Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Samantha Peifer, an employee of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, filed a lawsuit against her employer alleging pregnancy discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Peifer, who was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis and later became pregnant, requested accommodations from her employer due to her inability to perform certain tasks. Her requests were initially denied, but later granted after she filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). However, she was not allowed to work from home as requested due to her high-risk pregnancy and exposure to COVID-19. Peifer eventually resigned, citing discriminatory treatment, and filed additional charges with the EEOC.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted the Board's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Peifer could not establish a prima facie case for any of her claims. Peifer appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the District Court's decision. The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court that Peifer's claims partly failed but concluded that the District Court was best situated to analyze the impact of the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis on whether Peifer makes out a prima facie case under an adverse employment action theory. The Court of Appeals also concluded that Peifer makes out a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination based on the Board’s denials of her light-duty requests under a failure to accommodate theory. The case was remanded for further analysis on Peifer’s adverse employment theory and failure to accommodate theory, while the District Court’s decisions on Peifer’s constructive discharge allegation and retaliation claim were affirmed. View "Peifer v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole" on Justia Law

The case involves Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc., Smith & Wesson Sales Company, and Smith & Wesson Inc. (collectively, “Smith & Wesson”) and the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey and the New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs. The New Jersey Attorney General issued a subpoena to Smith & Wesson under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, seeking documents related to the company's advertising practices. Smith & Wesson filed a federal lawsuit to enjoin enforcement of the subpoena, alleging it violated various constitutional provisions. The New Jersey Attorney General then filed a subpoena enforcement action in state court. The state court rejected Smith & Wesson’s objections and ordered the company to comply with the subpoena.The state court proceedings concluded before the federal case, with the state court ordering Smith & Wesson to comply with the subpoena. The federal court then dismissed Smith & Wesson’s civil rights action on claim preclusion grounds, giving preclusive effect to the state court’s order. The state appellate court later affirmed the state court judgment. Smith & Wesson appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, arguing that the District Court should not have given preclusive effect to the state court order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order. The court found that all elements of New Jersey’s claim preclusion test were satisfied. The court also rejected Smith & Wesson’s argument that it had reserved its right to litigate in federal court, finding that such reservation was unavailable in this case. The court emphasized that litigants get one opportunity to make their arguments, not two, and they cannot file a federal lawsuit to hedge against a potentially unfavorable state ruling. View "Smith & Wesson Brands Inc. v. Attorney General of the State of New Jersey" on Justia Law

The case involves a non-verbal student, Alexandre Le Pape, and his family who repeatedly requested that the Lower Merion School District change his educational program to include a new communication protocol known as "Spelling to Communicate" (S2C). The school district denied these requests, leading to Alexandre's withdrawal from public education. The family filed an administrative special education due process complaint against the school district, alleging that the district failed to protect Alexandre's rights and denied him a Free Accessible Public Education (FAPE) under various laws. An administrative hearing officer ruled against the family on all claims, leading them to file a suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.The District Court granted the school district's motions for summary judgment on the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim and judgment on the administrative record for the denial-of-FAPE claims. The Le Papes appealed the court's decision, arguing that the court granted judgment without applying the summary judgment standard to which they were entitled under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded the case. The court held that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment for the school district on the Le Papes' ADA discrimination claim and judgment on the administrative record for their discrimination claims under both the ADA and Section 504. The court clarified that a denial-of-FAPE claim under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) can be resolved through an administrative appeal, but ADA and Section 504 discrimination claims seeking compensatory damages, even if on the same facts, should be resolved through summary judgment and, possibly, trial. View "Le Pape v. Lower Merion School District" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a local ordinance in the Borough of Camp Hill that regulates the display of signs on private property. The ordinance categorizes signs into about twenty different types, each with its own set of restrictions. Two residents, Katherine Pearson and Caroline Machiraju, displayed political signs on their lawns in the lead-up to the 2022 midterm elections. However, they were told to remove their signs as they violated the local sign ordinance. The ordinance categorized their signs as "Temporary Signs" and further classified them as "Personal Expression Signs," which express a non-commercial message. The ordinance limited the number of such signs a resident could display and the time frame within which they could be displayed.The residents complied with the directive but subsequently sued Camp Hill, challenging the provisions of the ordinance under the First Amendment. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted them summary judgment on their facial challenge, ruling that the provisions were content-based and failed strict scrutiny.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court of Appeals found that the ordinance was content-based as it classified signs based on their content, favoring commercial expression over noncommercial and holiday messages over non-holiday messages. The court held that such content-based restrictions could only stand if they furthered a compelling government interest and were narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. The court found that Camp Hill's interests in traffic safety and aesthetics, while legitimate, were not compelling and that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to serve those interests. The court concluded that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face. View "Camp Hill Borough Republican Association v. Borough of Camp HIll" on Justia Law

Paul Montemuro was elected as the President of the Jim Thorpe Area School Board. However, a week later, the Board elected someone else without giving Montemuro any prior notice. Montemuro sued the Board members who voted against him and the Jim Thorpe Area School District, alleging that they had deprived him of his property without due process, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants claimed qualified immunity.The District Court held that Montemuro had a clearly established property right in his employment and had been deprived of that right without due process. The defendants appealed this decision, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court found that Pennsylvania law clearly established that Montemuro had a property interest in his job as the Board President. The Court also accepted Montemuro's allegation that he was removed from office without notice. Therefore, the Court concluded that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because they had violated Montemuro's clearly established right to due process. View "Montemuro v. Jim Thorpe Area School District" on Justia Law

Michael Rivera, a Pennsylvania state prisoner, was in an open-air telephone cage when he overheard prison officials preparing to forcibly extract another inmate, Ryan Miller, from a nearby cell. Anticipating the use of pepper spray, Rivera informed the officials that exposure to the spray would trigger his asthma. Despite his pleas to be moved back to his cell, the officials refused, citing the lack of available personnel due to the ongoing preparations for Miller's extraction. After the pepper spray was deployed, Rivera suffered an asthma attack. He sued the prison officials for damages, alleging they had acted with deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm to him, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor of the prison officials. The court concluded that the law was not clearly established to the extent that the officials would have known that their actions violated the Eighth Amendment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity because their actions did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. The court noted that the officials were confronted with competing institutional concerns and that the cited case law did not clearly establish that the officials' decision to prioritize one prisoner's health and safety over another's violated the Eighth Amendment. View "Rivera v. Redfern" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over Pennsylvania's rule requiring mail-in and absentee voters to date the return envelope carrying their ballot. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had ruled this requirement mandatory and declared that undated or incorrectly dated ballots were invalid under state law. The case centered on whether federal law, specifically Section 10101(a)(2)(B) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, mandated that these non-compliant ballots be counted. This provision prohibits the denial of the right to vote due to an immaterial error or omission on paperwork related to voting.The District Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, declaring that rejecting timely received mail ballots due to missing or incorrect dates violated the federal provision. They reasoned that the date requirement was immaterial, as it played no role in determining a vote's timeliness.However, the appellate court reversed this decision. The court held that the federal provision only applies when the state is determining who may vote, not how a qualified voter must cast their ballot. They found that the provision does not apply to rules, like the date requirement, that govern how a qualified voter must cast their ballot for it to be counted. The court concluded that a contrary approach could not be reconciled with the text and historic backdrop of the statute. Therefore, the court ruled that the federal provision does not override Pennsylvania's date requirement for casting a mail-in ballot. The case was remanded for further consideration of the plaintiffs' pending equal protection claim. View "Pennsylvania State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Northampton County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the plaintiff, Troy Moore, Sr., a prisoner, sued Correctional Officer Saajida Walton under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that she violated his Eighth Amendment rights. The claim was based on an incident where a toilet in Moore’s prison cell exploded and Walton refused to let him out of his cell to clean up for over eight hours. Moore originally filed the complaint under a misspelled version of Walton’s name. The correct spelling was not provided until after the statute of limitations for his claim had expired. The District Court granted summary judgment to Walton based on the statute of limitations.The Circuit Court held that the District Court misapplied the relation back analysis under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C) by failing to consider the period for service provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). It held that Rule 15(c)(1)(C)’s reference to “the period provided by Rule 4(m)” includes any extensions for service granted under Rule 4(m) for good cause. The case was remanded to the District Court to determine whether Walton received notice of the action by a certain date and, if so, whether Moore could demonstrate the absence of prejudice—the final element necessary to satisfy the relation back inquiry. If all these conditions were met, the District Court would then need to consider the merits of Moore’s Eighth Amendment claim. View "Moore v. Walton" on Justia Law

In this case, Kobe Pinkney sued Officer Jared Frum and others for false arrest and malicious prosecution. Officer Frum, in an investigation into an assault, had obtained an arrest warrant for Pinkney based on a witness statement. However, the court found that Officer Frum had misrepresented information in the warrant application, overstating the certainty of the witness, ignoring inconsistencies, and omitting key facts. The court found that Officer Frum had recklessly disregarded the truth, and the misrepresentations and omissions were deemed material to the finding of probable cause.The court concluded that the single witness identification, without more, must have at least basic signs of reliability to amount to probable cause. The court noted that this bar is not high; either corroboration or an appropriate witness interview may suffice. But based on the facts alleged, neither happened in Pinkney's case. Thus, Officer Frum was found to have violated Pinkney’s Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him without probable cause.Further, the court ruled that Pinkney’s right not to be arrested without probable cause was clearly established, as was his right not to be prosecuted without probable cause. Hence, a reasonable officer would have known that Officer Frum’s alleged conduct was unlawful. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision and allowed the case to proceed. View "Pinkney v. Meadville Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dealt with two consolidated cases involving two New Jersey parents, who claimed they were retaliated against for protesting school policies related to mandatory masking during the COVID-19 pandemic. One parent, George Falcone, was issued a summons for defiant trespass after refusing to wear a mask at a school board meeting, while another parent, Gwyneth Murray-Nolan, was arrested under similar circumstances. Falcone claimed retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights, while Murray-Nolan argued the same and also claimed she was deprived of substantive due process. The district court dismissed both cases. On appeal, the court found that Falcone had standing to sue, reversing and remanding the lower court's decision. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Murray-Nolan's case, concluding that refusing to wear a mask during a pandemic was not protected conduct under the First Amendment. View "Murray-Nolan v. Rubin" on Justia Law