Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A dispute arose over Pennsylvania's rule requiring mail-in and absentee voters to date the return envelope carrying their ballot. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had ruled this requirement mandatory and declared that undated or incorrectly dated ballots were invalid under state law. The case centered on whether federal law, specifically Section 10101(a)(2)(B) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, mandated that these non-compliant ballots be counted. This provision prohibits the denial of the right to vote due to an immaterial error or omission on paperwork related to voting.The District Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, declaring that rejecting timely received mail ballots due to missing or incorrect dates violated the federal provision. They reasoned that the date requirement was immaterial, as it played no role in determining a vote's timeliness.However, the appellate court reversed this decision. The court held that the federal provision only applies when the state is determining who may vote, not how a qualified voter must cast their ballot. They found that the provision does not apply to rules, like the date requirement, that govern how a qualified voter must cast their ballot for it to be counted. The court concluded that a contrary approach could not be reconciled with the text and historic backdrop of the statute. Therefore, the court ruled that the federal provision does not override Pennsylvania's date requirement for casting a mail-in ballot. The case was remanded for further consideration of the plaintiffs' pending equal protection claim. View "Pennsylvania State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Northampton County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the plaintiff, Troy Moore, Sr., a prisoner, sued Correctional Officer Saajida Walton under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that she violated his Eighth Amendment rights. The claim was based on an incident where a toilet in Moore’s prison cell exploded and Walton refused to let him out of his cell to clean up for over eight hours. Moore originally filed the complaint under a misspelled version of Walton’s name. The correct spelling was not provided until after the statute of limitations for his claim had expired. The District Court granted summary judgment to Walton based on the statute of limitations.The Circuit Court held that the District Court misapplied the relation back analysis under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C) by failing to consider the period for service provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). It held that Rule 15(c)(1)(C)’s reference to “the period provided by Rule 4(m)” includes any extensions for service granted under Rule 4(m) for good cause. The case was remanded to the District Court to determine whether Walton received notice of the action by a certain date and, if so, whether Moore could demonstrate the absence of prejudice—the final element necessary to satisfy the relation back inquiry. If all these conditions were met, the District Court would then need to consider the merits of Moore’s Eighth Amendment claim. View "Moore v. Walton" on Justia Law

In this case, Kobe Pinkney sued Officer Jared Frum and others for false arrest and malicious prosecution. Officer Frum, in an investigation into an assault, had obtained an arrest warrant for Pinkney based on a witness statement. However, the court found that Officer Frum had misrepresented information in the warrant application, overstating the certainty of the witness, ignoring inconsistencies, and omitting key facts. The court found that Officer Frum had recklessly disregarded the truth, and the misrepresentations and omissions were deemed material to the finding of probable cause.The court concluded that the single witness identification, without more, must have at least basic signs of reliability to amount to probable cause. The court noted that this bar is not high; either corroboration or an appropriate witness interview may suffice. But based on the facts alleged, neither happened in Pinkney's case. Thus, Officer Frum was found to have violated Pinkney’s Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him without probable cause.Further, the court ruled that Pinkney’s right not to be arrested without probable cause was clearly established, as was his right not to be prosecuted without probable cause. Hence, a reasonable officer would have known that Officer Frum’s alleged conduct was unlawful. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision and allowed the case to proceed. View "Pinkney v. Meadville Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dealt with two consolidated cases involving two New Jersey parents, who claimed they were retaliated against for protesting school policies related to mandatory masking during the COVID-19 pandemic. One parent, George Falcone, was issued a summons for defiant trespass after refusing to wear a mask at a school board meeting, while another parent, Gwyneth Murray-Nolan, was arrested under similar circumstances. Falcone claimed retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights, while Murray-Nolan argued the same and also claimed she was deprived of substantive due process. The district court dismissed both cases. On appeal, the court found that Falcone had standing to sue, reversing and remanding the lower court's decision. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Murray-Nolan's case, concluding that refusing to wear a mask during a pandemic was not protected conduct under the First Amendment. View "Murray-Nolan v. Rubin" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims brought by a group of students and Children’s Health Defense, Inc. against Rutgers University. The plaintiffs challenged the university's COVID-19 vaccination policy, which required in-person students to be vaccinated or else enroll in online programs or seek exemptions for medical or religious reasons. The court found that the university's policy did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional or statutory rights.The court held that there is no fundamental right to refuse vaccination. It applied the rational basis review and concluded that Rutgers University had a rational basis for its policy given the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the policy was ultra vires under New Jersey law, determining that Rutgers was authorized to require COVID-19 vaccinations under state law. Furthermore, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' equal protection claim, concluding that Rutgers had a rational basis for its differential treatment of students and staff, as well as vaccinated and unvaccinated students. View "Children's Health Defense Inc. v. Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over the rights of retired law enforcement officers to carry concealed firearms in New Jersey. The plaintiffs, three retired officers and two organizations, sued New Jersey officials, arguing that a federal statute, the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA), gives them a federal right to carry a concealed firearm anywhere in the United States, including within New Jersey, and that LEOSA preempts any more burdensome state requirements. The state countered that the federal statute does not provide such an enforceable right, and even if it did, it would only apply to officers who retired from federal or out-of-state law enforcement agencies. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that LEOSA does provide certain retired officers with an enforceable right to carry concealed firearms, and that this right extends equally to officers who retired from New Jersey agencies and those who retired from federal or out-of-state agencies. The court concluded that LEOSA also preempts contrary aspects of New Jersey law. Therefore, the court affirmed the District Court’s order granting declaratory and injunctive relief to the retired officers. View "Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association v. Attorney General New Jersey" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the interpretation of the federal Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004 (LEOSA), which allows certain qualified retired law enforcement officers to carry concealed firearms, and its relation to New Jersey’s more restrictive retired police officer permitting law. The retired law enforcement officers from various agencies claimed that LEOSA provided them with a federal right to carry concealed firearms in New Jersey, superseding the state law. The State of New Jersey argued that LEOSA did not provide an enforceable right and, if it did, it would only apply to officers who retired from federal or out-of-state law enforcement agencies—not to officers who retired from New Jersey law enforcement agencies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that LEOSA does provide certain retired officers who meet all the statutory requirements with an enforceable right, and that right extends equally to officers who retired from New Jersey agencies and those who retired from federal or out-of-state agencies. The court held that the federal statute also preempts contrary aspects of New Jersey law. Therefore, the court affirmed the District Court’s order granting declaratory and injunctive relief to the retired officers, allowing them to carry concealed firearms. View "Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association v. Attorney General New Jersey" on Justia Law

In Pennsylvania, four family members, including two elderly parents, were injured during a pre-dawn, no-knock raid by the Special Emergency Response Team (SERT) of the Pennsylvania State Police. The police acted on information about alleged drug sales by a family member, but none of the four injured individuals were suspected of any wrongdoing. They sued the officers for excessive use of force, but the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, ruling that they were entitled to qualified immunity.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the District Court's decision. The court found that the officers' conduct was objectively unreasonable as they had used substantial force against individuals who were unarmed, cooperative, outnumbered by law enforcement, not suspected of wrongdoing, and in their own home. Furthermore, the court held that the right to be free from such excessive force was clearly established at the time of the officers' conduct, and that any reasonable officer would have known that their actions were unlawful. Hence, the court concluded that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity.The case has been remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. View "Anglemeyer v. Ammons" on Justia Law

In this case, two New Jersey parents sued various school and law enforcement officials, alleging that their First Amendment rights were violated when they were punished for refusing to wear masks at school board meetings. George Falcone was issued a summons and Gwyneth Murray-Nolan was arrested. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Falcone had standing to sue because his alleged injuries were directly traceable to the defendants who allegedly conspired to violate his First Amendment right to engage in political and symbolic speech. The court reversed and remanded the lower court's order dismissing Falcone's complaint for lack of standing.However, the court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Murray-Nolan's complaint. The court held that refusing to wear a mask is not expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. Further, Murray-Nolan's retaliation claim failed because the police had probable cause to arrest her and she did not link her constitutionally protected speech activities (such as her social media posts) to any of the defendants' allegedly retaliatory actions. View "Falcone v. Dickstein" on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, a group of former union members alleged that their First Amendment rights were violated when their respective unions continued to deduct membership dues from their paychecks after they had resigned from the unions. The appellants had previously signed union membership applications authorizing the deduction of dues from their paychecks, with the authorizations being irrevocable for a year, regardless of membership status, unless the member provided written notice of revocation within a specified annual window. The appellants resigned from their respective unions after their annual revocation windows had passed, and the unions continued to deduct dues until the next annual revocation window. The appellants argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, which held that public-sector unions charging fees to nonmembers is a form of coerced speech that violates the First Amendment, should extend to their situation. The Third Circuit disagreed, holding that Janus was focused on preventing forced speech by nonmembers who never consented to join a union, not members who voluntarily join a union and later resign. The court further rejected the appellants' due process claims, finding that they had not been deprived of any constitutional rights. The court also dismissed the appellants' contract defenses, finding that they had not alleged that the terms of their original membership agreements entitled them to membership in perpetuity. The court affirmed the District Court's orders dismissing the appellants' claims. View "Fultz v. AFSCME" on Justia Law