Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Petitioner David Gregg was convicted of rape, a first-degree felony. The trial court sentenced Gregg to an indeterminate term of five years to life. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Gregg subsequently filed an amended petition for post-confiction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The district court dismissed all of Gregg's claims as procedurally barred under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) because of a procedural error on behalf of the court clerk. The Supreme Court vacated Gregg's conviction, holding (1) Gregg qualified for an exception to the procedural bar because the Court would not hold Gregg accountable for the clerk of court's procedural error; and (2) Gregg received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Remanded for a new trial.

Wolfgango Ruiz pled guilty to one count of attempted sexual abuse of a child, a third degree felony. Prior to his sentencing, Ruiz made a request to withdraw his plea on the ground that his original defense counsel had not informed him of the immigration consequences of a felony conviction. District Court Judge Fuchs initially granted Ruiz's motion, but upon a motion to reconsider, Judge Skanchy reversed the order that permitted Ruiz to withdraw his plea. The court of appeals reversed Judge Skanchy's ruling and reinstated Judge Fuch's order based on Judge Skanchy's failure to state the basis for his ruling on the record and the principal that motions to withdraw guilty pleas should be liberally granted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals err in vacating Judge Skanchy's ruling because the basis for the ruling was apparent on the record; and (2) recent amendments to the Plea Withdrawal Statute superseded prior case law stating that presentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas should be liberally granted. Remanded.

This appeal encompassed two consolidated cases. In the first case, Charles Moa entered a no contest plea to a third degree felony but later filed motions to withdraw that plea. Moa first stipulated that his plea was taken in compliance with Utah R. Crim. P. 11 but, on appeal, argued that his plea was not taken in compliance with Rule 11. The court of appeals held that Moa failed to demonstrate plain error in the district court's denial of his motions. In the second case, Moa pled guilty to two felonies and a misdemeanor. The sentencing judge imposed consecutive sentences. The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting Moa's argument that the sentencing judge relied on irrelevant information in imposing the sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in the first case, by stipulating that his plea was taken in compliance with Rule 11, Moa invited any error that may have been committed by the district court; and (2) in the second case, the court of appeals was correct in concluding that there was no evidence that the district court relied on any improper information in imposing consecutive sentences.

James Alexander pled guilty to burglary with intent to commit sexual battery. Prior to sentencing, Alexander filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing (1) the district court failed to apprise him of the elements of sexual battery as required by Utah R. Crim. P. 11, and (2) his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made. The court denied Alexander's motion and sentenced him accordingly. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) the district court did not comply with Rule 11 at the plea hearing because it did not inform Alexander of the elements of sexual battery, and (2) the violation of Rule 11 rendered the plea unknowing and involuntary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although the court of appeals erred in limiting its review to whether the district court had complied with Rule 11 during the plea hearing, the record demonstrated that Alexander's plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made; (2) the court of appeals did not err in declining to require a showing of prejudice; and (3) because this case involved a different issue than the one addressed in the Court's holding in Hurst v. Cook, the two cases did not conflict.

Troy Kell was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Kell subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which the district court dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed. Kell thereafter filed a Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion, asking the district court to relieve him from its earlier dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief. The district court denied the motion, holding that because Kell's postconviction petition had been dismissed, appealed, and affirmed on appeal, the underlying denial of his petition for postconviction relief was no longer "pending" and thus the court could not consider the merits of the 60(b) motion. The Supreme Court affirmed on alternate grounds, holding (1) Rule 60(b) does not have a "pending" requirement and is not necessarily inappropriate in all cases in which the Court has already ruled, but it may not be used as a way to circumvent the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA); and (2) in this case, Kell's claims were barred by the PCRA and therefore could not be brought under Rule 60(b).

Lemuel Prion pled guilty and mentally ill to three felony charges pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 77-16-104(3). Under the provisions of the statute, Prion was first sentenced to three terms of varying length, all to be served concurrently. As part of his first sentence, Prion was committed to the hospital for evaluation. After his stay there, Prion was released. Based upon the recommendations of the hospital staff and administration, the district court resentenced Prion to serve his three terms consecutively, nearly doubling his prison time. Prion filed a motion to correct his sentence, claiming that his second sentence was statutorily barred and violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the federal constitution. The district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that, although the sentencing statute at issue expressly allows for a recall and resentencing at any time during an eighteen-month review period, Prion's resentencing exceeded the bounds of the double jeopardy clause in light of the nature and timeframe of this proceeding.

While driving, Jed Price struck another vehicle, killing a passenger in that vehicle. After he consented to accompany an officer to a police station, a magistrate issued a warrant to seize Price's blood for testing to determine his blood-alcohol levels. The blood was tested for the presence of, among other things, THC, and the test results came back positive for the presence of THC. Price was subsequently charged with causing death while driving with a measurable controlled substance and failing to yield the right of way. The district court denied Price's motion to suppress the evidence. Price appealed, arguing that testing for THC was outside the scope of the warrant because the magistrate's probable cause determination was based only on the suspicion that Price had been driving under the influence of alcohol. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) after his blood was lawfully obtained, Price did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in any contraband in his blood; (2) the test for THC did not infringe on any legitimate privacy interests; and (3) the testing was therefore constitutional.

Von Lester Taylor pled guilty to two capital homicide charges and was sentenced to death. A Utah R. App. P. 23B hearing was later held before the district court, after which the court rejected all of Taylor's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed. Taylor's counsel thereafter filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed. Taylor then filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief. The district court granted the State's motion to dismiss the petition, holding that all of Taylor's claims were procedurally barred under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) because they were raised, or could have been, but were not, raised in a prior proceeding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Taylor failed to establish that his claims could not have been raised in a prior proceeding and failed to meet any statutory or common law exceptions to the procedural bar.

Lonnie Arave approached an eleven-year-old boy and offered to pay him if he would agree to let Arave perform oral sex on him. At trial, Arave moved to dismiss a charge of attempted sodomy on a child, asserting that his conduct amounted only to the offense of solicitation and could not sustain a conviction of attempt. The district court denied the motion, and Arave was convicted on the attempt charge. A divided court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals insofar as it upheld Arave's conviction for attempt, holding (1) solicitation of a potential victim falls within the ambit of the solicitation statute; and (2) the act of solicitation alone is not enough to constitute a substantial step, and thereby an attempt, to commit a crime. Remanded.

During an investigation by the Utah Attorney General's Task Force on Internet Crimes against Children (ICAC), ICAC agents discovered that child pornography had been downloaded through an IP address belonging to David Maxwell. The agents went to Maxwell's home and asked if he would consent to a seizure and search of his computer. Maxwell refused and adverted to the possibility of destroying his computer. The agents then seized the computer and later secured a warrant to search it. The ensuing search uncovered video and still images of child pornography, and Maxwell was charged with ten counts of sexual exploitation of a minor. The district court granted Maxwell's motion to suppress the files found on his computer, concluding that there was no exigent circumstance sustaining a warrantless seizure of Maxwell's computer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an exigent circumstance arose out of Maxwell's open acknowledgment that he was thinking of destroying his computer; (2) the exigency was not improperly created by the police, as there was not threat to engage in conduct violating the Fourth Amendment; and (3) the decision to seize Maxwell's computer was a reasonable method of preventing the destruction of evidence.