Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A jury found that the Michigan Department of State Police had retaliated against Mys, a former desk sergeant with the Department, by transferring her from her longtime post in Newaygo, Michigan, to a post in Detroit. Department officials initiated the process that culminated in Sgt. Mys’s transfer shortly after she had filed the second of two complaints alleging sexual assault and sexual harassment by her coworker, Sergeant Miller. Mys was awarded $350,000 in compensatory damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the Department’s claim that the trial record contains no evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found in Mys’s favor or upon which the jury’s award could be justified. The court noted several misstatements of facts by the Department’s attorney. The Department conceded that the long distance of the Detroit post from Mys’s home made her transfer there an adverse employment action; her supervisor initiated the transfer process with explicit reference to Mys’s complaints, explaining to both his superior and the Human Resources Department that Mys’s transfer was necessary for one reason and one reason only: her sexual-harassment complaints. An “unbroken chain” connects Mys’s supervisor to her transfer. View "Mys v. Michigan Department of State Police" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs submitted a ballot initiative petition proposing to amend the Ohio Constitution by imposing term limits on the justices of the Ohio Supreme Court and requiring that all laws “that apply to the people of the State of Ohio . . . apply equally to the members and employees of the General Assembly.” The single-subject rule, Ohio Rev. Code 3503.062(A), allows initiative petitions to contain only “one proposed law or constitutional amendment,” so the Ohio Ballot Board split the initiative into two initiatives, each containing one proposed constitutional amendment. Plaintiffs challenged the process. Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, rejecting an argument that the process was a content-based regulation of core political speech. The Supreme Court has not viewed single-subject rules as inconsistent with the First Amendment and the Ohio Supreme Court has rejected an essentially identical challenge. Ohio’s single-subject rule applies to all petitions, regardless of their substantive messages, and may be justified without reference to the content of any initiative petitions. The rule is intended to prevent voter confusion and "logrolling." Whether Plaintiffs violate Ohio’s single-subject rule depends not on what they say, but simply on where they say it; it is a minimally burdensome and nondiscriminatory regulation. View "Committee to Impose Term Limits on the Ohio Supreme Court v. Ohio Ballot Board" on Justia Law

In 1998, Byerley was found beside the road with her throat slashed. Jordan was convicted for the murder. Prosecutors never told him that a knife found near Byerley's body might have implicated someone else. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Jordan sought post-conviction relief under Brady v. Maryland. The same court vacated Jordan’s conviction in 2011. Jordan was retried and acquitted in 2015. Less than a year later, Jordan sued a Blount County prosecutor, detective, and the county under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking damages for the Brady violation. The statute of limitations for that claim is one year. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of his suit As a general rule, a claim accrues “when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” To obtain relief, the plaintiff must be able to prove the elements of his claim. Analogizing to the tort of malicious prosecution, which requires “termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused,” the court concluded that Brady claim under section 1983 cannot accrue until the criminal proceeding so terminates. Jordan’s criminal proceeding continued after the vacatur of his conviction, ending only upon his acquittal in 2015. His claim did not accrue until then. View "Jordan v. Blount County" on Justia Law

In 1998, Byerley was found beside the road with her throat slashed. Jordan was convicted for the murder. Prosecutors never told him that a knife found near Byerley's body might have implicated someone else. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Jordan sought post-conviction relief under Brady v. Maryland. The same court vacated Jordan’s conviction in 2011. Jordan was retried and acquitted in 2015. Less than a year later, Jordan sued a Blount County prosecutor, detective, and the county under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking damages for the Brady violation. The statute of limitations for that claim is one year. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of his suit As a general rule, a claim accrues “when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” To obtain relief, the plaintiff must be able to prove the elements of his claim. Analogizing to the tort of malicious prosecution, which requires “termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused,” the court concluded that Brady claim under section 1983 cannot accrue until the criminal proceeding so terminates. Jordan’s criminal proceeding continued after the vacatur of his conviction, ending only upon his acquittal in 2015. His claim did not accrue until then. View "Jordan v. Blount County" on Justia Law

Stephens, born biologically male, worked as a funeral director for a corporation that operates Michigan funeral homes. Stephens was terminated shortly after informing the owner, Rost, that she intended to transition and would represent herself as a woman while at work. The EEOC investigated Stephens’s allegations of sex discrimination and learned that the Funeral Home provided its male public-facing employees with clothing that complied with its dress code while female public-facing employees received no such allowance. The EEOC sued, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by terminating Stephens’s employment on the basis of her transgender or transitioning status and refusal to conform to sex-based stereotypes and administering a discriminatory clothing policy. The Sixth Circuit ruled in favor of the EEOC. The Funeral Home engaged in unlawful discrimination against Stephens on the basis of her sex and did not establish that applying Title VII’s proscriptions against sex discrimination would substantially burden Rost’s religious exercise in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Even if Rost’s religious exercise were substantially burdened, the EEOC has established that enforcing Title VII is the least restrictive means of furthering the government’s compelling interest in eradicating workplace discrimination against Stephens. The EEOC may bring the clothing claim in this case because an investigation into the clothing-allowance policy was reasonably expected to grow out of the original discrimination charge. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes" on Justia Law

Stephens, born biologically male, worked as a funeral director for a corporation that operates Michigan funeral homes. Stephens was terminated shortly after informing the owner, Rost, that she intended to transition and would represent herself as a woman while at work. The EEOC investigated Stephens’s allegations of sex discrimination and learned that the Funeral Home provided its male public-facing employees with clothing that complied with its dress code while female public-facing employees received no such allowance. The EEOC sued, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by terminating Stephens’s employment on the basis of her transgender or transitioning status and refusal to conform to sex-based stereotypes and administering a discriminatory clothing policy. The Sixth Circuit ruled in favor of the EEOC. The Funeral Home engaged in unlawful discrimination against Stephens on the basis of her sex and did not establish that applying Title VII’s proscriptions against sex discrimination would substantially burden Rost’s religious exercise in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Even if Rost’s religious exercise were substantially burdened, the EEOC has established that enforcing Title VII is the least restrictive means of furthering the government’s compelling interest in eradicating workplace discrimination against Stephens. The EEOC may bring the clothing claim in this case because an investigation into the clothing-allowance policy was reasonably expected to grow out of the original discrimination charge. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes" on Justia Law

On October 29, 2014, at 4:00 a.m., 13 police officers wearing SWAT gear and face masks blew open the door of the Greers’ West Bloomfield Township home with a shotgun. The officers did not knock or announce their presence. The parents and their daughters were ordered to their knees at gunpoint; officers handcuffed a nephew. The Greers repeatedly asked to see the search warrant, but the officers refused to show it and did not allow the mother to sit with her seven-year-old daughter. Officers stated that they were searching for a “dangerous Russian,” who had evidently resided at the house more than a year before the search. Police found neither the suspect nor any contraband. The Highland Park Police Department, which evidently conducted the search, produced the underlying search warrant in response to the Greers' complaint. The warrant described the Greers’ home and listed controlled substances and items connected to narcotics trafficking as items to be seized. In the Greers’ suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the officers’ motion for judgment on the pleadings based on qualified immunity. The complaint states a plausible claim that the officers violated the plaintiffs’ clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by executing a search warrant on their home in an unreasonable manner. View "Greer v. City of Highland Park" on Justia Law

Medical personnel treated three infants, between 19-days old and six-months-old, in the emergency room of Nationwide Children’s Hospital for serious injuries, including skull fractures and a broken leg. Nationwide’s physicians suspected child abuse. They conducted testing to identify additional injuries, then alerted Franklin County Children Services of their concerns. One family did not appeal the finding that the suspicion of child abuse was “substantiated’ or the designation of their case for “ongoing supportive services.” In another case, the county found no evidence of abuse. The parents of the infants filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against Nationwide and the County, alleging that the medical testing violated their children’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and their own right to familial association. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. State action did not prompt Nationwide, a private hospital, to perform the diagnostic tests, and the county had nothing to do with the tests. The court noted that the parents consented to the tests. View "Thomas v. Nationwide Children's Hospital" on Justia Law

John attended a party, drank six beers, then proceeded to a bar and drank more beer and alcohol. He left the bar in the early morning, sufficiently intoxicated that he cannot remember what happened for the remainder of the night. Based on text messages he later found on his cellphone, John knows that he called Jane. The two had engaged in several prior physical encounters. Jane, who had also been drinking, joined John in his bed. According to Jane’s subsequent statement, the two engaged in some consensual sexual acts, but Jane stopped consenting and John continued to engage in non-consensual sexual acts. John was found responsible for violating Miami University’s sexual assault policy and was suspended for four months. John sued Jane, Miami University, and individual University employees. John and Jane reached a settlement. The court dismissed John’s remaining claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of John’s Title IX hostile-environment claim, Title IX deliberate-indifference claim, and 42 U.S.C. 1983 substantive-due-process claim. The court reversed, in part, finding that John sufficiently pleaded procedural-due-process and equal protection claims against one employee based on the claims that she was not an impartial adjudicator and did not fully disclose the evidence against him. The court also reversed a finding of qualified immunity as to that employee and held that John sufficiently pled his Title IX erroneous-outcome claim. View "Doe v. Miami University" on Justia Law

John attended a party, drank six beers, then proceeded to a bar and drank more beer and alcohol. He left the bar in the early morning, sufficiently intoxicated that he cannot remember what happened for the remainder of the night. Based on text messages he later found on his cellphone, John knows that he called Jane. The two had engaged in several prior physical encounters. Jane, who had also been drinking, joined John in his bed. According to Jane’s subsequent statement, the two engaged in some consensual sexual acts, but Jane stopped consenting and John continued to engage in non-consensual sexual acts. John was found responsible for violating Miami University’s sexual assault policy and was suspended for four months. John sued Jane, Miami University, and individual University employees. John and Jane reached a settlement. The court dismissed John’s remaining claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of John’s Title IX hostile-environment claim, Title IX deliberate-indifference claim, and 42 U.S.C. 1983 substantive-due-process claim. The court reversed, in part, finding that John sufficiently pleaded procedural-due-process and equal protection claims against one employee based on the claims that she was not an impartial adjudicator and did not fully disclose the evidence against him. The court also reversed a finding of qualified immunity as to that employee and held that John sufficiently pled his Title IX erroneous-outcome claim. View "Doe v. Miami University" on Justia Law