Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Argueta, a 20-year-old citizen of Honduras, entered the U.S. in 1998. In 2007, Argueta had an altercation with a former employer over the late payment of wages. Convicted of aggravated assault, he was sentenced to 96 months’ imprisonment. In removal proceedings, he sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Argueta has been in ICE custody since December 2014 and has been transferred at least 15 times. His removal proceedings remain pending, Argueta unsuccessfully requested bond.In 2019, Argueta sought habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2241. The district court denied Argueta’s petition without prejudice, reasoning that the statutory scheme under which Argueta was detained rendered him ineligible for immediate release. In April 2020, Argueta, who by then had been transferred to a detention facility outside of New Jersey, moved to reopen. The district court denied Argueta’s motion, finding that the motion raised new claims and constituted a new habeas petition over which it lacked jurisdiction because of ICE’s transfer of Argueta.The Third Circuit reversed. In referring to Covid-19 and to a change in the governing statutory scheme, Argueta did not raise new claims; his motion is a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. After a district court acquires jurisdiction over an ICE detainee’s section 2241 petition for relief from continued detention, the transfer of the detainee outside of the court’s territorial jurisdiction does not strip that court of jurisdiction to entertain a Rule 60(b) motion. View "Anariba v. Director Hudson County Correctional Center" on Justia Law

Since his 2012 federal conviction, Garrett has brought at least 10 federal civil suits. In this suit, Garrett sued New Jersey's Governor and another official under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging due process and “speedy trial” violations. The district court granted Garrett in forma pauperis status. The court screened Garrett’s complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii), concluded that Garrett’s due process claim “is a string of nonsequiturs" with no facts to support any claim, and dismissed Garrett’s speedy trial claim as properly raised only in a habeas action. The Third Circuit advised Garrett to seek a final judgment to perfect his right to appeal. The district court obliged, dismissing Garrett’s complaint “with prejudice.” Garrett never filed a new or amended notice of appeal in the district court, and a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days “after the entry” of judgment, 28 U.S.C. 2107(a).The Third Circuit then denied Garrett’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis; he must pay filing fees under the three-strikes rule. 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). A suit dismissed under “Heck” is dismissed for failure to state a claim and counts as a strike. In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner lacks a section 1983 “cause of action” if the prisoner is challenging an “allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment” before having the conviction or sentence overturned. Garrett has not shown imminent danger or serious physical injury. View "Garrett v. Murphy" on Justia Law

In 2014, Claude, convicted of bank fraud, access device fraud, aggravated identity theft, and currency offenses, was sentenced to 232 months’ imprisonment. In 2020, Claude sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), citing “extraordinary and compelling circumstances” arising from his purported “substantial assistance to the D.E.A. of New Jersey.” Claude alleged that, four years earlier, he provided crucial assistance, which allowed the government to “bust[] someone with multiple kilos of cocaine” and “locat[e] a cell phone that was part of a child pornography indictment.” The government filed a Rule 35(b) motion on behalf of another prisoner who, Claude insists, “reap[ed] the benefits” of his efforts, resulting in a “gross disparity” between his sentence and that of the undeserving cooperator. The government asserted that his purported assistance was neither substantial nor welcomed.The district court denied Claude’s motion, stating that a reduction of sentence for post-sentencing cooperation requires a Rule 35 motion from the government’ and cannot be raised by a defendant through a section 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for compassionate release. While the First Step Act made substantial changes to the procedures applicable to compassionate release motiongs based on extraordinary and compelling reasons, Congress made no changes to Rule 35, which governs sentence reductions based on substantial assistance. The Third Circuit affirmed. Substantial assistance is not itself an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting compassionate release under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). View "United States v. Claude" on Justia Law

Talley, a Pennsylvania state prison inmate, signed a settlement agreement resolving two prior lawsuits. He alleges that the Settlement Agreement was fraudulent because attorneys had not entered a “‘proper’ appearance” on behalf of a defendant and that another attorney breached the Agreement when he filed it as an exhibit to a motion in one of the suits. Talley asserted violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961, violations of the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and numerous state law claims.The district court dismissed, finding that the attorney had entered a permissible appearance by signing and filing an answer on behalf of the defendants, and Talley’s RICO and constitutional claims were meritless because the Agreement was never actually filed on the docket. The court denied Talley leave to amend his federal claims as futile. Talley moved to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal. The Third Circuit granted the IFP motion and affirmed the dismissal. The IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. 1915 providing that prisoners may proceed in federal court without prepayment of filing fees, contains a “three-strikes rule.” Courts may call a strike when a prisoner’s “action or appeal . . . was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[.]” Talley’s prior “mixed dismissals” are not strikes. View "Talley v. Wetzel" on Justia Law

At initial hearings, New Jersey's Parole Board may consult any information it deems relevant, including an inmate’s criminal history. At successive parole hearings, the Board could not consider old information, including the inmate's criminal history. The 1997 Amendments to the Parole Act eliminated that prohibition and instructed the Board to prepare an “objective risk assessment” before every parole hearing, incorporating old information, including an inmate’s “educational and employment history” and “family and marital history,” and other factors. When Holmes was on parole in the 1970s, he killed two acquaintances, murdered a 69-year-old, and wounded a police officer. Sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole, Holmes remains behind bars 48 years later. At his initial parole hearing in 2001, the Board refused to release Holmes. After a 2012, hearing, the Board issued a detailed written statement that probed Holmes’s past parole violations, highlighted the homicides, and scrutinized the shootout that preceded his arrest. The statement noted his unblemished disciplinary record since his initial parole hearing. Without specifying the weight placed on each factor, the Board rejected Holmes’s request for release.Holmes challenged the decision on ex post facto grounds. The Third Circuit vacated the dismissal of his petition. For many prisoners, the rules present little risk to their parole prospects. For Holmes, the change plausibly produced a significant risk of prolonging his time behind bars. View "Holmes v. Christie" on Justia Law

Icker, a part-time uniformed police officer, twice pulled over a woman who was driving alone at night and detained her, claiming that she appeared intoxicated or that he could smell marijuana. Icker handcuffed each woman and searched her car, claiming to find incriminating evidence. The women had criminal histories. He advised each that charges could put them in violation of their supervision or bond. Icker indicated that he wanted oral sex and transported each victim in his police cruiser to a location where the woman performed oral sex on him. Icker also groped or harassed three other women, using his authority as a police officer. Icker pleaded guilty to two counts of depriving the victims of their civil right to bodily integrity, 18 U.S.C. 242. The plea agreement recommended 144 months' imprisonment and included several conditions of supervised release but did not refer to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 34 U.S.C. 20901. Icker waived his right to appeal.The Third Circuit vacated the imposition of a condition of supervised release that required Icker to register as a sex offender under SORNA “as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency.” Convictions under section 242 are not SORNA “sex offenses.” Icker was not given notice of any potential SORNA requirements in signing his appellate waiver. Any attempted delegation of Icker’s status as a “sex offender” to a third party was an improper delegation of Article III powers. View "United States v. Icker" on Justia Law

Arrington claims he stopped engaging in drug activity after he was released from prison on parole in 2007. The government contends Arrington became a Pennsylvania drug supplier. In 2009, the police arrested Arrington’s co-conspirators. Arrington helped them attempt to escape apprehension. He abandoned his parole appointments and fled the state. Arrington was subsequently charged with possession with the intent to distribute controlled substances, conspiracy to do the same, and traveling in interstate commerce with the intent to facilitate unlawful activity. His co-conspirators testified against him. Arrington claims he told his attorney, Kress, that he wanted to testify to explain that he absconded from parole not because of his involvement in drug trafficking; Kress did not honor this request because doing so would open Arrington to cross-examination, which might enable the government to introduce evidence of his prior convictions. Kress allegedly never sought Arrington's consent to waive his right to testify or explained that the decision was his to make. However, during his closing argument, Kress covered some of the material to which Arrington claims he would have testified.Arrington moved to vacate his convictions under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that Kress was ineffective for unilaterally waiving his right to testify. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The bar for obtaining an evidentiary hearing on a section 2255 motion is low but Arrington does not meet it, because his claim conclusively fails Strickland’s prejudice prong. View "United States v. Arrington" on Justia Law

Under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), the government must detain noncitizens who are removable because they committed certain specified offenses or have connections with terrorism, and it must hold them without bond pending their removal proceedings. In 2012, the plaintiffs filed a habeas petition on behalf of a putative class of noncitizens who are detained under section 1226(c) in New Jersey, contending that it violates due process to mandatorily detain noncitizens who have substantial defenses to removal and that the procedure for conducting “Joseph” hearings is constitutionally inadequate.The Third Circuit held that section 1226(c) is constitutional even as applied to noncitizens who have substantial defenses to removal. For those detainees who contend that they are not properly included within section 1226(c) and are therefore entitled to a Josepth hearing, the government has the burden to establish the applicability of section 1226(c) by a preponderance of the evidence and the government must make available a contemporaneous record of the hearing, consisting of an audio recording, a transcript, or their functional equivalent. Section 1252(f)(1) does not authorize classwide injunctions, so the court reversed the district court’s order in part. View "Gayle v. Warden Monmouth County Correctional Institution" on Justia Law

Shorter, a transgender woman, has undergone hormone replacement therapy; her body is “openly female.” In 2015, she entered a Federal Correctional Institution to begin a 96-month sentence for creating a fraudulent “tax service.” Despite knowing that Shorter was transgender, prison officials first housed her in a room without a lock with 11 men. Prison officials screened her risk for sexual assault under the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 regulations and concluded she was at “significantly” higher risk than other inmates because she presented as transgender, was small in stature, and had previously been sexually assaulted at another prison. Later, in an unlocked two-person cell, she was assigned a sex offender as her cellmate. Although the prison’s psychology department agreed Shorter should be transferred, she remained in the cell furthest from the officers. Shorter alleges that despite her repeated requests and grievances, she was ultimately stabbed and raped by a fellow inmate. She brought a pro se suit under “Bivens,” claiming officials violated her Eighth Amendment rights by deliberate indifference to the substantial risk that another inmate would assault her.Citing 28 U.S.C. 1915 and 1915A, the district court dismissed her complaint sua sponte before allowing her to serve the defendants. The Third Circuit reversed. Shorter’s case falls comfortably within one of the few contexts in which the Supreme Court has recognized a Bivens remedy. Shorter adequately pleaded a violation of the Eighth Amendment. View "Shorter v. United States" on Justia Law

Rought sold fentanyl to Carichner, who provided some to Giberson. Both overdosed. Giberson was revived with Narcan; Carichner died. Rought was indicted for possession of fentanyl with intent to distribute resulting in death and serious bodily injury. Days later, he was interrogated by the FBI. After being advised of his rights verbally and in writing, he answered questions about his drug use and his supplier but said he did not want to talk about Carichner’s death without a lawyer. The interrogating agents respected his wishes and turned the questioning to other subjects. In discussing those other subjects, however, Rought quickly brought the conversation back around to Carichner and made incriminating statements.The district court denied Rought’s motion to suppress the statements. A jury convicted him. The Third Circuit affirmed. Invocations of the right to counsel during custodial interrogations can be “limited.” After a limited invocation, interrogation can continue on topics not covered by the invocation. If the suspect, without prompting from law enforcement, then voluntarily reinitiates discussion of a covered topic and waives her previously invoked rights, it “is quite consistent with the Fifth Amendment” for the suspect’s statements about a covered topic to be admissible at trial. View "United States v. Rought" on Justia Law