Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After the FBI arrested Monea for money laundering, he told his attorney that the undercover agent coerced him into committing the crime. Much of the sting operation had been recorded; the threats Monea claimed were not on the recordings. He then claimed that the government tampered with evidence. After the jury convicted him Monea found a witness (the trustee of the Monea Family Trust) claiming that the undercover FBI agent lied on the stand. He sought habeas relief, claiming his trial counsel ineffectively pursued the evidence-tampering claim by not adequately following up on an assertion that the recordings had been tampered with, or that the government’s star witness perjured himself. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition. The district court “thoroughly considered” the affidavits presented by Monea and concluded that they could not overcome the government’s contrary evidence. It is not enough for Monea to argue that a different attorney would have done a better job. Monea provided no new evidence and no new arguments that would have altered the trial court’s denial of his outrageous-conduct defense. Monea bore the burden of proving perjury and “mere inconsistencies” in the agent’s testimony were not enough to sustain the claim. View "Monea v. United States" on Justia Law

As a cost-saving measure, Flint's municipal water supply was switched from the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD) to the Flint River and was processed by an outdated and previously mothballed water treatment plant, with the approval of Michigan regulators and an engineering firm, and distributed without adding chemicals to counter the river water’s known corrosivity. Within days, residents complained of foul smelling and tasting water. Within weeks, some residents’ hair began to fall out and their skin developed rashes. Within a year, there were positive tests for E. coli, a spike in deaths from Legionnaires’ disease, and reports of dangerously high blood-lead levels in Flint children. The river water was 19 times more corrosive than the Lake Huron water pumped supplied by DWSD; without corrosion-control treatment, lead leached out of the lead-based service lines. The district court dismissed many claims and defendants in a suit by residents. The remaining defendants appealed with respect to the remaining 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim--that defendants violated their right to bodily integrity as guaranteed by the Substantive Due Process Clause. The Sixth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs pled a plausible Due Process violation regarding some defendants, rejecting their qualified immunity claims. The court reversed as to other defendants; plaintiffs alleged mere negligence, not a constitutional violation, against them. The court rejected a claim that the city was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity based on Michigan's takeover of the city under the “Emergency Manager” law. View "Guertin v. Michigan" on Justia Law

Michigan’s Unemployment Insurance Agency's automated program, MiDAS, accessed claimant records from employers, state agencies, and the federal government. When MiDAS detected unreported income or “flagged” other information, it initiated an automated process to determine whether the individual had engaged in fraud. If an employee reported no income for any week during a quarter in which he earned income, MiDAS automatically found fraud. MiDAS did not inform the claimant about the basis for suspicion and did not allow fact-based adjudication but automatically sent claimants multiple-choice questionnaires. No human being took part in the fraud determination. MiDAS sent the questionnaires to claimants’ online accounts, many of which were dormant, and did not take additional steps (emails, mail, or phone) to notify claimants. When MiDAS determined that a claimant committed fraud, the individual’s right to benefits terminated immediately and severe monetary penalties were automatically assessed, even when claimants did not actually receive benefits. Most claimants did not know about the determination until the time for appeal had expired. The Agency did not answer calls and garnished claimants’ wages and intercepted their federal income tax returns without an opportunity to contest the fraud determinations. The Michigan Auditor General reviewed 22,000 MiDAS fraud determinations; 93% did not actually involve fraud.In an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied the Individual Defendants qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Plaintiffs adequately alleged that Defendants violated their right to procedural due process by terminating their eligibility for benefits and seizing their tax refunds without any meaningful pre-deprivation process; the right to a pre-deprivation hearing was clearly established at the time. Plaintiffs failed to state a plausible equal protection claim; they failed to allege Defendants intentionally singled them out for discriminatory treatment. Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights were not clearly established in this context. View "Cahoo v. SAS Analytics Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners, Iraqi nationals, were ordered removed years ago because of criminal offenses they committed in the U.S. Iraq refused to repatriate them, so Petitioners remained under orders of supervision by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. In 2017, Iraq began to cooperate and removal of Iraqi nationals resumed. In April 2017 ICE conducted a removal by charter flight to Iraq, scheduling a second charter for June and arresting more than 200 Iraqi nationals. Iraq declined to issue requisite travel documents and would accept only Iraqi nationals who had unexpired passports and were returning on commercial flights. Petitioners filed a putative class action habeas petition on behalf of all Iraqi nationals with final orders of removal, who have been, or will be, arrested and detained as a result of Iraq’s recent decision,” seeking a TRO or stay of removal, pending arguments on allegedly changed country conditions. Under 8 U.S.C. 1252(g), immigration courts hold exclusive jurisdiction over removal proceedings. The district court stayed the final removal orders and concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear Petitioners’ claims as an as-applied constitutional violation of the Suspension Clause. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The district court lacked the jurisdiction. Rejecting Petitioners’ argument the petition-for-review process is constitutionally inadequate as an alternative to habeas review, the court noted that Petitioners had years to file motions to reopen and the administrative scheme provides multiple avenues to stay removal while pursuing relief. The court was not merely interpreting a statute: it “created out of thin air a requirement for bond hearings that does not exist in the statute; and adopted new standards that the government must meet.” View "Hamama v. Adducci" on Justia Law

Logan was a drug courier in a cross-country drug ring from 2004-2007. In total, Logan transported over 150 kilograms of cocaine from California to Michigan. Logan received conflicting advice while considering whether to accept a plea offer with a 10-year sentencing cap. His counsel of record told him it was a very good deal that avoided the high risks of proceeding to trial. Logan signed the plea agreement. His second attorney (retained by Logan’s family but not counsel of record) subsequently persuaded Logan to withdraw from the plea agreement. Ultimately, Logan accepted another plea agreement that did not include a sentencing cap and received a much longer sentence than contemplated by the first agreement. Logan claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court and Sixth Circuit rejected his argument. Counsel of record advised Logan about the risks of going to trial; Logan testified that he signed the plea agreement because he was guilty and was worried about facing a sentence of 30 years or more. He was aware of the risks of trial. Whether to accept the plea offer was ultimately Logan’s decision and that the fear of a higher sentence after trial was a valid concern. Logan received all the information needed to make an informed decision. View "Logan v. United States" on Justia Law

Hill turned on the sink in a detox cell and let the water overflow. Jailor Hickman punched Hill, knocking him to the floor, severely injuring his jaw. Hickman and Asher kicked Hill while he laid curled on the floor; mocked Hill for soiling his pants; and stated, “We’re the law, dawg. We can do what we want.” They threw Hill into a restraint chair. Asher watched as Hickman pounded Hill’s face. Bruises on Hill’s wrists memorialized his attempts to free himself. The jailors left Hill in the restraints, sitting in his own feces. Hill woke up on the floor and asked to see a doctor. Hickman testified that he and Asher took Hill to another room, where a “doctor” looked at him and that the “doctor” was Asher in disguise. Hill filed a complaint. Hickman wrote a report stating that Hill was the aggressor. Asher signed Hickman’s report and later wrote a corroborating report, claiming that Hill slipped on the water and hit the wall.Asher was charged with depriving Hill of his civil rights, 18 U.S.C. 242, and falsifying a record to impede a federal investigation, 18 U.S.C. 1519.2. The court allowed the prosecution to introduce testimony that Asher had battered a different prisoner and concealed that crime. over Asher's objection and offer that if the jury believed that he committed the charged assault, he would admit intent. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The charged conduct provided a sufficient basis for the jury to find intent; the prior-act evidence had only incremental probative value. Evidence of Asher’s guilt was not overwhelming. Absent the prior-act evidence, Asher’s arguments that Hickman lied might have persuaded the jury. Hill testified that he could not remember much about Asher’s role. View "United States v. Asher" on Justia Law

Deputies responding to a call about a disturbance on county property peered into the car in which Carter was sitting with C.C. and saw “a bag containing green leafy substance” and rolling papers. Believing the bag contained marijuana, and learning that C.C. was just 13, the deputies obtained Carter’s consent to search the car and found another bag of marijuana. Carter had an apparent anxiety attack. After an ambulance took Carter away, deputies resumed searching; one picked up what looked like a dictionary, shook it, and realized it was a disguised lockbox. The deputy broke the lock and found sexually explicit photographs of C.C. and DVDs. Carter consented to searches of his apartment and his computer, where more images of C.C. were found. Carter admitted to taking pictures of C.C. and knowingly exposing him to HIV. Carter used the pictures as blackmail to force C.C. into sexual acts. Tennessee charged Carter with child rape, criminal exposure to HIV, sexual exploitation of a minor, and possession of marijuana. After denial of motions to suppress, Carter pled guilty. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals declined to consider whether Carter had consented to the lockbox search. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief, rejecting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Carter cannot demonstrate prejudice. Even if Carter’s counsel had made different arguments, the end result would have remained the same. Seeing a bag of marijuana gave officers probable cause to search. The Supreme Court makes no distinction between searching a vehicle and searching a container within a vehicle. View "Carter v. Parris" on Justia Law

Haddad sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging his employment was terminated by the Michigan Department of Insurance and Financial Services (MDIFS), for exercising his First Amendment rights. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer. Haddad argued that he was acting as a “virtual private citizen” because his duties as an MDIFS examiner required him to speak in the public interest and work to end the inclusion of intra-family exclusion clauses (IFEs) in insurance policies. By making this argument, however, Haddad acknowledged that he was acting pursuant to his official duties when he sought to end the use of IFEs through his examinations, the very activity that he claims was the basis for his termination. “[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Haddad’s purpose was to further his official work to end what he believed to be an unfair insurer practice; his conduct was part of the performance of his job, and the district court did not err by concluding that Haddad was not speaking as a private citizen. View "Haddad v. Gregg" on Justia Law

In 1982, a Tennessee jury convicted Miller of first-degree murder. The court sentenced him to death. In 2012, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Miller’s federal habeas petition. In November 2018, Miller and other Tennessee capital prisoners sought injunctive relief preventing implementation of a recently-adopted lethal-injection protocol. Miller sought a preliminary injunction; his execution is currently scheduled for December 6, 2018. The district court denied a preliminary injunction to prevent the use of the lethal injection protocol. Miller sought a stay while the appeal is pending. The court was notified that Miller has elected to be executed by electrocution. The Sixth Circuit denied his motion. Miller has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. Electrocution was the method of execution that existed at the time of Miller’s crime. A change in a State’s method of execution does not constitute an ex post facto violation if the evidence shows the new method to be more humane. Some risk of pain is inherent in any method of execution, no matter how humane; the Constitution does not guarantee a pain-free execution. Miller has not shown that the new protocol is “sure or very likely” to be less humane than electrocution but neither method violates the Constitution. View "Miller v. Parker" on Justia Law

In 2006-2008, plaintiffs each applied, unsuccessfully, for Social Security disability benefits, 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). Each plaintiff retained Kentucky attorney Conn to assist with a subsequent hearing. Each plaintiff’s application included medical records from one of four examining doctors. In each case, ALJ Daugherty relied exclusively on the doctor's opinion to conclude, without a hearing, that plaintiffs were disabled and entitled to benefits. Daugherty took bribes from Conn to assign Conn’s cases to himself and issue favorable rulings. Nearly 10 years after the agency learned of the scheme, it initiated “redeterminations” of plaintiffs’ eligibility for benefits and held new hearings, disregarding all medical evidence submitted by the four doctors participating in Conn’s scheme. Plaintiffs had no opportunity to rebut the assertion of fraud as to this evidence. Each plaintiff was deemed ineligible for benefits as of the date of their original applications; their benefits were terminated. Plaintiffs sued, alleging violations of the Due Process Clause and the Social Security Act. The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their due-process claim and the agency is entitled to summary judgment on the Social Security Act claims. The agency must proffer some factual basis for believing that the plaintiffs’ evidence is fraudulent. Plaintiffs must have an opportunity to “rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.” Congress has already told the agency what to do when redetermination proceedings threaten criminal adjudications; the answer is not to deprive claimants of basic procedural safeguards. View "Griffith v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law