Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder. Petitioner appealed his conviction, but the Supreme Court refused the request to hear the appeal. Petitioner subsequently filed a request for habeas corpus relief, alleging that both his trial counsel and his appellate counsel were ineffective. The circuit court denied the requested habeas relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in finding that trial counsel effectively represented Petitioner; and (2) the circuit court did not err in denying habeas corpus relief on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. View "State ex rel. Adkins v. Dingus" on Justia Law

Petitioners in these two consolidated appeals were convicted of sexual-related offenses. Both Petitioners were sentenced pursuant to section W. Va. Code 62-12-26, which provides for extended supervision of certain sex offenders. In each case, the lower courts modified Petitioners' supervised release and imposed additional sanctions pursuant to section 62-12-26(g)(3). The primary issue in the appeals was the constitutionality of the portion of section 62-12-26 that permits the revocation of supervised release and additional incarceration when a sex offender violates a condition of supervised release. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' orders in each case, holding (1) section 62-12-26(g)(3) does not violate constitutional principles of due process, equal protection, and double jeopardy; and (2) Petitioners' post-revocation sanctions were not constitutionally disproportionate to their underlying convictions. View "State v. Hargus" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) Defendant's recorded confession was not obtained in violation of his right to be promptly presented before a magistrate following his arrest, and therefore, the trial court did not err by not suppressing the confession; (2) the trial court did not deny Defendant a theory of defense by refusing to give an insanity instruction; (3) W. Va. Code 62-3-15 is not unconstitutional; and (4) the trial court did not commit reversible error in instructing the jury on the use of notes and note taking. View "State v. Flournoy" on Justia Law

In 2009, GameStop, Inc., which operated retail stores that sold video games and video gaming software, hired Petitioner as an assistant manager. When she began her employment, Petitioner received a store associate handbook. In a document included with the handbook was an arbitration agreement. Petitioner signed and dated an acknowledgment of the handbook and rules including arbitration. In 2011, Petitioner sued GameStop and some of its managers (collectively, GameStop) for wrongful discharge, sexual harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, among other causes of action. The circuit court dismissed the complaint pending Petitioner's submission of her claims to final and binding arbitration. Petitioner appealed, arguing that she did not enter into a valid arbitration with GameStop or, in the alternative, the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner and GameStop entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate Petitioner's claims; and (2) the arbitration agreement was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. View "New v. GameStop, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and death of a child by a parent, guardian, or custodian. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he had been punished twice for the same offense and, thus, his double jeopardy protections were violated. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the two offenses of which Petitioner was charged and convicted were separate and distinct pursuant to the test set forth under Blockburger v. United States because (1) intent to kill is an element of second degree murder but is not an element of the offense of death of a child by a parent, guardian, or custodian; and (2) the offense of death of a child by a parent, guardian, or custodian by child abuse contains elements of proof not required to establish second degree murder. View "Gerlach v. Ballard" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of sexual abuse by a parent, guardian or custodian, and distribution and display of obscene matter to a minor. The victim, who was four years old at the time of the offenses, was found to be incompetent to testify. During trial, the trial court admitted certain of the victim's out-of-court statements. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) even if the admission of the victim's out-of-court statements was error under Crawford v. Washington and State v. Mechling, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) any error in the State's closing argument did not result in manifest injustice that would require the reversal of Petitioner's conviction. View "State v. Lambert" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and malicious wounding. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murder count and up to ten years' imprisonment for the malicious wounding count. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of perjured testimony because the jury was made fully aware that a false statement was made to Defendant's grand jury; (2) sufficient evidence supported Defendant's convictions; and (3) the trial court did not err by permitting the State to introduce two prior acts of violence that Defendant committed against the victim. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on appeal. Defendant later filed a petition for habeas relief. After an omnibus hearing, the circuit court found that Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to investigate a confession by a third party that he had killed the victim. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting Defendant habeas relief in the form of a new trial, holding that Defendant's counsel provided constitutionally deficient performance and that, but for counsel's errors, there was a reasonable probability the results of the proceedings would have been different. View "Ballard v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, wanton endangerment, and carrying a concealed weapon without a permit. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that he was denied his constitutional right to an effective cross-examination when the trial court interrupted defense counsel's cross-examination of a key witness and directed counsel to meet with prosecutors and the witness to prepare questions for the continuation of the cross-examiantion. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that the circuit court deprived Defendant of his constitutional right to an effective cross-examination by requiring defense counsel to prepare the witness in advance for the continuation of cross examination. View "State v. Garner" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of child neglect. Thereafter, a jury convicted Defendant on recidivist charges, for which Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The trial court subsequently granted Defendant a new trial on the underlying child neglect felony. After a retrial, Defendant was found guilty of child neglect. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to a second recidivist life sentence. Defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus, contending that his second recidivist life sentence was invalid because he was not arraigned on the recidivist information during the same term of court in which he was convicted on retrial for the underlying offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the recidivist life imprisonment sentence was void and unenforceable because (1) the State failed to comply with the requirements of W. Va. Code 61-11-19 insofar as Defendant was not arraigned on the information during the term of court in which he was convicted of the principal offense; and (2) a recidivist sentence under section 61-11-19 is automatically vacated whenever the underlying felony conviction is vacated. View "Holcomb v. Ballard" on Justia Law