Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Stimmel tried to purchase a firearm at a Walmart store in 2002. The store rejected Stimmel’s offer because a mandatory national background check revealed that he had been convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence in 1997. Stimmel has not been convicted of another crime. Federal law prohibits domestic violence misdemeanants from possessing firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). He unsuccessfully appealed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and challenged the law in district court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his complaint. The law survives intermediate scrutiny and does not unconstitutionally burden Stimmel’s Second Amendment rights. The court noted “the growing consensus of our sister circuits that have unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the domestic violence misdemeanant restriction to firearms possession.” The record contains sufficient evidence to reasonably conclude that disarming domestic violence misdemeanants is substantially related to the government’s compelling interest of preventing gun violence and, particularly, domestic gun violence. View "Stimmel v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Ferndale Officer Jaklic stopped Latits for turning the wrong way onto a divided boulevard after midnight. Latits opened his glove box to retrieve his registration. Jaklic testified that he saw bags that he suspected to contain marijuana, which Latits attempted to move. A dashboard video shows that Jaklic pointed his gun at the ground for about 30 seconds, then pointed it, point-blank. Jaklic broadcast that he was pursuing a fleeing vehicle. Three officers joined the chase. Department policy prohibits more than two cars from pursuing a fleeing car without special permission. Latits can be seen steering away from Jaklic’s car in a vacant parking lot but Jaklic broadcast that Latits “tried to ram my vehicle,” Latits fled, entering a highway. The chase continued through two red lights in an uninhabited area. Officer Wurm twice collided with Latits’s car, causing Latits to lose control. Phillips rammed Latits’s car, which stopped, then slowly moved forward. Latits’s and Jaklic’s cars collided at low speed. Phillips ran toward Latits’s car from behind. Latits started reversing away with Phillips following; gunshots are heard on the recording. Phillips could see that no cars or persons were immediately behind Latits. Latits, struck by three bullets, died. Less than four minutes passed from Latits driving away from Jaklic until the shooting. Phillips violated multiple department procedures and was terminated. In a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, the court granted Phillips summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Phillips’s use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment, but then-existing precedent did not clearly establish the objective unreasonableness under these circumstances; Phillips is entitled to qualified immunity. View "Latits v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Since 2010, federal courts have been reviewing the punishments Michigan may impose on individuals convicted of first-degree murder for acts they committed as children. In the meantime, the Supreme Court has twice ruled that the unique characteristics of youth must factor into sentencing decisions for juvenile offenders facing life imprisonment. Michigan has amended its statutory scheme to implement these rulings. On remand, the district court considered a Second Amended Complaint (SAC), asserting that Michigan’s sentencing scheme and parole system deny youth offenders a meaningful opportunity for release. The court determined that jurisprudential concerns barred Plaintiffs’ claims and dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. The claim based on Michigan statutory law, which has been amended, is moot. Declining to apply “Younger” abstention, the court reasoned that finding that the filing of the SAC required reconsideration of jurisdiction “would both expand and warp an otherwise cabined and clear doctrine.” One claim was properly dismissed under the “Heck” doctrine: a declaration that sentences of life without parole for juvenile offenders are unconstitutional would necessarily implicate the duration of impending sentences and is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Claims that seek an examination of “policies and procedures governing access to prison programming and parole eligibility, consideration and release” and that the retroactive elimination of Plaintiffs’ accrued good time credits violates the Ex Post Facto Clause should not have been dismissed. View "Hill v. Snyder" on Justia Law

In 2009, Clardy pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon and to possessing over 50 grams of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute it. He signed a “Waiver of Appellate Rights,” stating that Clardy “knowingly waives the right to challenge the sentence imposed in any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, a motion brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255 and/or 2241, and/or 18 U.S.C. 3582(c).” After ensuring that Clardy understood and had signed the agreement voluntarily, the court accepted his plea and sentenced him to 144 months' imprisonment. The Sentencing Commission later amended the Guidelines to reduce the offense levels for drug crimes. Clardy filed a motion under section 3582(c)(2), which allows a court to reduce a sentence that was based on a Guidelines range that has been lowered. The Seventh Circuit affirmed rejection of his motion. A defendant can waive “any right, even a constitutional right,” in a plea agreement. Clardy signed his agreement knowingly and voluntarily. By its plain terms, Clardy waived his right to file a 3582(c) motion. The specific terms within the agreement, not its general title, control its reach. References to specific statutes more clearly explain an agreement’s scope than do terms like “collateral attack.” View "United States v. Clardy" on Justia Law

As many as 50,000 stray dogs roam Detroit’s streets, sometimes in packs. An ordinance allows animal control officers to capture and impound stray dogs owned in violation of licensing and vaccination provisions and to euthanize them under some circumstances. It makes it unlawful to refuse to surrender an animal that has attacked or bitten a person or other animal. It allows officers to enter “real property ... for the purpose of capturing, collecting, or restraining any animal,” without a warrant. Violations are misdemeanors. Detroit Animal Control officers seized each of the plaintiff’s dogs because the dogs were running loose off of the owners’ property, attacked a person or other animal, or during evictions. In their suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the plaintiffs an injunction with respect to the warrantless search-and-seizure claim but granted the defendants judgment as a matter of law as to other claims because the plaintiffs could not show any constitutional violations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of the Fourteenth Amendment and several Fourth Amendment claims but reversed rejection of two Fourth Amendment claims. Most of the plaintiffs cannot show that a Detroit policy or custom directly caused the alleged search-and-seizure violations, and all of them cannot show a cognizable due-process violation. View "Hardrick v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Dufresne of three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) and six counts of third-degree CSC, based upon sexual acts that Dufresne committed against his then-girlfriend, Wiertalla, with whom he shared a son. Wiertalla reported the acts after Dufresne left her and traveled to Florida with their son. Dufresne belonged to the “Creativity Movement,” which was considered by law enforcement to be a white-supremacist group. The trial court sentenced Dufresne to 50-75 years of imprisonment on the first-degree CSC counts and 25-50 years on the third-degree counts. Following a hearing on the effectiveness of trial counsel’s assistance, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed rejection of an ineffective assistance claim. After rejection of his state court motion for relief from judgment, Dufresne filed a federal habeas petition, alleging: trial counsel performed ineffectively; the trial court erred by granting a motion to exclude evidence and the prosecutor intimidated crucial witnesses; appellate counsel failed to raise meritorious issues; repeated references to his post-arrest, post-Miranda silence; and repeated references to his ties to the Creativity Movement. The district court denied habeas relief, concluding that Dufresne procedurally defaulted grounds one and two and was not entitled to habeas relief on the merits of grounds three through five. The Sixth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability, calling the evidence of guilt “overwhelming.” View "Dufresne v. Palmer" on Justia Law

In 2006, Williams pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He had prior convictions under Ohio law: attempted felonious assault, domestic violence, and assault on a peace officer, which subjected him to a mandatory-minimum sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (ACCA). Williams twice, unsuccessfully filed 28 U.S.C. 2255 petitions to vacate his sentence. In 2015, (Johnson) the Supreme Court found the ACCA's residual clause, section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), unconstitutional and subsequently held that Johnson had announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law that courts must apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. Williams filed a third 2255 motion, arguing that his prior convictions no longer counted as ACCA predicate offenses. The Sixth Circuit authorized the district court to consider whether Williams’ felonious assault conviction still qualifies as an ACCA violent felony, noting its 2012 holding (Anderson), that committing felonious assault in Ohio necessarily requires the use of physical force and is a predicate offense under the ACCA elements clause. The district court then held, and the Sixth Circuit agreed, that Anderson remains controlling precedent. Section 2255 motions based on Johnson are appropriate where the sentencing court may have relied on the residual clause. When binding precedent establishes that a violent felony used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA qualifies as a predicate offense under a separate ACCA provision, like the elements clause, the Johnson holding is not implicated. The courts found no reason to overrule Anderson. View "Williams v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claimed Ohio’s paper-ballot absentee voter system discriminated against the blind, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101. In Ohio, blind voters must seek the aid of a sighted person to vote absentee, depriving them of the ability to vote anonymously. Plaintiffs proposed that the state provide an online absentee ballot in lieu of a paper one, and adopt online ballot marking tools used in other states for blind voters. The state argued that adoption of plaintiffs’ proposal would violate state law, given Ohio’s certification requirements for voting equipment, and would force through untested and uncertified voting tools—which are neither appropriate nor necessary auxiliary aids under the ADA—and would fundamentally alter Ohio election law. The district court granted the state judgment on the pleadings. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that the district court based its ruling on defendant’s mere allegation of the “fundamental alteration” affirmative defense under the ADA, without any evidentiary support. The state had the burden of production and persuasion to prove that the proposed accommodation—the ballot marking tools and electronic ballots—would fundamentally alter Ohio’s election system by not “correctly, accurately, and continuously register[ing] and record[ing] every vote cast.” A state procedural requirement may not excuse a substantive ADA violation. View "Hindel v. Husted" on Justia Law

Michigan mandates that school-age children be vaccinated before entering the public school system but offers exemptions for certain medical and nonmedical reasons. To get an exemption, a parent must visit a local health department. A devout Catholic, Nikolao, sought a religious waiver for her children. At the mandatory meeting, Wayne County nurses tried to disabuse Nikolao of the notion that her faith prohibited vaccination. The Religious Waiver Note contained a quote falsely attributed to Pope Benedict XVI stating that parents who chose not to vaccinate their children “would be in more proximate cooperation with evil" because of the life-saving nature of vaccines. Nikolao received the waiver. On the compliance form, the nurses wrote that Nikolao objected because she wanted her “child to have natural immunity.” Nikolao wanted the form to report her religious objection . She sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of the First Amendment. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. The state is merely voicing its own opinion on religious objections to prevent the outbreak of communicable diseases. This does not constitute excessive entanglement for an Establishment Clause challenge. Nikolao has not presented any facts to suggest that the state has coerced her religious practices and did not suffer an injury-in-fact under the Free Exercise Clause; she did not have standing to pursue that claim. View "Nikolao v. Lyon" on Justia Law

Smith has epilepsy. He had a seizure while driving, steered into a yard, exited the car, and walked away. A neighbor called the police. Miami County Deputy Osting arrived and observed Smith, sweating, grasping a fence, and yelling, “Baby,” with his outer pants down around his knees. Osting identified himself and asked Smith to return to his car. Smith did not respond. Osting thought that Smith was under the influence of something. Osting pried Smith’s fingers from the fence. Smith pulled away. Osting took Smith to the ground with a leg sweep and fell on top of him. During the ensuing struggle, Troy Officer Gates arrived, drew his taser, and ordered Smith to put his hands behind his back. Smith did not comply. Gates applied the taser. Additional officers arrived and grabbed Smith’s legs, allowing Osting to handcuff Smith. Gates’s taser was deployed eight times, a total of 48 seconds, during the two-minute encounter. No officer informed Smith that he was under arrest. Smith testified that he drifted out of lucidity during the incident, but remembered telling Osting he was having a seizure and that he developed PTSD following the incident. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on Smith’s federal civil rights claims; concluded that the officers used measured force and that even if individuals used excessive force, they were entitled to qualified immunity; held that municipal defendants could not be liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 without an underlying constitutional violation; and granted the defendants summary judgment on Smith’s ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12132, claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed Osting's summary judgment on Smith’s excessive force claims and the dismissal of Smith’s pendent state-law claims but otherwise affirmed. View "Smith v. City of Troy, Ohio" on Justia Law