Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Chaney pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Because his criminal history included convictions for one “serious drug offense” and two “violent felon[ies],” Chaney was sentenced as an armed career criminal, subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act’s 15-year mandatory minimum, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). On collateral review, Chaney argued that one of his three predicate convictions (a 1981 Michigan conviction for attempted unarmed robbery) did not qualify as a “violent felony” after the Supreme Court’s 2015 invalidation of the ACCA’s residual clause (Johnson). The Sixth Circuit rejected his argument, finding that Chaney’s conviction qualifies as an ACCA-enhancing violent felony under the elements clause, which continues to apply notwithstanding Johnson. Michigan unarmed robbery (as it existed in 1981) counts as a violent felony under the ACCA’s elements clause even though the statute extends to “putting [a victim] in fear,” because under Michigan law “putting in fear” means “putting in fear of bodily injury from physical force.” View "Chaney v. United States" on Justia Law

Caldwell pleaded guilty to murder and an unrelated aggravated robbery in two separate cases in the same court on the same day. He initially filed an unsuccessful 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition challenging his murder conviction. He then challenged both convictions in a second section 2254 petition. The district court transferred Caldwell’s petition to the Sixth Circuit, which held that the petition is second or successive only to the extent it re-attacks his murder conviction. To the extent it challenges his aggravated-robbery conviction for the first time, the court returned it to the district court for consideration as an initial petition. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act limits “second or successive” applications for habeas relief but Caldwell had no obligation to challenge both convictions in his initial habeas petition. A petition qualifies as second or successive only if it challenges a previously challenged judgment. The court declined to authorize Caldwell’s second petition, challenging his murder conviction; Caldwell did not identify a new rule of constitutional law supporting any of his claims nor did he identify any factual predicates for these claims that could not have been discovered previously and that would establish his actual innocence. View "In re Caldwell" on Justia Law

Sampson is serving a life sentence in a Michigan prison. He sued Wayne County, state court officials, and private attorneys under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging they conspired to deprive him of trial transcripts, exhibits, and other records to frustrate his constitutional right to access the court. The district court dismissed Sampson’s pro se complaint, concluding that several defendants are immune from suit or are not state actors and that the Supreme Court’s 1994 holding, Heck v. Humphrey, bars his access-to-the-court claim because its success “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Heck was intended to channel what amount to unlawful-confinement claims to the place they belong: habeas corpus; the reasoning applies to an access-to-the-court claim alleging state interference with a direct criminal appeal. Sampson could prevail on his claim only if he showed that the information he sought could make a difference in a nonfrivolous challenge to his convictions; he could win only if he implied the invalidity of his underlying judgment. A favorable judgment on Sampson’s access-to-the-court claim would necessarily bear on the validity of his underlying judgment, because that is exactly what he says the defendants kept him from contesting fairly. View "Sampson v. Garrett" on Justia Law

Five federal prisoners filed habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. 2241, arguing that their respective sentences are too long under federal law. Each paid the $5 habeas filing fee in the district court and each lost his petition on the merits. Each man moved to proceed as a pauper on appeal, seeking to avoid prepaying the $505 appellate filing fee. The statute, 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(1), says that a federal court “may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees” by a person who “is unable to pay such fees.” After examining each petitioner’s financial status, the district courts granted the motions in part, requiring each petitioner to make a one-time, partial prepayment of the fee, ranging from $50 to $400. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Nothing in the statute deprives a district court of discretion to require partial prepayment of appellate filing fees, and nothing about it alters the pre-1996-amendment practice of doing so. View "Samarripa v. Ormond" on Justia Law

Defendants, members of an FBI/Grand Rapids task force, were searching for Davison. Neither officer was wearing a uniform; both were wearing lanyards displaying their badges. Defendants knew that Davison was a 26-year-old white male, 5ʹ10″ to 6ʹ3″ tall, with glasses. Davison bought a soft drink from a particular gas station every afternoon. Davison’s driver’s license photo was seven years old. Defendants approached Plaintiff near the gas station. Plaintiff, a 21-year-old student, 5ʹ10″ to 6ʹ3″, and wearing glasses, claims Defendants never identified themselves. Defendants assert that Allen identified himself as a police officer. Plaintiff gave his name and followed' instructions to put his hands on his head because Defendants “had small badges.” Allen removed Plaintiff’s wallet. Plaintiff asked, “[a]re you mugging me?” and attempted to flee. Allen tackled him. Plaintiff yelled for passersby to call the police. Allen put Plaintiff in a chokehold. Plaintiff claims he lost consciousness. Plaintiff bit Allen. Allen started punching Plaintiff in the head and face. Bystanders called the police and began filming. Officers arrived and ordered them to delete their videos because they could reveal undercover FBI agents. One bystander stated, “They were out of control pounding him.” A 911 caller stated, “[t]hey’re gonna kill this man.” Emergency room doctors released Plaintiff with painkillers. Police then arrested him. Plaintiff spent the weekend in jail. A jury acquitted Plaintiff of all charges.The district court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim against the United States, and granted Defendants summary judgment based on qualified immunity. With respect to Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 or Bivens claims, the Sixth Circuit reversed. The FTCA judgment bar, 28 U.S.C. 2676, does not apply because the FTCA judgment was not on the merits. Defendants were not protected by qualified immunity. A jury could reasonably conclude that Plaintiff bears no resemblance to Davison’s photograph. Under clearly established law, removing Plaintiff’s wallet during a protective search was unreasonable. Clearly established law held that using a chokehold when Plaintiff was attempting to flee was objectively unreasonable. View "King v. United States" on Justia Law

Sherman was incarcerated at the Trumbull County Jail where Drennan was a corrections officer. Drennen regularly patrolled the pod where Sherman lived with Rafferty, another female inmate. Three or four times, Sherman complied with Drennen's demand that Sherman expose her breasts to him. Once or twice, Sherman masturbated in Drennen’s presence “because he asked for it.” Sherman does not allege that Drennen ever touched her. Drennen never explicitly threatened Sherman. Sherman was deeply disturbed by Drennen’s demands. As a result of Drennen’s abuse, Sherman’s post-traumatic stress disorder worsened and her night terrors and flashbacks increased in severity. Sherman never reported Drennen to the jail administration because she felt intimidated. Sherman and Rafferty sued Drennen and county officials, alleging Fourth Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims against Drennen and Monell claims against the officials. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on every claim except Sherman’s Eighth Amendment claim against Drennen, finding that Drennen was not entitled to qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Sherman satisfied the subjective component of her Eighth Amendment claim; a jury could conclude that Drennen acted with deliberate indifference or acted maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing her harm. When Drennen allegedly sexually abused Sherman, it was clearly established that such abuse could violate the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment. View "Rafferty v. Trumbull Cty" on Justia Law

Maye became a member of the Nation of Islam—one of several Islamic sects— in 1992. Maye has been a devout, active Muslim for 20 years, including the years he spent incarcerated in Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) facilities. Eid al-Fitr is one of two annual religious feasts central to Islam. MDOC officials twice prevented Maye from participating in Eid. In 2013, Chaplain Serafin told Maye he could only attend Eid if he changed his religion from Nation of Islam to Al-Islam; Maye testified that Chaplain Taylor denied his request to participate in Eid in 2014 without offering any justification. Maye filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied Serafin and Taylor qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court noted that, since 2006, MDOC has been embroiled in litigation regarding its policy of refusing to allow Muslim inmates to participate in Eid and that in July 2013, MDOC amended its Policy Directive to recognize Eid as a protected religious holy day. Maye sufficiently alleges the deprivation of his constitutional rights and a reasonable official would have known that the constitutional rights at issue were clearly established when faced with a court order specifically instructing MDOC officials to allow Muslim inmates to participate in Eid. View "Maye v. Klee" on Justia Law

In 2002, Thomas and Gregory arranged to buy cocaine from Burdette at a Lexington Waffle House. They got into Burdette’s car, with Thomas in the back seat. Thomas grabbed Burdette from behind, held a gun to his head, and demanded the cocaine. When Burdette refused, Thomas shot him in the leg. Burdette then said the cocaine was across the street with his partner. Thomas shot Burdette three more times. Thomas and Gregory fled. Burdette died. Thomas was convicted of murder and sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed. Kentucky courts denied post-conviction relief. Thomas sought habeas corpus relief, claiming that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the jury instructions. The district court found the petition untimely. The Sixth Circuit reversed. On remand, the district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Kentucky definition of murder violated due process because it prescribes two mental states—intent to kill and extreme indifference to human life—as alternative means for the mens rea element. The fact that the jury needed to find was that Thomas either intended to kill his victim or possessed extreme indifference as to whether he killed him; the jury made that finding, View "Thomas v. Meko" on Justia Law

Officers searched for a fugitive in a house in which Jacobs rented a basement apartment. The house belonged to the fugitive’s brother. They did not find the fugitive. Following the search, plaintiff returned home from work and entered his basement apartment through a backdoor without noticing the officers. He claims that his living area had been ransacked. He ran up the backstairs shouting. According to the officers, Jacobs pointed a gun and shot at them. The officers returned fire and arrested him. Jacob admits he had a holstered pistol but denies that he touched it at all. Contemporaneous with turning to flee and reaching for his holster, Jacobs fell down the steps and was shot in the stomach, shoulder, and leg. Forensic evidence later confirmed that Jacobs did not fire his gun; witness accounts conflicted on whether he pointed the gun at an officer. .After a jury acquitted Jacobs of state criminal charges, he filed “Bivens” action against the officers, alleging excessive force, false arrest, malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence, and civil conspiracy. The district court denied defendants qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, finding plaintiff’s “garden-variety Bivens” claims viable in light of the Supreme Court’s holdings in “Ziglar” and “Hernandez” as “run-of-the-mill challenges” to “standard law enforcement operations.” The court dismissed some of the specific challenges for lack of jurisdiction in an interlocutory appeal. View "Jacobs v. Alam" on Justia Law

In 2010, Ewing was tried as the shooter in a gang-related shooting. Ewing claimed that he was attending a funeral when the shooting happened and that the shooter was Washington. Ewing put on alibi witnesses and a jailhouse informant who testified that Washington had bragged about the shooting. On the second day of deliberations, the jury asked the court to declare that it was deadlocked. The court refused. On the fourth day of deliberations the jury returned a verdict against Ewing on all counts, including first-degree murder. About two months later, Juror Byrnes filed an affidavit stating that two fellow jurors had brought up information that was not part of the trial evidence, coming from Facebook postings and “googling” information about gangs. Ewing sought a new trial, alternatively requesting an evidentiary hearing to further develop the facts surrounding the allegedly tainted jury deliberations. The state did not object to an evidentiary hearing. The court denied the motion outright, finding that the internet information was duplicative of what the jury had learned from the trial evidence. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Ewing sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court held that the state court’s determination was contrary to clearly established law and that “the internet information may have tainted the jury,” and ordered a new trial. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The appropriate remedy was a hearing to consider whether a new trial is warranted. View "Ewing v. Horton" on Justia Law