Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

As Plaintiff William Frey proceeded through the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) checkpoint at Jackson Hole Airport in Teton County, Wyoming, the body scanner alerted TSA screeners to a potentially suspicious area on Plaintiff’s person. When the security screeners informed Plaintiff that they would have to conduct a pat down, Plaintiff became agitated and repeatedly refused to cooperate. So the security screeners summoned a police officer, Defendant Nathan Karnes, who arrested Plaintiff. After being transported to the Teton County Jail for booking, Plaintiff continued his noncooperation, refusing to participate in the booking process and demanding that jail officials allow him to have an attorney present. Jail officials detained Plaintiff for about three hours before releasing him. Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging many violations of his rights. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, denied leave to file a second amended complaint, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, awarded attorney’s fees to the Municipal Defendants, and sanctioned Plaintiff’s attorneys. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that some of his claims should have survived dismissal, that the district court should have permitted him to add some of his new proposed claims in a second amended complaint, and that the district court should not have awarded any attorney’s fees. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Frey v. Town of Jackson, WY, et al." on Justia Law

Cattle rancher Zane Odell was a cattle rancher who had a permit to graze his cattle in parts of San Juan County, Utah on land held by the U.S. Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") and the Utah School and Institutional Trust Land Administration. On the morning of April 1, 2017, Odell left his corral gate open so his cattle could graze on state and federal public land and then return home to get water on his property. That same evening, Odell noticed that his corral gate had been shut and latched. Odell called the San Juan County Sheriff’s Department and reported the situation, explaining that but for a 10-foot gap in his fence, the closure of the corral gate risked depriving his cattle of water. Odell and Sergeant Wilcox reviewed video footage from Odell’s trail camera which showed part of a SUV’s license plate number. The SUV belonged to plaintiff Rosalie Chilcoat and her husband. A few days after Odell reported the gate closure, Chilcoat and her husband were driving on the county road near Odell’s property. Odell and two other ranchers caught up to the couple and detained them by blocking the public roadway. Odell called the San Juan County Sheriff’s Department and was told Chilcoat and her husband should not be allowed to leave until the deputy arrived. While waiting for the deputy, Odell accused Chilcoat and her husband of criminal activity and threatened them with jail time. Chilcoat was ultimately held on criminal charges relating to the initial gate closure. The State of Utah elected not to defend the state court’s ruling. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the state court’s probable cause determination, ultimately resulting in the dismissal with prejudice of all remaining criminal charges pending against Chilcoat. Chilcoat then sued Odell, Prosecutor Laws, and San Juan County in federal district court in Utah, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants, and a state-law assault claim against Odell. Considering the allegations in Chilcoat's proposed amended complaint, and viewing all non-conclusory allegations in the light most favorable to Chilcoat, the Tenth Circuit concluded she stated a plausible municipal liability claim against San Juan County. The district court erred by denying her proposed amended complaint as futile under Rule 15(a)(2). The district court's denial of her request for leave to amend was reversed. View "Chilcoat v. San Juan County, et al." on Justia Law

A federal district court concluded that a reasonable factfinder could determine that a law-enforcement officer, Officer Michael DiNapoli, had punched, tackled, and used a chokehold on plaintiff-appellee Greg McWilliams. At the time, McWilliams was suspected only of trespassing on a marina by riding in a golf cart. McWilliams sued DiNapoli under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In response, DiNapoli moved for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) his use of force had been reasonable; and (2) he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, DiNapoli argued: (1) a surveillance video blatantly contradictd the district court’s factual determination that McWilliams had not touched DiNapoli’s chest; and (2) even under the district court’s factual determinations, DiNapoli did not commit a constitutional violation because his use of force was reasonable. The Tenth Circuit concluded it was bound by the district court's factual assessment, and the district court did not err in denying qualified immunity. View "McWilliams v. Dinapoli, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Abade Irizarry, a a YouTube journalist and blogger, was filming a DUI traffic stop in Lakewood, Colorado. Officer Ahmed Yehia arrived on the scene and stood in front of Irizarry, obstructing his filming of the stop. When Irizarry and a fellow journalist objected, Officer Yehia shined a flashlight into Irizarry’s camera and then drove his police cruiser at the two journalists. Irizarry sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Officer Yehia violated his First Amendment rights. The district court granted the motion, concluding that the complaint alleged a First Amendment constitutional violation based on prior restraint and retaliation. Although the Tenth Circuit had not previously recognized a First Amendment right to record police officers performing their official duties in public, the district court, relying on out-of-circuit decisions, held that the First Amendment guaranteed such a right, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. The district court nonetheless held that Officer Yehia was entitled to qualified immunity because Irizarry had not shown a violation of clearly established law. The Tenth Circuit found the complaint alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim under clearly established law, so Officer Yehia was not entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, judgment was reversed. View "Irizarry v. Yehia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Cl.G., on behalf of his minor son, C.G., appealed a district court’s dismissal of his case against Defendants-Appellees Cherry Creek School District (District or CCSD) and various employees for alleged constitutional violations stemming from C.G.’s suspension and expulsion from Cherry Creek High School (CCHS). In 2019, C.G. was off campus at a thrift store with three friends. He took a picture of his friends wearing wigs and hats, including “one hat that resembled a foreign military hat from the World War II period.” C.G. posted that picture on Snapchat and captioned it, “Me and the boys bout [sic] to exterminate the Jews.” C.G.’s post (the photo and caption) was part of a private “story,” visible only to Snapchat users connected with C.G. on that platform. Posts on a user’s Snapchat story are automatically deleted after 24 hours, but C.G. removed this post after a few hours. He then posted on his Snapchat story, “I’m sorry for that picture it was ment [sic] to be a joke.” One of C.G.’s Snapchat “friend[s]” took a photograph of the post before C.G. deleted it and showed it to her father. The father called the police, who visited C.G.’s house and found no threat. Referencing prior anti-Semitic activity and indicating that the post caused concern for many in the Jewish community, a CCHS parent emailed the school and community leaders about the post, leading to C.G.'s expulsion. Plaintiff filed suit claiming violations of C.G.'s constitutional rights. Defendants moved to dismiss, which was ultimately granted. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the First Amendment limited school authority to regulate off-campus student speech, particularly speech unconnected with a school activity and not directed at the school or its specific members. Defendants maintained that C.G. was lawfully disciplined for what amounts to off-campus hate speech. According to Defendants, although originating off campus, C.G.’s speech still spread to the school community, disrupted the school’s learning environment, and interfered with the rights of other students to be free from harassment and receive an education. The Tenth Circuit determined Plaintiff properly pled that Defendants violated C.G.’s First Amendment rights by disciplining him for his post; the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s first claim was reversed in part. The Court affirmed dismissal of Plaintiff’s further facial challenges to CCSD’s policies. Questions of qualified and absolute immunity and Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim were remanded for further consideration. View "C1.G v. Siegfried, et al." on Justia Law

After Wichita police received a seemingly legitimate call, officers had to make a split-second decision based on fraudulent threats and reports of violence. Unfortunately, that "swatting" call and the subsequent reaction from police resulted in an innocent man’s death. Officers rushed to Andrew Finch's house, where the caller claimed a deranged man who had just killed his father and was holding the rest of his family hostage at gunpoint. Finch had not committed any crime and had no way of knowing why police were surrounding his home. As Finch exited the house, multiple officers yelled different commands. Ten seconds later, one officer thought he saw Finch reaching for a weapon and shot him in the chest. Finch's estate brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force and other constitutional violations. The district court granted summary judgement in favor of some of the responding officers and the City of Wichita, but denied summary judgment as to the officer who fired the fatal shots. Finch appealed the grant of summary judgment to one officer and the City; the officer appealed the denial of qualified immunity. The district court held that a reasonable jury could have found that Finch was unarmed and unthreatening. The Tenth Circuit concluded it was bound by those findings for the purposes of this appeal. Thus, the claims against Officer Rapp could go forward. The Court found the claims against the City were properly resolved. In addition, the Court concluded the district court correctly found that Finch did not put forth sufficient evidence to prevail on his municipal liability claim against the City. View "Finch, et al. v. Rapp" on Justia Law

Faith Bible Chapel International operated a school, Faith Christian Academy (“Faith Christian”). Plaintiff Gregory Tucker, a former high school teacher and administrator/chaplain, alleged Faith Christian fired him in violation of Title VII (and Colorado common law) for opposing alleged race discrimination at the school. As a religious employer, Faith Christian generally had to comply with anti-discrimination employment laws. But under the affirmative “ministerial exception” defense, those anti-discrimination laws do not apply to employment disputes between a religious employer and its ministers. Here, Faith Christian defended against Tucker’s race discrimination claims by asserting that he was a “minister” for purposes of the exception. After permitting limited discovery on only the “ministerial exception,” the district court ruled that, because there are genuinely disputed material facts, a jury would have to resolve whether Tucker was a “minister.” Summary judgment for Faith Christian, therefore, was not warranted. Faith Christian immediately appealed that decision, seeking to invoke the Tenth Circuit's jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. The Tenth Circuit determined it did not have jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal: the category of orders at issue here could be adequately reviewed at the conclusion of litigation. The appeal was thus dismissed. View "Tucker v. Faith Bible Chapel Int'l." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from traffic stops of Blaine and Samuel Shaw and Joshua Bosire that were prolonged for K-9 sweeps. Master Trooper Doug Schulte and Technical Trooper Brandon McMillan moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motions. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, and reversed in part, finding material issues of fact remained as to whether Troopers Schulte and McMillan had an arguable reasonable suspicion to extend the stops. Thus, the Court found the Shaws and Bosire could proceed on their 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against Trooper Schulte and Trooper McMillan, respectively. However, the Court reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on: (1) the scope of the Shaws’ claim; and (2) Bosire’s claim against Trooper Schulte. View "Shaw, et al. v. Schulte, et al." on Justia Law

In 2014, Tomas Beauford suffered a fatal epileptic seizure in his cell while in pretrial custody at the Mesa County Detention Facility (“MCDF”). The administrator of Beauford’s estate sued various Mesa County and medical defendants in federal district court in Colorado under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to Beauford’s serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Deputy Dalrymple, finding that whether the deputy was aware that Beauford was not breathing was a material fact in genuine dispute: “We cannot imagine a more material fact in the context of the Estate’s deliberate indifference claim than whether Deputy Dalrymple knew of the risk that Mr. Beauford was not breathing. The district court failed to account for this dispute, which a reasonable jury could resolve in favor of the Estate.” The Court affirmed summary judgment in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Estate of Tomas Beauford, et al. v. Correct Care Solutions, et al." on Justia Law

Various City of Denver officials, and certain State of Colorado officials, authorized and/or conducted sweeps of homeless encampments throughout Denver, Colorado. The advocacy organization, Denver Homeless Out Loud and several people experiencing homelessness (“DHOL Plaintiffs”), alleged these sweeps violated the rights of persons experiencing homelessness and breached a settlement agreement resolving related litigation. The DHOL Plaintiffs therefore filed this putative class action and corresponding motion for a preliminary injunction, asking the federal district court in Colorado to enjoin all sweeps or, in the alternative, require seven days’ advanced notice for all sweeps. The district court granted the motion in part after concluding the DHOL Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim was likely to succeed on the merits. The district court then issued a preliminary injunction requiring the Denver Defendants to satisfy additional notice and procedural requirements before conducting future sweeps. The Denver Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the injunction. Finding that the district court abused its discretion in ruling the first preliminary injunction factor weighed in the DHOL Plaintiffs' favor (and ultimately granting the preliminary injunction), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's order. View "Denver Homeless Out Loud, et al. v. Denver, Colorado, et al." on Justia Law