Justia Law

Martin, Kentucky Mayor Thomasine Robinson, sought reelection. Her challenger, Howell, won by three votes. Husband James confronted and threatened to kill Howell; he was convicted in state court of terroristic threatening and menacing. Thomasine was charged with bribery, coercion, and intimidation. Testimony indicated that: Thomasine gave a woman $20 to vote for her and coerced voters to vote for her by absentee ballot; that her son Steven attempted to intimidate a voter; that James paid $10 for a vote; and that James gave an individual money with which to purchase votes. The jury returned a guilty verdict on conspiracy and vote-buying (52 U.S.C. 10307(c)) charges, but the court granted James acquittal on the conspiracy charge. Thomasine was convicted of vote-buying and conspiracy to violate civil rights (18 U.S.C. 241); Steven was found guilty of conspiracy and two counts of vote-buying, but acquitted of a third count. The court assessed a leadership enhancement to James for directing another to purchase votes and an obstruction of justice enhancement for behaving menacingly during a trial recess and sentenced him to an above-guidelines 40 months in prison. Steven was sentenced to 21 months and three years of supervised release, with a condition requiring him to abstain from the consumption of alcohol. Thomasine was sentenced to 33 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In 2007 fraudulent checks in the amount of $181,577 were cashed against the accounts of seven Citizens Bank customers in New York, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. Fraud investigator Swoyer discovered that Tolliver’s employee number was the only one used to access all of the accounts; only Tolliver and one assistant manager worked on all of the days on which the accounts were accessed.. Swoyer, Postal Inspector Busch, and a Secret Service agent interviewed Tolliver. At trial, Swoyer testified that he reviewed Tolliver’s entire logbook with her and that Tolliver told him that she had not given her password to anyone and that she always logged off her computer when she walked away from a terminal. Seven of Tolliver’s former co-workers testified they never knew Tolliver’s password or saw it written down. A jury convicted Tolliver of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344, aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a), and unauthorized use of a computer, 18 U.S.C. 1030. The court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment and restitution. The Third Circuit affirmed. Tolliver, represented by newly appointed counsel, filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, claiming that her trial counsel was ineffective by failure to investigate. The district court granted her motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Third Circuit vacated. View "United States v. Tolliver" on Justia Law

King pled guilty in Arkansas state court to 1,577 counts of forgery and theft of property for embezzling more than $700,000 from the school district where she worked. The court sentenced King to 80 years imprisonment, within the guidelines range. King had no criminal history and claims she accepted the plea because of threats that her husband and son would also be charged. Five months later, the court reduced King’s sentence to 20 years imprisonment, under Arkansas Code 16-90-111, which allows a trial court to “correct an illegal sentence at any time” or to “correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within . . . ninety (90) days after the sentence is imposed.” The state appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court, which reinstated King’s 80-year sentence, finding the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the reduction because the 90-day period for doing so had expired. King sought federal habeas relief. Although the district court was clearly sympathetic, it found no grounds for habeas relief. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that King is not entitled to habeas relief based on her disagreement with the Arkansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of Arkansas law. View "King v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted and sentenced for conspiracy to obstruct justice, accessory after the fact to mail fraud and securities law violations, altering documents to influence a federal investigation, and aiding and abetting false testimony at an SEC deposition. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err at sentencing by applying both the “Broker-Dealer” enhancement and the “Special Skill” enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines; (2) the district court did not err in calculating loss and victim amounts, as required under the Sentencing Guidelines; (3) Defendant was competent to waive his right to a jury trial, and his waiver was knowing and intelligent; and (4) the district court did not plainly err in (a) excluding a non-lawyer’s testimony reciting facts and the legal conclusion that Defendant did not break the law; (b) determining that the district court was capable of understanding an expert’s opinion regarding Defendant’s professional and ethical duties as an attorney; and (c) admitting coconspirator nonhearsay testimony. View "United States v. Tamman" on Justia Law

Waters, a former Michigan state legislator, became involved in a corruption probe involving her then-live-in companion, political consultant Riddle. With a negotiated plea agreement, Waters pleaded guilty to filing a fraudulent tax return (26 U.S.C. 7207). The district court sentenced her to a year’s probation on the misdemeanor charge. Eight days later, Waters moved pro se to withdraw her guilty plea. The district court denied that motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed and later affirmed Waters’s conviction and sentence. More than three years later, Waters petitioned for a writ of error coram nobis, claiming that her attorney was constitutionally ineffective in promising that her misdemeanor conviction could “easily” be expunged and in failing to represent her vigorously at sentencing because he had a conflict of interest arising from his simultaneous representation of Riddle. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Waters did not establish an ongoing civil disability. At most she has alleged an injury to reputation, but this is not enough to warrant coram nobis. Although Waters claimed that her ability to travel outside the United States has been impaired, she did not show how this is the case.View "United States v. Waters" on Justia Law