Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding (1) Defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's exclusion of members of the press from pretrial hearings; (2) the circuit court did not commit reversible error by failing to strike two potential jurors for cause; (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of malfunctions within Defendant's gun; (4) the circuit court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on manslaughter; (5) the circuit court erred by admitting the testimony of certain witnesses, but the errors were harmless; and (6) the trial court erred by admitting disputed W. Va. R. Crim. P. 404(b) "bad character" evidence, but the error was harmless. View "State v. Bowling" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of one count of child neglect resulting in death and two counts of gross child neglect creating a substantial risk of serious bodily injury or of death. The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's convictions, holding (1) the indictment, which charged Petitioner with child neglect causing injury, did not result in the trial court imposing an illegal sentence on Petitioner for child neglect resulting in death because the indictment provided Petitioner with enough information to defend against the charge of child neglect resulting in death; and (2) the evidence at trial was clearly sufficient to convict Petitioner of child neglect creating a substantial risk of bodily injury. View "State v. Chic-Colbert" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of one count of second degree sexual assault and sentenced to a suspended sentence of ten to twenty-five years in prison. Petitioner appealed, alleging several assignments of error. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the circuit court erred by allowing the State to question the victim regarding Petitioner's sexual history, as the victim's answers, which attacked Petitioner's reputation and character as an alleged sexual predator, constituted the type of character evidence that is barred by W. Va. R. Evid. 404(a). View "State v. Maggard" on Justia Law

Respondent began employment with Employer in 2005. In 2006, Respondent was terminated for refusing to take a drug test, but he was re-hired one month later. In 2007, Respondent suffered a compensable back injury and later underwent surgery. Respondent filed a worker's compensation claim and later agreed to a settlement for his claim. A few weeks later, Respondent was terminated. Respondent filed a civil action against Employer, asserting discrimination and that his receipt of the workers' compensation settlement was a significant factor in Employer's decision to discharge him. The jury found for Respondent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying Employer's motion for judgment as a matter of law; (2) the circuit court did not err in its denial of Employer's motion for a new trial; (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in providing a punitive damages instruction to the jury; and (4) Employer suffered no prejudice emanating from a late disclosure of Respondent's recent employment with Walmart. View "JWCF, LP v. Farruggia" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of multiple felonies, including first degree murder. Defendant appealed, arguing primarily that the trial court erred in allowing him to represent himself, thus depriving him of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel. Specifically, Defendant contended that the trial court failed to make him aware of the disadvantages of self-representation or to make sufficient inquiries to assess whether Defendant's decision to proceed pro se was knowingly and intelligently made. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Petitioner to represent himself. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree in violation of W. Va. Code 61-2-1 and arson in the first degree. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and five years imprisonment for the arson conviction. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the first degree murder conviction; (2) section 61-2-1 is not unconstitutionally vague; (3) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress; and (4) Defendant's argument that the trial court erred when it denied his post-trial motions was without merit. View "State v. Horn" on Justia Law

Respondent was employed by Petitioner. After Respondent was terminated, she filed a complaint with the West Virginia Human Rights Commission alleging that she was unlawfully discriminated against. The director of operations for the Commission issued a finding that no probable cause was found in Respondent's complaint and ordered it dismissed. After the assistant attorney general (Sheridan) conducted an administrative review hearing, the Commission found probable cause was alleged in the complaint. Sheridan then filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Respondent in proceedings before the Commission. Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify Sheridan, arguing that he was conflicted from representing Respondent because he had acted in a judicial capacity while conducting the administrative review. The administrative law judge denied the motion. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court (1) declined to issue the writ insofar as it requested that Respondent's claims be dismissed; (2) declined to order that a subpoena be issued to allow Petitioner to access documents reviewed during the administrative review; but (3) issued the writ to state that Sheridan could not represent Respondent in proceedings before the Commission. View "State ex rel. Ten S. Mgmt. v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n" on Justia Law

The cases underlying these consolidated appeals involved the purchase of an automobile. Plaintiffs purchased vehicles and signed retail installment contracts with three separate dealers. The dealers assigned their rights in the contract and vehicles to Credit Acceptance Corporation, who financed the purchases. All of the contracts contained arbitration clauses. Plaintiffs later commenced civil actions against Credit Acceptance in circuit court, alleging, inter alia, violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection act (WVCCPA). Credit Acceptance filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss, which the circuit court denied, finding that the arbitration agreements were unconscionable based upon the unavailability of some of the arbitration forums named therein and because Plaintiffs in the agreements waived their respective rights to a jury trial. The Supreme Court reversed in both of the cases, holding that because one of the arbitration forums named in the arbitration agreements remained available to arbitrate the parties' disputes, and because an arbitration agreement is not unenforceable solely because a party to the contract waives her right to a jury trial, the causes must be remanded for entry of orders compelling arbitration. View "Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Front" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery and convicted to a term of incarceration of ten to twenty years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in admitting testimony solicited by the prosecution because the statements did not amount to an improper reference to Defendant's silence post-Miranda warning; (2) did not err in allowing W. Va. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence of a second uncharged bank robbery; (3) did not violate Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights by permitting a police officer to testify about statements made by a witness who did not take the stand at trial because the statements were not introduced to inculpate Defendant and were not testimonial; and (4) did not err in finding that the investigating officer's affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant. View "State v. Bruffey" on Justia Law

The grand jury returned an indictment against Defendant charging Defendant with several sexual offenses. Defendant filed a motion to suppress statements to police officers during an interrogation. Before the interrogation, Defendant requested that counsel be appointed to him after his arraignment. Before he had an opportunity to confer with his counsel, however, Defendant was approached by a police officer and asked to sign a waiver of his right to counsel. Defendant signed the waiver and then made inculpatory statements to the police. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the interrogation was not conduct in violation of Defendant's right to counsel pursuant to Montejo v. Louisiana. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to sexual abuse by a parent, guardian, custodian, or person in a position of trust. On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court faced the question of whether it would follow its existing precedent or adopt the conclusions of the U.s. Supreme Court in Montejo. The Supreme Court reversed after declining to adopt Montejo, holding that the circuit court erred by failing to suppress the inculpatory statements made by Defendant. Remanded. View "State v. Bevel" on Justia Law