Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed an order of the circuit court denying his petition for a writ of prohibition. Petitioner had sought extraordinary relief in the court below in an effort to stop the Commissioner of the West Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) from pursuing license revocation proceedings against him. Petitioner contended that he was deprived of constitutional and statutory protections because DMV had no shown good cause for the repeated delays in hearing the license revocation matter. The lower court denied relief in prohibition, concluding that the Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Hare posed identical issues and rendered Petitioner's request moot. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the lower court misinterpreted the Court's holding in Hare by failing to observe its limited application to facts not present in this case; and (2) the circuit court was required to address problems in the record. Remanded to determine whether good cause was established under existing due process standards for granting the continuances in Petitioner's DMV proceeding, and for entry of a final order capable of review. View "Holland v. Miller" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against The Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corporation, Stella-Jones U.S. Holding Corporation, and Stella-Jones, Inc. (collectively, Defendants) alleging that Defendants unlawfully terminated his employment based on his age. Finding that Defendants wrongfully terminated the employment of Plaintiff based on his age, the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff in the amount of $2,133,990, which represented compensatory damages for lost back pay and front pay. Denying that age played any role in Plaintiff's termination, Defendants filed a motion for a new trial, which the circuit court denied. Defendants submitted three assignments of error upon which they contended the motion for a new trial should have been granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment. View "Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp. v. Rice " on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a circuit court order affirming a magistrate court's ruling that she obstructed a police officer in violation of W. Va. Code 61-5-17(a). Defendant admitted she lied to a police officer during the course of a felony investigation and that the false statement she gave was a violation of section 61-5-17(c). Defendant argued, however, that making a false statement to a police officer is not a violation of section 61-5-17(a) and that her conviction should be overturned because she was charged under the wrong statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order, holding that Defendant's conduct - lying to a law-enforcement officer during the course of an official investigation - was sufficient to support a conviction of obstruction pursuant to section 61-5-17(a). View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

This was a criminal appeal by Defendant from an order of the circuit court sentencing him to life imprisonment without parole for first degree murder, ten to twenty-five years imprisonment on each of nine counts of sexual assault in the second degree, and one to five years imprisonment on each of three counts of sexual abuse in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge did not commit error in rejecting a plea proposal; (2) the evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant of felony murder; and (3) the trial judge properly admitted a statement Defendant made to the police. View "State v. Welch" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of the first degree murder of his wife with a finding that a firearm had been used in the commission of the murder. The circuit court then sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court committed reversible error when it permitted the State to introduce a statement made by him to investigators - a statement in which he confessed to killing his wife. The Supreme Court found no error and affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding that Defendant's statement was voluntarily given and that the trial court did not err in admitting it into evidence. View "State v. Finley" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a candidate for the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, invoked the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction seeking a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents, including the secretary of state and members of the state election commission, to comply with W. Va. Code 3-12-11(e) and approve the release of matching funds to his campaign. Petitioner, a participant in the Supreme Court Public Campaign Financing Pilot Program, argued that because he complied with the applicable requirements set forth in the Pilot Program, and because one of the privately finances candidates spent a sum sufficient to trigger the matching funds provisions, the election commission was statutorily required to disburse matching funds to his campaign. The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus requested by Petitioner, holding (1) the matching funds provisions set forth in the Pilot Program violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment; and (2) therefore, Petitioner failed to establish a clear legal right to the relief sought. View "State ex rel. Loughry v. Tennant" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted and sentenced on twenty-six charges stemming from an alcohol-related automobile accident in which five people died and seven others were injured. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a driver who fails to comply with the requirements of W. Va. Code 17C-4-3 by leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury or death violates W. Va. Code 17C-4-1 only once regardless of the number of injuries or deaths resulting from the accident; (2) insofar as Appellant was convicted and sentenced on more than one violation of section 17C-4-1, that portion of the circuit court's order was reversed; (3) under W. Va. Code 17C-5-4, any person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to a blood alcohol content test, but if any person under arrest as specified in W. va. Code 17C-5-4 refuses to submit to any secondary chemical test, the tests shall not be given except pursuant to a valid search warrant; and (4) the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant's convictions of DUI causing death and leaving the scene of the accident.

In this appeal, Defendant challenged an order of the circuit court convicting him of felony murder and child neglect resulting in death and sentencing him to life with mercy for the felony-murder conviction and a consecutive sentence of three to fifteen years for child neglect resulting in death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in allowing the State to proceed against Defendant for the separate offenses of felony murder, death of a child by a parent, and child neglect resulting in death; (2) the evidence was sufficient to prove Defendant caused his son's death beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) the circuit court did not err in suppressing Defendant's statement only during the State's case-in-chief; (4) the circuit court did not err in allowing the State to use photographs of the child's autopsy; and (5) the circuit court did not err in permitting the use of certain W. Va. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence at trial.

Petitioner Brent McGilton was convicted by a jury of three counts of malicious assault against his wife, Angela McGilton. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the circuit court violated his double jeopardy protections by sentencing him for three counts of malicious assault for three wounds caused during the same course of conduct. Petitioner was sentenced to two to ten years on the first count of malicious assault, two to ten years on the second count of malicious assault, and four to ten years on the third count of malicious assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner's double jeopardy rights were not violated for his three separate malicious assault convictions, as a defendant may be convicted of multiple offenses of malicious assault under W. Va. Code 61-2-9(a) against the same victim even when the offenses were a part of the same course of conduct as long as the facts demonstrate separate and distinct violations of the statute.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to the misdemeanor offense of sexual abuse in the second degree. Defendant was sentenced to a term of twelve months in jail and was required to register as a sex offender. When Defendant entered his guilty plea, the Sex Offender Registration Act provided that anyone who was required to register as a sex offender must do so for a period of ten years. Following the completion of Defendant's sentence but during his ten-year registration period, the Legislature amended the Act, requiring a registration period for certain sex offenders increased from ten years to life. The statutory changes applied to Defendant. After Defendant was indicted for offenses relating to the amended Act, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment. The Supreme Court accepted certified questions from the circuit court and answered that constitutional separation of powers provisions were not violated by the Act's authorization of the state police to impose an increase in the registration period for convicted sex offenders.