Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Jeffrey Helvie appealed a district court’s decision to grant Defendant Chad Jenkins, an Adams County, Colorado, deputy sheriff, qualified immunity on Helvie’s claim that the deputy used excessive force against Helvie during a traffic stop. On August 23, 2018, at approximately 11:45 p.m., Deputy Jenkins observed Plaintiff make several traffic infractions while driving a Nissan pickup truck. The vehicle window was partially down when Deputy Jenkins approached. According to Deputy Jenkins, he could smell the strong odor of burnt marijuana coming out of the window, though Plaintiff disputed having smoked marijuana that day. Plaintiff handed his driver’s license and registration to Deputy Jenkins, but had difficulty providing his proof of insurance (which was on his phone) due to either poor cellular reception or Plaintiff's inability to correctly enter a passcode. According to Deputy Jenkins, he believed that Plaintiff was operating a vehicle while under the influence and wanted to conduct further investigation. When Plaintiff did not get out of the vehicle, Deputy Jenkins grabbed Plaintiff's arm and ordered him out of the vehicle. According to Deputy Jenkins, Plaintiff pulled away. Deputy Jenkins then grabbed Plaintiff's leg and pulled him out of the vehicle, causing Plaintiff to land on his back. As Deputy Jenkins was pulling Plaintiff out of the vehicle, he observed a handgun in the pocket of the driver’s side door. After review of Plaintiff's complaint, the Tenth Circuit determined he failed to show that Deputy Jenkins violated his constitutional rights and, necessarily flowing from that holding, Plaintiff failed to show that his constitutional rights allegedly violated were clearly established. View "Helvie v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

In 2013, Sergeant Robert Motyka, a Denver police officer, shot Michael Valdez, who was lying unarmed on the ground and surrendering. In the ensuing lawsuit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a jury awarded Valdez $131,000 from Sergeant Motyka for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment1 and $2,400,000 from the City and County of Denver (“Denver”) for failure to train its officers. The district court awarded $1,132,327.40 in attorney fees and $18,199.60 in costs to Valdez’s lawyers. The Tenth Circuit addressed three appeals arising from this litigation. Denver challenged the district court's: (1) denial of its motion for summary judgment; (2) reversal of a discovery order and permission for Valdez to present additional municipal liability theories; and (3) jury instructions on municipal liability. Valdez cross-appealed the district court's grant of qualified immunity to Lieutenant John Macdonald, another Denver police officer who shot at him. And Sergeant Motyka and Denver contend that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs. The Tenth Circuit: (1) affirmed the judgment against Denver; (2) affirmed qualified immunity because Valdez did not show the court erred in this respect; and (3) affirmed the attorney fee award but reversed costs, finding the district court did not explain its award after finding Valdez had not substantiated them. The case was remanded for the district court to reexamine whether costs should be awarded. View "Valdez v. City and County of Denver" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under: 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68; and Oklahoma state law, challenging an allegedly unconstitutional scheme to collect “court debts” from impoverished Oklahoma citizens. The Second Amended Class Action Complaint (“SACAC”) named numerous “Defendants,” which fell into three broad categories: (1) individual Oklahoma sheriffs, the Oklahoma Sheriff’s Association (“OSA”), and officials of Tulsa and Rodgers Counties (collectively, “Sheriffs”); (2) state court judges (collectively, “Judges”); and (3) Aberdeen Enterprises, II, Inc. and its principal officers (collectively, “Aberdeen”). Plaintiffs alleged Aberdeen, a debt-collection company, acting in concert with other Defendants, used actual or threatened incarceration to coerce indigent Oklahomans into paying court debts, without any inquiry into ability to pay. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, broadly holding that three independent doctrines prevented Plaintiffs from proceeding on any claim against any Defendant. Plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, asserting that none of the doctrines identified by the district court deprived federal courts of the ability to reach the merits of the claims listed in the complaint. To this, the Tenth Circuit agrees the district court erred in dismissing the SACAC. Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Graff, et al. v. Aberdeen Enterprizes, II, et al." on Justia Law

Two Yellowstone Park rangers received an alert that a park employee had spotted Michael Bullinger, a fugitive wanted for allegedly shooting and killing three women in Idaho. The report said Bullinger was leaving the park in a white Toyota with a Missouri license plate. But the employee was mistaken—he had instead spoken with Brett Hemry, a man on vacation with his wife, Genalyn, and his seven-year-old daughter. The rangers spotted the white Toyota leaving the park and trailed it. Hemry noticed the rangers and pulled over near a campground sixteen miles east of the park entrance. Waiting for reinforcements, the rangers exited their patrol car and from a distance held the Hemrys at gunpoint until county law enforcement arrived. Once county law enforcement arrived, the rangers moved Mr. and Mrs. Hemry to separate police cruisers. After examining Mr. Hemry’s driver’s license, they set the couple free. The Hemrys sued the rangers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating their Fourth Amendment rights. On a motion to dismiss, the district court denied the rangers qualified immunity for Mrs. Hemry’s false-arrest claim and for Mr. and Mrs. Hemry’s excessive force claims. The rangers appealed. The Tenth Circuit reversed: in the context presented, the Court found the law did not clearly establish this investigative stop amounted to (1) an arrest of Mrs. Hemry without probable cause, or (2) excessive force against the Hemrys. View "Hemry, et al. v. Ross, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Elsa Palacios, personal representative of the estate of the deceased, Bernardo Palacios Carbajal, filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants-Appellees Salt Lake City Police Officers Neil Iversen and Kevin Fortuna in their individual capacities, as well as Salt Lake City Corporation. Plaintiff alleged the officers violated Palacios’ Fourth Amendment rights when he was fatally shot during a police pursuit. The district court granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity in favor of Defendants, finding a lack of a constitutional violation and that Plaintiff failed to show a violation of clearly established law. On appeal, Plaintiff contended that disputes about material and historical facts precluded summary judgment. According to Plaintiff, the district court erred by not making reasonable factual inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, primarily that: (1) Palacios may have been unaware he was being pursued by police because officers did not verbally identify themselves, because he was severely intoxicated, and he did not match the full description of the robbery suspect; (2) once Palacios fell onto his side during the shooting and did not point his gun at officers, he was effectively subdued; and (3) Palacios’ conduct showed he was attempting to avoid confrontation, not evade arrest. Plaintiff also contended that officers exaggerated the seriousness of the offenses that precipitated the pursuit and that officers should have used less intrusive means of apprehension because Palacios did not pose an imminent threat. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's case. View "Palacios v. Fortuna, et al." on Justia Law

Longtime demonstrators outside the Abortion Surgery Center in the City of Norman, Oklahoma (Appellants) contended a disturbing-the-peace ordinance was unconstitutional both facially and as applied to their demonstrations. The Tenth Circuit found, as did the district court, Appellants failed to furnish evidence that the ordinance was content-based, infected with religious animus, or enforced unconstitutionally. "In fact, the record reveals the opposite: Norman police officers enforced the ordinance only when the demonstrators’ speech became so loud or unusual that it breached the peace." View "Harmon, et al. v. City of Norman, Oklahoma, et al." on Justia Law

While investigating the overdose death of plaintiff Walter Shrum’s wife, law enforcement officers searched Shrum’s home and discovered drugs, firearms, and ammunition. He was charged with various crimes in federal court. Before trial he argued the officers had illegally searched his home, and that the evidence discovered could not be used against him at trial. The district court disagreed, and Shrum entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving the right to appeal the suppression order. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded the search violated the Constitution, and any resulting evidence should have been excluded. Without this evidence, the government dismissed its prosecution. Shrum then sued various state and federal law enforcement officials for civil rights violations arising from the illegal search and subsequent prosecution. The district court dismissed the action as time-barred and insufficiently pled. To this, the Tenth Circuit agreed: (1) Shrum failed to prove he was entitled to equitable tolling under Kansas or federal law; and (2) Shrum’s complaint inadequately alleged all of the requirements for a malicious prosecution claim against the City and County defendants. View "Shrum v. Cooke, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Roxanne Torres appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Janice Madrid and Richard Williamson, agents of the New Mexico State Police Investigations Bureau. The encounter between Torres and Defendants lasted only 14 seconds: Torres was sitting in her vehicle, backed into a spot in front of a suspect’s apartment and cars parked on either side. The vehicle’s engine was running and the doors were locked. Defendants approached Torres’s vehicle and Agent Williamson attempted to open the driver’s door. Defendants shouted commands at Torres to open her door, but they did not announce themselves as police officers. Torres stepped on the gas and headed forward across the parking lot. Both Defendants fired at Torres. Neither Defendant was struck as Torres drove past. Five bullets were fired at the rear of Torres’s vehicle, one of them striking her in the back. Torres ultimately entered a no-contest plea to: (1) aggravated flight from a law- enforcement officer; and (2) assault upon a peace officer. Torres filed a civil-rights suit against Defendants alleging they used excessive force. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that because Torres had successfully fled the scene, she was not seized. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed. After remand from the Supreme Court the district court again granted Defendants summary judgment, finding: (1) Torres’s claims were barred because her claims against Defendants were inconsistent with her no-contest pleas to charges of aggravated flight from a law-enforcement officer and assault upon a peace officer; and (2) Torres’s claims were barred on the ground that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding: (1) Torres' pleas were not inconsistent with her claims that the officers used excessive force by firing at her after she had driven past them and no longer posed a threat; and (2) because Defendants did not know Torres would escape when they shot at her, and facts unknown to officers at the moment they use force were not relevant to the qualified-immunity analysis. The Court remanded for further proceedings on the remaining issues raised by Defendant's arguments on appeal. View "Torres v. Madrid, et al." on Justia Law

U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”) employed Darren Markley as Vice President and Managing Director of Private Wealth Management at its Denver, Colorado location. Markley managed a team of wealth managers and private bankers, including Bob Provencher and Dave Crittendon, when issues arose in mid-2017. In violation of U.S. Bank policy, Markey provided Provencher a personal loan. Markley allegedly prevented Crittendon from “sandbagging” an investment. And members of Markley’s team, including Crittendon, accused Markley of giving Provencher commission credits for sales on which Provencher did not participate and had not met the clients. After an investigation, a disciplinary committee unanimously voted to terminate Markley’s employment. At no time during the investigation did Markley suggest the allegations against him were motivated by his age, but over a year later, Markley filed suit advancing a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and a wrongful discharge claim under Colorado law. U.S. Bank moved for summary judgment. As to the ADEA claim at issue in this appeal, the district court concluded Markley did not sustain his burden of producing evidence capable of establishing that U.S. Bank’s reason for terminating his employment was pretext for age discrimination. On appeal, Markley contended U.S. Bank conducted a “sham” investigation, and this established pretext. For two reasons, the Tenth Circuit rejected Markley’s assertion: (1) while an imperfect investigation may help support an inference of pretext, there must be some other indicator of protected-class-based discrimination for investigatory flaws to be capable of establishing pretext; and (2) even if deficiencies in an investigation alone could support a finding of pretext, Markley’s criticisms of the investigation were unpersuasive and insufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find U.S. Bank’s reasons for termination pretextual. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Markley v. U.S. Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Francisco Serna sued a police officer and local police department that allegedly prevented him from transporting hemp plants on a flight from Colorado to Texas. In the complaint, he asserted a single claim under § 10114(b) of the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (the 2018 Farm Bill), a statute that authorized states to legalize hemp and regulate its production within their borders, but generally precluded states from interfering with the interstate transportation of hemp. The district court dismissed Serna’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that Serna failed to state a viable claim because § 10114(b) did not create a private cause of action to sue state officials who allegedly violate that provision. Serna appealed, arguing that § 10114(b) impliedly authorized a private cause of action and that even if it didn't, the district court should have allowed him to amend the complaint to add other potentially viable claims rather than dismissing the case altogether. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that contrary to Serna’s view, the language in § 10114(b) did not suggest that Congress intended to grant hemp farmers a right to freely transport their product from one jurisdiction to another, with no interference from state officials. Because courts could not read a private cause of action into a statute that lacked such rights-creating language, the Court held the district court properly dismissed Serna’s § 10114(b) claim. The Court also concluded the trial court properly declined to allow Serna to amend his complaint. View "Serna v. Denver Police Department, et al." on Justia Law