Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The American Civil Rights Union (ACRU) challenged the Philadelphia City Commissioners’ failure to purge the city’s voter rolls of registered voters who are currently incarcerated due to a felony conviction. Because state law prohibits felons from voting while they are in prison, the ACRU argues that the National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. 50207, requires the Commissioners to remove them from the voter rolls. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The unambiguous text of the Act states that while states are required to make reasonable efforts to remove registrants for certain reasons, states are merely permitted—not required— to provide for removal of registrants from the official list based on criminal conviction. The 2002 Help America Vote Act, 42 U.S.C. 15301, also cited by ACRU, contains no private right of enforcement. View "American Civil Rights Union v. Philadelphia City Commissioner" on Justia Law

Mann, a Palmerton Area School District football player, experienced a hard hit during a practice session. While some players thought that Sheldon may have been exhibiting concussion-like symptoms, he was sent back into the practice session by Coach Walkowiak. Sheldon then suffered another violent collision and was removed from the practice field. He was later diagnosed with a traumatic brain injury. Sheldon’s parents asserted that Walkowiak violated Sheldon’s constitutional right to bodily integrity under a state-created danger theory of liability and that the District was accountable under a “Monell” theory. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Walkowiak’s alleged conduct, if proven at trial, would be sufficient to support a jury verdict in favor of Mann on his state-created danger claim, but the right in question—to be free from deliberate exposure to a traumatic brain injury after exhibiting signs of a concussion in the context of a violent contact sport—was not clearly established in 2011. Walkowiak was entitled to qualified immunity. There was not sufficient evidence to warrant a jury trial on the Monell claim against the District. View "Mann v. Palmerton Area School District" on Justia Law

In 1997, Wilkerson and Hill had a verbal confrontation. Wilkerson struck Hill in the head with a gun, then shot Hill in the chest. Wilkerson was charged with multiple crimes. In jury instructions, the judge stated that an attempted murder conviction would require a finding Wilkerson “did a certain act,” “alleged to be a shooting,” while a conviction for aggravated assault would require finding “that [Wilkerson] caused or attempted to cause serious bodily injury.” The judge did not specify that the shooting could not both serve as the basis for an attempted murder conviction and as the “attempt[] to cause serious bodily injury” for aggravated assault. The jury convicted on both counts on a general verdict form that did not specify whether the “serious bodily injury” finding underlying the aggravated assault conviction related to the shooting or the preceding assault. In federal habeas proceedings, the Third Circuit rejected Wilkerson’s double jeopardy argument that the jury instructions permitted conviction on both offenses based on the shooting alone. The state court’s rejection of that claim was not “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” The court rejected, as untimely, Wilkerson’s “Apprendi” challenge to the imposition of an enhanced sentence for attempted murder based on a finding by the judge, but not the jury, that the victim suffered serious bodily injury and a claim that counsel was ineffective for not objecting to that finding. View "Wilkerson v. Superintendent Fayette SCI" on Justia Law

In 2002, Hoffner was convicted of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, distribution of methamphetamine, and unlawful use of a communication facility. The district court applied the career offender guideline, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, based upon Pennsylvania convictions Hoffner incurred in the 1980s, one for simple assault and another for burglary, robbery, and conspiracy. Hoffner’s direct appeal and habeas corpus petition were unsuccessful. In 2012, he filed an unauthorized second habeas corpus petition. In 2015, he filed the pro se motion seeking to file a successive habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2255(h)(2), citing the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Johnson” holding that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act is unconstitutionally vague. Hoffner was sentenced under an identical residual clause that existed until recently in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ career offender guideline, U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2). The Third Circuit granted the petition. Hoffner made a “prima facie showing,” 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(C), of the pre-filing requirements for a successive habeas corpus petition: the rule on which his claim relies is a new rule of constitutional law that has been made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court and the claim was previously unavailable. View "In re: Hoffner" on Justia Law

Parker, an indigent prisoner and prolific pro se litigant, initiated about 40 civil matters over a short period of time. In 2014, Parker filed suit, claiming that officials subjected him to false arrest, malicious prosecution, and the use of excessive force during his 2011 arrest, and sought to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The court granted the IFP motion and considered the case under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), which directs a court to dismiss a case “at any time” if it determines that the “action or appeal is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” The court concluded that Parker’s claims were time-barred and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. This was Parker’s first strike under the PLRA “three strikes” rule. which limits a prisoner’s ability to proceed IFP if the prisoner abuses the judicial system by filing frivolous actions. Parker’s next strikes arose from the dismissals, as “frivolous,” of two 2015 civil rights complaints. The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that an indigent prisoner appealing a district court’s imposition of his “third strike” may not proceed IFP for that appeal without demonstrating that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. View "Parker v. Montgomery County Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

Geisinger Medical Center, a private hospital that operates clinical training, partnered with Bloomsburg University, which teaches in the classroom, to establish the Nurse Anesthetist Program. Geisinger provides certificates upon completion of its clinic and Bloomsburg confers Master of Science degrees to students who complete both the coursework and the clinical component. Geisinger’s policies, including its drug and alcohol policy, apply to students participating in the clinic; drug tests “may be administered upon reasonable suspicion of substance abuse,” and any worker “who refuses to cooperate ... shall be subject to disciplinary action, including termination” without pre-termination hearing or process. Geisinger has sole authority to remove an enrollee from the clinical program. The Program's Director, a Geisinger nurse anesthetist, Richer, was a joint employee of Geisinger and Bloomsburg. Richer terminated Borrell, who had previously been a Geisinger RN, for refusing to take a drug test after another nurse reported that Borrell used cocaine and “acted erratically” on a recent trip. Richer had previously “noticed that Borrell appeared disheveled on a few occasions.” Richer claimed he acted as Director of the clinical training portion and that Bloomsburg played no part in the decision. Borrell requested, but did not receive, a formal hearing from Bloomsburg, then filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. The Third Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of Borrell, concluding that the defendants were not state actors. View "Borrell v. Bloomsburg University" on Justia Law

Williams, an African-American woman, claimed that she was subjected to constant harassment by her supervisors at the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, faced a hostile work environment, and was ultimately constructively discharged from her position as a Human Relations Representative. After taking leave under the Family Medical Leave Act, she had not returned to work. She filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, seeking damages for the loss of her job and the harm sustained to her physical and emotional health. She included claims against her former supervisors, claiming that they violated her rights under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and were liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that violations of Title VII and the ADA may not be brought through section 1983, given the comprehensive administrative scheme established by Title VII and the ADA. Those statutes require plaintiffs to comply with particular procedures and/or to exhaust particular administrative remedies prior to filing suit. In addition, Williams presented no triable issues of fact on her Title VII claims against the Commission. View "Williams v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission" on Justia Law

On a Sunday morning in January 2013, Davenport was riding in the front passenger seat of a vehicle driven by her son, Burris. After running a red light and refusing to pull over, Burris led police officers on a nearly five-mile low-speed pursuit into Pittsburgh. As the pursuit entered an area with high pedestrian traffic, Officers Schweitzer, Matakovich, Kennedy, and Gorecki each opened fire on Burris’s vehicle. Davenport was struck by one of the bullets. She filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers used excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity in favor of many of the defendants but denied it as to Schweitzer, Matakovich, Kennedy, and Gorecki, finding that their alleged conduct violated clearly established law. The Third Circuit dismissed the appeal as to Gorecki for lack of jurisdiction and reversed in part as to Schweitzer, Matakovich, and Kennedy. Considering the serious threat of immediate harm to others, no reasonable jury could conclude that the officers fired at the vehicle for any reason other than to eliminate that threat. The court held that a passenger shot by an officer during the course of a vehicular pursuit may seek relief under the Fourth Amendment View "Davenport v. Borough of Homestead" on Justia Law

In 2006, Mathias was convicted of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder based on a shooting that killed one person and severely injured another. The judge properly instructed the jurors they must find the accomplice himself had the specific intent to kill but, over defense counsel’s objection and contrary to Pennsylvania law, also indicated that the jurors could convict an accomplice based on the specific intent of the principal. While appellate counsel raised the jury instructions on criminal conspiracy, he did not raise the murder instructions. The state court observed that appellate counsel had not adequately briefed any of Mathias’s claims and deemed them waived but rejected the conspiracy instruction claim on the merits. Mathias filed a pro se petition under Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act, untimely raising a claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Superior Court rejected it on the merits. Mathias filed a pro se petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Third Circuit reversed a grant of habeas relief on Mathias’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel and due process claims based on the murder instruction despite waiving the Rule 4(a)(3) timeliness requirement. Regardless of whether counsel’s performance was deficient, the state court did not clearly err in determining there was no prejudice and its decision was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent on internally inconsistent jury instructions. View "Mathias v. Superintendent Frackville SCI" on Justia Law

In 1991, Bruce and others went Vine’s mussel shell camp, tied up Vine and his fiance, shot them, set the house ablaze and completed a robbery. Federal authorities became involved, leading to Bruce’s 1996 convictions for witness tampering murder. In 2011, the Supreme Court decided “Fowler,” interpreting the statute under which Bruce was convicted, making it a crime “to kill another person, with intent to . . . prevent the communication by any person to a law enforcement officer . . . of the United States . . . of information relating to the . . . possible commission of a Federal offense,” 18 U.S.C. 1512(a)(1)(C). Fowler addressed situations where the defendant killed with the intent to prevent communication with officers in general but did not have federal officers in mind at the time. Ordinarily, federal prisoners collaterally challenge their convictions or sentences under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Bruce never pursued his statutory interpretation argument on direct appeal or in his initial section 2255 motion. Section 2255(h) does not permit a second petition for previously unavailable rules of statutory interpretation, but a savings clause allows a federal prisoner to seek habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 when 2255’s remedy “is inadequate or ineffective.” The Third Circuit concluded that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction under section 2241, but that this is not the extraordinary case in which a successful showing of actual innocence has been made View "Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP" on Justia Law