Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Township solicited bids for the demolition of former hospital buildings. ICC, a Detroit-based minority-owned company, submitted the lowest bid. AAI, a white-owned business submitted the second-lowest bid, with a difference between the bids of almost $1 million. The Township hired a consulting company (F&V) to vet the bidders and manage the project. F&V conducted interviews with both companies and provided a checklist with comments about both companies to the Township. ICC alleges that F&V made several factual errors about both companies, including that AAI had no contracting violations and that ICC had such violations; that ICC had no relevant experience, that AAI had relevant experience, and that AAI was not on a federal contracting exclusion list. F&V recommended that AAI receive the contract. The Township awarded AAI the contract. ICC filed a complaint, alleging violations of the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, and Michigan law.The district court dismissed the case, finding that ICC failed to state a claim under either 42 U.S.C. 1981 or 42 U.S.C. 1983 by failing to allege the racial composition of its ownership and lacked standing to assert its constitutional claims and that F&V was not a state actor. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. ICC had standing to bring its claims, and sufficiently pleaded a section 1981 claim against F&V. The other federal claims were properly dismissed. View "Inner City Contracting LLC v. Charter Township of Northville" on Justia Law

S.C., a high school freshman, was unwillingly video-recorded engaging in non-consensual sexual activity with a male student on school property. The video was shared online and other students began to harass S.C. Students then began harassing and threatening S.C. and her family. S.C. and her mother met with Detective, Carrigan, who assumed the video-recording and sexual encounter were consensual and repeatedly rejected S.C.’s statements and information about the threats, suggesting that S.C. had participated in producing child pornography. Following another meeting, Principal Kessler denied being informed that the encounter was not consensual or of any harassment, although a list of students making threats was found in Kessler’s file. Kessler suspended S.C., after which she was expected to return to school. The Assistant Principal also declined to address the threats. S.C. entered an in-patient facility and continued coursework remotely. Because the threats continued, her family moved to a different county. S.C.'s grades dropped substantially, she began abusing drugs and alcohol, and she engaged in self-harm. Before the incident, the district already had “a widespread problem of students circulating sexual pictures and videos of themselves and their peers.” The district was aware of the problem.S.C. alleged deliberate indifference to student-on-student harassment before she was assaulted; deliberate indifference during the investigation; and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims. S.C.’s Title IX “before” claim was dismissed. The court found the district liable for emotional distress and other damages on the Title IX “after” claim, but not liable under section 1983. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded the Title IX and Section 1983 “before” claims and affirmed that the district is liable on S.C.’s Title IX “after” claim. View "S.C. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County" on Justia Law

In 2020, Bennett, a nursing student completing a clinical rotation at Hurley, requested that her service dog, Pistol, be permitted to accompany her. Pistol recognizes the symptoms Bennett exhibits just before a panic attack and alerts her so that she can take Ativan. Hurley agreed. Its Service Animal Policy largely tracks regulations implementing the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12131. When Bennett brought Pistol to the hospital, one staff member and one patient reported allergic reactions. Hurley revoked Bennett’s ability to have Pistol with her at all times, stating the hospital remained “open to continued dialogue” and would provide space for a crate for Pistol on another floor and “make every effort to accommodate” unscheduled breaks. Hurley concluded that relocating staff and patients could compromise patient care. Moving nurses would be difficult; Hurley nurses are union members and the hospital was short-staffed during the pandemic. There were concerns about having a dog on a floor with immunocompromised or unconscious patients. Bennett finished her Hurley rotation without Pistol and without experiencing a panic attack. Bennett completed rotations at other hospitals with PistolThe Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of Bennett’s claims under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, and Michigan law. Hurley’s concerns were with Pistol, not with Bennett’s medical condition. Hurley reasonably decided that Pistol posed a direct threat to the health and safety of patients and that the accommodations necessary to mitigate the risk were not reasonable. View "Bennett v. Hurley Medical Center" on Justia Law

In 1970, Michigan voters approved Proposal C, amending Article VIII, section 2 of Michigan’s constitution: “No public monies or property shall be appropriated or paid or any public credit utilized, by the legislature or any other political subdivision or agency of the state directly or indirectly to aid or maintain any private, denominational or other nonpublic, pre-elementary, elementary, or secondary schools.” The plaintiffs allege that Proposal C was spurred by the legislature’s passage of 1970 PA 100, which “allowed the Department of Education to purchase educational services from nonpublic schools in secular subjects,” and authorized $22 million in spending during the 1970-71 school year. Plaintiffs allege that “nonpublic schools” meant “religious schools”; opposition to 1970 PA 100 resulted in Proposal C. In 2000, Michigan voters rejected a ballot initiative that would have amended the section to authorize “indirect” support of non-public school students and create a voucher program for students in underperforming public school districts to attend nonpublic schools.Plaintiffs brought unsuccessful free exercise claims, alleging they have funded Michigan Education Savings Program plans and wish to use those plans to pay for their children’s religious school tuition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of their equal protection claim that section 2, while facially neutral, creates a political structure that unconstitutionally discriminates against religion because religious persons and schools cannot lobby their state representatives for governmental aid or tuition help without first amending the state constitution. View "Hile v. State of Michigan" on Justia Law

In 1993, Fields, having spent the day drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, fought with Burton, who lived in a duplex owned by Horton. That night, Burton was locked outside. Fields appeared, with a knife, and broke a window in the duplex. Fields and Burton fled before police arrived, having been called by a neighbor. Officers found Fields in Horton’s residence, a block away, in possession of Horton’s jewelry, saying that he had killed Horton, who was dead in her bedroom. At his second trial, the prosecution argued that Fields broke into Horton’s residence through a storm window, murdered her, and started burglarizing the residence before police arrived. To test that theory, the jury conducted an experiment using a flat-tipped knife submitted into evidence to remove a cabinet door in the jury room (in place of the storm window). Satisfied with the outcome, the jurors convicted Fields of intentional murder and sentenced him to death.In 2022, the Sixth Circuit granted Fields conditional habeas corpus relief. On rehearing, en banc, the court affirmed the denial of relief. The Supreme Court has not addressed when jury experiments of this type violate state or federal law. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act habeas relief is unavailable unless a state court has unreasonably applied “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). View "Fields v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Jones was convicted of robbery in Indiana, Kentucky, and federal courts. Jones’s Kentucky plea deal agreed to a commencement date for Jones’s accrual of time-served credits, not when officers actually took Jones into custody, as would ordinarily be the case, but on an earlier date. The sentencing court failed to adopt the plea agreement and ordered the Department of Corrections to calculate Jones’s time-served credit in accordance with “this judgment,” which made no mention of the negotiated agreement, and “the law.” The court did not provide Jones the opportunity to withdraw his plea. Jones did not appeal or seek correction of his sentence. Jones unsuccessfully asked prison administrators to honor the plea agreement’s time-served provision; doing so would have violated the judgment of conviction. Jones asked the sentencing court for clarification. The court ratified the administrators’ calculations. Jones did not appeal. The court subsequently instructed that Jones be given credit in accordance with the agreement. Jones was then released.Jones filed suit, alleging that Kentucky prison administrators violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights through their alleged deliberate indifference to the prospect of incarcerating him beyond the length of his sentence. The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of the defendants’ qualified immunity motions. The defendants—state corrections officials—neither caused nor contributed to Jones’s over-incarceration nor could they unilaterally remedy the matter, which was dictated by court orders. View "Jones v. Bottom" on Justia Law

During his booking at Kenton County Detention Center, Grote could not complete paperwork while standing nor be photographed due to his agitated state. By the time he was examined by LPN Brand, Grote was constantly shaking and twitching and was covered in sweat. With officers, Grote denied that he had taken any substances but told Brand that he had taken a half gram of methamphetamine. Grote’s oxygen level was 89 percent; he was hyperventilating. Brand was unable to take any other vital signs. Brand does not recall communicating to anyone her assessment that Grote was detoxing. Deputies conducted sporadic checks on Grote in his cell before an inmate reported that Grote was unconscious and foaming at the mouth. Grote suffered multiple cardiac arrests and did not regain neurological function before dying. A doctor testified that Grote’s overdose would have been obvious to a layperson and that the situation required urgent medical care. Grote had a blood methamphetamine concentration 14 times higher than “the lowest reported lethal dose.”The KCDC defendants testified received no training on recognizing signs of an overdose or detox and could not call 911 immediately in the event of an inmate overdose, but instead were to notify shift managers. The Sixth Circuit reversed, in part, the dismissal of a section 1983 suit. A jury could find that the medical provider was deliberately indifferent to Grote’s need for medical attention, but not that the deputies acted unconstitutionally. View "Grote v. Kenton County, Kentucky" on Justia Law

After being stopped for a broken headlight, Akima was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated based on his performance on a three-part field sobriety exam and a preliminary breathalyzer test. Arresting Officer Peca determined that he failed the assessments but had both administered the field sobriety tests improperly and misread the breathalyzer. Akima blew a blood alcohol content of 0.02, well below the legal limit of 0.08; Peca read the result as 0.22 and arrested him, causing Akima, a Japanese citizen, to lose his work visa and be deported. A blood test confirmed the Officer’s error. Akima sued, alleging constitutional violations. Peca moved to dismiss, citing qualified immunity.The district court permitted Akima’s constitutional claims to proceed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Officer Peca lacked probable cause to believe Akima’s license was not in his immediate possession or that he was intoxicated. A reasonable jury could find that while driving without any apparent difficulty, Akima was stopped for a broken headlight; perhaps due to evident communication barriers, Akima took the atypical step of exiting his vehicle. Akima acknowledged he had been drinking “just a little bit,” registered 0.02 on a breathalyzer, exhibited a temperate and responsive demeanor, and maintained steady speech and gait. He completed three field sobriety tests. View "Akima v. Peca" on Justia Law

James picked up Herald and Hickerson in a silver car. Driving around, the men got high and plotted to rob the Contreras home. At a gas station, Hickerson picked up black ski masks. Herald went home. Hours later, two armed, masked men invaded the Contreras home and shot Adrian five times, killing him. Adrian’s brothers returned fire, hitting Hickerson. The other intruder escaped in a silver car. Around 4 a.m. that day, James arrived at his friends’ house in a silver car, telling them he had attempted a robbery with Hickerson and that Hickerson had been shot. James later told Herald that he “left Johnny” and had thrown his gun in a lake. Police found a black ski mask two blocks from the Contreras house, with James’s DNA on it.James was convicted of felony murder, home invasion, assault, and firearm offenses. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, finding that Herald’s testimony was supported by “the location of the weapon” and that a “weapon” found near the crime scene had James’s DNA on it. No evidence supported those findings. Police never found the second intruder’s gun and did not find James's DNA on any weapons. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of James’s federal habeas petition. Even serious errors do not warrant habeas relief by themselves. Petitioners need to show a violation of the Constitution or federal law. James has not. View "James v. Corrigan" on Justia Law

Zakhari, in a program to become a cardiothoracic surgeon, engaged in online sexually explicit conversations with a profile (boredcrbgirl) created by a detective, claiming to be a 15-year-old girl. He received an image of an officer. Zakhari sent an Uber to take boredcrbgirl to his apartment for sex. The officer arrived at Zakhari’s residence in the Uber. Zakhari was arrested. The detective interrogated him after giving the Miranda warnings. Zakhari said, “I can answer some questions and then maybe call.” After responding to basic questions, he said: My sister’s an attorney. Asked if he wanted to call her, Zakhari said “yeah,” then paused. The detective interjected that such a call would end the questioning. Zakhari continued to answer questions and made incriminating statements.Zakhari was convicted of attempting to persuade a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), attempting to transmit an obscene image to a minor, section 1470, and attempting to produce child pornography sections 2251(a)(e). Zakhari unsuccessfully moved to suppress his statements. The court declined to strike the third charge on grounds of prosecutorial vindictiveness.The Sixth Circuit vacated the convictions. The suppression motion should have been granted. The factual context shows Zakhari had “lawyerly assistance” in mind in wanting to call his sister and the invocation was not ambiguous. The court abused its discretion in failing to require the government to substantiate its explanations concerning Count 3. Zakhari showed enough to presume vindictiveness. View "United States v. Zakhari" on Justia Law