Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether Washington's constitutional separation of powers creates a qualified gubernatorial communications privilege that functions as an exemption to the Public Records Act (PRA). Freedom Foundation sued the governor to compel production of documents under the PRA after the governor asserted executive privilege and refused to release them. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court ruled that separation of powers principles produced a qualified gubernatorial communications privilege. Because the Foundation made no attempt to overcome this qualified privilege, the trial court granted the governor summary judgment. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Freedom Foundation v. Gregoire" on Justia Law

Respondent Robert Chaney was fired from his position and argued his termination violated the federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). The employer, Providence Health Care d/b/a Sacred Heart Medical Center & Children's Hospital (Providence), claimed no violation of the FMLA occurred. The trial court denied motions for a directed verdict on the issue by both Chaney and Providence. Based upon undisputed facts, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in failing to grant Chaney's motion for a directed verdict that as a matter of law the hospital violated the FMLA. In 2005, his wife fell ill after giving birth, Chaney himself suffered a back injury, and he relied heavily on FMLA leave over the next two years. By June 2007, Chaney had used up most of his FMLA leave and had been donated leave from other employees. The record indicated that Providence administration and other staff were growing resentful that Chaney had taken so much time off. In 2007, an employee reported that Chaney appeared fatigued and incoherent. Although no claim was made that his work was compromised, Chaney was ordered to report for drug testing. The drug test was positive for methadone. Chaney had a prescription for methadone to treat back pain, but the doctor who gave the drug test noted that Chaney "[m]ay need fitness for duty evaluation or visit to his Dr. to fine tune his medication." A few months later, Chaney indicated he was prepared to return to work. The record reflected that Chaney was erroneously informed he needed Providence's permission to return to work. This violated the FMLA, under which Chaney could only be required to get authorization from his own health care provider. Chaney went to Providence's doctor, and administration told him the hospital would not allow him to return to work unless their doctor changed his recommended restriction. The hospital's doctor refused to change his recommendation. Subsequently, Chaney was fired. Providence claimed the termination was proper because Chaney failed to provide a valid fitness for work certification as required under the FMLA. View "Chaney v. Providence Health Care" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned an arbitration award arising out of a collective bargaining agreement. The arbitration award in this case reinstated Port of Seattle (Port) employee Mark Cann with a 20-day unpaid suspension after he was terminated for hanging a noose in the workplace for nonracial reasons. The reviewing trial court found this punishment so lenient that it violated the public policy against racial harassment in the workplace and imposed a six-month unpaid suspension instead. The arbitrator found that Cann intended the noose as a joke toward an older white co-worker. The arbitrator determined that Cann's impression of a noose was "not racial" and that in this situation, Cann was "more clueless than racist." The arbitrator also noted that the white employee targeted by the "joke" was not offended, and an African-American employee who observed the noose was angry but did not feel harassed. In light of these facts, the arbitrator determined that a 20-day unpaid suspension was the appropriate discipline. Given that Cann's 20-working-day unpaid suspension amounts to a month without pay, and given that so many working families live month to month, the Supreme Court found that to be a substantial penalty. "As we are bound by the arbitrator's findings of fact, we cannot find that a 20-day suspension was insufficient to deter such conduct in the future. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's decision to vacate the arbitrator's award. We also take this opportunity to clarify that a trial court that properly vacates an arbitration award does not have authority to impose its own remedy. Instead, trial courts facing such a situation should remand for further proceedings." View "Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 286 v. Port of Seattle" on Justia Law

An employee of a church who claimed she was harmed by actions of a church's minister brought numerous claims against the church and the minister. At this point in the proceedings, the case involved her negligent retention, negligent supervision, and Title VII sex discrimination claims against the church. The Court of Appeals, reversing the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment, ruled that these claims were not barred by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as the trial court had determined. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the negligent retention and supervision claims. "Under the First Amendment, allowing these claims to go forward would violate the First Amendment right of the church to select and supervise its ministers as well as the First Amendment right of a hierarchical religious organization to be free of government involvement in the decisions made by its ecclesiastical tribunals. We remand the Title VII claims for further proceedings." View "Erdman v. Chapel Hill Presbyterian Church" on Justia Law

After an amendment to the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), Debra Loeffelholz sued the University of Washington and her superior, James Lukehart (collectively “University”), for discrimination based on sexual orientation. She alleged the sexual-orientation-based discrimination created a hostile work environment based on a series of preamendment acts and one potentially postamendment act. This case presented two related issues on appeal: (1) whether the WLAD amendment applied retroactively and, if not, whether preamendment discriminatory conduct is actionable and (2) whether a single comment made postamendment is a discriminatory act. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the WLAD amendment is not retroactive and that the preamendment conduct was not actionable as it was not unlawful when it occurred. The postamendment, allegedly discriminatory comment is arguably similar enough to the preamendment conduct to survive summary judgment. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals only in reversing summary judgment for the University and clarified that the Court of Appeals erred in allowing recovery for preamendment conduct. View "Loeffelholz v. Univ. of Wash." on Justia Law

Respondent Michael Gendler made a public records request for location-specific accident reports from the Washington State Patrol (WSP). The WSP refused to provide the records unless Gendler certified that he would not use the records in any litigation against the State, claiming a federal statute (23 U.S.C. sec. 409) protected the records sought. WSP claimed the records were shielded because they were located in an electronic database that the Department of Transportation (DOT) utilized for purposes related to the federal hazard elimination program. Respondent then brought a suit under the PRA and argued section 409 did not apply to the WSP because it did not compile or collect the information for the hazard elimination program's purposes. Rather, the information was collected pursuant to WSP’s statutory duty under RCW 46.52.060. The trial court agreed and on summary judgment ordered WSP to produce the requested accident reports. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed because section 409 does not extend to police accident reports generated and received by WSP pursuant to its own statutory duty.

Petitioner John Hurst was charged with a felony, but he was found incompetent to stand trial. He was twice committed to a mental health treatment facility. After two 90-day periods in the facility, Petitioner failed to regain competency. The State sought a third and final mental health treatment period, lasting this time for up to 180 days. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the standard of proof required to commit an incompetent criminal defendant charged with a felony to a third mental health treatment period. Petitioner alleged that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution requires that the standard of proof be "clear, cogent and convincing evidence." The Supreme Court disagreed: "the legislature's selected preponderance of the evidence standard satisfied the Due Process Clause." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellate court.

Petitioner Demar Rhome argued on direct appeal to the Supreme Court that the state and federal constitutions require independent findings of fact that a defendant is competent to waive counsel and represent himself at trial. In November of 2003, 17-year-old Lashonda Flynn was stabbed to death. Seventeen-year-old Kialani Brown confessed to the killing but pointed to Defendant as the mastermind behind the slaying. Defendant was charged in King County Superior Court with first degree murder with a deadly weapon. Defendant's mental competency became an issue at trial. After considering the evidence and arguments of counsel, the superior court found that the defense had not met the burden of proving Defendant was incompetent to stand trial. Shortly after the competency hearing, Defendant received new counsel. Defendant represented himself throughout his 2006 proceedings with counsel on stand-by. In reviewing his performance during pretrial and trial proceedings, a defense expert opined that Defendant's mental illness impacted his ability to defend himself in court. Defendant was convicted by a jury as charged and sentenced to 371 months in prison. Represented by appointed federal public defenders, Defendant filed this original personal restraint petition to challenge the trial courtâs decision to allow him to waive counsel and proceed pro se. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Defendant did not demonstrate that federal or state law requires an independent determination of mental competency to proceed pro se when a mentally ill defendant seeks to waive counsel: "[e]ven if such a rule could be crafted from [federal case law] in conjunction with this courtâs precedent, Rhome cannot benefit from that rule on a personal restraint petition." The Court also concluded that Defendant failed to show the trial court abused its discretion when it found his waiver of counsel to be knowing and intelligent. The Court dismissed Defendant's petition.

The primary issue presented in this case was whether former RCW 9.92.151 (2004) or the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution requires a county jail to provide opportunities for an inmate who is yet to be sentenced to earn credit toward early release, also known as "good-time" credit. Petitioner, Teddy Talley argued that the Skamania County Jail and the Department of Corrections (Department) violated the former RCW 9.92.151(1) and the Constitution by not providing opportunities for him to earn good-time credit before his criminal conviction. Skamania County argued that the statutory issue was not properly before the Supreme Court and that its program for earning good-time credit is constitutional. The Department argued that it may rely on a countyâs jail-time certification when determining the appropriate amount of good-time credit to apply toward early release. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the matter was properly before it, and that the former RCW 9.92.151 required a county jail to provide opportunities for a presentence inmate to earn good-time credit. The Court did not reach Defendant's constitutional argument. Because the Skamania County Jail policy conflicted with the former RCW 9.92.151, the Court calculated that Defendant should have received an earned early-release credit at the statutory maximum rate of 15 percent.

Ten special education students and their parents and guardians (Appellants) sued Clover Park School District for intentional torts, outrage, negligence and unlawful discrimination under state law. Clover Park moved for summary judgment to dismiss, arguing that Appellants had not exhausted the administrative remedies available under the state Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The trial court granted Clover Parkâs motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case, holding that IDEAâs administrative exhaustion requirement does not apply to state-law claims nor does Washington State law require exhaustion before filing such claims.