Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The West Virginia Office of Tax Appeals rejected the challenge of ConAgra Brands, Inc. to assessments for unpaid corporation net income tax and business franchise tax. The assessments were imposed on apportioned royalties ConAgra received from the licensing of its intangible trademarks and trade names for use through the United States, including West Virginia. In setting aside the decision of the Office of Tax Appeals, the circuit court held that ConAgra's licensing transactions did not constitute doing business in West Virginia and that the assessments failed to meet the requirements of the due process and commerce clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The State Tax Commissioner sought reinstatement of the assessments for corporation net income tax and business franchise tax. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, holding that the order setting aside the decision of the Office of Tax Appeals and invalidating the assessments should not be disturbed.

Michael Chenoweth was arrested for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Thereafter, Commissioner Joe Miller of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles issued an order revoking Chenoweth's privilege to drive a motor vehicle. The circuit court reversed and vacated the revocation of Chenoweth's driver's license based on its finding that the trooper improperly stopped Chenoweth's vehicle without an articulable reasonable suspicion. In so doing, the circuit court applied the exclusionary rule to an administrative driver's license revocation proceeding. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no illegal stop, and thus it was not necessary to reach the issue of whether the circuit court properly applied the exclusionary rule in this case.

Respondent Timothy Judge was charged with failure to register as a sex offender. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, which the trial court granted after concluding that Respondent did not violate the West Virginia Sex Offender Registration Act by failing to re-register as a sex offender after a one-night period of confinement in jail for an unrelated charge. The State appealed, contending that every dismissal from a penal institution, regardless of the nature of the offense or the length of confinement, requires a sex offender to initiate the registration process required by the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the indictment, holding that Respondent was in compliance with the registration requirements of the Act, and Respondent was not required by the provisions of the Act to re-register with the state police following his release from jail.

In these consolidated cases, Petitioners Paul Hoston and Reese Riley were convicted of drug-related offenses. In their appeals, Petitioners challenged the circuit court's denial of their motions to suppress evidence obtained against them through the use of a body wire worn by a confidential informant into their homes that recorded the illegal drug transactions. The electronic interception was authorized in both cases by a magistrate. Petitioners contended that such electronic interception could only be authorized by one of five designated circuit court judges, and therefore, the evidence was illegally obtained and should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. The Supreme Court affirmed the final orders of the circuit court, holding (1) electronic interception by law enforcement authorities of a person's conduct or oral communications in his or her home is governed by W. Va. Code 62-1F-1 to -9; and 9; and (2) pursuant to W. Va. Code 62-1F-2(a), an order authorizing law enforcement authorities to conduct electronic interception of conduct or oral communications in the home can be obtained from either a magistrate or a judge of a circuit court within the county wherein the non-consenting party's home is located.

Kendra Sulick was convicted by a jury on three counts of criminal civil rights violations pursuant to W. Va. Code 61-6-21(b). Sulick appealed the circuit court's denial of her post-trial motions, raising several arguments that essentially challenged the constitutionality of section 61-6-21(b) on vagueness and proportionality grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to prove that Sulick committed the acts complained of, and the evidence proved that the acts met the requirements of the statute; and (2) section 61-6-21 is not unconstitutionally vague and does not allow for a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the offenses sought to be prosecuted.

Timothy Waldron was convicted by a jury of one count of delivery of a controlled substance and was sentenced to one to five years imprisonment. Waldron appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court committed error in admitting audio and video recordings of the drug transaction because the admission of certain statements on the recordings violated his right to confrontation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the record provided on the issue, the trial court did not err in admitting the recordings of the drug transaction where Waldron failed to provide the Court with either the recordings of the drug transaction or the text of the statements he alleged violated Crawford v. Washington, nor did the trial transcript contain any testimony from the recordings, and, consequently, the Court was unable to determine whether those statements fell outside the application of the general rule that such statements are admissible the defendant when they are not offered for the truth of the matter they assert.

When he was fifty-five years old, Plaintiff Albert Postlewait, Jr. applied for a job with the City of Wheeling as a mechanic. Although Plaintiff had the highest score on the City's application examination, the City instead hired an eighteen-year-old applicant. Plaintiff filed an age-discrimination lawsuit against the City, and the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The City filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that one of the jurors had not been forthright and truthful during voir dire. The circuit court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the City's motion for a new trial was timely, and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion.

Defendant Rhonda Stewart was convicted for the first degree murder of her husband. At trial, the circuit court prohibited Defendant from presenting evidence that she had been battered and abused by her husband during their thirty-eight-year marriage and did not allow an expert witness to testify as to how this abuse may have affected Defendant's state of mind and reasoning as it related to premeditation, malice, or intent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) based on well-established precedent, Defendant was entitled to present evidence of Battered Woman's Syndrome and evidence of abuse through eyewitnesses and expert witnesses; and (2) because the jury could have reasonably found that Defendant's crime was not first degree murder, but second degree murder or manslaughter had the jury been allowed to hear the abuse evidence, Defendant did not receive a fair trial. Remanded for a new trial.

Appellee was allegedly hit in the head by a law enforcement officer during a confrontation. Appellee filed a civil complaint against the city and the two officers involved in the incident (Appellants), alleging that his civil rights had been violated due to the use of excessive force by the officers. Appellants moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity from suit both on qualified immunity and statutory immunity grounds. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed the denial of summary judgment, holding (1) a public officer is entitled to qualified immunity from civil damages for performance of discretionary functions where (i) a trial court finds the alleged facts do not demonstrate that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right, or (ii) a trial court finds the evidence could establish the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right but further finds that it would be clear to any reasonable officer that such conduct was lawful in the situation confronted; and (2) Appellants were entitled to qualified immunity from suit, either because (i) no constitutional violated was established by the facts alleged, or (ii) a reasonable officer confronting the same situation, without notice to the contrary, would have considered the action lawful.

Appellant David Kaufman was convicted of first degree murder in the circuit court. On appeal, appellant argued that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence the victim's diary and certain statements by the victim to others, both of which recounted alleged threats and acts of violence by appellant towards the victim during the weeks preceding her death. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that (1) the trial court's admission of the entire diary without an analysis of each declaration and remark from the diary was an abuse of discretion because when ruling upon the admission of a narrative under the hearsay rule of evidence, a trial court must break down the narrative and determine the separate admissibility of each single declaration or remark; and (2) the trial court committed error in admitting certain statements by the victim without setting forth any reasoning in support of its ruling that the victim's statements were admissible under State v. Sutphin. Remanded.