Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

On June 13, 2014, Beaver County Correctional Facility (“BCCF”) officers responded to reports of a truck running into parked cars. The decedent, Troy Bradshaw, was arrested Bradshaw for driving under the influence and he was transported to Beaver Valley Hospital. A deputy completed the Initial Arrestee Assessment (IAA), which reflected that Bradshaw previously considered suicide; was not thinking about it currently; had a brother who committed or attempted suicide; and was intoxicated. Bradshaw stated that he would kill himself if placed in a cell. After the IAA, the officers placed Bradshaw on suicide watch. Bradshaw beat on the cell door for two to three hours. Officers did not place him in a safety smock or create a suicide watch log, in violation of BCCF’s suicide-prevention policy, but a corporal monitored Bradshaw by sitting in the booking area all night. By June 14, Bradshaw was no longer acting violently, and he was transferred from a suicide-watch cell two to cell three, pertinent here, a cell with bed linens. Just after noon on June 15, Bradshaw was found dead in his cell after he hanged himself with some of the provided bedding. Bradshaw’s mother, plaintiff Kathy George, sued on behalf of her son’s estate, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 that prison defendants violated Bradshaw’s Fourteenth Amendment rights and “Utah Code Article I, Section 7.” The district court granted summary judgment to all prison defendants because the law entitled them to qualified immunity, and no Beaver County policy violated Bradshaw’s constitutional rights. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that although Plaintiff proved that certain officers failed to follow Beaver County’s suicide-prevention policy, “failing to follow prison policy is not a constitutional violation in and of itself.” View "George v. Beaver County, et al." on Justia Law

Three Tulsa police officers were dispatched late at night to a parking lot, finding plaintiff-appellant Ira Lee Wilkins asleep in the driver’s seat of a running vehicle. They smelled alcohol on him, ordered him out of his car, and eventually forced him to the ground, where they pepper sprayed him. Wilkins sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging they used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, concluding they were entitled to qualified immunity because they did not use excessive force. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding a reasonable jury could have found that the officers’ use of pepper spray was excessive force. The Court thus remanded this case for further proceedings, including consideration of the municipal liability claim against the City of Tulsa. View "Wilkins v. City of Tulsa, et al." on Justia Law

Following Susanne Burgaz’s suicide in a County Detention Facility, her children and estate sued two individual Sheriff’s deputies on duty the night she died, and various other County officials. They argued the deputies were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs and the County and sheriff negligently operated the jail. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, and the district court granted the motion. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that both individual deputies were entitled to qualified immunity because the Estate failed to allege either deputy violated Ms. Burgaz’s constitutional rights. The "Monell" claim against the sheriff was also properly dismissed. And because all the claims arising under federal law were properly dismissed, the district court correctly dismissed the remaining state-law claims. View "Estate of Susanne Burgaz, et al. v. Board of County Commissioners, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner Kelly Gonzalez Aguilar was a transgender woman from Honduras. She came to the United States and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and deferral of removal. In support, Kelly claimed she had been persecuted by family, feared further persecution from pervasive discrimination and violence against transgender women in Honduras, and would likely be tortured if she returned to Honduras. In denying asylum, an immigration judge found no pattern or practice of persecution. Kelly appealed the denial of each application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the appeal. The dismissal led Kelly to petition for judicial review to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which granted the petition. "On the asylum claim, any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to find a pattern or practice of persecution against transgender women in Honduras." View "Gonzalez Aguilar v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee Gregory Heard sued Denver Police Officer Greg Dulayev and the City and County of Denver (“the City”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 (collectively, “defendants”). Heard claimed Dulayev used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment during an event that took place in June 2016. Heard further claimed this alleged constitutional violation was a foreseeable consequence of the City’s alleged failure to train, supervise, and discipline its employees, including Dulayev, with respect to the use of force. Dulayev and the City moved for summary judgment on Heard’s two claims. The district court denied defendants’ motion, and defendants appealed. Finding jurisdiction over part of Dulayev’s appeal, the Tenth Circuit denied in part Heard’s motion to dismiss. As to the substance of the appeal, the Court held Heard failed to show Dulayev’s use of the Taser violated a constitutional right clearly established at the time where Dulayev had ordered Heard to crawl, threatened to use his Taser, and repeatedly ordered Heard to stop, but where Heard still continued to approach Dulayev. The the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to Dulayev was reversed, and that issue was remanded with instructions to grant Dulayev qualified immunity and for entry of judgment in Dulayev’s favor. However, because the Court resolved the claim against Dulayev by finding that it was not clearly established that his conduct amounted to a constitutional violation, it declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the City’s appeal. View "Heard v. Dulayev, et al." on Justia Law

Wayne Bowker died at the Carter County Jail on June 30, 2016, while awaiting trial for a drug possession charge. In the days and weeks preceding his death, Bowker did not receive several of his prescribed medications, experienced incontinence and catatonia, and was able to communicate with jail staff only by using strange repetitive phrases. Despite Bowker’s condition, jail officials failed to provide any medical attention in the nineteen days leading up to his death. His mother, Judy Prince, as the administrator of his estate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and other claims. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether the district court properly granted summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds to jail nurse Kimberlee Miller in her individual capacity, and whether it properly granted summary judgment to the Sheriff of Carter County in his official capacity. The Court concluded a reasonable jury could determine Miller violated Bowker’s constitutional right by acting with deliberate indifference toward his psychosis, incontinence, and catatonia. In addition, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Carter County’s failure to medically train jail employees, adequately staff the jail, and provide timely medical attention caused Bowker’s death. The Court reversed district court’s grants of summary judgment. View "Prince v. Sheriff of Carter County, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant United Airlines (“United”) appealed a district court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”), and its motion for new trial. A jury found that United discriminated against two flight attendants, Plaintiffs-Appellees Jeanne Stroup and Ruben Lee by terminating them because of their ages in willful violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). United filed its motions with the district court, contending, among other things, that the jury’s verdict was based on legally insufficient evidence and the court erred in admitting Plaintiffs’ testimony about their emotional distress. The district court denied the motions. United contended: (1) the district court erred in denying its JMOL motion because (a) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that United discriminated against Plaintiffs because of their ages in violation of the ADEA, and (b) similarly, there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that United acted willfully in committing any ADEA violation; and (2) the court abused its discretion and committed reversible error when it admitted Plaintiffs’ allegedly irrelevant and highly prejudicial emotional distress testimony. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded there was sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably find that, not only did United violate the ADEA by discriminating against Plaintiffs, but it did so willfully. Furthermore, the Court determined the district court did not err by admitting the challenged emotional distress testimony. View "Stroup, et al. v. United Airlines" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Tiffany Litzsinger worked for the Adams County Coroner’s Office from 2013 until she was terminated in 2018. During her time there, Litzsinger suffered from anxiety and depression, both of which worsened in the months leading up to her termination. After an anxiety episode, Adams County granted Litzsinger temporary leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). When Litzsinger returned from her FMLA leave, the Coroner placed Litzsinger on probation for myriad violations of workplace policies. Shortly after Litzsinger’s probation began, the Coroner terminated Litzsinger for violating the terms of her probation. Litzsinger sued the Coroner’s Office under the FMLA and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming the Coroner terminated her in retaliation for exercising her rights under both statutes. The district court granted summary judgment for the Coroner’s Office because Litzsinger failed to demonstrate that the Coroner’s reason for terminating her was pretextual. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding a rational jury could not find that the Coroner’s proffered reason for firing Litzsinger was pretextual. View "Litzsinger v. Adams County Coroner's Office" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Ahmad Ajaj, a practicing Muslim, was a Bureau of Prisons (BOP) inmate serving a 114-year sentence for terrorist acts connected with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Ajaj sued to obtain injunctive relief against BOP and damages from BOP officials on several grounds, including violations of his rights to free exercise of religion under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed his claims, and Ajaj appealed, contending the district court erred by holding: (1) his claim against the BOP for denial of his right to group prayer was moot; and (2) that RFRA did not provide a claim for damages against government officials in their individual capacities. After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Ajaj and reversed the challenged rulings. The Court found the mootness ruling was based on a misconception of the evidence of Ajaj’s prison conditions. And the Supreme Court ruled in Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486 (2020), that damages claims were permissible under RFRA. The Court rejected Ajaj’s contention that the doctrine of qualified immunity was inapplicable to RFRA claims, but declined to resolve whether the individual defendants in this case showed entitlement to qualified immunity, leaving that matter to the district court in the first instance. View "Ajaj v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, et al." on Justia Law

Metropolitan State University of Denver (MSU) student Rowan Thompson had a classroom dispute with her chemistry professor that ultimately prompted Thompson to drop the professor’s class. But when Thompson emailed her former classmates to express her displeasure with the professor and to suggest that her classmates leave “honest” end-of-term evaluations. Thomas Ragland, MSU’s Associate Director for Student Conduct, allegedly prohibited Thompson from further contacting the professor or even discussing the professor with any students taking any of the professor’s classes. Thompson sued Ragland under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that he violated her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that Ragland had not violated clearly established law and therefore was entitled to qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit disagreed and reversed. "Because one can infer from the allegations in the complaint that there was no proper justification for Ragland’s actions, the complaint states a violation of clearly established law governing the regulation of student speech." View "Thompson v. Ragland" on Justia Law