Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Student H.P.-B. resides with her adult cousin Q.T. within the geographical boundaries of Pottsgrove. H.P.-B. enrolled in Pottsgrove during the 2014–2015 school year. Q.T. does not have legal custody of H.P.-B—an August 2008 order grants primary physical and legal custody to H.P.-B.’s grandmother, E.E. Q.T. filed an IDEA due process complaint on H.P.-B’s behalf. The district court held that a straightforward application of C.F.R. 34 Section 300.30 (b)(2) “dictates that Q.T. does not qualify as H.P.-B.’s ‘parent’ for purposes of the IDEA.” Q.T., E.E., and F.P. appealed the district court’s order. Appellants argued that the district court erred by holding that Q.T. does not qualify as H.P.-B.’s parent for purposes of the IDEA and, thus that Q.T. is unable to file a due process complaint on H.P.-B.’s behalf.   The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained the district court erred in finding that Q.T. did not qualify as H.P.-B.’s parent and thus lacked standing to file a due process complaint on H.P.-B.’s behalf. The court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded with instructions to vacate the hearing officer’s order dismissing Q.T.’s due process complaint. The court explained there is ample evidence in the record that Q.T. was acting in the place of H.P.-B.’s natural parent, satisfying the third definition of “parent.” The record shows Q.T. affirmed that she was supporting H.P.- B. assumed all personal obligations related to school requirements for H.P.-B. and intended to keep and support H.P.-B. continuously, and not merely through the school year. View "Q. T. v. Pottsgrove School District" on Justia Law

The DRBA, a bi-state agency created by an interstate compact between Delaware and New Jersey, hired Minor as its Deputy Executive Director in 2009 and terminated him in 2017. Minor, believing he was fired for his support of then-incoming New Jersey Governor Murphy, sued the DRBA and its Commissioners for violating his First Amendment right to political affiliation. The court rejected the Commissioners’ request for qualified immunity, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Minor’s responsibilities were purely administrative by the time he was dismissed so that the Commissioners were barred potentially by the First Amendment from firing Minor on account of his politics.The Third Circuit vacated. The district court correctly held that the right of certain employees not to be fired based on political affiliation was clearly established. However, there is a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether Minor held such a position. The question of immunity must await the determination of facts at trial. Third Circuit precedent requires the district court to “analyze separately, and state findings with respect to, the specific conduct of each [Commissioner]” to learn more about whether each Commissioner could know that his specific conduct violated clearly established rights. View "Minor v. Delaware River & Bay Authority" on Justia Law

Twelve current and former Philadelphia police officers posted highly offensive Facebook messages that glorified violence and denigrated minority groups. The posts became part of an expose by a national online news organization. The officers, who were disciplined or terminated, alleged First Amendment retaliation.The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of their suit, noting that it did not condone the officers’ conduct and that the city has an interest in protecting the public’s perception of its officers. There were material factual gaps concerning when certain posts were written and by whom and which posts were the basis of the disciplinary actions. With respect to causation, there was unsubstantiated speculation about the impact of the posts, some of which had been public for years. View "Fenico v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

In 1995, Range pleaded guilty to making false statements about his income to obtain $2,458 of food stamp assistance. His conviction was classified as a misdemeanor punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. Range was sentenced to three years’ probation. Three years later, Range attempted to purchase a firearm but was rejected by the instant background check system. Range’s wife subsequently bought him a deer-hunting rifle. Years later Range learned that he was barred from purchasing and possessing firearms because of his welfare fraud conviction. He sold his rifle to a firearms dealer and sought a declaratory judgment that 18 U.S.C. 922(g) violated the Second Amendment as applied to him. The section prohibits firearm ownership by any person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year—the federal definition of a felony.In 2022, the Third Circuit affirmed the rejection of the suit, reasoning that “the people” constitutionally entitled to bear arms are “law-abiding, responsible citizens,” and that even if Range fell within “the people,” the government demonstrated that its prohibition is consistent with historical tradition.On rehearing, en banc, the Third Circuit reversed. Despite his false statement conviction, Range remains among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. The government did not carry its burden of showing that the Nation’s history and tradition of firearm regulation support disarming Range. View "Range v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Xi and his wife, Li, immigrated to the U.S. from China in 1989. Xi, an internationally acclaimed expert on thin film superconducting technology, became Chair of the Physics Department at Temple University. On May 21, 2015, Xi answered the door and was confronted by armed FBI agents. Agents held the family at gunpoint and conducted an extensive search before taking Xi to the FBI’s field office. He was interrogated before the agents revealed that Xi had been indicted for providing Chinese entities with sensitive information about a “revolution[ary]” superconductor, the “pocket heater.” Eventually, prosecutors realized that, as the inventor allegedly explained, Xi’s emails did not concern the pocket heater and the pocket heater was not “revolutionary.” The government moved to dismiss the Indictment. The case received widespread media attention. Temple placed Xi on administrative leave; the family suffered emotionally and financially.The district court dismissed Xi's “Bivens” claims alleging equal protection and Fourth Amendment violations, malicious prosecution, and fabrication of evidence, and the family's Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b) claims. The court determined that Xi failed to allege “clearly established” constitutional violations and assumed that the same qualified immunity standard applied to the FTCA’s “discretionary function exception.”The Third Circuit affirmed in part, citing Supreme Court precedent declining to extend Bivens into the national security realm and the limited circumstances in which Congress has provided a remedy. The court vacated the dismissal of the FTCA claims. The “clearly established” threshold is inapplicable. The government has no discretion to violate the Constitution; FTCA claims premised on conduct that is plausibly alleged to violate the Constitution may not be dismissed on the basis of the discretionary function exception. View "Xi v. Haugen" on Justia Law

Nucera was charged with committing a hate crime, depriving another of his civil rights, and making false statements to the FBI, arising from actions he took as a police officer arresting Stroye. His jury engaged in heated deliberations with racial tensions playing a major role. Credibility determinations were crucial, and jurors were deeply divided over whom and what to believe.The Third Circuit rejected Nucera’s claims of jury misconduct. Nucera offers only post-verdict affidavits from jurors who say they experienced racial vitriol, intimidation, and other misconduct that occurred during the jury deliberations. When parties challenge a verdict, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) bars a court from considering a juror’s statement or affidavit unless it satisfies either an exception in the Rule or a constitutional exception created by the Supreme Court (Peña-Rodriguez, 2017), for evidence of racial bias. The latter exception is narrow and specific: it requires a clear statement that a juror voted for a conviction based on racial animus toward, or stereotypes about, the defendant. None of Nucera’s evidence satisfies the Rule 606(b) exceptions nor does it fit the Peña-Rodriguez exception. The court also affirmed a ruling that limited Nucera’s use of the victim’s out-of-court statement and the court’s jury instructions about unanimity. The court vacated Nucera’s sentence; the district court erred in applying the Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Nucera" on Justia Law

Diaz was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine and was sentenced to 33 months’ incarceration followed by 36 months’ supervised release. During that period of supervised release, Scranton Police Officers responded to a report of a physical, domestic incident involving Diaz’s then-girlfriend, Fernandez. Other violations of supervised release included possessing and using marijuana. During a probable cause and detention hearing, Magistrate Saporito heard testimony from Fernandez that she was not scared of Diaz. Saporito imposed a no-contact condition. Fernandez's testimony in the detention hearing was proven false. Diaz had called Fernandez and persuaded her to recant her statements to the police. Saporito ordered Diaz to be detained until his final revocation hearing.At the final supervised release violation hearing, Judge Mannion sentenced Diaz to the statutory maximum of 24 months’ incarceration followed by another two years’ supervised release. Mannion reimposed the no-contact order to apply during Diaz’s incarceration and his new term of supervised release. The Third Circuit vacated in part. The district court lacked either statutory or inherent authority to impose the custodial no-contact order. The court upheld the condition of Diaz’s second period of supervised release as narrowly tailored and sufficiently connected to the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. View "United States v. Santos Diaz" on Justia Law

When Mack was incarcerated, he worked at the prison commissary, where two supervising prison guards singled him out for harassment because of his Muslim faith. When Mack went to the back of the commissary to pray during shift breaks, the guards followed him and interfered with his prayers by making noises, talking loudly, and kicking boxes. Fearing retaliation if he continued to pray at work, Mack stopped doing so. The guards nevertheless engineered his termination from his commissary job. He sued.The district court granted the guards summary judgment on Mack’s lone surviving claim, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb, citing qualified immunity. The Third Circuit vacated. While, as a matter of law, qualified immunity can be asserted as a defense under RFRA, the officers have not met their burden of establishing that defense. Framed in the light most favorable to Mack, evidence of the RFRA violation here involved significant, deliberate, repeated, and unjustified interference by prison officials with Mack’s ability to pray as required by his faith. If different facts come out at trial, the officers may again raise qualified immunity. View "Mack v. Yost" on Justia Law

Freeman was convicted, along with Miller and Collier, of second-degree murder. The jury had heard the confession of Miller, a non-testifying codefendant, with redactions that replaced the names of Collier and Freeman, with the substitutes “the first guy” and “the second guy.” The court gave a limiting instruction that the statement was to be considered only as to Miller, not as to the other defendants, in order to protect Freeman’s Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against him. Freeman’s objection was overruled and rejected on appeal in state court.The district court concluded that a “Bruton” violation occurred and that the violation was not harmless, and granted Freeman habeas relief. The Third Circuit reversed. A Bruton violation occurred. When a statement is redacted— whether by substituting the codefendant’s name with a neutral pronoun, a blank space, or a symbol—in such a manner that “[a] juror … need only lift his eyes to [the codefendant], sitting at counsel table” to understand who is being implicated, the introduction of that statement is a Sixth Amendment violation. However, there was ample other evidence against Freeman, and the violative statement was largely duplicative of other evidence; there is no “grave doubt about whether [the error] had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” The error was harmless. View "Freeman v. Superintendent Fayette SCI" on Justia Law

To improve a stretch of U.S. Route 22 near Altoona, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) sought two right-of-way easements from for new drainage pipes, covering less than one-tenth of an acre of Merritt's property. PennDOT initiated condemnation and over Merritts’s objections, acquired title to and possession of the easements. With no success in that state-court proceeding, Merritts filed a federal suit, claiming that PennDOT’s acquisition of the easements and the compensation offered for them violated the U.S. Constitution and Pennsylvania law.The district court dismissed all claims with prejudice, some based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, the remainder under “Burford abstention,” which protects “complex state administrative processes from undue federal interference.” The Third Circuit affirmed in part. The “Ex parte Young” exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity does not allow Merritts’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against the PennDOT officials in their official capacities because he does not seek prospective relief from an ongoing violation. Merritts’s section 1983 claims for damages against the PennDOT officials in their individual capacities for allegedly unlawfully acquiring the easements for PennDOT cannot be dismissed under Burford abstention; his claims for damages premised on the allegedly unlawful acquisition of the easements meet the conditions for dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but his claims concerning the denial of just compensation do not. The dismissals on Eleventh Amendment and Rooker-Feldman grounds should have been without prejudice. View "Merritts v. Richards" on Justia Law