Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Rodriguez-Penton moved from Cuba to the U.S. when he was 15. He is a lawful permanent resident. Rodriguez-Penton was indicted for conspiracy to distribute and possess Oxycodone, retained counsel Butler, and initially cooperated but stopped because he feared for his family’s safety. The government offered Rodriguez-Penton plea deals but he entered an open guilty plea. Rodriguez-Penton’s Cuban citizenship arose during the hearing: the court stated that there was no need to review the civil rights one forfeits by pleading guilty; inquired whether, due to Rodriguez-Penton’s citizenship, there would be an early sentencing; and asked about an Immigration and Customs Enforcement detainer, but did not advise Rodriguez-Penton that pleading guilty might have adverse immigration consequences and sentenced him to a 121-month prison term. Rodriguez-Penton alleges that he learned of the deportation risk after sentencing, during a meeting with his prison counselor. Rodriguez-Penton appealed, represented by Butler, arguing that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. After hearing testimony from Butler and an interpreter, a magistrate concluded that Butler merely told Rodriguez-Penton that he did not have to worry about deportation. Rodriguez-Penton testified unequivocally that he “would not have gone to trial, even if he could not have negotiated a better plea arrangement.” The district court dismissed his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The legal standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims has changed in the context of non-citizens faced with criminal charges. Rodriguez-Penton asserted that his decision-making process would have been different if he had been properly advised; the government has not offered any countervailing evidence that Rodriguez-Penton could not have secured a more favorable plea. View "Rodriguez-Penton v. United States" on Justia Law

The 1993 Lucasville Prison Riot at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility began when prisoners overpowered a guard and took his keys. Rioting prisoners ultimately took a dozen guards hostage and gained complete control of the prison’s L-block. The riot continued for 11 days; one guard and nine prisoners were murdered. Many were injured. Tens of millions of dollars’ worth of damage was done to the prison facility. Four prisoners were sentenced to death for their involvement in the riot and are classified as restricted population inmates, who “pose a direct threat to the safety of persons, including themselves, or an elevated, clear[,] and ongoing threat to the safe and secure operations of the facility. The Media Plaintiffs are professional journalists who unsuccessfully sought in-person, recorded interviews with the Prisoner Plaintiffs for the twentieth anniversary of the riot. The Prisoners and Media Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the interview denials violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments because they were based on the interviews’ anticipated content. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of their claims after considering the “Turner factors” to determine that the prison regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and therefore constitutional. There is a rational connection between a policy prohibiting face-to-face interviews with Lucasville participants and the legitimate, neutral penological interest of prison security. The impact of accommodation of the right and the availability of ready alternatives also support the restrictions’ constitutionality. View "Hanrahan v. Mohr" on Justia Law

Bullington worked as a Bedford County Sheriff’s Department dispatcher for over eight years. During her employment, Bullington had Hodgkin’s Lymphoma, a form of cancer, which she treated with chemotherapy. The chemotherapy caused neuropathy and scar tissue in Bullington’s lungs, so Bullington needed additional treatment. Because of her diagnosis and treatment, Bullington asserts that the Department treated her differently than the other employees. Bullington brought suit, alleging violations of constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from discrimination and retaliation, that the county violated her constitutional rights by not providing adequate supervision and training, violations of the Tennessee Human Rights Act, and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court rejected her claims on the pleadings. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The district court correctly dismissed Bullington’s ADA claim, which required exhaustion of administrative remedies. Bullington did not file a claim with the EEOC. The court improperly dismissed her claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. In enacting the ADA, Congress did not intend to abandon the rights and remedies set forth in Fourteenth Amendment equal protection jurisprudence. View "Bullington v. Bedford County" on Justia Law

On November 22, 1997, around 1:30 a.m., Miles demanded money from brothers Maher and Ziad, outside of Maher’s Cincinnati Save-Way store. The brothers complied but Miles shot them with an assault rifle. Cincinnati police hypothesized that Issa, a Save-Way employee, hired Miles to commit the murders because Linda, Maher’s wife, offered Issa money to kill her husband. The state charged all three with aggravated murder. Miles refused to testify at Issa’s trial although he had testified in Linda’s trial. The prosecution had revoked Miles’s immunity the day before he was to testify. The court concluded that Miles was unavailable and allowed the admission of Miles’s out-of-court statements, through the testimony of siblings who were Miles’s teenage friends at the time of the murders. A jury acquitted Linda; Miles received a life sentence. Issa received a death sentence. In 2003, Issa filed his initial habeas petition. The district court denied relief but granted a certificate of appealability for grounds including failure to call Linda as a witness and admission of the siblings’ testimony about Miles’s hearsay statements. The Sixth Circuit ordered a conditional writ of habeas corpus. The admission of Miles’s hearsay statements violated the Confrontation Clause under then-governing Supreme Court law and was not harmless. The Ohio Supreme Court did not consider the “totality of the circumstances,” which show that the statements are not trustworthy. The statements were the only direct evidence implicating Issa in a murder for hire. View "Issa v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

In September 2016, the Governor of Tennessee convened a special session of the Tennessee General Assembly, concerning federal highway funding. During the session, a member of the House of Representatives moved to expel Durham. The House approved the motion 70 votes to two. It immediately expelled Durham. Durham may have qualified for lifetime health insurance if he had retired but because the House expelled him, the administrators stated that his government-health insurance would expire at the end of September. He also lost certain state-pension benefits. Durham sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging procedural due process violations, and requesting an order that the administrators pay his alleged benefits. The district court dismissed for lack of standing because the complaint alleged that the denial of his benefits was caused by the legislature’s expelling him, rather than by any act by the administrators. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Durham’s injury is fairly traceable to the administrators’ conduct: Durham alleges that he is not receiving benefits that the administrators should pay. That is sufficient to show standing. View "Durham v. Martin" on Justia Law

During her freshman and his junior year at the University of Michigan, John and Jane met at a fraternity party, drank, danced, and eventually had sex. Two days later, Roe filed a sexual misconduct complaint, claiming that she was too drunk to consent. For three months, the school’s investigator collected evidence and interviewed John, Jane, and 23 others. John stated that Jane did not appear drunk, that she was an active participant in their sexual encounter, and that he had no reason to believe that his sexual advances were unwelcome. Jane claimed that she was drunk and told Doe “no sex” before she “flopped” onto his bed. Almost all of the male witnesses corroborated John’s story; all of the female witnesses corroborated Jane’s. The investigator concluded that the evidence supporting a finding of sexual misconduct was not more convincing than the evidence offered in opposition and recommended closing the case. The Appeals Board held closed sessions (without considering new evidence or interviewing any students), and reversed, finding Jane’s narrative “more credible” and her witnesses more persuasive. Facing possible expulsion, John agreed to withdraw from the university, 13.5 credits short of graduating. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of John’s suit against the University. If a public university has to choose between competing narratives to resolve a case, it must give the accused student an opportunity to cross-examine the accuser and adverse witnesses in the presence of a neutral fact-finder. View "Doe v. Baum" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs' home, on a one-acre lot, displayed no-trespassing signs and was not readily visible to neighbors. The back has a second-story balcony, accessible only from inside the house, and not visible from the front; a fence and trees block the views from neighboring houses. The county’s Street Crime Reduction and Apprehension Program (SCRAP) unit received anonymous tips that Plaintiffs were growing marijuana and cooking methamphetamine. SCRAP had conducted a ‘knock and talk’ a year earlier and given Plaintiffs a warning. SCRAP went to the house and, following standard practice, surrounded it before knocking. Officers stood five-to-seven feet from the house and could see inside. Deputy Campbell knocked and spoke with Plaintiff Graf, who shut the door, remaining inside. Meanwhile, an officer in the back noticed marijuana plants growing on the balcony. Campbell opened the door, entered, and brought Plaintiffs outside to wait for a search warrant. Officers found weapons, drugs, and drug paraphernalia. On appeal, the denial of their suppression motion was overturned and their convictions vacated.After dismissal of the charges, Plaintiffs filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. The Sixth Circuit reversed its dismissal as to the county and officials but affirmed that individual officers were entitled to qualified immunity. It is well-established that a warrantless entry of the area immediately surrounding the home is presumed unreasonable unless it meets an exception. SCRAP, following official policy, entered that constitutionally-protected area without a warrant and without satisfying any of the narrow exceptions, violating the Fourth Amendment. Because of then-existing Sixth Circuit Fourth Amendment law, however, it was not clearly established that SCRAP could not do what it did. County policy required officers to ignore Constitutional protection of the curtilage. View "Morgan v. Fairfield County" on Justia Law

Brittany, age 17, her mother, father, and sister, driving home from dinner, were stopped by Erlanger police because of an obstructed license plate. Mother, the driver, was arrested for obstructing a license plate, driving with no registration plates, driving with a suspended license, and possession of a forged instrument. Officers noticed that father's “tools, like screwdrivers and wrenches,” some of which were “sitting out” and others “in containers” and suspected that mother was engaged in drug activity. They sent for a drug dog, which found no drugs. The wait took about an hour. A female officer, Klare, escorted Brittany to the restroom with permission from father. Klare told Brittany that she “may have to search” her, then asked, “would you step over here.” Brittany answered “yes” and walked to the requested location. The snap securing Klare’s gun was unfastened; she placed her hand on the gun five times while talking to Brittany. Klare secured Brittany’s hands behind her back. Brittany claims that Klare placed her hands under Harris’s brassiere and pinched her breasts, causing bruising, stating a previous suspect had “stuffed needles in her bra” and that “[y]ou have the look of a junkie whore.” Klare found no drugs, paraphernalia, weapon, or other contraband. Brittany sued Klare under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment. A reasonable jury could find that Klare’s search of Brittany was unconstitutional and that Klare is not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Harris v. Klare" on Justia Law

Wogenstahl was convicted of aggravated murder, kidnapping, and aggravated burglary, and was sentenced to death. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, in 1996, Wogenstahl sought post-conviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel and the suppression of evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland and seeking to conduct DNA testing. Ohio courts denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Wogenstahl's 1999 petition for federal habeas relief. In 2014, Wogenstahl again sought a new trial, citing a 2013 Justice Department letter, stating that testimony by an FBI examiner, included “inappropriate” statements that “‘exceed[ed] the limits of the science’ of microscopic-hair-comparison analysis.” State courts denied relief. Wogenstahl sought to file another habeas petition in the district court, arguing that his petition, although second-in-time, was not second or successive.The Sixth Circuit granted permission to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition. Wogenstahl is attacking the same state court judgment of conviction and his claims were not unripe at the time of his initial petition. Wogenstahl’s claims fall under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2)(B); he is raising new claims, relying on facts that he only recently discovered. That Wogenstahl did not previously obtain that evidence is not attributable to a lack of reasonable diligence. Wogenstahl has made prima facie showings that the evidence is impeaching; the state suppressed the material in the original police file and made inaccurate statements misrepresenting the hair analysis; and that he can establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-finder would have found him guilty. View "In re Wogenstahl" on Justia Law

Following the 2010 census, Michigan’s Republican-controlled government enacted new legislative and congressional districting plans. Plaintiffs sued in December 2017, alleging the maps violate the Equal Protection Clause by diluting the voting power of Democratic voters and the First Amendment by marginalizing votes based on party affiliation. The state sought dismissal and asked the court to stay the case pending the Supreme Court’s decision in then-pending redistricting cases, Gill v. Whitford and Benisek v. Lamone. In February, while that motion was pending, eight Republican Michigan Congressional representatives moved to intervene, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) (intervention by right), and permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). They argued that they stood “to be irrevocably harmed by any redrawing of congressional districts” and asserted that none of the original parties adequately represented their interests. The court denied the motion to stay and the motion to intervene. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to permissive intervention, noting that the court did not explain how the “complex issues” would delay the case or prejudice Plaintiffs, how allowing the Congressmen to intervene would frustrate an expeditious resolution, or how the shared interests of the Congressmen and the citizens of Michigan were relevant to the delay-and-prejudice calculus. The Congressmen identify several interests they seek to protect, including “the relationship between constituent and representative.” Those interests differ from those of the Secretary of State and Michigan's citizens. View "League of Women Voters of Michigan v. Johnson" on Justia Law