Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2008 Prieto was convicted of a 1988 capital murder in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape, Code § 18.2-31(5); capital murder of more than one person as part of the same act or transaction, Code § 18.2-31(7); rape, Code § 18.2-61; two counts of use of a firearm in the commission of murder, Code § 18.2-53.1; and grand larceny, Code § 18.2-95, and was sentenced to death for each of the capital murder convictions and 20 years' imprisonment for the remaining convictions. Following a remand, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the sentences and subsequently denied a petition for habeas corpus that claimed denial of effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed bring up Prieto's claimed mental retardation and failed to thoroughly investigate and review scientific evidence including DNA found in the victim’s vagina, hair found on the body, and anal swabs. The court also rejected a claims that Prieto was denied the right to a jury "of the state and district" where the crimes were committed, because a juror who did not reside in Virginia was seated at his first trial and that another juror intentionally withheld information during voir dire regarding sexual assaults the juror had suffered. View "Prieto v. Warden " on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to carnal knowledge of a minor. At the time of his conviction, Defendant's crime was classified as a non-violent sex offense. Defendant was required to register annually for ten years, after which he could petition for expungement. The federal government subsequently enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, which resulted in Defendant's conviction being retroactively reclassified as a sexually violent offense. Consequently, Defendant was required to register every ninety days for the rest of his life with no right to petition for expungement. Defendant filed a complaint asserting that the reclassification of his offense violated his contractual and constitutional rights. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Commonwealth. Smith appealed, arguing that his plea agreement was a contract that incorporated the sex offender registration laws in existence at the time of the agreement, and thus, the Commonwealth materially breached the plea agreement by amending the registration laws and retroactively enforcing them against him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there were no contractual or constitutional violations resulting from the reclassification of Defendant's conviction, and therefore, the circuit court properly dismissed Defendant's petition for expungement and for a permanent injunction. View "Smith v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was hired by New Dimensions, Inc. (NDI) as a design and sales consultant. Plaintiff was paid a commission of 2.12 percent of her total sales, but other design and sales consultants, both male and female, previously hired by NDI were paid commissions of 2.25 percent. Plaintiff was subsequently terminated by NDI and was not paid commissions for certain sales she had secured. Plaintiff filed this amended complaint against NDI alleging breach of contract, quantum meruit, and violation of the federal Equal Pay Act (EPA). In its answer, NDI did not affirmatively plead the four defenses articulated in the statute. The circuit court determined that NDI was prohibited from presenting evidence in defense of the EPA claim and precluded the introduction of evidence related to those defenses. The circuit court ruled in favor of Plaintiff on the EPA claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the defenses set forth in the EPA are affirmative but were not waived under the facts presented in this case; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred in preventing NDI from presenting evidence of its gender-neutral compensation system at trial. Remanded. View "New Dimensions, Inc. v. Tarquini" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty of animate object sexual penetration. Prior to his sentencing, Defendant hired a new attorney, who discovered that the Commonwealth had made a plea offer prior to trial. The circuit court found that the plea offer was not conveyed to Defendant, declared a mistrial, and ordered a new trial. Defendant subsequently entered a plea of no contest, which the circuit court accepted. The court then sentenced Defendant to thirty years' imprisonment. Thereafter, Defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for his first attorney's failure to communicate to him the plea offer from the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth dismissed the petition, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over Defendant's claim because Defendant was not being detained as a result of his first trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition, holding that, assuming that Defendant may link the first and second trials and assert ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant could not prove he was prejudiced by counsel's performance pursuant to Missouri v. Frye, which provides the standard for proving prejudice in the plea context. View "Laster v. Russell" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of petit larceny, third or subsequent offense, and breaking and entering with the intent to commit larceny. The court of appeals denied Petitioner's appeal. Petitioner subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court and filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging the legality of his confinement and asserting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's habeas petition, holding (1) a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a direct appeal from a final judgment of conviction can proceed simultaneously in the Court; and (2) with regard to the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in the petition, Petitioner failed to prove that, but for his counsel's alleged errors, the outcome of his trial would have been different. View "Sigmon v. Dir. of Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of taking indecent liberties with a child, aggravated sexual battery, and animate object penetration. Defendant appealed, contending that the Commonwealth violated Brady v. Maryland by suppressing evidence in the form of an audio tape recording of an investigative interview with the victim. The court of appeals reversed on the Brady issue and remanded the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the recording was made available to Defendant in sufficient time for its use at trial, the Commonwealth committed no Brady violation. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Tuma" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted upon a charge of knowingly and intentionally possessing or transporting a firearm after having previously been convicted of a violent felony in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-308.2(A). At a jury trial, the trial court admitted one prior conviction for robbery and four prior convictions for burglary, each of which was a violent felony. Defendant objected to the evidence, arguing that the phrase "previously convicted of a violent felony" in section 18.2-308.2(A) limited the Commonwealth to adducing evidence of only one prior conviction for a violent felony. The circuit court overruled the objection, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because section 18.2-308.2(A) establishes the elements of the offense rather than a rule of evidence by which the elements may be proven, the statute does not limit the Commonwealth's prerogative to meet its burden of proof using whatever available evidence it chooses. View "Boone v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2009, the City Council revoked a blanket special exception permitting two business establishments (the Establishments) operating in the City to operate as "entertainment establishments" serving alcoholic beverages for on-site consumption and denied their individual applications for special exceptions to continue such operations. The City later filed a complaint requesting that the Establishments be permanently enjoined from selling or serving alcohol or providing entertainment in their businesses. The Establishments filed a separate complaint and petition for appeal, asserting that the City Council's actions impaired their vested rights and that the manner in which the Council executed these actions violated their statutory notice and due process rights. The circuit court denied the relief requested by the Establishments and granted the City's request for injunctive relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Establishments did not acquire any vested rights under Va. Code 15.2-2307 or Va. Code 15.2-2311(C); and (2) because the Establishments had actual notice of and actively participated in the City Council meeting, any statutory notice issues were waived and their constitutional rights were not violated. View "Norfolk 102, LLC v. City of Norfolk" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned an underlying criminal case against Lillian Callender and Michael Stoffa. Following bench trials, Callender and Stoffa were found guilty of felony neglect and second-degree murder. Prior to Callender's sentencing and Stoffa's trial, Daily Press requested permission to review the file related to Callender's trial. The clerk of the circuit court denied the request, and the circuit court entered an order sealing the entire Callender file from public inspection until the conclusion of Callender's and Stoffa's cases. The circuit court later rescinded the order and allowed the attorneys for Callender and the Commonwealth to withdraw the original exhibits from the Callender file to be used in Stoffa's trial. Daily Press requested that photocopies of the withdrawn exhibits remain in the public file, but the court directed that photocopies of the original exhibits be placed in the file under seal. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court, holding that the order violated the public's constitutional and statutory right of access to criminal proceedings. View "Daily Press, Inc. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Adam Ewing submitted a Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA) request to the James City County Police Department seeking information and records related to Ewing's arresting officer, Ryan Shelton. The Department issued some, but not all, of the requested documents. Ewing petitioned for a writ of mandamus requiring the production of all the requested documents. The Department found in favor of Ewing and awarded costs and fees. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred in ordering the disclosure of personnel records or conduct investigative records, as such records were contained in personnel files and were thus exempted from VFOIA disclosure; (2) the circuit court erred in ordering the identities of all individuals arrested or charged by Shelton or by another officer based on information supplied by Shelton, as the identities of individuals for which Shelton was not the arrested officer were exempt from disclosure; and (3) the issue of attorneys fees was to be remanded to the trial court in light of the holdings in favor of the Department on appeal. View "Harmon v. Ewing" on Justia Law