Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Sharkey worked as a special educator and assistant principal at Susquehanna Township High School in 2013. He and M.S., a 16-year-old female student, began a sexual relationship. Weeks later, students began spreading rumors. The District launched an investigation, which included numerous interviews with M.S., Sharkey, and others; review of Sharkey’s telephone records, and examinations of texts, emails, and photos on M.S.’s telephone and on Sharkey’s district-issued telephone. M.S. and Sharkey denied the rumors. Not finding any evidence of wrongdoing, the superintendent ended the investigation.At the beginning of the next school year, the rumors resurfaced. The District contacted the police and placed Sharkey on administrative leave. M.S. still denied having a sexual relationship with Sharkey but officers informed her that they planned to get a search warrant for her phone. The next day, M.S. and her parents met with the police; M.S. provided details about her relationship with Sharkey. Sharkey was criminally charged. The District informed Sharkey that it intended to terminate his employment and obtained his resignation.M.S. sued the District, alleging a hostile educational environment in violation of Title IX, violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, and state-law claims. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the District. Sharkey’s knowledge of his own wrongdoing is irrelevant to the District’s actual knowledge of the sexual harassment. No other appropriate person at the District had actual knowledge of the sexual relationship until days before Sharkey resigned. View "M. S. v. Susquehanna Township School District" on Justia Law

Mack, a practicing Muslim, was an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution in Loretto, Pennsylvania, and worked for pay at the prison’s commissary. Mack alleges that he was harassed, based on his religion, by correctional officers Roberts and Venslosky, who supervised the inmates working in the commissary. Mack alleges that he raised these issues with their supervisor, Stephens; that upon overhearing Mack’s oral complaint to Stephens, Roberts told Mack, “[y]ou are not going to be here long”; and that Venslosky fired Mack less than two weeks later. The district court denied the government’s motion for summary judgment on Mack’s First Amendment retaliation claim.The Third Circuit reversed. The court noted that no statute provides a damages remedy for constitutional claims brought against federal officials. Although the Supreme Court recognized an implied damages action for such claims under the Fourth Amendment in 1971 (Bivens), the Court has since recognized an implied damages remedy in only two other instances. In 2017, the Supreme Court cautioned against creating additional implied damages remedies and explicitly declared expansion of Bivens a “disfavored judicial activity.” The Third Circuit declined to expand Bivens to create a damages remedy for Mack’s First Amendment retaliation claim. View "Mack v. Yost" on Justia Law

Downey has long struggled with glaucoma, which can lead to blindness if left uncontrolled. His condition worsened while he was imprisoned at the State Correctional Institution at Waymart, Pennsylvania. Doctors recommended that Downey have surgery expeditiously to save his eyesight. Nothing happened for almost a year, although he repeatedly reached out to prison staff. Surgery came too late; Downey is now blind. Downey sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1999. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment, concluding that he failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a)..The Third Circuit reversed in part. Downey’s claims for monetary relief are not procedurally defaulted. Under the prison’s procedures, a prisoner dealing with an emergency or an urgent situation is not bound by the ordinary procedures specified in the grievance policy; he only needs to alert the closest staff person. The court rejected the prison’s “efforts to downplay the urgency” of Downey’s situation and found that Downey complied with the policy. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims against the Department of Corrections and its officials on state sovereign immunity grounds, although that defense was not raised before the district court. View "Downey v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Two counties sued Sherwin-Williams in state court, seeking abatement of the public nuisance caused by lead-based paint. Anticipating suits by other counties, Sherwin-Williams sued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Sherwin-Williams claimed that “[i]t is likely that the fee agreement between [Delaware County] and the outside trial lawyers [is] or will be substantively similar to an agreement struck by the same attorneys and Lehigh County to pursue what appears to be identical litigation” and that “the Count[y] ha[s] effectively and impermissibly delegated [its] exercise of police power to the private trial attorneys” by vesting the prosecutorial function in someone who has a financial interest in using the government’s police power to hold a defendant liable. The complaint pleaded a First Amendment violation, citing the company’s membership in trade associations, Sherwin-Williams’ purported petitioning of federal, state, and local governments, and its commercial speech. The complaint also argued that the public nuisance theory would seek to impose liability “that is grossly disproportionate,” arbitrary, retroactive, vague, and “after an unexplainable, prejudicial, and extraordinarily long delay, in violation of the Due Process Clause.”The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Sherwin-Williams failed to plead an injury in fact or a ripe case or controversy because the alleged harms hinged on the County actually filing suit. View "Sherwin Williams Co. v. County of Delaware" on Justia Law

Ramsey, a medical student. unsuccessfully sought testing accommodations for dyslexia and ADHD from the National Board of Medical Examiners. Ramsey sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Third Circuit affirmed the award of a preliminary injunction, requiring the Board to provide her accommodations. Ramsay established irreparable harm because she would likely be forced to withdraw from medical school if she could not take the initial test with accommodations and pass. The balance of equities tipped in her favor because granting her accommodations would not undermine the Board’s interests in fair and accurate testing and it was in the public interest for the ADA to be followed, to increase the number of physicians. Evidence that Ramsay’s reading, processing, and writing skills were abnormally low by multiple measures provided a sufficient comparison of her abilities to those of the general population to support the finding of disability. While the district court viewed Ramsay’s experts more favorably and found the Board’s experts unpersuasive, there is no indication that the court believed that it was compelled to defer to Ramsay’s experts; the court discounted the Board’s experts because they never met with Ramsay, engaged in too demanding an analysis of whether Ramsay had a disability, and overly focused on Ramsay’s academic achievements. View "Ramsay v. National Board of Medical Examiners" on Justia Law

A York, Pennsylvania officer reported a shooting and said the suspects fled in a vehicle. Other officers pursued the vehicle, which crashed. Officers pursued the driver and a passenger on foot. An officer found a spent .38 caliber shell casing inside the vehicle. Officers observed Williams and Scott running and ordered them to get on the ground. Scott complied but Williams ran and was eventually apprehended. Williams claims the officers were very rough with her and disregarded her complaints. According to three officers, Williams “was kicking, flailing around, being disorderly, and yelling.” At one point, she tripped on an unidentified officer’s foot. She was transported to City Hall where she continued to refuse to cooperate. Williams claims that an unidentified officer “approached her, twisted her arm, threw her against the wall, and threatened if she did not give him her arm, he would break it.”Williams, found not guilty of disorderly conduct, sued the city and the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied the officers qualified immunity. The Third Circuit reversed. A plaintiff alleging that one or more officers engaged in unconstitutional conduct must establish the personal involvement of each named defendant to survive summary judgment and district courts must specify those material facts that are and are not subject to genuine dispute and explain their materiality. Reviewing the actions attributable to identified officers, the court concluded that the officers did not violate clearly established law. View "Williams v. City of York" on Justia Law

Santos, a native of the Dominican Republic, became a lawful permanent U.S. resident in 2006. In 2017, he pleaded guilty to possessing marijuana with intent to deliver. If that crime is the “aggravated felony,” “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance” he is removable, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Santos was taken to the Pike County Correctional Facility, 8 U.S.C. 1226(c). In 2018, an IJ ordered Santos removed. While awaiting the BIA’s decision on remand from the Third Circuit, Santos filed this federal habeas petition, arguing that the Due Process Clause guarantees a bond hearing to an alien detained under section 1226(c) once his detention becomes “unreasonable.” The district court denied relief, finding no evidence that the government had “improperly or unreasonably delayed the regular course of proceedings, or that [it] ha[d] detained him for any purpose other than the resolution of his removal proceedings.” The BIA then held that Santos’s conviction was not an aggravated felony and remanded for a hearing on his application for cancellation of removal. The IJ denied that application, leaving Santos in prison (then more than 30 months). The Third Circuit reversed; his detention has become unreasonable and Santos has a due process right to a bond hearing, at which the government must justify his continued detention by clear and convincing evidence. View "Santos v. Warden Pike County Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

B.L., as an MAHS freshman, was on the junior varsity cheerleading squad. The next year, she was again placed on JV. An incoming freshman made the varsity team. B.L took a photo of herself and her friend with their middle fingers raised and posted it to her Snapchat story that was visible to about 250 “friends.” The caption stated: “Fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything.” A teammate took a screenshot and sent it to a cheerleading coach. Another coach stated that: “Several students” had approached her, “visibly upset” about the snaps. The coaches decided B.L.’s snap violated team and school rules, which required cheerleaders to “have respect for [their] school, coaches, . . . [and] other cheerleaders”; avoid “foul language and inappropriate gestures”; and refrain from sharing “negative information regarding cheerleading, cheerleaders, or coaches . . . on the internet.” The coaches removed B.L. from the team. School authorities upheld the decision.B.L. filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in B.L.’s favor. B.L. did not waive her speech rights by agreeing to the team’s rules; her suspension from the team implicated the First Amendment even though extracurricular participation is merely a privilege. B.L.’s snap was off-campus speech and had not caused any actual or foreseeable substantial disruption of the school environment. View "B.L. v. Mahanoy Area School District" on Justia Law

While imprisoned at Moshannon Valley Correctional Center ()MVCC), Davis, a Jamaican national, requested permission to marry a non-inmate U.S. citizen. MVCC apparently imposed requirements on those wishing to get married, beyond the requirements specified in the Federal Bureau of Prison regulations. Davis alleges that, despite having complied with all requirements, including MVCC’s additional requirements, Warden Wigen denied the request. MVCC almost exclusively houses foreign nationals who have been ordered to be deported or are facing immigration proceedings. Davis claims that federal defendants and officials of GEO, a company that operates private prisons on behalf of the government, conspired to ensure that no MVCC inmate can get married; marriage could complicate, and perhaps stop, removal and other immigration proceedings.The Third Circuit vacated the dismissal of section 1983 claims, reasoning that the complaint did not allege a purely private conspiracy, so a basic premise of the district court’s decision on the availability of relief was erroneous. The court affirmed the dismissal of the Bivens claim as asking for an unsupportable extension of Bivens liability; the Supreme Court has never recognized or been asked to recognize, a Bivens remedy for infringement of the right to marry. The court affirmed the dismissal of other 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, and 2000d claims. View "Davis v. Samuels" on Justia Law

Scripps was convicted of wire fraud for transferring millions of dollars from the bank accounts of his mother and autistic uncle—heirs to the family’s publishing fortune—into his own account. During sentencing arguments, the court repeatedly indicated that Scripps could address the court without personally asking Scripps if he wished to speak. The court asked defense counsel (Dezsi) whether Scripps wished to address the court. Dezsi stated that Scripps did not. The judge later concluded that “[t]here’s nothing in this record from which I could fairly conclude there’s any remorse” and sentenced Scripps to 108 months’ imprisonment, the maximum period of incarceration within the Guidelines range. On appeal, with Scripps represented by Dezsi, the Third Circuit affirmed. Scripps filed an unsuccessful 28 U.S.C 2255 motion, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, including by failing to argue that the judge erred by not personally inviting Scripps to speak during sentencing. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) requires a sentencing judge to “address the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence.”The Third Circuit reversed. The district court abused its discretion in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing. It is possible that appellate counsel’s failure to raise Rule 32 error “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” The Supreme Court has held that a Rule 32 query, directed towards counsel, does not satisfy the requirement that the court personally address the defendant. View "United States v. Scripps" on Justia Law