Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2004, when the Sentencing Guidelines were deemed mandatory, Raybon pleaded guilty to distributing more than 50 grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), agreeing that he qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, based on a prior drug trafficking conviction and a conviction for assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. The career offender designation increased his guidelines range to 262-327 months’ imprisonment (from 140-175 months). The Sixth Circuit affirmed a sentence 295 months’ imprisonment. Ten years later, under a different regime of “effectively advisory” Guidelines, Raybon moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 based on the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Johnson, which invalidated the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), as unconstitutionally void for vagueness. Raybon argued that his predicate conviction for assault with intent to do great bodily harm no longer qualified as a crime of violence under an identically-worded residual clause in the career offender guideline. The district court denied the motion as untimely. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; whether the 2015 Johnson decision applies to identical language in the mandatory guidelines is an open question. Raybon’s appeal was not based on a right newly established by the Supreme Court in 2015. View "Raybon v. United States" on Justia Law

Brown arrived to pick up Hamilton for what he thought was a date. Hamilton’s boyfriend, Stewart, was waiting for him. A struggle ensued. Shots were fired. The men grappled down an apartment stairwell building and out the door. At the end of a trail of blood, Brown lay dead with several gunshot wounds in his chest. Stewart was gone. Michigan charged Stewart and Hamilton with felony murder, felon in possession of a firearm, armed robbery, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. The evidence at a joint trial showed that Stewart and Hamilton planned to rob Brown. The jury found Stewart guilty. The court sentenced him to life for the first-degree felony murder conviction, two years for the felony-firearm conviction, and 25-50 years for the armed robbery and conspiracy convictions. The jury also found Hamilton guilty. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Stewart’s conviction, finding some claims forfeited, others without error, and still others harmless. The federal district court granted habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The state court properly found that any of Hamilton’s statements that were admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause were cumulative of properly admitted evidence and not outcome-determinative. Given the judge’s curative instructions, prosecutorial statements about credibility did not deprive Steward of due process. View "Stewart v. Trierweiler" on Justia Law

In 1986, Black shot his girlfriend Angela’s ex-husband. Black pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two years at a Davidson County, Tennessee, workhouse. In 1988, while on a weekend furlough, Black entered Angela’s home, shot Angela as she slept, and then shot Angela’s nine-year-old and six-year-old children, killing all three. Black returned to the workhouse before officers discovered the bodies. Black’s trial and post-conviction proceedings have spanned nearly 30 years. In 2000, Black filed an unsuccessful federal habeas petition, claiming that his mental retardation precluded the imposition of the death penalty. After two remands, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. While the Supreme Court and the Tennessee courts have recently recognized limitations imposed by the Eighth Amendment on the power of states to execute mentally retarded persons, those developments do not give Black a reprieve from his death sentence. The court rejected Black’s claims that the district court erred in perceiving the remand to be a limited remand; erred in denying Black an evidentiary hearing; erred in failing to apply a summary-judgment standard in ruling on Black’s Atkins claim; and erred in its merits determination regarding relief under the Supreme Court’s "Atkins" standard. Black did not meet his burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he has significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that manifested before Black turned 18. View "Black v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Miller was arrested, charged, and indicted on charges of reckless driving and resisting arrest, based on false statements made by Officer Maddox. The district court granted summary judgment in Maddox’s favor on Miller’s malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Maddox is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law and is not entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity. Although Maddox may never have directly spoken with the prosecutor regarding the case, Maddox swore out the warrant affidavit that was submitted to the night commissioner and was the only witness to testify at the preliminary hearing; he at least influenced or participated in the prosecution decision. Miller may be able to rebut the general rule that an indictment conclusively establishes probable cause. There is a genuine dispute of material fact with respect to whether Miller suffered a deprivation of liberty by being detained past the time necessary to enroll her in a pretrial services program. View "Miller v. Maddox" on Justia Law

Flint, which previously obtained water from DWSD, decided to join the Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA). The DWSD contract terminated in 2014. Because KWA would take years to construct, Flint chose the Flint River as an interim source. A 2011 Report had determined that river water would need to be treated to meet safety regulations; the cost of treatment was less than continuing with DWSD. Genesee County also decided to switch to KWA but continued to purchase DWSD water during construction. Flint did not upgrade its treatment plants or provide additional safety measures before switching. Residents immediately complained that the water “smelled rotten, looked foul, and tasted terrible.” Tests detected coliform and E. coli bacteria; the water was linked to Legionnaire’s disease. General Motors discontinued its water service, which was corroding its parts. Eventually, the city issued a notice that the drinking water violated standards, but was safe to drink. Subsequent testing indicated high levels of lead and trihalomethane that did not exceed the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) Lead and Copper Rule’s “action level.” The tests indicated that corrosion control treatment was needed to counteract lead levels. The City Council voted to reconnect with DWSD; the vote was overruled by the state-appointed Emergency Manager. The EPA warned of high lead levels; officials distributed filters. Genesee County declared a public health emergency in Flint, advising residents not to drink the water. The Emergency Manager ordered reconnection to DWSD but the supply pipes' protective coating had been damaged by River water. Flint remains in a state of emergency but residents have been billed continuously for water. The Michigan Civil Rights Commission determined that the response to the crisis was “the result of systemic racism.” The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal, as preempted by SDWA, of cases under 42 U.S.C. 1983. SDWA has no textual preemption of section 1983 claims and SDWA’s remedial scheme does not demonstrate such an intention. The rights and protections found in the constitutional claims diverge from those provided by SDWA. The court affirmed dismissal of claims against state defendants as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. View "Boler v. Earley" on Justia Law

Darrah, a Madison Correctional Institution (MCI) inmate, sued medical staff under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Darrah had a severe form of psoriasis that causes debilitating pain from large and deep fissures that form on the bottom of the feet. He had been treated successfully with Soriatane; multiple other treatments had proven ineffective. Soriatane was not listed on the Drug Formulary for Ohio prisons and could not be dispensed without prior authorization. MCI was not able to obtain non-Formulary drugs at the time of Darrah’s arrival. After weeks without the drug, Darrah developed fissures on his heels, pain, and difficulty walking. The doctors tried other drugs. Darrah visited the infirmary repeatedly, filed complaints and a grievance, but a year elapsed before he received Soriatane. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. It was “clearly established” by 2011 that neglecting to provide a prisoner with needed medication, choosing to prescribe an arguably less efficacious treatment method, and continuing on a treatment path that was clearly ineffective could constitute a constitutional violation. The facts could support a finding of deliberate indifference. View "Darrah v. Krisher" on Justia Law

Lincoln Park’s dire financial condition led Michigan officials to place the city under the purview of an Emergency Manager pursuant to the Local Financial Stability and Choice Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 141.1541. Emergency Manager Coulter, with the approval of Michigan’s Treasurer, issued 10 orders that temporarily replaced Lincoln Park retiree health-care benefits with monthly stipends that retirees could use to purchase individual health-care coverage. Retirees filed sui under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting violations of the Contracts Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Takings Clause. The district court rejected the Treasurer’s motion to dismiss, arguing qualified immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The court held, as a matter of first impression, that an alleged Contracts Clause violation cannot give rise to a cause of action under section 1983. With respect to other constitutional claims, the claimed property right derives from contract; a state contract action would be sufficient to safeguard the retirees’ contractual property rights. Because the state contract action is available as a remedy for any uncompensated taking the challenges to the constitutionality of Coulter’s orders are not ripe for resolution. As the claims fail on the merits, there is no need to evaluate the alleged immunity defenses. View "Kaminski v. Coulter" on Justia Law

Edwards was killed in 1991. In 1999, Defendant, incarcerated on unrelated charges, contacted Chattanooga Police, stating he had information related to the unsolved murder. Detective Mathis interviewed Defendant. Defendant was not under arrest or charged with Edwards’ murder at the time of his recorded confession. Mathis testified he did not promise anything in return for the confession; that Defendant waived his right to remain silent and to an attorney; that he talked with Defendant for some time before reading him his Miranda rights because Defendant stated that he had heard about the murder, not that he was involved; and that he told Defendant that he would tell the district attorney’s office that Defendant had come forward and cooperated. Defendant testified that he asked to speak with his attorney but that Mathis stated he did not need an attorney and that Mathis promised him that Defendant would not be charged with the murder and promised to speak with Defendant’s parole officer and the district attorney about other cases in return for cooperation. A jury convicted him of first-degree felony murder and aggravated robbery. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal; state courts denied post-conviction relief. The district court denied petitions for federal habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The state court’s ruling was objectively reasonable in finding that Defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes. An individual who is not in Miranda custody has no constitutional right to counsel. View "Schreane v. Ebbert" on Justia Law

Wesley was an elementary school counselor in Covington, Kentucky. Seven-year-old J.S., who suffered from psychological problems, told his mother that Wesley had sexually assaulted him. Campbell, a social worker, talked to J.S. and contacted Detective Rigney, Rigney and Campbell interviewed 32 other students who had contact with Wesley; none disclosed any inappropriate behavior. A medical exam of J.S. did not reveal any evidence of abuse. Rigney obtained a warrant for Wesley’s arrest. Rigney did not interview employees who worked near Wesley’s office, although the sexual abuse allegedly occurred in Wesley’s office, with the door ajar and others able to see inside. The charges were dismissed. In Wesley’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the jury found that Rigney lacked probable cause to secure an arrest warrant; facts misrepresented in or omitted from Rigney’s affidavit and warrant application were material; and the misrepresentations or omissions were done intentionally, deliberately, or with reckless disregard for the truth. The jury awarded Wesley $589,000 in compensatory and $500,000 in punitive damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Rigney’s arguments concerning failure to instruct the jury adequately about qualified immunity; the court’s reference to J.S.’s psychological history during the probable-cause jury instruction; the denial of a motion regarding the availability of punitive damages; and the court’s refusal to remit the damage awards. View "Wesley v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The Alger County, Michigan dispatch center received a report that Mitchell had assaulted “Kevin,” had been drinking, and was “swerving all over the road.” Officer Schlabach identified Mitchell’s car, followed it into a parking lot, and stopped alongside. Mitchell sped back onto the highway. Schlabach pursued Mitchell through residential neighborhoods, around cars, and through stop signs, often in excess of 100 miles per hour in pouring rain. Minutes later, Mitchell ran his car into a ditch in a national forest. Schlabach parked 63.6 feet from Mitchell’s car. Mitchell exited the car, looked toward Schlabach, then turned away and crouched toward the ground. Mitchell appeared to be unarmed. Schlabach drew his handgun and slowly approached Mitchell. Mitchell walked toward Schlabach with “[c]lenched fists, wide eyes, coming directly ... towards me, ... refusing to listen to any of my direct commands.” The dash-cam video did not clearly show Mitchell’s facial expressions but left “little room to doubt the hostility of Mitchell’s approach” even after Schlabach began backing away in fear. Mitchell pressed Schlabach all the way across the road. Schlabach fired a shot. Mitchell hunched over slightly but continued moving purposefully toward Schlabach. Schlabach fired again. Mitchell collapsed and died. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment of qualified immunity in favor of Schlabach, noting that the confrontation took less than 20 seconds. Courts must make an “allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments.” View "Mitchell v. Schlabach" on Justia Law