Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Smith, wanting to expand her graphic design business to include wedding websites, worried that the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act would require her to create websites celebrating marriages that defy her belief that marriage should be between one man and one woman. Smith intends to produce a story for each couple using her own words and original artwork, combined with the couple’s messages. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of Smith’s request for an injunction.The Supreme Court reversed. The First Amendment prohibits Colorado from forcing a website designer to create expressive designs conveying messages with which the designer disagrees. The First Amendment protects an individual’s right to speak his mind regardless of whether the government considers his speech “misguided.” Generally, the government may not compel a person to speak preferred messages. The wedding websites Smith seeks to create involve her speech and are pure speech protected by the First Amendment. Colorado seeks to put Smith to a choice prohibited by precedent. If she wishes to speak, she must either speak as Colorado demands or face sanctions for expressing her own beliefs.Public accommodations laws are vital to realizing the civil rights of all Americans; governments have a “compelling interest” in eliminating discrimination in places of public accommodation. States may protect gay persons, just as they protect other classes of individuals. However, public accommodations laws are not immune from the demands of the Constitution. Smith does not seek to sell an ordinary commercial good but intends to create “customized and tailored” expressive speech “to celebrate and promote the couple’s wedding.” Speakers do not shed their First Amendment protections by accepting compensation or employing the corporate form to disseminate their speech. Smith will gladly conduct business with those having protected characteristics when the product she is creating does not violate her beliefs. View "303 Creative LLC v. Elenis" on Justia Law

Groff, an Evangelical Christian who believes that Sunday should be devoted to worship and rest, took a mail delivery job with the Postal Service (USPS). USPS subsequently began facilitating Amazon’s Sunday deliveries. To avoid working Sundays on a rotating basis, Groff transferred to a rural USPS station. After Amazon deliveries began at that station, Groff received progressive discipline for failing to work on Sundays. He eventually resigned. Groff sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, asserting that USPS could accommodate his Sunday Sabbath practice “without undue hardship" to its business, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j). The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of USPS, reasoning that under Supreme Court precedent, “requiring an employer ‘to bear more than a de minimis cost’ to provide a religious accommodation is an undue hardship.”The Supreme Court vacated. Title VII requires an employer that denies a religious accommodation to show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in substantially increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business. After tracing Establishment Clause and Title VII jurisprudence, the Court concluded that showing “more than a de minimis cost,” as that phrase is used in common parlance, does not establish “undue hardship” under Title VII. Undue hardship is shown when a burden is substantial in the overall context of the business–a fact-specific inquiry. Courts must consider all relevant factors, including the accommodations at issue and their practical impact, given the nature, size, and operating cost of an employer. Impacts on coworkers are relevant only to the extent those impacts affect the conduct of the business. Title VII requires that an employer “reasonably accommodate” an employee’s practice of religion, not merely assess the reasonableness of a particular possible accommodation. An employer must do more than conclude that forcing other employees to work overtime would constitute an undue hardship; other options must be considered. View "Groff v. DeJoy" on Justia Law

In the Harvard College admissions process, “race is a determinative tip for” a significant percentage “of all admitted African American and Hispanic applicants.” University of North Carolina (UNC) also considers the applicant’s race. SFFA challenged both systems.The Supreme Court held that both programs violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first held that SFFA complies with the standing requirements for organizational plaintiffs as a voluntary membership organization with identifiable members who support its mission and whom SFFA represents in good faith.Tracing the history of Fourteenth Amendment precedent, the Court acknowledged its "role in that ignoble history,” and subsequent efforts to eliminate racial discrimination. The core purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to eliminate all governmentally-imposed discrimination based on race. Any exceptions must survive strict scrutiny. which asks whether the racial classification is used to advance compelling governmental interests and whether the use of race is narrowly tailored--necessary to achieve that interest. Previous holdings permitted race-based college admissions only in compliance with strict scrutiny and acknowledged that, eventually, they must end.The admissions programs at issue are not sufficiently measurable to permit strict scrutiny. The identified "compelling" interests include training future leaders, acquiring new knowledge based on diverse outlooks, promoting a robust marketplace of ideas, and preparing engaged and productive citizens. The question of whether a particular mix of minority students produces those results is standardless. The systems fail to articulate a meaningful connection between the means they employ and those goals; they use racial categories that are overbroad, arbitrary or undefined, or underinclusive.The systems also use race as a “negative” and employ stereotypes. College admissions are zero-sum. A benefit provided to some applicants is necessarily at the expense of others. The systems employ “the offensive and demeaning assumption" that students of a particular race think alike. The systems lack a “logical endpoint. View "Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College" on Justia Law

From 2014-2016, Counterman sent hundreds of Facebook messages to C.W., a local musician. Each time C.W. tried to block him, Counterman created a new Facebook account and resumed contacting C.W. Several of his messages envisaged violent harm. C.W. stopped walking alone, declined social engagements, canceled performances, and eventually contacted the authorities. Counterman was charged under a Colorado statute making it unlawful to repeatedly make any form of communication with another person in a manner that would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress, that does cause that person to suffer serious emotional distress. Colorado courts rejected Counterman’s First Amendment argument.The Supreme Court vacated. In true-threat cases, the prosecution must prove that the defendant had some subjective understanding of his statements’ threatening nature.The First Amendment permits restrictions upon the content of speech in a few areas, including true threats--serious expressions conveying that a speaker means to commit an act of unlawful violence. The existence of a threat depends on what the statement conveys to the person receiving it but the First Amendment may demand a subjective mental-state requirement shielding some true threats because bans on speech have the potential to deter speech outside their boundaries. In this context, a recklessness standard, a showing that a person consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct will cause harm to another, is the appropriate mental state. Requiring purpose or knowledge would make it harder for states to counter true threats, with diminished returns for protected expression. View "Counterman v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Samia, Hunter, and Stillwell were tried jointly for the murder-for-hire of Lee, a real estate broker. The prosecution argued that Hunter had hired Samia and Stillwell to pose as buyers and visit properties with Lee. The court admitted Stillwell’s confession that he was in the van in which Lee was killed, but he claimed that Samia had shot Lee. Since Stillwell would not be testifying and the full confession implicated Samia, the prosecution introduced the testimony of a DEA agent, who described Stillwell’s confession in a way that eliminated Samia’s name while avoiding obvious indications of redaction. Before that testimony and again before deliberations, the court instructed the jury that the testimony about Stillwell’s confession was admissible only as to Stillwell and should not be considered as to Samia or Hunter. All three were convicted. The Second Circuit held that the admission of Stillwell’s confession did not violate Samia’s Confrontation Clause rights.The Supreme Court affirmed. The Confrontation Clause was not violated by the admission of a non-testifying codefendant’s confession that did not directly inculpate the defendant and was subject to a proper limiting instruction. The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause forbids the introduction of out-of-court “testimonial” statements unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant has had the chance to cross-examine the witness previously but applies only to witnesses “against the accused.” Ordinarily, a witness at a joint trial is not considered a witness ‘against’ a defendant if the jury is instructed to consider that testimony only against a codefendant. This rule is consistent with the Clause’s text, historical practice, and the law’s reliance on limiting instructions in other contexts. To mandate severance whenever the prosecution wishes to introduce the confession of a non-testifying codefendant in a joint trial would be “too high” a price to pay. View "Samia v. United States" on Justia Law

Hansen promised hundreds of noncitizens a path to U.S. citizenship through “adult adoption,” earning nearly $2 million from his fraudulent scheme. The government charged Hansen under 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), which forbids “encourag[ing] or induc[ing] an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such [activity] is or will be in violation of law.” The Ninth Circuit found Clause (iv) unconstitutionally overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment.The Supreme Court reversed. Because 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) forbids only the purposeful solicitation and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law, the clause is not unconstitutionally overbroad. A statute is facially invalid under the overbreadth doctrine if it “prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech” relative to its “plainly legitimate sweep.” Here, Congress used “encourage” and “induce” as terms of art referring to criminal solicitation and facilitation (capturing only a narrow band of speech) not as those terms are used in ordinary conversation. Criminal solicitation is the intentional encouragement of an unlawful act, and facilitation—i.e., aiding and abetting—is the provision of assistance to a wrongdoer with the intent to further an offense’s commission. Neither requires lending physical aid; both require an intent to bring about a particular unlawful act. The context of these words and statutory history indicate that Congress intended to refer to their well-established legal meanings. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) reaches no further than the purposeful solicitation and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law and does not “prohibi[t] a substantial amount of protected speech” relative to its “plainly legitimate sweep.” View "United States v. Hansen" on Justia Law

In 2000, Jones was convicted on two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Eighth Circuit affirmed Jones’ convictions and sentence. Jones’ subsequent 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion resulted in the vacatur of one of his concurrent sentences. Years later, the Supreme Court held (Rehaif) that a defendant’s knowledge of the status that disqualifies him from owning a firearm is an element of a 922(g) conviction, abrogating contrary Eighth Circuit precedent. Jones filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 motion in the district of his imprisonment.The Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition. Section 2255(e) does not allow a prisoner asserting an intervening change in interpretation of a criminal statute to circumvent the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) restrictions on second or successive 2255 motions by filing a 2241 habeas petition.Under section 2255, federal prisoners can collaterally attack their sentences in the sentencing court, rather than by a 2241 habeas corpus petition in the district of confinement. The purpose of 2255 was to address problems created by district courts collaterally reviewing one another’s proceedings and by the concentration of federal prisoners in certain districts. Congress generally barred federal prisoners “authorized” to file a 2255 motion from filing a 2241 petition but preserved access to 2241 in cases where “the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality" of the detention (Saving Clause). AEDPA subsequently barred second or successive 2255 motions unless based on either newly discovered evidence or “a new rule of constitutional law.” The inability of a prisoner with a statutory claim to satisfy section 2255(h) does not mean that the prisoner may bring a 2241 petition. Section 2255 is not necessarily “inadequate or ineffective” if the 2255 court fails to apply the correct substantive law. The Saving Clause is concerned with the adequacy or effectiveness of the remedial vehicle, not asserted errors of law. Due process does not guarantee the opportunity to have legal issues redetermined in successive collateral attacks. AEDPA embodies a balance between finality and error correction; there is nothing incongruous about a system in which the application of a since-rejected statutory interpretation cannot be remedied after final judgment. View "Jones v. Hendrix" on Justia Law

Smith was indicted in the Northern District of Florida for theft of trade secrets from StrikeLines’ website. Smith moved to dismiss the indictment, citing the Constitution’s Venue Clause and the Vicinage Clause. Smith argued that he had accessed the website from his Alabama home and that the servers storing StrikeLines’ data were in Orlando, Florida. The Eleventh Circuit determined that venue was improper and vacated Smith’s conviction, but held that a trial in an improper venue did not bar reprosecution.The Supreme Court affirmed. The Constitution permits the retrial of a defendant following a trial in an improper venue conducted before a jury drawn from the wrong district. Except as prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause, when a defendant obtains a reversal of a prior, unsatisfied conviction, he may be retried. Nothing in the Venue Clause suggests that a new trial in the proper venue is not an adequate remedy for its violation. The Vicinage Clause—which guarantees the right to “an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,” concerns jury composition, not the place where a trial may be held, and concerns the district where the crime was committed, rather than the state. The vicinage right is one aspect of the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial rights and retrials are the appropriate remedy for violations of other jury-trial rights.The Double Jeopardy Clause is not implicated by retrial in a proper venue. A judicial decision on venue is fundamentally different from a jury’s verdict of acquittal. Culpability is the touchstone; when a trial terminates with a finding that the defendant’s criminal culpability had not been established, retrial is prohibited. Retrial is permissible when a trial terminates on a basis unrelated to factual guilt. The reversal of a conviction based on a violation of the Venue or Vicinage Clauses, even when called a “judgment of acquittal,” does not resolve the question of criminal culpability. View "Smith v. United States" on Justia Law

After Talevski’s move to a nursing home proved problematic, Talevski sued a county-owned nursing home (HHC) under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that HHC’s actions violated rights guaranteed him under the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA). The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit, concluding that the FNHRA rights cited by Talevski—the right to be free from unnecessary chemical restraints and rights to be discharged or transferred only when certain preconditions are met, “unambiguously confer individually enforceable rights on nursing home residents,” presumptively enforceable via section 1983.The Supreme Court affirmed. The FNHRA provisions at issue unambiguously create section 1983-enforceable rights. There is no incompatibility between private enforcement under section 1983 and the remedial scheme that Congress devised. The Court rejected HHC’s argument that, because Congress apparently enacted the FNHRA pursuant to the Spending Clause, Talevski cannot invoke section 1983 to vindicate rights recognized by the FNHRA. FNHRA lacks any indicia of congressional intent to preclude section 1983 enforcement, such as an express private judicial right of action or any other provision that might signify that intent. HHC cited the comprehensiveness of FNHRA’s enforcement mechanisms, but implicit preclusion is shown only by a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under section 1983. There is no indication that private enforcement under section 1983 would thwart Congress’s scheme by circumventing the statutes’ pre-suit procedures, or by giving plaintiffs access to tangible benefits otherwise unavailable under the statutes. View "Health and Hospital Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski" on Justia Law

In 1992, Voting Rights Act (52 U.S.C. 10301) Section 2 litigation challenging Alabama’s districting map resulted in Alabama’s first majority-black district and its first black Representative since 1877. Alabama’s congressional map has remained similar since then. Following the 2020 census, the state enacted a new districting map (HB1), which produced only one district in which black voters constituted a majority.The Supreme Court affirmed a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the use of HB 1.Section 2 provides that the right to vote “shall not be denied or abridged ... on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” A 1982 amendment incorporated an effects test and a disclaimer that “nothing” in Section 2 “establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.” The Supreme Court subsequently employed the “Gingles framework,” under which Section 2 plaintiffs must satisfy three preconditions and then show that, under the “totality of circumstances,” the challenged process is not “equally open” to minority voters.The district court correctly found that black voters could constitute a majority in a second district that was “reasonably configured” and that there was no serious dispute that Black voters are politically cohesive, nor that the challenged districts’ white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat Black voters’ preferred candidate. The court’s findings that “Black Alabamians enjoy virtually zero success in statewide elections” and concerning “Alabama’s extensive history of repugnant racial and voting-related discrimination” were unchallenged.The Court rejected Alabama’s arguments that a state’s map cannot abridge a person’s right to vote “on account of race” if the map resembles a sufficient number of race-neutral alternatives and that the plaintiffs must prove discriminatory intent. Section 2, as applied to redistricting, is not unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment. View "Allen v. Milligan" on Justia Law