Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Stevenson is serving life in prison in Michigan for first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and possessing a firearm in the commission of a felony. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Stevenson’s state motion for relief from judgment was denied. Stevenson filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition in the Western District of Michigan, which was denied as untimely. Days before the Western District dismissed the first petition, Stevenson filed another 2254 petition in the Eastern District, which, upon learning of Stevenson’s earlier petition, dismissed the second as “duplicative.” Noting that the second petition sought to raise three grounds not mentioned in the first petition, the Sixth Circuit determined that the Eastern District abused its discretion by failing to transfer the second petition to the Western District because a subsequent 2254 petition filed while the petitioner’s initial petition is still pending should be construed as a motion to amend the initial petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. On remand, the Eastern District transferred the case to the Western District, which transferred the case to the Sixth Circuit for consideration as an application to file a second or successive habeas petition (28 U.S.C. 1631). The Sixth Circuit remanded, noting that it already determined that the second petition was not second or successive but should be construed as a motion to amend the first petition. View "In re Stevenson" on Justia Law

In 1994, Carruthers and Montgomery assaulted three people, robbed them, then buried them alive. The bodies were found buried in a Memphis cemetery, a week after they disappeared. Carruthers’ family retained Wharton to represent him. Wharton was allowed to withdraw because of a conflict of interest. The court appointed Nance. Carruthers repeatedly complained about Nance; the court appointed other attorneys, who ultimately withdrew. Massey was appointed and was given permission to withdraw because his family was receiving threats from Carruthers. Between January and April 1996, the court denied Carruthers’s five motions to appoint new counsel. Carruthers represented himself during the guilt and sentencing phases. A Tennessee jury convicted Carruthers of three counts of first-degree, premeditated murder and imposed a death sentence for each. State courts affirmed on direct appeal and denied Carruthers post-conviction relief. The federal district court denied his petition for habeas corpus relief, in which Carruthers argued that he was denied counsel at critical stages of the proceedings in violation of Supreme Court precedent (Cronic), that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in ordering him to proceed pro se, and that he was not competent to stand trial or to represent himself. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Carruthers procedurally defaulted his Cronic and competency claims, and the state court’s decision that Carruthers forfeited his right to counsel was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. View "Von Carruthers v. Mays" on Justia Law

As voir dire was about to commence at Bickham’s state court trial, officers cleared the public from the courtroom. Bickham’s counsel objected, citing Presley v. Georgia (2010), which established that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial is violated when a court excludes the public from jury selection. In response, the judge stated that removing spectators was necessary so that the jury panel of 52 people would not be intermixed with the audience, and that once the panel was in, those who fit separately from the jury could be allowed in. Counsel stated: I understand. After jury selection, counsel raised the matter again. The judge noted that only two seats had remained after the panel was seated and that no request had been made for those seats. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Bickham’s convictions for second-degree murder, armed robbery, assault with intent to commit armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, finding that Bickham procedurally defaulted his Sixth Amendment claim when he did not make a contemporaneous objection to the courtroom's closure. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition, agreeing that Bickham's claim was procedurally defaulted for failing to make a timely objection to the exclusion of the public. View "Bickham v. Winn" on Justia Law

Enacted in 2016, Ohio Revised Code 3701.034 requires the Ohio Department of Health (ODH) to ensure that all funds it receives through six non-abortion-related federal health programs are not used to contract with any entity that performs or promotes nontherapeutic abortions, or becomes or continues to be an affiliate of any entity that performs or promotes nontherapeutic abortions. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the entry of a permanent injunction, first rejecting a challenge to Plaintiffs’ standing to assert due process claims. The district court properly applied the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine, which is not limited to First Amendment rights. Although the government has no obligation to subsidize constitutionally protected activity, it may not use its control over funds to curtail the exercise of constitutionally protected rights outside the scope of a government-funded program. Section 3701.034 imposes conditions; does not distinguish between the grantee and the project; does not permit the grantee to keep abortion-related speech and activities separate from governmental programs; does not leave the grantee unfettered in its other activities; and does not permit the grantee to continue to perform abortion and provide abortion-related services through programs that are independent from projects that receive the funds. While finding the “undue-burden analysis” employed in some courts “questionable,” the court concluded that section 3701.034 is unnecessary to advance the interests ODH asserts. View "Planned Parenthood of Greater Ohio v. Himes" on Justia Law

In 2003, Potter pleaded guilty to various drug and gun crimes, including possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Armed Career Criminal Act imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on repeat offenders—those who have three or more previous convictions for a “violent felony.” After the district court sentenced Potter as a repeat offender, the Supreme Court (Johnson v. United States), held that the Act;s residual clause violates the Constitution’s prohibition against vague criminal laws. Potter asked to be resentenced in a successive 28 U.S.C. motion, claiming he did not qualify as a repeat offender. The district court declined the request on the ground that he sentenced Potter under a different clause (the enumerated-crimes clause) of the Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed because the same district court judge who sentenced him was in a better position than anyone else to know why he applied the Act and because at all events Potter did not meet his burden of showing that the court used the residual clause to increase his sentence. View "Potter v. United States" on Justia Law

Richardson was arrested after failing to appear at a child-support enforcement hearing. The judge imposed a sentence of up to 30 days for civil contempt, which could be purged and Richardson released upon payment of $2,500. Two days later, Richardson collapsed in his cell. An overhead camera recorded as officers and medical staff responded. Richardson, lethargic and unbalanced, with blood and saliva coming from his mouth, was trying to stand. The officers told Richardson to “stay down,” pulled Richardson from his cell, and placed him face down on the floor. Despite a jail policy prohibiting placing restrained inmates in a prone position and a medic’s appeal to handcuff Richardson in front, Richardson was handcuffed behind his back and restrained face down. Richardson died after a 22-minute struggle during which he continually stated he could not breathe. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 the court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on qualified- and statutory-immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Because Richardson was sanctioned outside the criminal context, the Fourteenth Amendment governs. The court rejected an argument that, as long as they acted without reckless or malicious intent, the officers could apply any degree of force. Existing precedent gave notice that it “[w]as unconstitutional” to create asphyxiating conditions by “forcibly restraining an individual in a prone position for a prolonged period” when that individual posed no material threat. Because the finding regarding defendants’ “knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm” was premised on Richardson’s complaints about his inability to breathe, the qualified immunity inquiry was sufficiently individualized. View "Hopper v. Plummer" on Justia Law

An Ohio jury found Hautzenroeder, a high school teacher, guilty of one count of sexual battery involving a student. Although her state court appeals were unsuccessful, the trial court suspended most of her two-year prison sentence and discharged her early from community control. No court could suspend Hautzenroeder’s statutorily-mandated classification as a Tier III sex offender with lifetime reporting requirements, Ohio Rev. Code 2950.01(G)(1)(a), 2950.07(B)(1). Hautzenroeder’s federal habeas petition alleged a due process violation stemming from insufficient evidence supporting her conviction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for lack of jurisdiction because Hautzenroeder filed it after her period of incarceration and community control expired— she was no longer “in custody.” Changes in Ohio’s registration requirements did not mean that being subject to the requirements would constitute being in custody. View "Hautzenroeder v. DeWine" on Justia Law

An Ohio jury found Hautzenroeder, a high school teacher, guilty of one count of sexual battery involving a student. Although her state court appeals were unsuccessful, the trial court suspended most of her two-year prison sentence and discharged her early from community control. No court could suspend Hautzenroeder’s statutorily-mandated classification as a Tier III sex offender with lifetime reporting requirements, Ohio Rev. Code 2950.01(G)(1)(a), 2950.07(B)(1). Hautzenroeder’s federal habeas petition alleged a due process violation stemming from insufficient evidence supporting her conviction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for lack of jurisdiction because Hautzenroeder filed it after her period of incarceration and community control expired— she was no longer “in custody.” Changes in Ohio’s registration requirements did not mean that being subject to the requirements would constitute being in custody. View "Hautzenroeder v. DeWine" on Justia Law

Toll was in solitary confinement at Riverbend Maximum Security Institution when he allegedly threw liquid at a correctional officer. The commander decided to extract Toll from his cell. After the cell extraction team (Doss and Horton) removed Toll from his cell, Toll became unresponsive. A doctor pronounced him dead. Toll’s mother, Luna, sued Horton and Doss in their individual capacities for excessive force, and Bell, the warden, for failure to train (42 U.S.C. 1983). In 2013, the district court entered judgments in favor of the defendants. In 2014, the New York Times published an article about the cell extraction team, based on a letter written by a former team member. Based on this new evidence, Luna was granted a new trial. The court declined to award sanctions because the defendants did not act in bad faith in failing to produce the letter and granted summary judgment, rejecting the claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the order granting a new trial and reversed the summary judgment. Luna acted diligently in requesting discovery responses that should have included the letter, which was material, controlling evidence. Summary judgment was inappropriate because the court granted a completely new trial, requiring a new jury to examine anew all factual disputes; the court should have reviewed all material facts in a light most favorable to Luna. View "Luna v. Bell" on Justia Law

Maben, a Michigan prisoner, was in line for lunch. The server provided Maben with half a serving, dumping out the rest, stating that he “was doing as told.” Before Maben could speak to a supervisor, Thelen, a prison guard, “began yelling,” “shut the fuck up if you wanna eat.” The supervisor “acknowledged the severely inadequate portion,” and gave Maben the full portion. Thelen stated “if you’re going to complain then you’re going to get a misconduct,” then issued Maben a ticket. Maben claimed that he never became disruptive, but has had shortened portions ever since, because of Thelen's retaliation. A hearing officer found Thelen’s statement “more credible” without viewing video footage, Maben was found guilty of creating a disturbance and lost privileges for seven days. The court rejected Maben's pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part; factual findings made at Maben’s minor misconduct hearing do not have preclusive effect in federal court. The court declined to adopt the “checkmate doctrine,” which provides that when a prison body finds that a prisoner has committed an actual violation of prison rules and the finding is based on some evidence, it "essentially checkmates" a retaliation claim. Maben introduced sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment on his First Amendment retaliation claim. The court affirmed summary judgment on Maben’s official-capacity claim, citing the Eleventh Amendment. View "Maben v. Thelen" on Justia Law