Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The elected Sheriff of El Paso County, Colorado, and head of the Paso County Sheriff’s Office (“EPSO”), fired Keith Duda, a patrol sergeant. Duda believed he was fired for supporting candidate Mike Angley, who challenged Sheriff Elder's reelection bid, and for giving an interview to a local newspaper about sexual harassment and other misconduct at the EPSO. Duda brought First Amendment retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At summary judgment, the district court denied qualified immunity to Sheriff Elder. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Sheriff Elder on Duda’s Angley speech claim. The district court did not err in finding a constitutional violation. On the reporting claim, Sheriff Elder did not contest there was a constitutional violation. Instead, he argued no law clearly established it was unconstitutional to terminate Duda for the reporting speech, contending the district court incorrectly relied on Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1989). To this, the Tenth Circuit affirmed because Wulf was substantially similar to the facts of this case. "Under Wulf, it was 'sufficiently clear that every reasonable official [in Sheriff Elder’s position] would have understood' that firing Mr. Duda based on his speech reporting misconduct at EPSO to The Independent was unconstitutional." View "Duda, et al. v. Elder" on Justia Law

Appellants Lorie Smith and her website design company 303 Creative, LLC (collectively, “Appellants”) appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees Aubrey Elenis, Director of the Colorado Civil Rights Division (the “Director”), members of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission (the “Commission”), and Phil Weiser, Colorado Attorney General (collectively, “Colorado”). Appellants challenged Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”) on free speech, free exercise, and vagueness and overbreadth grounds. Consistent with Ms. Smith’s religious beliefs, Appellants intended to offer wedding websites that celebrate opposite-sex marriages but intended to refuse to create similar websites that celebrate same-sex marriages. Appellants’ objection was based on the message of the specific website; Appellants would not create a website celebrating same-sex marriage regardless of whether the customer was the same-sex couple themselves, a heterosexual friend of the couple, or even a disinterested wedding planner requesting a mock-up. Appellants brought a pre-enforcement challenge to CADA in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. After summary judgment briefing had concluded, the district court found that Appellants only established standing to challenge the Communication Clause, and not the Accommodation Clause. After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the district court denied Appellants’ summary judgment motion on its Communication Clause challenges. The Tenth Circuit held Appellants had standing to challenge CADA. As to the merits, the Court held that CADA satisfied strict scrutiny, and thus permissibly compelled Appellants’ speech. The Court also held that CADA was a neutral law of general applicability, and that it was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. View "303 Creative, et al. v. Elenis, et al." on Justia Law

Charles Williams was a Colorado prisoner who practiced a Native American religion that used tobacco in sweat lodges. The ceremonies were possible because prison officials specified where inmates could use tobacco in religious services. In 2018, prison officials confiscated tobacco from a prisoner and suspected that it had come from Williams’s religious group. Prison officials responded with a 30-day ban on the use of tobacco for religious services. Weeks later, prison officials imposed a lockdown and modified operations, including an indefinite suspension of Native American religious services. Despite this suspension, prison officials allowed Christian and Islamic groups to continue their religious services because outside volunteers could provide supervision. The complaint implied that the suspension lasted at least nine days. Williams sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging in part that prison officials violated the First Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion on the ground that Williams’s allegations had overcome qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit concurred: because Williams adequately alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right, he has overcome qualified immunity. So the denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss was affirmed. View "Williams v. Borrego" on Justia Law

This case arose after a Silver City police officer murdered his ex-girlfriend, Nikki Bascom, and then committed suicide. Her Estate sued, alleging the Silver City police did not adequately respond to Bascom’s domestic violence complaints because the shooter, Marcello Contreras, was a fellow police officer. The Estate brought various civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, including a claim that Silver City officers Ed Reynolds and Ricky Villalobos violated Bascom’s equal protection rights by providing her less police protection than other similarly situated domestic violence victims. The officers moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, and, as relevant here, the district court denied their motion as to the equal protection claim. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment to officers Reynolds and Villalobos: "A reasonable jury could find their conduct violated Ms. Bascom’s clearly established right to equal protection of the law." View "Dalton v. Town of Silver City" on Justia Law

This case arose from a sexual-misconduct investigation conducted by the University of Denver and the subsequent expulsion of John Doe after a classmate accused him of sexual assault. Doe sued the University and various school administrators (collectively, the University) alleging, among other things, that the University violated the sex discrimination prohibition of Title IX, because anti-male bias pervaded the sexual-misconduct investigation, resulting in a disciplinary decision against the weight of the evidence. The district court concluded Doe failed to present sufficient evidence that the University’s actions were motivated by bias against him because of his sex, and it therefore granted summary judgment to the University on Doe’s Title IX claim. Doe challenged that conclusion, alleging the district court applied the wrong legal standard in resolving his motion for summary judgment. Applying the “McDonnell Douglas” evidentiary standard to Doe’s claim, the Tenth Circuit concluded he provided sufficient evidence for a jury to decide whether the investigation into the allegations and subsequent disciplinary action discriminated against him because of his sex. View "Doe v. University of Denver" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Conrad Truman sued state prosecutor Craig Johnson and various Orem City police officers for violating his civil rights by fabricating evidence that was used against him in a murder prosecution. Truman was prosecuted twice for the murder of his wife. According to the complaint, the prosecution knowingly falsified measurements of the murder scene to rule out the possibility of suicide or a self-inflicted accidental wound. As a result, the state medical examiner deemed Mrs. Truman’s death a homicide and Mr. Truman was indicted and successfully prosecuted for murder. After his conviction, he learned of the mismeasurements and the state court granted him a new trial. In the second trial where proper room measurements were admitted into evidence, Truman was acquitted. These events led Truman to file a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the prosecutor and the police. The district court found that the prosecutor was entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law and the claims against the police officers were barred by previous holdings in state court. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court that the prosecutor was entitled to qualified immunity at this stage in the proceedings. But summary judgment was appropriate as to the police officers because Truman forfeited his argument regarding issue preclusion in state court and did not argue for plain error review on appeal. View "Truman v. Orem City" on Justia Law

Responding to a call to the sheriff’s office that the occupant was intoxicated and possibly suicidal, Deputy Kyle Wilson drove to the home of Shane Bridges. Within seconds of his arrival at the home, Wilson had fired 13 rounds from his semiautomatic handgun at Bridges, hitting him twice and killing him. The shooting led to claims by Plaintiff Janelle Bridges, special administrator of Shane. Bridges’ estate, against Deputy Wilson and the Board of County Commissioners of Mayes County. She sued Wilson under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for allegedly violating Mr. Bridges’ constitutional rights by using unreasonable force, and sued the Board under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (OGTCA) based on alleged negligence by Deputy Wilson. The district court granted the Board summary judgment on the ground that the OGTCA did not waive the Board’s immunity from suit because Wilson was acting “as a protector, not as a law enforcer.” The section 1983 claim against Wilson was then tried to a jury, which ruled in Wilson’s favor. At trial Plaintiff contended that when Wilson drove up, Mr. Bridges had briefly opened the door to his home to look outside and had never fired a weapon, but that Wilson began firing at him after he had closed the door and gone inside, where he was hit by shots that pierced the door. Wilson’s account was that Mr. Bridges began firing at him from the porch of the home after he had parked his vehicle, and that Wilson fired only in response to the shots from Mr. Bridges, who then retreated into his home and died. Plaintiff did not dispute the jury verdict on appeal to the Tenth Circuit, but she challenged the summary judgment entered in favor of the Board. After reviewing the briefs and the record, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the Board on the ground suggested at oral argument (the Court did not address the immunity issue). “But on the evidence and theories of liability in this case, … a negligence claim under the OGTCA would be incompatible with the jury verdict. Plaintiff could prevail on the merits on each claim if, and only if, Mr. Bridges did not initiate the gun battle by firing at Deputy Wilson from his porch. By rendering a verdict in Wilson’s favor, the jury must have found that Mr. Bridges fired first.” View "Bridges v. Wilson" on Justia Law

As plaintiff-appellant Julie Huff was at the bank in early 2016, Cedric Norris entered, murdered the bank president, grabbed some money from tellers, and took Huff hostage, forcing her to drive the getaway vehicle. Police officers pursued the vehicle and were able to force it to crash. At first, Norris fired at the officers and fled in one direction while Huff fled away from him. She raised her arms and faced the officers. But they fired at her and she fell to the ground. Later, Norris came up behind her and used her body as a shield. Norris was killed in the shootout. Huff was shot at least 10 times. Huff later filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of her civil rights, alleging, among other things, that Oklahoma Highway Patrol Trooper Chris Reeves used excessive force against her, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. She also sued McIntosh County Sheriff Kevin Ledbetter for failure to properly train his deputies. The district court granted summary judgment to both defendants. The court found Reeves did not violate Huff’s constitutional rights because he did not shoot her intentionally. And it dismissed the claim against the sheriff on the grounds that Huff could neither demonstrate a predicate constitutional violation by one of his deputies nor identify any specific training deficiency related to the alleged violation. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment claim against Reeves and the failure-to-train claim against Sheriff Ledbetter, but reversed and remanded on the Fourth Amendment claim against Reeves. The Tenth Circuit held Huff could not invoke Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process in the circumstances of this case, and she failed to point to any additional training of Ledbetter’s personnel that could have prevented the alleged constitutional violation. But the Court concluded that Huff has presented a genuine issue of material fact on whether Reeves shot her intentionally. “And because it is clearly established in this circuit that an officer may not employ deadly force against a person who poses no threat, Reeves is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings.” View "Huff v. Reeves" on Justia Law

Dr. Erfan Ibrahim was a Muslim man of Pakistani descent who served as an executive at Alliance for Sustainable Energy until he was fired. Alliance attributed the firing to Dr. Ibrahim’s inappropriate comments to two women; Dr. Ibrahim disagrees, attributing the firing to discrimination based on his race, religion, and gender. Summary judgment was entered in favor of Alliance, rejecting Dr. Ibrahim's allegation that Alliance decided not to fire another executive accused of sexual harassment. The district court rejected the comparison, pointing to differences between the conduct of Dr. Ibrahim and the other executive. The Tenth Circuit concluded these differences involved matters for the factfinder. So judgment was reversed on the claim of race discrimination. View "Ibrahim v. Alliance for Sustainable Nrg." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Joan Unrein became legally blind and could no longer drive herself to work, a 120 mile round trip. She asked her employer, Colorado Plains Medical Center, to allow her to work a flexible schedule dependent on her ability to secure rides. The Medical Center permitted this arrangement for a while, but it became a problem because Unrein’s physical presence at the hospital was unpredictable. The flexible schedule arrangement ended in 2016, and was never reinstated. After Unrein was terminated, she sued the Medical Center for failure to accommodate her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the Medical Center because it concluded Unrein’s accommodation request was unreasonable since a physical presence at the hospital on a set and predictable schedule was an essential job function of her position. Unrein appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Unrein’s physical presence at the hospital on a set and predictable schedule was essential to her job, and the ADA did not require an employer to accommodate employees’ non-work related barriers created by personal lifestyle choices. View "Unrein v. PHC-Fort Morgan" on Justia Law