Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

At the time this appeal was initiated, Jason Brooks was a Colorado-state inmate serving a lengthy prison sentence for securities fraud. Brooks had an extreme and incurable case of ulcerative colitis: even when his disease was well treated, Brooks suffered from frequent, unpredictable fecal incontinence. This case involved the Colorado Department of Corrections’s (“CDOC”) efforts, or lack thereof, to deal with the impact of Brooks’s condition on his ability to access the prison cafeteria. Specifically, the issues presented centered on whether the district court erred when it concluded: (1) Brooks’s Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim for damages failed because the CDOC’s offer to provide Brooks with adult diapers was a reasonable accommodation of Brooks’s disability; and (2) Brooks’s Eighth Amendment claim against ADA Inmate Coordinator Julie Russell failed because the decision not to access the cafeteria with the use of adult diapers was Brooks’s alone. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined the district court erred in its treatment of Brooks’s ADA claim for damages. "A reasonable juror could conclude the offer of adult diapers was not a reasonable accommodation of Brooks’s disability. Thus, at least as to the question of the reasonableness of the proposed accommodation, the district court erred in granting CDOC summary judgment on Brooks’s ADA claim for damages." On the other hand, the Court concluded the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Russell on Brooks’s Eighth Amendment claim: "the record is devoid of sufficient evidence for a jury to find Russell acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind—deliberate indifference to Brooks’s ability to access food—when she declined Brooks’s request for a movement pass." Accordingly, the Court dismissed in part, reversed in part, and remanded this matter to the district court for further proceedings. View "Brooks v. CDOC, et al." on Justia Law

Kendall Morgan, a former deputy sheriff for LeFlore County, conducted a traffic stop of plaintiff-appellee Chad Osterhout. During the traffic stop, Morgan struck Osterhout in the face and kicked him twice in the ribs. According to Morgan, Osterhout was trying to flee; Osterhout maintained he remained still with his hands raised. Osterhout sued Morgan and the Board of County Commissioners of LeFlore County, Oklahoma. The jury attributed liability to Morgan and the Board, awarding Osterhout $3 million in compensatory damages against both defendants, and $1 million in punitive damages against Morgan. Morgan moved for a new trial or remittitur of damages. The district court remitted the compensatory damages to $2 million, but denied the motion for a new trial. Both defendants appealed. The Board and Mr. Morgan argue that the district court abused its discretion by using a verdict form with a single total for compensatory damages. And the Board argued: (1) the district court erred in denying summary judgment because the notice had been defective and Morgan’s alleged force would have fallen outside the scope of his employment; (2) the jury acted inconsistently by assessing punitive damages and finding that Morgan had acted within the scope of his employment; (3) the verdict against the Board conflicted with the clear weight of the evidence; and (4) the award of compensatory damages was grossly excessive. Morgan argued: (5) the district court should have granted a new trial based on opposing counsel’s misconduct; (6) the compensatory damages were grossly excessive and unsupported by the evidence; and (7) the punitive damages were grossly excessive. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court judgment. View "Osterhout v. Board of County Commissioners, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Tajuddin Ashaheed arrived at the Colorado Department of Corrections (“CDOC”) Denver Reception and Diagnostic Center (the “Center”) to serve a short sentence for parole violations. The Center’s policies required inmates to shave their beards at intake but exempted those like Ashaheed who wore beards due to their religion. Ashaheed alleged that he repeatedly invoked this exemption, but Sergeant Thomas Currington, motivated by anti-Muslim animus, forced him to shave his beard. Ashaheed sued Currington under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims for violations of the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. Currington moved to dismiss both claims based on qualified immunity and for failure to state a claim. The court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. Finding that Ashaheed alleged facts from which a reasonable jury could infer Currington acted from anti-Muslim animus, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ashaheed v. Currington" on Justia Law

Mark Janny was released from jail on parole in early 2015. His parole officer, John Gamez, directed Janny to establish his residence of record at the Rescue Mission in Fort Collins, Colorado, and to abide by its “house rules.” After arriving at the Mission, Janny learned he had been enrolled in “Steps to Success,” a Christian transitional program involving mandatory prayer, bible study, and church attendance. When Janny objected, citing his atheist beliefs, he alleged both Officer Gamez and Jim Carmack, the Mission’s director, repeatedly told him he could choose between participating in the Christian programming or returning to jail. Less than a week later, Carmack expelled Janny from the Mission for skipping worship services, leading to Janny’s arrest on a parole violation and the revocation of his parole. Janny brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against Gamez, Carmack, and the Mission’s assistant director, Tom Konstanty, alleging violations of his First Amendment religious freedom rights under both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. The district court granted summary judgment to all three defendants, finding Janny had failed to: (1) adduce evidence of an Establishment Clause violation by Gamez; (2) show Gamez violated any clearly established right under the Free Exercise Clause; or (3) raise a triable issue regarding whether Carmack and Konstanty were state actors, as required to establish their liability under either clause. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order as to Gamez and Carmack, and affirmed as to Konstanty. The Court found the evidence created a genuine dispute of material fact regarding his claims under both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. "And because the basic right to be free from state-sponsored religious coercion was clearly established under both clauses at the time of the events, Officer Gamez is not entitled to qualified immunity on either claim." Furthermore, the Court held the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find Carmack was a state actor, as required to impose section 1983 liability on private parties. However, because no facts linked Konstanty to Gamez, the evidence was legally insufficient for a jury finding that Konstanty acted under color of state law. View "Janny v. Gamez, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants James Hald, Monterial Wesley, and Walter Sands appealed the denials of their district-court motions for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). They were among many prisoners who sought to be released from prison confinement during the COVID-19 pandemic. Each claimed that his underlying health conditions and mounting infections at his correctional facility satisfied the statute’s “extraordinary and compelling reasons” requirement for early release. Before granting a sentence reduction, the district court had to consider whether the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) supported the reduction. The Tenth Circuit found each of the Defendants was denied relief by the United States District Court for the District of Kansas based on the court’s discretionary analysis of the section 3553(a) factors. The principal issue for the Tenth Circuit's review was whether, as argued by Hald and Sands, a district court was permitted to deny relief based on its assessment of the 3553(a) factors without first making a determination on the existence of “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” To this, the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument, holding that district courts were free to deny relief on the basis of any one of section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s requirements without considering the others. The Court also rejected the other arguments raised by Sands and Wesley. Accordingly, the denial of all three motions for compassionate release was affirmed. View "United States v. Hald, et al." on Justia Law

The elected Sheriff of El Paso County, Colorado, and head of the Paso County Sheriff’s Office (“EPSO”), fired Keith Duda, a patrol sergeant. Duda believed he was fired for supporting candidate Mike Angley, who challenged Sheriff Elder's reelection bid, and for giving an interview to a local newspaper about sexual harassment and other misconduct at the EPSO. Duda brought First Amendment retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At summary judgment, the district court denied qualified immunity to Sheriff Elder. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Sheriff Elder on Duda’s Angley speech claim. The district court did not err in finding a constitutional violation. On the reporting claim, Sheriff Elder did not contest there was a constitutional violation. Instead, he argued no law clearly established it was unconstitutional to terminate Duda for the reporting speech, contending the district court incorrectly relied on Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1989). To this, the Tenth Circuit affirmed because Wulf was substantially similar to the facts of this case. "Under Wulf, it was 'sufficiently clear that every reasonable official [in Sheriff Elder’s position] would have understood' that firing Mr. Duda based on his speech reporting misconduct at EPSO to The Independent was unconstitutional." View "Duda, et al. v. Elder" on Justia Law

Appellants Lorie Smith and her website design company 303 Creative, LLC (collectively, “Appellants”) appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees Aubrey Elenis, Director of the Colorado Civil Rights Division (the “Director”), members of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission (the “Commission”), and Phil Weiser, Colorado Attorney General (collectively, “Colorado”). Appellants challenged Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”) on free speech, free exercise, and vagueness and overbreadth grounds. Consistent with Ms. Smith’s religious beliefs, Appellants intended to offer wedding websites that celebrate opposite-sex marriages but intended to refuse to create similar websites that celebrate same-sex marriages. Appellants’ objection was based on the message of the specific website; Appellants would not create a website celebrating same-sex marriage regardless of whether the customer was the same-sex couple themselves, a heterosexual friend of the couple, or even a disinterested wedding planner requesting a mock-up. Appellants brought a pre-enforcement challenge to CADA in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. After summary judgment briefing had concluded, the district court found that Appellants only established standing to challenge the Communication Clause, and not the Accommodation Clause. After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the district court denied Appellants’ summary judgment motion on its Communication Clause challenges. The Tenth Circuit held Appellants had standing to challenge CADA. As to the merits, the Court held that CADA satisfied strict scrutiny, and thus permissibly compelled Appellants’ speech. The Court also held that CADA was a neutral law of general applicability, and that it was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. View "303 Creative, et al. v. Elenis, et al." on Justia Law

Charles Williams was a Colorado prisoner who practiced a Native American religion that used tobacco in sweat lodges. The ceremonies were possible because prison officials specified where inmates could use tobacco in religious services. In 2018, prison officials confiscated tobacco from a prisoner and suspected that it had come from Williams’s religious group. Prison officials responded with a 30-day ban on the use of tobacco for religious services. Weeks later, prison officials imposed a lockdown and modified operations, including an indefinite suspension of Native American religious services. Despite this suspension, prison officials allowed Christian and Islamic groups to continue their religious services because outside volunteers could provide supervision. The complaint implied that the suspension lasted at least nine days. Williams sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging in part that prison officials violated the First Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion on the ground that Williams’s allegations had overcome qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit concurred: because Williams adequately alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right, he has overcome qualified immunity. So the denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss was affirmed. View "Williams v. Borrego" on Justia Law

This case arose after a Silver City police officer murdered his ex-girlfriend, Nikki Bascom, and then committed suicide. Her Estate sued, alleging the Silver City police did not adequately respond to Bascom’s domestic violence complaints because the shooter, Marcello Contreras, was a fellow police officer. The Estate brought various civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, including a claim that Silver City officers Ed Reynolds and Ricky Villalobos violated Bascom’s equal protection rights by providing her less police protection than other similarly situated domestic violence victims. The officers moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, and, as relevant here, the district court denied their motion as to the equal protection claim. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment to officers Reynolds and Villalobos: "A reasonable jury could find their conduct violated Ms. Bascom’s clearly established right to equal protection of the law." View "Dalton v. Town of Silver City" on Justia Law

This case arose from a sexual-misconduct investigation conducted by the University of Denver and the subsequent expulsion of John Doe after a classmate accused him of sexual assault. Doe sued the University and various school administrators (collectively, the University) alleging, among other things, that the University violated the sex discrimination prohibition of Title IX, because anti-male bias pervaded the sexual-misconduct investigation, resulting in a disciplinary decision against the weight of the evidence. The district court concluded Doe failed to present sufficient evidence that the University’s actions were motivated by bias against him because of his sex, and it therefore granted summary judgment to the University on Doe’s Title IX claim. Doe challenged that conclusion, alleging the district court applied the wrong legal standard in resolving his motion for summary judgment. Applying the “McDonnell Douglas” evidentiary standard to Doe’s claim, the Tenth Circuit concluded he provided sufficient evidence for a jury to decide whether the investigation into the allegations and subsequent disciplinary action discriminated against him because of his sex. View "Doe v. University of Denver" on Justia Law