Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Thompson was living with his fiancée and their newborn baby in a Brooklyn apartment. Thompson’s sister-in-law, apparently suffering from mental illness, called 911 to report that Thompson was sexually abusing the baby. When Emergency Medical Technicians arrived, Thompson denied that anyone had called 911. The EMTs returned with police officers, Thompson told them that they could not enter without a warrant. The police nonetheless entered. Thompson was arrested and charged with obstructing governmental administration and resisting arrest. EMTs took the baby to the hospital where medical professionals examined her and found no signs of abuse. Thompson was detained for two days. The charges against Thompson were dismissed without any explanation. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Thompson’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim.The Supreme Court reversed, resolving a split among the Circuits. To demonstrate favorable termination of criminal prosecution for purposes of a section 1983 Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff need not show that the criminal prosecution ended with some affirmative indication of innocence but need only show that his prosecution ended without a conviction. The American tort-law consensus as of 1871 did not require a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution suit to show that his prosecution ended with an affirmative indication of innocence; similarly construing Thompson’s claim is consistent with “the values and purposes” of the Fourth Amendment. Questions concerning whether a defendant was wrongly charged, or whether an individual may seek redress for wrongful prosecution, cannot reasonably depend on whether the prosecutor or court explained why charges were dismissed. Requiring a plaintiff to show that his prosecution ended with an affirmative indication of innocence is not necessary to protect officers from unwarranted civil suits. View "Thompson v. Clark" on Justia Law

Ramirez was sentenced to death for a 2004 murder. Texas informed Ramirez of his September 2021 execution date. Ramirez requested that his pastor be present in the execution chamber. Texas amended its protocol to allow a prisoner’s spiritual advisor to enter the execution chamber. Ramirez then asked that his pastor be permitted to “lay hands” on him and “pray over” him during his execution. Texas denied Ramirez’s request without reference to its execution protocol despite a history of allowing prison chaplains to engage in such activities. The district court and Fifth Circuit declined to grant injunctive relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc–1(a). The Supreme Court stayed Ramirez’s execution, then reversed. Ramirez is likely to succeed on his RLUIPA claims because Texas’s restrictions on religious touch and audible prayer in the execution chamber burden religious exercise and are not the least restrictive means of furthering the state’s compelling interests. Ramirez's requests are “sincerely based on a religious belief.” The laying on of hands and prayer are traditional forms of religious exercise; Ramirez’s pastor confirmed that they are a significant part of their faith tradition.The Court rejected arguments about security and possible trauma to the victim’s family; that absolute silence is necessary to monitor the inmate; and that if spiritual advisors were allowed to pray aloud, the opportunity “could be exploited to make a statement to the witnesses or officials.” Prison officials have less restrictive ways to handle any concerns. Ramirez is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief. The balance of equities and public interest tilt in Ramirez’s favor because it is possible to accommodate Ramirez’s sincere religious beliefs without delaying or impeding his execution. There was no evidence that Ramirez engaged in litigation misconduct that should preclude equitable relief. View "Ramirez v. Collier" on Justia Law

Wilson, a member of the Board of Trustees of the Houston Community College System, brought multiple lawsuits challenging the Board’s actions. In 2016, the Board publicly reprimanded Wilson. He continued to charge the Board with violating its ethical rules and bylaws, in media outlets and in state-court actions. In 2018, the Board adopted a public resolution “censuring” Wilson and stating that his conduct was “not consistent with the best interests of the College” and “reprehensible.” The Board deemed Wilson ineligible for Board officer positions during 2018. The Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Wilson’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Supreme Court held that Wilson does not possess an actionable First Amendment claim arising from the Board’s purely verbal censure. In First Amendment cases, long-settled and established practice “is a consideration of great weight.” Elected bodies have long exercised the power to censure their members. In disagreements of this sort, the First Amendment permits “[f]ree speech on both sides and for every faction on any side.”A plaintiff pursuing a First Amendment retaliation claim must show that the government took an “adverse action” in response to his speech that “would not have been taken absent the retaliatory motive.” Any fair assessment of the materiality of the Board’s conduct must consider that elected representatives are expected to shoulder some criticism about their public service and that the only adverse action at issue is itself a form of speech from Wilson’s colleagues. The censure did not prevent Wilson from doing his job and did not deny him any privilege of office. Wilson does not allege it was defamatory. The censure does not qualify as a materially adverse action capable of deterring Wilson from exercising his own right to speak. View "Houston Community College System v. Wilson" on Justia Law

A stray 9-millimeter bullet killed a child after a Bronx street fight. Eyewitnesses described the shooter as wearing a blue shirt or sweater. Police officers determined Gilliam was involved and that Morris was at the scene. A search of Morris’ apartment revealed a 9-millimeter cartridge and .357-caliber bullets. Gilliam initially identified Morris as the shooter but subsequently said that Hemphill was the shooter. Morris was charged with murder and possession of a 9-millimeter handgun. The prosecution agreed to dismiss the murder charges if Morris pleaded guilty to possession of a .357 revolver. Years later, Hemphill was indicted for the murder; his DNA matched a blue sweater found in Morris’ apartment shortly after the murder. Hemphill elicited testimony that police had recovered 9-millimeter ammunition from Morris’ apartment, pointing to Morris as the culprit. Morris was not available to testify. The court allowed the prosecution to introduce parts of Morris’ plea allocation transcript to rebut Hemphill’s theory, reasoning that although Morris’ out-of-court statements had not been subjected to cross-examination, Hemphill’s arguments had “opened the door” and admission of the statements was reasonably necessary to correct a misleading impression. Hemphill was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed. Admission of the plea allocution transcript violated Hemphill’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. While the Sixth Amendment permits reasonable procedural rules concerning the exercise of a defendant’s confrontation right, the “door-opening principle” is a substantive principle that dictates what material is relevant and admissible. It was not for the trial judge to determine whether Hemphill’s theory that Morris was the shooter was unreliable, incredible, or otherwise misleading in light of the state’s proffered, unconfronted plea evidence, nor whether this evidence was reasonably necessary to correct that misleading impression. View "Hemphill v. New York" on Justia Law

Texas Senate Bill 8, the 2021 Heartbeat Act, prohibits physicians from performing or inducing an abortion if the physician detected a fetal heartbeat. S.B. 8 does not allow state officials to enforce the law but directs enforcement through “private civil actions” seeking injunctions and damages awards against those who perform or assist with prohibited abortions. Abortion providers may defend themselves by showing that holding them liable would place an “undue burden” on women seeking abortions.Abortion providers (petitioners) sought pre-enforcement review of S.B. 8 and an injunction barring its enforcement. They sought to certify a class and request an order enjoining all state-court clerks from docketing S.B. 8 cases, and all state-court judges from hearing them. The district court denied motions to dismiss. The Fifth Circuit denied a request for an injunction barring enforcement pending appeal. The petitioners sought injunctive relief in the Supreme Court, which concluded that the filings failed to identify a basis for disturbing the Fifth Circuit’s decision.On certiorari, the Court held that a pre-enforcement challenge to S.B. 8 under the U.S. Constitution may proceed against certain defendants but not others, without addressing whether S.B. 8 is consistent with the Constitution.The Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity do not allow an action to prevent state-court clerks and judges from enforcing state laws that are contrary to federal law. No Article III “case or controversy” between “adverse litigants” exists between the petitioners and either the clerks or judges. Texas Attorney General Paxton should be dismissed as possessing no enforcement authority in connection with S.B. 8. Even if Paxton had enforcement power, a federal court cannot parlay that authority into an injunction against any unnamed private parties who might pursue S.B. 8 suits. No court may “enjoin the world at large” or purport to enjoin challenged “laws themselves.” Sovereign immunity does not shield executive licensing officials who may take action against the petitioners for violations of Texas’s Health and Safety Code, including S.B. 8. A single private party, Dickson, should be dismissed, given his sworn declarations that he has no intention to file an S.B. 8 suit. View "Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Rollice’s ex-wife called 911. Rollice was in her garage, intoxicated, and would not leave. Three officers responded to the call and spoke with Rollice through the garage’s doorway. Rollice began fidgeting with something in his hands; he appeared nervous. Rollice refused a request for a pat-down. Police body-camera video captured Rollice conversing with the officers as he turned around and walked toward the back of the garage where his tools were hanging. No officer was within six feet of Rollice. The officers state that they ordered Rollice to stop. Rollice kept walking, grabbed a hammer, and turned toward the officers, grasping the hammer's handle with both hands and pulling it up to shoulder level. The officers backed up, drawing their guns. They yelled at Rollice to drop the hammer. Rollice took steps toward Officer Girdner, raised the hammer behind his head, and took a stance as if he was about to throw the hammer or charge at the officers. Two officers fired their weapons, killing Rollice. Rollice’s estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit. The officers did not violate any clearly established law and are shielded by qualified immunity. None of the decisions cited by the Tenth Circuit established that the officers’ conduct was unlawful. Officers engaged in a conversation with Rollice, followed him into a garage at a distance, and did not yell until after he picked up a hammer. Precedent did not “clearly establish” that their conduct was reckless or that their ultimate use of force was unlawful. View "City of Tahlequah v. Bond" on Justia Law

Union City, California officer Rivas-Villegas responded to a 911 call reporting that a woman and her children were barricaded in a room for fear that Cortesluna, the woman’s boyfriend, was going to hurt them. After confirming that the family had no means of escape, Rivas-Villegas and other officers commanded Cortesluna outside and onto the ground. Officers saw a knife in Cortesluna’s pocket. While Rivas-Villegas and another officer were removing the knife and handcuffing Cortesluna, Rivas-Villegas briefly placed his knee on the side of Cortesluna’s back.Cortesluna sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. Rivas-Villegas is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate clearly established law. Even assuming that controlling Circuit precedent clearly established the law for purposes of section 1983, Ninth Circuit precedent did not give Rivas-Villegas fair notice that he was using excessive force. This is not an obvious case. The officers, in this case, were responding to a serious alleged incident of domestic violence possibly involving a chainsaw and Cortesluna had a knife protruding from his pocket for which he had just previously appeared to reach. Cortesluna does not dispute, that Rivas-Villegas placed his knee on Cortesluna for no more than eight seconds and only on the side of his back near the knife that officers were in the process of retrieving. View "Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna" on Justia Law

In 1996, Reeves and some friends went “looking for some robberies ” but their car broke down. Johnson offered to tow their vehicle. After they arrived, Reeves shot Johnson and directed the others to get his money. Reeves bragged that the murder would earn him a gang tattoo; at a party, Reeves mocked pumping a shotgun and the way that Johnson died. Alabama charged Reeves with murder. His appointed attorneys explored possible intellectual disability. They obtained Reeves’ educational, medical, and correctional records and funding to hire a neuropsychologist (Dr.Goff). Reeves was within the “borderline” range of intelligence but had been denied special education services. A psychologist evaluated Reeves and opined that he was not intellectually disabled. Reeves’ attorneys apparently elected to pursue other mitigation strategies. The jury recommended a death sentence.Reeves unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction relief, alleging that he was intellectually disabled or that counsel should have hired Dr. Goff to develop mitigation. Dr. Goff testified that Reeves was intellectually disabled. The state’s expert administered his own evaluation and concluded that Reeves was not intellectually disabled, noting that Reeves had a leadership role in a drug-dealing group. Although his lawyers were available, Reeves did not call them to testify. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The federal district court denied habeas relief. The Eleventh Circuit reversed in part, finding that Reeves's lawyers were constitutionally deficient for not developing evidence of intellectual disability and that this failure might have changed the outcome of the trial. The Supreme Court reversed. The Alabama court did not violate clearly established federal law in rejecting Reeves’ claim. Counsel’s strategic decisions are entitled to a “strong presumption” of reasonableness. The analysis is “doubly deferential” when a state court has decided that counsel performed adequately. Despite Reeves’ allegations about his lawyers, he offered no evidence from them. Counsel’s efforts to collect Reeves’ records and obtain funding hardly indicates neglect and disinterest. The Alabama court conducted a case-specific analysis and reasonably concluded that the incomplete evidentiary record doomed Reeves’ belated efforts to second-guess his attorneys. The Eleventh Circuit recharacterized its analysis as a “categorical rule” that any prisoner will always lose if he fails to question trial counsel regarding his reasoning. View "Dunn v. Reeves" on Justia Law

Charitable organizations soliciting funds in California generally must register with the Attorney General and renew their registrations annually by filing copies of their IRS Form 990, on which tax-exempt organizations provide the names and addresses of their major donors. Two tax-exempt charities that solicit contributions in California renewed their registrations and filed redacted Form 990s to preserve their donors’ anonymity. The Attorney General threatened the charities with the suspension of their registrations and fines. The charities alleged that the compelled disclosure requirement violated their First Amendment rights and the rights of their donors. The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the Attorney General.The Supreme Court reversed. California’s disclosure requirement is facially invalid because it burdens donors’ First Amendment rights and is not narrowly tailored to an important government interest. Compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as other forms of governmental action. Exacting scrutiny requires that a government-mandated disclosure regime be narrowly tailored to the government’s asserted interest, even if it is not the least restrictive means of achieving that end.A dramatic mismatch exists between the Attorney General's asserted interest and the disclosure regime. While California’s interests in preventing charitable fraud and self-dealing are important, the enormous amount of sensitive information collected through the disclosures does not form an integral part of California’s fraud detection efforts. California does not rely on those disclosures to initiate investigations. There is no evidence that alternative means of obtaining the information, such as a subpoena or audit letter, are inefficient and ineffective by comparison. Mere administrative convenience does not “reflect the seriousness of the actual burden” that the disclosure requirement imposes on donors’ association rights. It does not make a difference if there is no public disclosure, if some donors do not mind having their identities revealed, or if the relevant donor information is already disclosed to the IRS. View "Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta" on Justia Law

Arizona voters may cast their ballots on election day in person at a traditional precinct or a “voting center” in their county of residence, may cast an “early ballot” by mail, or may vote in person at an early voting location in each county. Arizonans who vote in person on election day in a county that uses the precinct system must vote in the precinct to which they are assigned based on their address; if a voter votes in the wrong precinct, the vote is not counted. For Arizonans who vote early by mail, Arizona HB 2023 makes it a crime for any person other than a postal worker, an elections official, or a voter’s caregiver, family member, or household member to knowingly collect an early ballot.A suit under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. 10301, challenged Arizona’s refusal to count ballots cast in the wrong precinct and its ballot-collection restriction. The Ninth Circuit invalidated both restrictions. The Supreme Court reversed, characterizing Arizona's restrictions as “generally applicable time, place, or manner” voting rules and declining to apply the disparate-impact model to displace “the totality of circumstances.” The Court also rejected a “least-restrictive means” analysis as having “the potential to invalidate just about any voting rule.”The core of section 2(b) is “equally open” voting. Any circumstance that bears on whether voting is equally open and affords equal “opportunity” may be considered. Voting necessarily requires some effort and compliance with rules. Having to identify one’s polling place and travel there to vote does not exceed the “usual burdens of voting.” A rule’s impact on members of different racial or ethnic groups is important but the existence of some disparity does not necessarily mean that a system is not equally open. A procedure that apparently works for 98% or more of voters to whom it applies, minority and non-minority alike, is unlikely to render a system unequally open. The degree to which a voting rule departs from standard practices is relevant. The policy of not counting out-of-precinct ballots is widespread. The strength of the state interests served by a challenged rule is important. Precinct-based voting helps to distribute voters more evenly, can put polling places closer to voter residences, and helps to ensure that each voter receives a ballot that lists only the relevant candidates and public questions. Courts must consider the state’s entire system of voting; a burden associated with one voting option must be evaluated in the context of the other available means.HB 2023 also passes muster. Arizonans can submit early ballots in several ways. Even if the plaintiffs could demonstrate a disparate burden, Arizona’s “compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election procedures” would suffice under section 2. Third-party ballot collection can lead to pressure and intimidation and a state may take action to prevent election fraud without waiting for it to occur within its own borders. View "Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee" on Justia Law